GERALD SEIB INTERVIEW WITH ADCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401680002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 4, 1991
• Content Type: MEMO

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ADMINISTRATIV INTERNAL USE ONLY
STAT
4 October 1991
STAT
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
Chief, Soviet/East European Division/DO
FROM: Joseph R. DeTrani
Director of Public Affairs
SUBJECT: Gerald Seib Interview with ADCI
1. On 3 October the ADCI had an on-the-record session
with Gerald Seib of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Attached is an
article based on that interview and PAO's rough-cut
transcription of a portion of that interview.
2. Seib just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union
with Secretary of State Baker, where he participated in some
of the meetings with KGB Chief Batakin. He was present when
Batakin said that the KGB was interested in working closely
with the CIA on a number of transnational issues. Seib asked
Dick for his views on cooperating with the KGB. The ADCI
said that the CIA would be willing to talk and discuss those
areas of common interest, i.e., narcotics, terrorism, and
proliferation. The ADCI emphasized, however, that we would
be reluctant to engage the KGB in any other areas of discus-
sion, and we do not view them as equals. The ADCI stressed
the fact that in moral and business terms the KGB is not the
equal of the CIA. Therefore, the CIA is willing to look at
this new KGB and see what they do to prove that, indeed, it
is a new KGB.
3. Finally, Seib asked if the CIA would be willing to
help the KGB draft codes to make them a legal, responsive
organization. The ADCI said that the CIA is a very legal,
responsive organization that operates within the rule of
law. We would work with them on a selective basis trying to
assist the KGB in those areas to make them a more legal,
r e s p o n s i v e _
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1 - P es
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Distribution:
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CIA's Acting Chief Says U.S. Is Ready
To Cooperate Witht,Soviet Spy Ag
By GsAW F. Ssie $* The CIA's
wMagam to begin sf Reporter al T*m w ALL srussr roumA,, with the Soviet intellipm wosoing:
WASIIINGTON-The acting head of the. areas represents a ftrp ~e In sorne,
arty
Central Intelligence Agency said the U.S. tude here as well. "I've beeParticularly
is ready to open an era of cooperation with reluctant-and I think the as a
the revamped Soviet intelligence. service. whole has been reluctant, to dagency e at east
Richard Kerr, who is running the intelll- to engage the KGB in a direct and in an
Bence community while the Senate debates equal-to-equal discussion," Mr. Kerr said.
the nomination of Robert Gates as director "Quite simply, we didn't want to bring
of central intelligence, said the CIA is them up to our level."
"quite willing to talk and discuss with the But now, Mr. Kerr said, "we have a
KGB those areas where we have a com- new KGB. And I think we have to be will-
mon interest, whether they are terrorism ing to look at this KGB with new eyes, just
or narcotics or issues of [weapons I prolifer- as we're looking at the Soviet Union."
ation." In recent years, there has been some
Mr. Kerr, in an interview, was respond- tentative U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such
ing to a Soviet government suggestion this matters as battling narcotics and ter-
week that the two intelligence services, rorism. But contacts have been conducted
Cold War foes for four decades, begin largely through the State Department, and
working together in some areas. The idea haven't directly involved intelligence agen-
was offered by Yevgeny Primakov, who cies.
has just been named head of the indepen- Now, Mr. Kerr said, "we will clearly
dent intelligence agency the Kremlin is begin something that's more direct than it
creating to take over intelligence functions has been."
long handled by the KGB. The move toward more cooperation be-
Creation of the service apparently will gan last month, when Secretary, of State
change the Soviet system radically by sep- James Baker met witlf KGB Chairman Va-
arating intelligence activities from internal dim Bakatin during a visit to Moscow. Mr.
security work. Bakatin had taken
over the spy agency
and begun cleaning out its ranks after the
failed" August coup by Communist hard-
liners, which was led in part by the
KGB.
It isn't clear what relationship Mr. Ba-
katin and the traditional KGB bureauracy
will have with Mr. Primakov and the new
SOvlet intelligence service..
But U.S. officials said Mr. Bakatin bWi-
ciite4 ip hie meetings with Mr. Baker that
Op IMB would like to get QA help in
4 *wfrq_Yp legal guidelines govern the
at an intelligence service in a
d society.
Mr. the CIA would "cer-
tatdy" , be waling to provide help In that
area. "We have had more experience and
are more directly involved In the issues of
legality, and with issues of oversight and
the role of an intelligence organization in
democracy," he said.
But it's also clear there will be lim-
its on CIA cooperation with the Soviet Un-
ion. Mr. Kerr said he isn't prepared to de-
clare an end to the intelligence rivalry be-
tween the CIA and the KGB. "I don't be-
lieve we've reached that point," he said.
The U.S. still will have to "wait and see
where they are willing to cooperate" and
whether the KGB is dropping some of its
more unsavory activities, he added.
