NO LESSON IN COVERT AID

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580005-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 24, 2012
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 13, 1988
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580005-6.pdf85.82 KB
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25 :CIA-RDP99-014488000401580005-6 STAT ~ wav?ngta, port M IWw rout Tin-? ~ tM wW^I^gto~ tirrtq-- TN~ Wall $trMt JOUrn~l -- T~~ CAri~tlan Se~~nes Mon,~or -~ NM ' fork O.~ly Newa use r~~y ohs ~ MCepo TnOu STAT STAT T- M_ES P~. V N~o Lesson in Covert Aid A dangerous mythology is developing in the United States to the effect that the right combina- tion ~of covert military assistance ensures success fpi? diplomatic initiatives. The proof is Afghanistan. {~ui?veyors of the concept say, rushing to apply the Same formula to an analysis of events in Angola and 1~iicazagua. ~'he trouble with this is that Afghanistan is unique, beazing little resemblance to the situa- tions in Angola and Nicaragua. In Afghanistan a neighboring superpower, the Soviet Union, un- leashed amilitary invasion. The brazen breach of international law invited a firm response from the world at large, including the almost unanimous condemnation by the membership of the United Nations. The military conquest was resisted from the start by a substantial popular base within .Afghanistan, supported with increasing flows of arms from outside. The internal resistance, helped by foreign arms, made the cost of the conquest far greater that Moscow could have imagined. But what probably was decisive in Moscow's decision to withdraw was the realization that the negative consequences were undermining other Soviet efforts to create a new relationship with the West- ern democracies. In other words, diplomacy ap- pears to have been more important that weapons, even in Afghanistan. In both Angola and Nicaragua, Marxist-oriented governments have enjoyed substantial support from the Soviet Union and its allies, and have been challenged in open warfare by opposing elements receiving military and economic assistance from the United States. Much has been made of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, but it would be a mistake to confuse their role with that of the Soviet army of occupation in Afghanistan. Fur- thermore, the Angolan and Nicaraguan govern- ments enjoy the support of most of their neighbors and are recognized by the United Nations, while the U.S.-supported guerrillas in those countries are largely isolated, enjoying only limited approval from a few other nations. The contrast with Afghanistan _is most evident in Nicaragua, where the Contras, supported by Washington, appear to be opposed by virtually every other nation in the region. Indeed, the peace plan contrived by the Central American presi- dents themselves called for an end to this sort of guerrilla warfaze while at the same time asking all nations, the Soviet Union included, to terminate arms supplies to the area. U.S. militaTy~support for iUNITA_ in Angola and for the Contras in Nicaragua has, in sum, done more harm than good. Indeed, the United States ,must share responsibility for the terrible toll of civilians as well as the destruction of property that has characterized the wazfaze in both Angola and Nicaragua. The military commitment to these guerrilla movements has been out of all proportion to any risk to international security posed by the nascent Marxism of the governments in the two impoverished, puny nations. The development of peaceful settlements in both regions of the world can best be facilitated by an end to insurgency and a commitment to inter- national negotiations. The new interest in detente in Moscow reinforces this opportunity. This is not to argue that the United States can forgo clandestine armed intervention in all cases. But it is to argue that history already judges these adventures badly. Rarely do they work. That is a lesson of_particular importance for Vice President George ~Bush~ whose involvement in covert activ- ities while director of the Central Intelligence Agency may weaken the resistance that every President should have to these dangerous, and too often counterproductive, operations. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25 :CIA-RDP99-014488000401580005-6