PRESIDENTIAL POSTS AND DASHED HOPES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580057-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: August 9, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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Presidential
Posts and
Dashed Hopes
Appointive Jobs
Were Turning Point
By Walter Pincus
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers
A month after he lost his 1970
Senate race, then-Rep. George
Bush accepted a job in the Nixon
White House "as assistant to the
president with a wide range of
unspecified general responsibil-
ities," according to a memo by
then-chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Hal-
deman on file in the Nixon ar-
chives.
"Bush told the president," Hal-
deman wrote, "that he would be
delighted to take on this assign-
ment, although he did still prefer
the opportunity of going to the
United Nations as U.S. ambassa-
dor. He . pointed out that
there was a dearth of Nixon ad-
vocacy in New York City and the
general New York area-that he
could fill that need in the New
York social circles he would be
moving in as ambassador." .
That meeting on Dec. 9, 1970
ended with an agreement that
Bush would take the White House
job "for now," the memo said.
Three hours later, President
Richard M. Nixon called Halde-
man to his office in the Executive
Office Building and told him "he
had been very strongly persuaded
by Bush's arguments" and to no-
tify Bush that he was giving him
the 'U.N. job. Two days later it
was announced at a White House
news conference.
Bush's U.N. appointment-and
his private suggestion that he
take on the unpublicized role as a
spokesman for Nixon-marked a
sharp turning point in his political
career. His loss to Lloyd Bentsen
in the 1970 Senate race had ta-
ken him out of Texas elective pol-
itics for the immediate future. A
The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
two-term congressman, he was
46, married with five children,
and wanted to remain in public
life. But if he was not to win elec-
tions, then his next steps up the
political ladder would depend on
his ability to ingratiate himself
with more successful politi-
cians-Nixon, Gerald R. Ford and
Ronald Reagan.
Many new details of Bush's
career over the next six years-
as U.N. ambassador, chairman of
the Republican National Commit-
tee (RNC), envoy.to China and
CIA director-can be found in the
Nixon archives and at the Ford
Library in Ann Arbor, Mich. Doc-
uments in those collections and
interviews with people who
played roles in Bush's life during
the Nixon-Ford years prol+ided
the information in this article. Bush de-
clined to be interviewed.
These were not easy years for Bush. He
was bumped from job to job, and the oppor-
tunity he sought most avidly-to be picked
vice presidential Ford to candidate d in 1976-eluded
him. The setbacks were painful, according
to Bush intimates, but he always sought to
play down his personal ambition and play
the good Republican trouper. Thoughout
these years Bush made new friends and al-
liances, and his experiences convinced him
he could begin his own run for the presiden-
cy in the late '70s.
But in the days after his defeat by Bent-
sen in November 1970, Bush was worrying.
about. what he would do next for a job.
Nixon, according to former aide John Ehr-
lichman, had always planned to give Bush an
administration post if he lost the Senate
election. On the night of Nov. 3, as the elec-
tion results came in and Bentsen's victory
became clear, Haldeman wrote down
"Bush" as the fifth name on a list of defeated
Senate candidates under the heading: "Need
posts for:"
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Two days later, at a 9 a.m. meeting with
Nixon, Ehrlichman discussed the election
results and subsequently sent a note to Hal-
deman saying "as of 9 a.m. today, the Pres-
ident is thinking about Bush for NASA... "
the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration.
In subsequent conversations involving
Nixon and his top aides, Bush's name came
up as a possibility for various jobs including
head of the Small Business Administration,
chairman of the Republican National Com-
mittee, White House congressional liaison
and undersecretary of commerce.
Back in Houston, however, Bush heard
none of this, according to his close friend
and political aide Jack Steel. He received no
personal word of condolence from Nixon
after his defeat. On a Saturday in late No-
vember after the election, Steel said he
helped Bush clear out his Houston congres-
sional office. "He said he didn't know what
he was going to do" oext, Steel recalled.
At the time Nixon had another Texan on
his mind-former Gov. John B. Connally.
Connally loomed large in Nixon's imagina-
tion as a key figure in his secret plan to
transform American politics by luring cen-
trist and conservative Democrats into the
Republican Party. By early December,
Nixon had decided that Connally should join
his administration as secretary of the
Treasury.
Nixon's enthusiasm for Connally rankled
with Bush, who saw him as a principal spon-
sor of Bentsen, the conservative Texas
Democrat who had spoiled Bush's dream of
following his father to the Senate. When
Nixon appointed Connally to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB) in November, Bush complained to
White House legislative liaison man William
Timmons that the White House was helping
a man who helped defeat Bush.
