OUSTER OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401860001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1991
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO
WRERORTS
4:
Nightline WJLA-TV
August 23, 1991 11:30 P.M. Washington, D.C.
Ouster of Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
ALEXANDER BESSMERTNYKH [on telephone to Secretary of
State Baker]: Hello, Jim? Good morning. Is it early morning
there? I'm sorry. I hope I haven't waken you tip.
TED KOPPEL: Alexander Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Foreign
Minister, having just awakened James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of
State. Bessmertnykh's news today? He had just been fired.
BESSMERTNYKH: Actually, you're the first one to know.
I brought about it. And Ted Koppel is somewhere around and he
was the first man whom I talked about the situation.
KOPPEL: And what a story he tells: that he was ordered
early this week by the men who overthrew Gorbachev to send a
communication to Washington.
FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH: It was terrible,
terrible document. It was the start -- if it was sent or
published, it would be the start of a new Cold War.
KOPPEL: Only a few weeks ago, Bessmertnykh and Baker
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were still crafting a new world order with Presidents Gorbachev
and Bush at the Moscow summit. On Wednesday night, as Gorbachev
flew back into Moscow after the coup had collapsed, Bessmertnykh
was among those welcoming him back. Tonight he's out of a job,
suspected of collaborating with those who tried to seize power at
the beginning of the week.
KOPPEL: We have a bizarre story to tell you tonight.
And I'll be bringing it to you in a somewhat unconventional
fashion. Hos this story unfolded is almost as ingriguing as the
event itself. Because of the time difference between Moscow and
New York, we work through the nights here, putting Nightline on
live early in the morning. I'd just gotten to bed after last
night's broadcast. About an hour later I got a call that Soviet
Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh would talk to me if I
could come to his office immediately. We expected an interesting
story but nothing terribly dramatic. Reassurance, perhaps, that
U.S.-Soviet relations were still on track. But Bessmertnykh
wanted to talk privately with me before we began the interview.
He led me into his office, showed me pictures of his wife and
weven-month-old son. And then out of the blue he said that
Gorbachev had called him a couple of hours earlier and asked for
his resignation. He had just briefed his deputies. Now he
wanted to get his own version of the story on the record.
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Tonight we'll bring you highlights of the videotape we
recorced in Bessmertnykh's office.
Mr. Foreign Minister, is it still appropriate, in fact,
to call you Mr. Foreign Minister?
BESSMERTNYKH: Well, maybe not so. I have just had a
telephone conversation with my president, and he informed me that
he believes I was quite passive during the three last days of the
emergency situation. So we discussed my position and I have
resigned.
And because this is not true at all and I was not given
any information on which the conclusion is based, unfortunately
it's not the best way to do it, but I would like to tell the
story as it was, because you are the first person whom I meet
after that telephone conversation, besides my deputies and my
chiefs of the departments, whom I have immediately informed about
that telephone conversation with the president. And since I
agreed to meet you today and we saw each other last night at the
presidential press conference, I thought that I would be talking
on something else in this conference with you. But life is
bringing us a lot of unexpected surprises.
KOPPEL: Full of surprises.
BESSMERTNYKH: So that's the story.
KOPPEL: I want to get into all the details of this.
But first, since you just came out of a meeting with your
deputies and the members of your staff, give me your own personal
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feelings. For a man who has risen to such a distinguished post,
this must be a very difficult moment for you.
BESSMERTNYKH: It is a difficult moment. But as I have
said, I was seasoned in difficult situations. A diplomat's life
is not an easy one. I'm a professional diplomat. I've spent
dozens of years in this profession. And I have always served the
country and the people, and I always believed that the peres-
troika policy, the policy of new thinking, is my policy, because
I was always part of the team that worked it out.
Just the situation of today, which brings so much
confusion, a lot of emotions, misjudgments, probably is the
reason for the decision which has been taken by the president.
But I understand him. He's in shock. He is now advised by
someone around him and he's suspicious. His best friends, Yazov
and Kryuchkov, have betrayed him. So I understand the man.
I just want the world to know and my colleagues in the
world to know I am the man I always was. And as for the
particulars of these tragic three days, I will be prepared to
discuss them with you, so that you should know what terrible life
we've been through when you were here.