Tho Weshmgton Post
The New York Tlmy
The W&MIngton TIM"
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Scisno, Monitor
New York OINY News
USA Today
The QWcip Trlbuna
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INTERVIEW OF THE ADCI
BY
GERALD SEIB
OF THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL
3 OCTOBER 1991
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Q: I mostly wanted to talk about a piece that I am trying to do with
our Moscow guy, looking at the CIA and the KGB and how they both
address the ((word indistinct)). And now that history is over,
they have to address a different world. And I want to talk about
some philosophical things in that regard. But first I might ask
you about your reaction to Primakov yesterday, which was a fairly
interesting performance in which he tried to describe the way the
Soviet Union, or what remains of the Soviet Union, tries to reorder
its intelligence business and particularly the notion that he threw
out, which you hear from others in Moscow that they see areas of
cooperation like having to work with the CIA. Is that something
that appeals to you? Do you have interest in that?
ADCI: Well certainly we have an interest in it, and I think we are quite
willing to talk and discuss with the KGB those areas where we have
a common interest and there are quite a few, whether they are
issues of terrorism, narcotics, or issues of proliferation. Those
are important issues and ones we would be willing to discuss with
them. We have been reluctant, and I have been particularly
reluctant, and I think the Agency as a whole has been reluctant to
engage to date of these two, engage with the KGB in a direct, kind
of a equal-to-equal discussion. And quite simply, we didn't want
to bring them up to our level. I mean that in a very -- that's
precisely what I mean. I didn't want to have this organization
equated in moral or in business terms if you will to the KGB. But
that doesn't preclude our engaging them, and we have a new KGB, and
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I think we have to be willing to look at this KGB with new eyes,
just as we are looking at the Soviet Union with new eyes. So I
think there is no reason why we cannot engage, as we have engaged
other intelligence services of countries that may not have the
exact views or we may not agree, why we can't have some discussion
on issues of common interest.
Q: There was sort of an i-~ ~ undercurrent in what Primakov said
that the rivalry between the CIA and the KGB was over. Has it
gotten to that point in your eyes?
ADCI: I don't believe we've reached that. I think it's far too early and
premature to make that ((word indistinct)) rivalry, and besides we
are not rivals in that sense. Our interests are V,4 fit 0- _
*"--- it seems
to me that our interests are so different. We have not engaged
historically in the kinds of activities they have engaged in,
whether it's fundamental disinformation or the more extreme
operations that they have been involved in. And so I think the
idea of saying this is all over, I think we have to wait and see
where they are willing to cooperate, and more explicitly, precisely
what they are willing to do in this area.
Q: Is there any of that starting yet? Has there been any?
ADCI: It has been. It is not totally new, and it is one of those things
that has been ongoing from Baker's meeting and Strauss' meeting.
Obviously, we are going to pick up on that -- have already picked
up in terms of our own particular interests. We have had contacts
more indirectly through State Department who have had discussions
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with the Soviets on terrorism and narcotics. So these are areas
where we have been -- while we haven't been up front, we have
certainly been involved.
Q: But through the StIte Department more than directly?
ADCI: Certainly to date. Now we are starting a more directly -- you know
we will clearly begin something more direct than it has been
following the Baker meeting.
Q: You know one of the things -- as you know I was with Secretary
Baker when he was in Moscow, and one of the things that his people
said after their meeting with the KGB was that they particuarly
interested in getting some CIA technical assistance on legal
questions and organizational questions; less of a world
organization and more of a legal organization. Is that the sort of
thing you expect will happen?
ADCI: Certainly. I mean we are ((word indistinct)), although in today's
contact, today's environment it's a little hard to ((words
indistinct)) to sound terribly credible. Let's face it, we have
more experience and are more directly involved with the issues and
legalities and with issues of oversight and with the role of an
intelligence organization in a democracy. And we have had
experience with that. We know a great deal about it. It's hard, I
know, for people, to put this in context, but we have a very
ethOical organization and an organization which pays an
extraordinary amount of attention and time to issues of legality,
but also issues of contacts in a democracy. What is acceptable, not
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just legal, but what makes sense. And we, obviously, have
extraordinary experience with oversight, and we have been through
oversights, and while we are not -- I can't say that I am enthused
at all times about all aspects of oversight because I am not
because it tends to be at times micromanagement rather than the
larger, in my judgment, the larger issues that oversight should
address, which really are the legalities and contacts and
effectiveness of an intelligence organization. Is it doing its
job, and is it doing in a way that is consistent with the law, and
is it doing it reasonably efficiently, and I think that those are
the things Congress has a very legitimate reason to be involved
in. Those things we know a lot about, and I think we can help and
we have, and we will continue to try to help people understand,
give them advice, not directive, but advice based on people who
have had experience with it. So we will continue to do that. I
think that is not a bad role. It's rather interesting for CIA to
be giving advice to others on oversight, but we have done that and
will continue to do it.
Q: I am just wondering what your impression is overall about the way
the Soviets seem to be attempting to reorganize or remake the KGB.
Does it make sense to you what they are doing?