Connally agreed to join the Nixon admin-
istration, but he set one condition that
might have surprised Bush. Texas Repub-
licans would be furious, Connally warned
Nixon, if Nixon gave a big job to him-a
man who helped defeat Bush-when Bush
himself still had no job. According to a
source close to Connally, the former gov-
ernor told Nixon that a job had to be found
for Bush. The next week, Bush's appoint-
ment to the U.N. job was announced.
In his autobiography Bush skipped over
the details of how he got that appointment.
"My name had come up in connection with
the United Nations job," he wrote. Some of
Bush's closest friends and political associ-
ates said they never heard the full story.
Robert A. Mosbacher. for example, who has
been the chief fund-raiser for all Bush cam-
paigns since 1970, expressed surprise when
advised of Haldeman's memo describing
Bush's efforts to persuade Nixon to give
him the U.N. post. "I didn't realize until now
what a self-made opportunity it was," Mos-
bacher said in a recent interview.
"That's typical of George Bush," he added
of the fact that Bush had successfully
pleaded his own case for the job, but never
mentioned his efforts. "I'm not surprised."
Bush was elated to get the job, which car-
ried with it a seat in the president's Cabi-
net. He was determined to become a sig-
nificant player on a range of issues, not just
.:io.the foreign policy field, and he began at
once cultivating Nixon with notes and mes-
sages.
"Dear Mr. President," he wrote on March
2, 1971, "that handwritten note at the bot-
tom of your letter to [U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral]. U Thant will be VERY helpful to me in
my work. We Bushes, including parents,
brothers, sister etc., are still overcome by
the 'swearing in' [apparently,a reference to
the ceremony where Bush was sworn in as
ambassador]. Please thank Mrs. Nixon.
This work is interesting!"
Bush quickly learned, however, that Hen-
ry A. Kissinger, Nixon's national security
adviser, blocked any direct access to Nixon
on foreign policy issues. In May he sent
Nixon, through Haldeman, suggestions for
the makeup of4he 1971 U.S. delegation to
the General Assembly session. Haldeman
wrote back, saying "matters such as this
one should go directly through [Kissinger's]
office. "
The biggest U.S. concern at the United
Nations that year was how to handle the
seating of China. This issue was part of the
secret China diplomacy then being con-
ducted by Nixon, Kissinger and Secretary of
State William P. Rogers, and they kept
Bush in the dark.
Rogers told Nixon months before the fi-
nal U.N. vote that the original U.S. hope of
preserving a seat for Taiwan even after
China was seated was "a lost cause," accord-
ing to White House records. Bush, not
knowing of that assessment, pressed ahead
enthusiastically for the lost cause.
In September he sent Nixon's secretary,
Rose Mary Woods, a photograph that had
been taken of Tricia Nixon Cox and her hus-
band Edward with the U.N. secretary gen-
eral, suggesting Patricia Nixon might like it
for her scrapbook. With reference to his job,
Bush added in a postscript: "Things are boil-
ing here. WOW! - GB"
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The final vote took place about 11 p.m.
Oct. 26, 1971. Bush thought Taiwan's seat
would be saved, according to Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, a member of the U.S. delegation
that fall, and then was dejected when it lost.
Bush told Moynihan "it was his first assign-
ment and he believed he muffed it." Only
much later did Bush find out that his supe-
riors never expected him to win.
Bush spoke before numerous audiences
on Nixon's behalf during 1971, and was
thanked with a note from Nixon in June. By
the end of the year, Nixon's reelection cam-
paign was under way, and members of the
Cabinet had been instructed to "start mov-
ing on a totally all-out political basis," ac-
cording to a memo prepared for a Cabinet
meeting Bush attended.
In March 1972, Nixon and Bush talked
during a helicopter ride about the 1972
campaign. In a March 23 letter to Nixon,
Bush referred to that conversation and said
he had enclosed a list of 20 major speeches
he had made since the first of the year, half
of which were outside New York, and eight
others that were scheduled. "Also," he
added, "I will keep those states in mind that
you mentioned and direct more attention
that way. I enjoyed our chat!"
One of Bush's appearances was on behalf
of Rep. Delbert L. Latta (R-Ohio), who then
wrote Nixon: "I hope [Bush] is used exten-
sively during the campaign. His 'non-
partisan' pro-administration foreign policy
speeches will win friends in any audience."
A memo from a Haldeman assistant to
Nixon aide Dwight L. Chapin in September
said "we should be sure to use George Bush
as a major surrogate in nonpartisan forums.