KOPPEL: Remember now, Bessmertnykh was fired today
because he was accused of being too passive during the coup. He
has publicly insisted, in fact, that he was home, too ill to
work. He still insists he was sick, but he also claims that he
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fought what amounts to a rearguard action to protect U.S.-Soviet
relations.
BESSMERTNYKH: My assistant brought a paper we received
from the committee, which was called something like the Emergency
Committee Statement on President Bush's Declarations. It was
terrible, terrible document. It was the start -- if it was sent
or published, it would be the start of a new Cold War.
KOPPEL: Why? What did it say?
BESSMERTNYKH: Oh, it was an angry paper saying that
President Bush is interfering and that he's dictating us and he's
not -- he never understood us and he'll never understand us. And
we don't need this kind of relationship, and the previous
relations were not so good because the Soviet part too much
submitted itself to American pressure, but no more. Just stop
it. That kind of stuff.
And I knew that I was doing a dangerous thing, but I
have written on that paper, "Completely unacceptable."
KOPPEL: It was during a brief break that I asked
Bessmertnykh whether he'd called Secretary of State Baker yet.
Bessmertnykh instructed an aide to place the call to Washington.
When we come back, we'll show you how the U.S. Secretary
of State learned that the Soviet Foreign Minister had been fired.
KOPPEL: We've certainly grown accustomed over the last
few years to witnessing unprecedented scenes involving once-
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unapproachable Soviet officials. But think about it for a
moment. Here this afternoon was the Soviet Foreign Minister
revealing to the world that he had just been fired by calling in
an American reporter, and then inviting that reporter to bear
witness, with a camera crew, as he informed the U.S. Secretary of
State.
BESSMERTNYKH [on telephone]: Hello, Jim? Good morning.
Is it early morning there? I'm sorry. I hope I haven't waken
you up.
Jim, it's a very important piece of information for me,
but I think it will be also for you. I have just resigned, and I
wanted you to be the first among the foreign ministers to know
about it.
Yeah. I just want you to know, since we don't have
probably much time to discuss it, but I would like you to know
that there have been, I am, and I will be always the man of
perestroika and new-thinking policy. And I have been protecting
and pursuing it all the time. And it is just because of this
commotion and confusion in our capital in the afterwards of the
coup d'etat that things happen that in my view should not have
happened.
But anyway, I was blamed for being passive during the
last few days, although out of those three days two days I was
sick. But anyway, that was the case against me. And it is
impossible in this situation to continue the duty. And the
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president -- I had a talk with the president, and the president
shall probably be declaring this somewhat later.
Actually, you are the first one to know. I brought
about it. And Ted Koppel is somewhere around, and he was the
first man whom I talked about the situation, since I have
promised him yesterday to meet today.
Jim, we shall be maintaining the friendship and con-
tacts. And I'll be trying to be active in foreign policy and to
help to continue the cooperation with the United States and with
this administration and with you personally.
KOPPEL: Even without hearing Secretary Baker's side of
the conversation, you could sense that there wasn't a great deal
to be said on the Washington end of the line. Bessmertnykh and
Baker may still be friends, but the power relationship is gone.
BESSMERTNYKH [on telephone]: Yeah. Please do that.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Jim. And my best regards to
Susan. Thank you. Thank you. Bye-bye.
KOPPEL: What did Baker say? Please. Maybe if you
would just stay there for a moment.
BESSMERTNYKH: Well, he thanked me very much for calling
and informing him about that. He regrets very much that that has
happened. And he values what we have been doing together in
foreign policy. And he has always been thinking about me as a
man of perestroika and new thinking. And that's true. And he
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asked me to be in touch, and he said that he will report to the
President.
I said, "Please do that."
And, of course, he sent his best regards from Susan to
me and to Marina. And sent the same to him.
And, yes, and he also mentioned about this what's going
to happen to me. And I said I think I shall be helping -- you
heard that -- I shall be helping the man the best I can to pursue
the policy. And I think that what we have been doing was very
good.
So that's the thrust of what we have just...
KOPPEL: Were you, throughout the three days, were you
in touch with Baker?
BESSMERTNYKH: Yes. I talked -- we talked only once
because -- I think that was Wednesday or Tuesday. That was
Wednesday afternoon.
KOPPEL: When we come back, Bessmertnykh the loyal
foreign minister, or Bessmertnykh the collaborator?