ADCI: I don't I know enough about it yet or I am not sure we know
collectively about it to know whether that makes sense. It sounds
as though what they are going to try and do though is break off the
foreign intelligence element, which is essentially CIA, if you will,
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and its activities. Those things are pointed outside the country
from the domestic element. My own view of that is that it is an
extraordinarily sound and good approach. I think that trying to
mix foreign and domestic intelligence, if you will, crosses that
line into police functions and into areas where an intelligence
organization is going to get itself into enormous trouble. So I
think splitting that in the Soviet Union is a very good idea. We
have a good line between the FBI and the CIA. It's one that is
well understood. We have little areas where we overlap or areas
where we cooperate and some areas where there is some uncertainty,
but those are very minor, and almost all of them are in the area of
counterintelligence. And that's quite understandable why there
would be problems there or issues there -- not necessarily
problems. But there is no question about our role ((word
indistinct)), and I think that is a neat division to have.
Q: And that is the overall division?
ADCI: Seem to be moving toward -- domestic. And then they also seem to
be -- and I don't enough about this, but it that maybe they are
also moving away from having forces associated with the KGB. They
seemed to have done that already, but I don't know to what degree
there will be a break, but again I think having -- and these are
real military border guards -- them associated with an intelligence
organization I think has great potential for abuse.
Q: Let's talk a little bit about how the KGB and CIA in a broader
sense are going to be operating in the 90's as you see it now.
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There are all sorts of ideas out there. Moynihan wants to move
intelligence to the State Department or one day he'll say that and
one day he'll say something else, and Vince Cannistraro wants to
eliminate the whole thing, and there are all sorts of possibilities
floating around. What do you think the CIA ought to look like in
the 1990's given what has happened over the last couple of years?
ADCI: Well let me start what I think it should look like and what it is
going to look like, which are probably two different things. My
own personal view, and I am not even sure there is an institutional
view or certainly not agreement in the Executive, or has been
formed on the Hill or hasn't been discussed as a focused item yet.
There are a lot of ideas out there about what should be done. I
think in an era of diminishing resources of a fundamental change in
defense and the rationale and the threat and therefore the defense
against the threat that intelligence has to be -- organizations are
going to smaller, as a Community, size will be reduced and I think
it needs to be consolidated to a greater to much greater degree
than it is now. That in some ways runs counter to another pressure
which is the experience of DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD which
says the military needs requires to the ends more and more
intelligence and more control of intelligence when its forces are
engaged or going to be engaged or about to be engaged. So we have
two rather significant trends. One is, in my judgment, is a very
broad requirement for the military to be able to provide
intelligence support against a much less specific enemy and a much
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less certain time frame with a lot more ambiguities surrounding the
circumstances of when and how forces will be employed, and
therefore, in many ways, a much more demanding requirement because
uncertainty means you plan for the worse st the very time when
again on the other side there is a clear pressure to diminish the
resources committed, particuarly those intelligence elements that
support the military because if you can't take down units and
regular Army, Navy, and Air Force units without taking down the
support around them, that wouldn't make any sense. So we have I
think two contradictory forces as you always in a situation like
this forces it out. But from my perspective, the nature of the
problems we are going to face argues for more centralization of
intelligence activities because the problems we face I find are
more complex, require a more complex array of collection, and then
a much more sophisticated analytic act, and then required you to
translate that into whether it's law enforcement or policy in a
much more operational way than we had to do on a systematic basis
before. And if I can give you an example of the kind of -- I think
we are going to be involved in more activities that look like our
counterterrorism activities where very fine details of information
need to be pieced together, knitted together to get understanding,
and it is really investigative intelligence which is not something
that we have historically done as the principal business, but
investigative reporting that's tied to our allies, tied to foreign
liaison organizations that we are going to liaison with, tied to
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other governments that involves diplomatic initiatives and
demarches, and also ties in law enforcement on both US and foreign
law enforcement in a way where you take the information and move
against a particular target.
Q: What targets are you thinking about?
ADCI: Narcotics, I would say terrorism, counternarcotics, proliferation
itself it kind of nearly the epitome of that particular problem
because it involves illegal acquisition of small pieces of
technology from a vast set of suppliers, and is a very complicated
process to follow. But I would say those three certainly:
terrorism, proliferation, and counternarcotics are three that would
certainly kind of epitomize that. I think we are going to find
other areas whether it's technology transfer, although I think
that's of a lesser kind of problem unless it relates to
proliferation or relates to weapons. But those are going to occupy
a lot of time and attention and require, and I go back to the first
point -- I think that organizations that have inherent in them all
aspects of the business whether it's collection analysis and
operations in an integrated way, otherwise I don't think you could
tie these things together ((word indistinct)).
T1
Q: Let me ask you about another area that is like the ones you have
been talking about, but is more intriguing to me in a lot of ways
and maybe more sensitive in some ways. Everybody assumes or
conventional wisdom that the 90's is an area where the local
competition is not going military, it's going to be economic and an
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