We need to get him moving heavily around
the country as soon as possible."
Two years later, when Bush appeared be-
fore the Senate Armed Services Committee
as President Ford's nominee to be director
of central intelligence, he was asked wheth-
er his partisan background disqualified him
from such a sensitive post. He promised the
members that if approved, he would "take
no part, directly or indirectly, in any par-
tisan, political activity of any kind." In sup-
portof that pledge, Bush said, "My ability to
shut off politics when serving in nonpartisan
jobs has been demonstrated in two highly
sensitive foreign affairs posts, as I hope this
committee can verify." The first of those
posts was the U.N. ambassadorship.
How Watergate Touched Bush
In Nixon's second term, Bush hoped for a
senior job in the State Department, but
when he met the president at Camp David
on Nov. 20, 1972, Nixon proposed that
Bush take the RNC chairmanship. "We have
a chance to build a new coalition in the next
four years, and you're the one who can do
it," Nixon told Bush, according to Bush's
autobiography. Bush soon accepted the job
after winning an assurance that he could
retain his seat in the Cabinet. He also got an
office in the Executive Office Building near
Nixon's personal hideaway there.
Within a few months, Watergate was
Topic A for Bush and the RNC. Unaware
that Nixon and his inner circle were plotting
a cover-up, Bush was brought into the ques-
tion of allowing live- televising of White
House witnesses before the Senate Wkter-
gate committee, which the Democrats
wanted to do. The White.House wanted
executive sessions with transcripts released
later.
On April 12, Bush had breakfast with
Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), then
vice chairman of the committee, and Sen.
William E. Brock (R-Tenn.) to get their
views and called Ehrlichman to report the
results. The phone call was recorded by
Ehrlichman and a transcript is filed in the
Nixon archives.
Bush told Ehrlichman that Baker wanted
the session televised. Bush added: "My po-
sition is somewheke in between not doing it
but believing deep down that the fuller dis-
closure, the more open the thing, the better
we'll acquit ourselves."
Ehrlichman sharply disagreed. Haldeman,
he said, "just doesn't have any experience
with this kind of thing ... Dwight Chapin
who I would guess without knowing would
choke or could. conceivably choke
[Nixon aide Charles] Colson, who doesn't
appeal to me as the most attractive figure in
the world .... I'd rather have you out tell-
ing our story, you know."
Bush then, changed tack, saying, "I told
Howard [Baker], look, I'll talk to John [Ehr-
lichman] but I'm not going to be your best,
salesman because I don't think it [televi-
sion] is a sine qua non."
As the conversation continued, however,
Bush seemed again to change his view. "I
still feel in spite of what you've told me that
I'd rather see it [television] than not... But
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you make a point." After going over Baker's
position again, Bush closed by saying he was
"sitting happily on the middle of the fence
with a picket sticking up my you know what.
I'll see you."
Bush himself was touched by a Water-
gate-related issue when news leaked about
"Operation Townhouse," the secret White
House campaign fund that gave money to
Bush and other Republican senatorial can-
didates in 1970. On July 11, a news story in
The Washington Star disclosed that Sen.
Lowell P. Weicker (R-Conn.), an outspoken
member of the Senate Watergate Commit-
tee, had received Townhouse funds. The
next evening, according to notes Weicker
dictated at the time, Bush called him to say.
that he had the Townhouse records show-
ing contributions to Weicker and asked:
"What should I do, burn them?" Weicker
said he rejected that suggestion. Weicker
first publicly discussed this episode in 1980,
when Bush was running for president.
Asked about it then, Bush denied to a re-
porter that he ever mentioned burning the
records..
The 1973 call upset Weicker because it
followed an earlier private warning to him
from former White House counsel John
Dean that Weicker's acceptance of Town-
house money would be used against him by
Nixon aides. Against that backdrop, Weick-
er has told friends, he thought Bush's phone
call might be some kind of set-up.
At that time it was not publicly known
that Bush, too, had received Townhouse
money in 1970-a fact that would come
out, to Bush's disadvantage, 13 months lat-
er.
In 1974, as Nixon's impeachment prob-
lems deepened, Bush found himself part of a
White House "damage control" group, ac-
cording to Dean Burch, a longtime GOP
insider who had been brought to the White
House to help deal with the crisis.
Bush recommended to Republican can-
didates that they talk about "our record of
accomplishment, our positive programs, be
against congressional inaction." When vot-
ers say "What about Watergate?" Bush sug-
gested the answer should be "What else are.
[Democrats] for?"