KOPPEL: Following his talk with Secretary Baker,
Alexander Bessmertnykh and I resumed our conversation. For most
of his professional life, he has been a career diplomat in the
Soviet Foreign Service. Bessmertnykh has always been a highly
regarded professional, here and abroad. But now there is a dark
cloud over his career. Did he during the critical hours of the
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coup early this week betray his President? The just-fired
foreign minister was eager to give his version of events.
Let's go back to Sunday. Sunday, as you know, they sent
the delegation down to the Crimea to meet with President Gorba-
chev and placed him under house arrest. Did you know?
BESSMERTNYKH: I knew nothing about that. I learned
about it only from the president's press conference yesterday.
But I knew something else about Sunday. I was
vacationing in *Byelorussia, on one of the lakes in Byelorussia,
and then I received a call to come to Moscow for an emergency
discussion. I didn't know what the subject that it was. It
sounded so serious that I thought, "Well, some terrible crisis is
emerging somewhere," or maybe a great case of espionage, or
anything, if the matter is so delicate that the foreign minister
should be brought from his vacation to the capital.
So I was brought to Moscow. That was almost midnight.
I was in my jeans and casual dress. I just wanted to go to my
home to change, but my assistant, who met me at the airport said,
"You are asked to come directly to the Kremlin."
KOPPEL: This was Sunday.
BESSMERTNYKH: That was Sunday night. It was midnight
already.
And when I came to the Kremlin, I still didn't suspect
what is going to happen, what is going to be there and what's
going to happen.
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I was directed to a large room, and there was a long
table and a lot of people sitting there, generals and military
and Kryuchkov, Pavlov, some others.
So I sat next to the last one and I was waiting for the
explanation, what was the subject that they are going to discuss
with me. So Kryuchkov said, "I would like to have a talk with
you," and he brought me to the next room. And he said, "Listen.
The situation...
KOPPEL: Let me just explain to our audience Mr.
Kryuchkov is the former Chairman of the KGB.
BESSMERTNYKH: And he said, "Listen. The situation in
the country is terrible. The chaotic situation emerges. The
crisis is dangerous. People are disappointed. Something should
be done, and we decided to do something through emergency
measures and we have established a committee, emergency
committee. And we would like you to be part of it."
I said, "Is that committee arranged by the instructions
of the president?"
He said, "No. He's incapable of functioning now. He's
laying flat in dacha."
I said, "How about the medical report about his state?"
He said, "We don't have it now."
And I said, "Mr. Kryuchkov, I'm not going to be part of
that committee, and I categorically reject any participation in
that."
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So as we walked out of the room, Kryuchkov said,
"Bessmertnykh refused."
And someone said, "Well, we needed a liberal on the
committee." You know, just for -- I understand they wanted to
have a kind of balanced membership.
So I told them even there, "What you are doing will
bring a terrible blow to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy
situation. It's going to be isolated. There will be sanctions.
There will be embargoes. There'll be no grain. There'll be no
food. And that will be the situation."
They said, "Well, they don't help us anyway."
The people were not listening, I think. Everything was
decided already by the time I came.
KOPPEL: Whatever Bessmertnykh did or did not do behind
the scenes, he neither resigned nor did he publicly criticize his
colleagues who had seized power. I began to press him about some
of the inconsistencies in his version of events.
But you weren't under any illusions that the story about
Gorbachev's illness was true.
BESSMERTNYKH: I was maybe for a day or a day and a
half, I was expecting a document. Because I told them, "Where is
the document?"
They said, "Don't you believe this? It is coming. Yes,
it is coming, because he's really seriously ill."
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And I have been waiting till Tuesday, and on Tuesday it
was clear that it's not coming.
KOPPEL: Did it not occur to you to get in touch with
Gorbachev directly?
BESSMERTNYKH: Yes. We tried on Monday. We tried to
get in touch with Gorbachev. Then we found that it's impossible.
KOPPEL: Mr. Bessmertnykh, you knew -- hell, the whole
world knew -- that Gorbachev had been overthrown. And yet you
elected to stay here.
BESSMERTNYKH: You know, it's one of those things, the
loyalty to your business, which is the foreign policy. If we
resigned, as they have suggested to all of us, let us resign,
who will take over the foreign policy apparatus, foreign
ministry? Emergency committee? KGB? The military generals?
