'I DON'T SEE US GETTING INTO INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401680004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 3, 1991
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401680004-6
Newsweek
Time
U.S. News & World Report
02
`I don't see us getting .
into industrial espionage'
R ichard Kerr began his career
with the Central Intelligence
Agency 31 years ago. A Soviet
specialist, he* is the agency's dep-
uty director, overseeing its analy-
sis and operations. Kerr spoke
with U.S. News Assistant Man-
aging Editor Brian Duffy.
N. will the Dltsebr of Central
lnbfllgsna mdkwt do CIA?
DCIs have had a major impact
on the reputation of the agen-
cy. Whether fairly or not. Bill
Casey left the agency in real
trouble. Congress distrusted it
and there was a real perception
that the organization lacked in-
tegrity. Bill Webster rebuilt
that confidence because of the
force of his own personal integ-
rity. My perception is that Bob
Gates will be seen as coming
to the agency at a time when
the world and the role of in-
telligence is in flux. And he
will end up being a spokesman
for a community that is per-
countries are using in an either illegal
way or in an unfair way practices that
disadvantage us. Where you're talking
about governments and industry
working together to disadvantage an-
other government or another industry
in a competitive arrangement,
we will continue to work that. I
don't see us getting into what
we'd call industrial espionage.
We aren't going to go out and
steal secrets of companies.
Now Mal la hint.. hdaUl aae?-%o
It will be important for the
new DCI. It's been important fns,
the last one. You just don't gEp~
out and suddenly change your
capability to collect human inte
ligence, nor do you necessarily
want to do that. First of all, it's ao
very expensive way-and a dati--J
gerous way-to collect inform.'
tion. What you really are aftd?v
are pieces of information that
you can get no other way.
what are the big sst ^ystaries
ad there?
Well, there are some long-term
problems like the Soviet Union's
domestic stability. I think there
are, unfortunately, some other
areas that are more dramatic
that will shock the system more
Depsty dlrsetse. Like Gates, Kerr was an analyst.
ceived as having a new agenda-but
no less a demanding one.
le Us. rblillgsua abls Is hasp ep
with each a rapid ebasgb g wary!
The problems of intelligence are more
demanding of detailed information
and more demanding of analysis in-
volving that information. Terrorism is
a good example. You work terrorism
at a very fine grain of analysis that is
nearly an investigative level, the way
you might think of the FBI involved in
an investigative problem. This puts
different de:.,ands on our analysts. It
requires a different kind of product
because you are less interested in
writing a research paper about it than
you are in doing something about it.
And that puts you then back into us-
ing information, whether it's with law
enforcement officials or foreign gov-
ernments, and to try to do something
about what you've uncovered.
What Mist eesnswic wbftssse?
We have done a fair amount in terms
of competitiveness issues, where
directly, rather than being evolution-
ary. Take North Korea, where signifi-
cant U.S. forces are involved, where
there is a leadership that is isolated
but also a leader that is at or close to
the end of his career, just in terms of
longevity and age, and a very large mil-
itary capability facing not only United
States forces but also South Korean
forces. The more long-term issues of
terrorism, narcotics, the issue of eco-
nomic competitiveness-those are is-
sues that we work but without the
same drama involved in them.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401680004-6
Date