Discussing his role as RNC chairman dur-
ing Watergate in a meeting with Washing-
ton Post editors and reporters last month,
Bush said he had to walk a fine line. "I had
two stacks of mail," he said, one of letters
asking "How come you're not doing more to
support the president?" and the other "say-
ing how come you're keeping the party so
close to the president?"
"Therein," Bush said, "lay a very serious
dilemma."
Bush's loyalty finally broke Aug. 5, when
the tape of the June 23, 1972, White House
meeting was made public, disclosing that
Nixon ordered the cover-up. The day before
Nixon resigned, Bush sent him a private let-
ter saying, "I now feel that resignation is
best for the country, best for this Presi-
dept."
On the night of the resignation, a handful
of the Nixon faithful had dinner. The con-
versation turned to who Ford would pick for
vice president.. Leonard Garment, one of
Nixon's White House lawyers, guessed it
would be Bush.
Less than a fortnight later, on Tuesday,
Aug. 20, 1974, Bush was sitting on the
porch of his home in Kennebunkport,
Maine, with his wife Barbara and several
aidm watching television and waiting to
hear lronr President Ford about the vice
presidency. Bush and his supporters had
worked- -cautiously, but hard, to promote
him for the post. Bush and former New
York Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller were con-
sidered the front-runners, but Bush's high
hopes had dimmed over the previous 24
hours because he had heard nbthing from
Ford.
The station they were watching suddenly
switched to Washington. The i Oval Office
came on the screen. The door through
which Ford was to enter opened, and then
shut again before anyone appeared; a mo-
ment later the phone on Bush's porch rang.
Passed Over fob Vice President
The conversation was short. When Bush
hung up he said: "You'll never guess who
that was. Watch. It's not going to be me,"
according to Peter Roussel, his press aide
at the time. Ford then appeared with
Rockefeller.
Later, when a Portland, Maine, television
reporter observed that Bush didn't look too
upset, Bush responded, "You can't see what
I'm feeling inside," according to Roussel.
Bush's chances had seemed so bright
when Ford announced Aug. 10, two days af-
ter he became president, that he would poll
Republicans in Congress and across the
country, as well as his Cabinet and the
White House staff for suggestions on the
vice presidency. The, results of that survey
were striking: 255 respondents favored
Bush, 181 picked Rockefeller and no one
else was close.
According to Baine P. Kerr, a close Bush
friend for nearly 40 years and former pres-
ident of Pennzoil Co., a number of his old
Texas friends with ties to Ford were pro-
moting Bush for the vice presidency. They
"all thought he would get it and were quite
surprised" when Rockefeller was chosen in-
stead, Kerr recalled in an interview.
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On Aug. 15, Tom Evans, former cochair-
man with Bush of the RNC and a Rockefel.
ler supporter, complained to the White
House that at least 19 GOP national com-
mittee members had expressed a prefer-
ence for Bush as vice president because
they had to make their recommendations
through the RNC chairman-Bush himself.
In his letter to the White House, Evans said
that "George is great at PR but he is not as
good in substantive matters. This opinion
can be confirmed by individuals who held
key positions at the National Committee."
Evans also complained that "an active cam-
paign" was being conducted on? Bush's be-
half, "which I do not believe properly re-
flects Republican opinion."
On Aug. 18, Newsweek published a story
quoting "White House sources" who said
Bush's chances had been damaged by their
discovery that Bush's 1970 Senate cam-
paign had received $100,000 from the
Townhouse fund and that "$40,000 of the
money may not have been properly re-
ported as required by election law."
One former Ford aide, who asked not to
be identified, said the White House realized
that picking Bush could reopen Watergate
debates and also lead to the disclosure of up
to 18 more secret Townhouse donations to
Republican Senate candidates.
Ford picked Rockefeller. Two days after
the announcement, on Aug. 22, Bush met
with Ford for 40 minutes. Not since Bush's
1970 loss was his future so much in doubt.
Ford offered Bush almost any post he
wanted, according to Bush's friends and
aides. Bush expressed interest in becoming
head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing.
"He wanted to get as far away from the.
stench [of Watergate] as possible," accord-
ing to his old friend Mosbacher.
Burch recalled in a recent inter-
view that Bush came to his White
House office to discuss the China
job. Bush looked on the post "in a
romantic rather than practical"
sense, Burch said. He had a "Marco
Polo complex, thinking he could
penetrate the mystery of the place."
Bush soon learned that his new
job gave him no more influence in
the Ford administration than he had
had under Nixon. Kissinger, as both
secretary of state and national se-
curity adviser, held nearly total re-
sponsibility for China policy in his
hands. It took a note from Burch to
Ford even to arrange for Bush to
have a farewell session with the
president before he left for China.