And we decided, just a small group of us, to do every-
thing to protect the foreign policy, whatever happens, because
this a time of hardship and testing. We've got to protect what
we are assigned to do. If you're assigned to protect something
precious, you've got to do it. Not to run away just because it's
politically advisable.
KOPPEL: When you spoke to Gorbachev a couple of hours
ago, did you try to explain that to him?
BESSMERTNYKH: I tried to explain to him yesterday. I
met him yesterday. And I didn't go public on this matter before
I talked with the president.
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This is my professional part. You know, people might
say, "Why didn't you go public and make interviews?" I just
can't do it without first talking with the president. So I
explained to the president what I have just told you. And he
listened carefully and I thought he understood it, and he was all
right. And now I shouldn't go on working and go on giving
instructions to the ambassadors.
KOPPEL: Bessmertnykh's account is clearly self-serving,
but it may also be true. What is indisputably true is that
Moscow these days is a place of political infighting, finger-
pointing, and even a certain degree of witch-hunting.
Alexander Bessmertnykh discusses the increasingly nasty
political climate here when we come back.
KOPPEL: What's happening in Moscow right now is both
exhilaration and dangerous. The landscape is becoming littered
with broken symbols of the past and scenes of radical change.
I asked Mr. Bessmertnykh about something that happened
in Moscow this morning that would have been beyond imagination
even a few weeks ago.
Today here in Moscow there was a story this morning that
crowds -- I don't know how large -- storm is too strong a word,
but they tried to break into the KGB offices this morning. You
heard about that?
BESSMERTNYKH: Yes, I've heard it.
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KOPPEL: It almost sounds like the kind of thing that
was going on in Bucharest, in East Germany with the Stasi. Is
there that kind of a sense in the Soviet Union today, that the
people now just want to tear down the past, get rid of it? Are
you afraid that the Soviet Union may be swinging too far to the
left now?
BESSMERTNYKH: No. I think that that is the natural
reaction by people against the coup d'etat and against that
junta, which was actually arranged with the KGB. And they have
emotionally reacted to that. There were a lot of sentiments
against the KGB before, of course, because of the previous
practices, etcetera. And this emergency situation has actually
climaxed that reaction. So I can explain only by that. The
people are so angry, they're so desperate.
There is one guarantee that does exist for not having a
repetition of these kinds of things now. And now I'm not only
hopeful but I'm confident now. Things are not going to happen
this way anymore in the Soviet Union because the democratic
thinking, the democracy itself, the changed mentality of the
public has produced such deep roots that it can't just be
[unintelligible]. People are different. They may be not on the
left, but they're different. They understand that they can live
only in a lawful and legalistic society, a society based on good
laws and constitution, and they can live only with the system
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that protects those laws. Because otherwise they will come again
to any kind of situation.
KOPPEL: Are you afraid of a sort of Soviet-style
McCarthy era, that now perhaps people are going to be going
around doing loyalty checks: Was he against the revolutionary
group? Was he against the junta? Did he declare himself soon
enough? That can be very damaging to a country.
BESSMERTNYKH: Yes. I think we shall have maybe a
little bit of that leftist McCarthyism because of the enthusiasm
of the people who -- you know, the people who were on the
barricades. And now they ask everyone: Where you were for those
-- during those three days? Were you on the barricades? And if
you were not on the barricades, ah-ha, there's something suspi-
cious. Who are you?
So there will probably be a witch hunt for a while, but
then it will come down, because people will realize you can't
divide the country. Now is the time for the consent, for the
consensus and consent. We've got to unite all the democratic
forces. And the democratic forces are not only those who had the
chance and, let's say, the happiness to be on the barricades.
The democratic forces are everywhere, and they should not be
suspected because they worked quiet in their newspaper offices,
they worked in the factories, they worked in the foreign
ministry. By the way, several foreign ministry people were on
the barricades.
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So, you've got to think about the unity. Now we see a
tremendous attempt to clean the scene and to remove the people
and to install new ones.
I'm not against changing the guards. I'm only for
changing the guards with the better ones. So many mistakes will
be made. Many new people will be coming, maybe not all of them
good. But this is the initial part of any revolution. This is
really another revolution now. We have destroyed the plot. We
have come to the freedom of a new life. So that may happen.
KOPPEL: When I come back, I'll have a brief interview
that I conducted today with Mikhail Gorbachev, and we'll hear
Alexander Bessmertnykh's thoughts on his former boss and how
isolated he is becoming.
KOPPEL: Over these last few months, several of Mikhail
Gorbachev's closest advisers, reformers and hardliners, have
either left on their own or were trampled by this week's events.
Alexander Bessmertnykh worries that Gorbachev is becoming
increasingly isolated.
Let me try a theory out on you. Some of Boris Yeltsin's
people the other night were saying to me when we were over at the
Federation Building before it was completely over. They said
when this thing is over, we are going to want a coalition
government. And indeed, one of his top aides said to me -- I
said how would that work. He said, well, if, for example,
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Gorbachev picks the head of the KGB, we'll pick the head of the
Defense Ministry, and one and then the other.
Do you have a feeling that perhaps Yeltsin's people are
behind the request for your resignation so that they can sort of
clear the deck and decide who's going to be the new Foreign
Minister?
BESSMERTNYKH: I just don't know. I don't know who is
behind it. But there was a campaign, as I said, in today's
newspapers, and there was some yesterday. There was an arranged
and definitely orchestrated campaign against the Foreign
Ministry. It was always the most choicest place in the
government. So probably the people would like to take over it.
But who's going to be, whether it's going to be Gorbachev's men
or Russian Federation men, we shall see.
To me it's not important. To me the most important
thing is the professionalism, dedication to the work, honesty,
the ability to believe in the policy you follow, and that no
matter who's going to take that office you have been just in,
they should continue the policy of new thinking. Because this is
really the only policy which is good for the Soviet people and
for the national interest of the U.S.S.R. This is my complete
belief.
KOPPEL: You're too much of a professional to express
anger. But are you hurt that President Gorbachev has asked for
your resignation?
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BESSMERTNYKH: Well, I
m disappointed. Of course, for
me, it's not an easy situation. But Mr. Gorbachev -- actually,
he has lost one of his loyal supporters.
KOPPEL: He's lost a lot of those loyal supporters. I
mean he's lost Yakovlev. He's lost Shevardnadze. He's lost
Bessmertnykh. And then on the other side, he's lost Kryuchkov;
he's lost Yasov. Who's left?
BESSMERTNYKH: I don't know. I'm very much --
yesterday, Yakovlev said a very interesting thing. He said much
will depend who will surround Gorbachev now. It may be, again, a
group of yes men, subservient people who would create a bunch of
-- I don't know how to say it in English -- a bunch of some
nincompoops around him.
So much will depend on that, who is going to be around
Gorbachev now, because some of his best friends betrayed him, and
some of his best friends are being removed. So I don't know. We
shall see. I hope he'll now pay much more attention to that, to
the people who are around him, and he should not be rushed in
personnel affairs. I know how it is done in the United States,
and unfortunately it's not that way here. It may be done on the
spur of the moment.
But any way, I wish good luck to President Gorbachev. I
shall be supporting him all the way, in any capacity I am,
because he's the man who embodies the best of our perestroika and
the best of our hopes. He's the best man on the political scene.
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He's the man who created this policy, and he needs that support.
And I shall be doing that for him in any capacity I'm in, very,
very honestly and with all my heart.
KOPPEL: Mr. Bessmertnykh, I thank you. It's been an
extraordinary time to be here with you, and you're very, very
gracious to have spent so much time with me.
13ESSMERTNYKH: Thank you.
KOPPEL: There are some who believe that this week is
already bearing witness to the beginnings of a second coup
against Gorbachev, that Boris Yeltsin and his supporters in the
Russian Republic forced Gorbachev to call on all his ministers to
resign today so that they can be replaced with Yeltsin loyalists.
For the moment, though, Gorbachev still insists that his program
is on track.
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV [Translated]: We just sat down and
talked about urgent measures to be taken. We talked for several
hours about economic measures that need to be taken immediately,
measures of a social character. And naturally I confirmed our
course not only concerning the reforms in this country, but also
in foreign policy. It's the democratic forces that are
functioning today.
KOPPEL: There are no longer any tanks rolling through
the streets of Moscow. The barricades are down. The crowds have
dispersed. But the struggle for power in this city and in this
country continue. I'll be back in a moment.
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KOPPEL: On Sunday, Secretary of State Baker will be
David Brinkley's guest on "This Week with David Brinkley."
That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in
Moscow. For all of us here at ABC News, good night.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000401860001-9