Burch had suggested a 15-minute
meeting, but Brent Scowcroft, Kiss-
inger's deputy in the White House
job, cut it to 10 minutes.
From China to the CIA
Bush has often spoken of how
much he enjoyed his time in China,
but the documentary record sug-
gests that Bush looked at it as a
temporary job.
On March 20, 1975, just five
months after Bush arrived in Bei-
jing, a White House memo showed
he was thinking about coming
home. "It is my impression and par-
tial understanding that George
Bush has probably had enough of
egg rolls and Peking by now (and
has probably gotten over his lost
VP opportunity)," Russell Rourke
wrote to his boss, Ford counselor
Jack Marsh. "He's one hell of a
presidential surrogate, and would
be an outstanding spokesman for
the White House between now and
November 1976. Don't-you think he
would make an outstanding secre-
tary of commerce or a similar post
sometime during the next six
months?"
The same idea had been put to
Bush by Rogers Morton, the sec-
retary of commerce and a former
RNC chairman himself, as well as
an old Bush friend.. Morton and
Bush discussed the idea before
Bush left for China; according to
Bush's memoirs, Morton described
the Commerce post as "a perfect ,
springboard for a place on the tick-
et" in 1976.
Bush learned that Ford had new
plans for him in a telegram from
Kissinger in early November 1975,
which informed him that CIA Direc-
tor William Colby would be trans-
ferred as part of several personnel
shifts and "the president asks that
you consent to his nominating you
as the new director" of CIA.
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In his autobiography, Bush indi-
cates that this was the first he
heard that he was being considered
for that job. (Ford had first offered
the CIA job to Washington attorney
Edward Bennett Williams, who
turned it down.) Bush had hoped to
return to Washington to be in po-
sition to run as Ford's vice presi-
dential 'candidate from a Cabinet
post such as Commerce. His friends
saw the CIA offer as a move to get
Bush out of contention, a view Bush
included in his book. "Having lost
out to Rockefeller as Ford's vice
presidential choice in 1974," Bush
wrote, "I might be considered by
some as a leading contender for the
number two spot in Kansas City [at
the 1976 GOP Convention]-but
not if I spent the next six months
serving as point man fora contro-
versial agency being investigated
by two major congressional commit-
tees."
The White House understood
that because of Bush's partisan po-
litical roles in the past, naming him
to the CIA could cause some con-
troversy. In a Nov. 18 memo to
Marsh from Michael Raol-Duval,
his assistant for intelligence mat-
ters, Duval wrote that it was Bush's
intention to declare "his non-in-
volvement in politics" if his nomi-
nation were approved. Ford took
the same tack in a phone conver.
sation with then-Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.)
on Nov. 22. To win Mansfield's sup-
port, Ford's notes of that conver.
sation indicate, Mansfield said Bush
"must say no politics."
When he appeared before the
Senate panel Dec. 15, Bush pledged
that "If confirmed I will take no
part, directly or indirectly, in any
partisan political activity of any
kind." It was in that testimony that
Bush asserted that he had already
demonstrated "my ability to shut
politics off when serving in nonpar-
tisan jobs" at the United Nations
and in China.
Key Democratic senators wanted
a more explicit assurance from
Ford that Bush would not be on the
Republican ticket in 1976. Bush
was reluctant to give "a Sherman-
like statement" disavowing the vice
presidency, he wrote in his autobi-
ography. Bush associates have long
said that Bush himself finally asked
Ford to issue this assurance.
But a~ key source close to Ford,
said that the president himself-ap-
parently nervous that his nominee
might not be confirmed-decided
that a letter should be written'
promising that Bush would not .be
his running mate. ,
Ford showed Bush the letter he
proposed to send to the Senate in
an Oval Office meeting. This must
have been a blow to Bush, but in the
end, according to a source involved
in these events, he proposed mod-
ifying the letter to make it appear
that he and Ford had jointly decided
to rule him out as a potential vice
presidential candidate. These bit-
tersweet sentences were added:
"He [Bush) and I have discussed
this in detail. In fact, he urged that I
make this decision. This says some-
thing about the man and about his
desire to do this job for the nation."
George Bush's ability takwin his
way with his president had failed
him for the second time in just 16
months. For the second time, Ger-
ald Ford. had denied him the chance
he sought to become vice president.
Staff researcher William F.
Powers Jr. contributed to this report.
NEXT- Bush at the CIA.
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