BY-THE-BOOK CIA AGENT LED CONTRAS, REBELS SAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301290090-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: March 1, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301290090-5
ARTICLE APPEARED 1 March 1987
ON PAGLIA?disk
By-the-book CIA agent
t.led contras, rebels say ,
Legal murkiness
? WASHINGTON ? He entered
the contras' clandestine world in
1982'. a carefully tailored man
A with native Spanish who called
himself Tomas Castillo. Beyond
that, he kilIfrr011rIrRriaid only
that he was "working for the U.S.
government."
For four years. Castillo adminis-
tered an insurgency in Nicaragua.
American-style. He paid salaries
and presided at meetings. He
negotiated contra disputes. He
purged the rebel ranks. And, those
who have known Castillo say, he
did it bv the book.
One 'former contra leader re- ?A
called Castillo as "the vellow?pad rA
man." a relentless note-scribbler /1
during rebel strategy sessions. a
bureaucrat who doled out stacks
of 5100 bills from an'attache case 71
but always got a receipt.
Today Castillo is in trouble.
under investigation for apparently
illegal collaboration with Lt. Col.
Oliver North last year while
Castillo was CIA station chief in
Costa Rica. His CIA superiors are
depicting him as a cowboy: an
agent gone wrong whose troubles
-derived from personal reckless-
ness.
? The official story contrasts
sharply, curiously, with the pic-
ture painted by more than a dozen
parsons who dealt with Castillo
over four years.
"An able professional" who
would never do anything without
"proper clearance." recalled one
former U.S. Intelligence officer
who served with Castillo in sever-
al Latin American posts.
"An operative, used to working
for somebody else, a go-between..
an organization man. Always."
said Edgar Chamorro. a Nicara-
guan exile whom Castillo re-
cruited into the contra leadership
? in 1982. "He could supervise. but
taC creatively initiate."
Castillo was. from 1982 until
hnuary, a key agent in the
US.-backed contra war. In many
whys, Castillo's story is the story
of the Reagan administration's
War on Nicaragua. At least until
ttfall, his activities have always
lecosd official administration
[Icy.
was there. out of sight but
watching, when the CIA unveiled
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force,
the rebel army. in a 1982 Fort
Latderdale press conference.
Hi was there, managing the
contas when they began mining
the arbors in 1983. He was there
when they wrote the psychologi-
cal ;virtue manual in 1984. He
was there when the CIA support-
ed. then uniermined. Eden Puto-
ra.
Last Mares. as CIA station chief
In Costa Ric, be even took his
wife to a plicate audience with
President Reagan when they ac-
companied Coda Rica's outgoing
public securits minister and his
wife to a Whitt House thank-you
session for the ifficial's steadfalt,
cooperation will US. Initiatives.
And when the "private" contra
air supply operatic became public
knowledge last fal after one of Its
planes was shot dawn in Nicara-
gua. it soon becane clear that
Castillo had been there, too.
Newspapers reportec his ties to a
clandestine Costa Rcan airstrip
and his work dithatehing supply
flights into southern Nicaragua.
The CIA yanked Castilb home and
forced him into early ntirement.
His predicament was nailing.
A longtime team player, had he
broken the rules, free-landng his
own contra ventures? Or cd he
been male a scapegoat?
Scrutiny of Castillo's care. and
his present plight highlights the
legal questions surrounding the
CIA's involvement with the wn-
tras since Congress banned all
contact in 1984, then softened tie
ban a year later-
Called before the Tower Comi
mission investigating the Iran-costra affair Jan. 28, Castillo himser
testified that his support for the
supply flights had been approved
by CIA superiors. Specifically,
covert operations chief glair
George and Central America-GA
force curector Alan. tiers.
But acting tlA Dared& Robert,
Gates, appearing before the Senate
--rElLifftgence Committee Feb. 17.
laid out the administration line:
Castillo's indiscretions had been
unauthorized.
- .'"The officer was not following
policy in terms of contact with
private benefactors ... Apparently
lie has not told us the story
straight. I was extremely con-
cerned that this one officer appar-
ently. had not told the truth."
Gates said.
Since Gates' testimony. congres-
sional leaders have voiced skepti-
cism about his remarks, throwing
his confirmation into doubt.
Lan weekend. a CIA spokes.
woman called The Herald to state
categorically that "no senior of ft-
cial provided authorization" to
Castillo for any of his actions on
behalf of the contras when con-
gressional prohibitions were in
effect She noted that Gates' Feb.
17 testimony was under oath.
'The yellow-Pad man'
Tomas Castillo is a pseudonym.
When he served as station chief in
Costa Rica. his public identity was
as first secretary of the US.
Embassy. Nearly all of Costa
Rican officialdom seemed to know
Castillo, by what one US. official
said was his real name. It Is Illegal
to disclose the true name of a CIA
agent.
It is not absolutely certain, but
careful examination of govern-
ment records and interviews with
former intelligence officials Ca-
cate that Castillo's early career
with the CIA, starting in the early
1970s, included diplomatic stints
in Uruguay. Peru and Mexico.
When the contra war began.
Castillo appears to have been
assigned to CIA headquarters in
Langley, Va.
He appeared in Miami in 1982,
with the contra movement still in
Its infancy, recruiting Chamorro
and other Nicaraguan exiles to
serve on the directorate of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN). the rebel army the CIA had
started funding a year earlier.
An olive-skinned, heavy-set
man. maybe 5-foot. 10 inches,
with black hair graying at the
temples. Castillo took a special
care with clothes that impressed
Chamorro.
"Dark, quality suits, like an
executive," Chamorro recalls.
"And If you were well-dressed.
he'd notice, and tell you."
Where was he born? He said
"Galithia." intentionally lisping
the "c" of the Spanish province
Galicia to imply an accent. Cha-
morro guesses Cuba Pastors
thinks Puerto Rico.
In contra meetings at Miami's
Four Ambassadors hotel, Castillo
liked to follow an agenda. "He'd
come with his briefcase." Chamor-
ro said, "pull out the pad. take
notes. He was a man who's used to
organizing his work on paper."
Chamorro recalls Castillo's de-
liveries of attache cases stuffed
with cash. "I'd have to sign to say
I received $10.000. He said they
had a little old lady in Washington
who would be very upset if we
didn't get receipts." Chamorro
recalled.
In Chamorro's view. Castillo
vas of "moderate intelligence,"
with distinctly middle-class tastes.
He once confided his life's dream:
to retire to a suburban home with
a backyard barbecue.
Anti-communism dominated his
political vision, US. and rebel
officials said.
Late in 1983. after a year of
working together in Tegucigalpa
and Miami. Chamorro and Castillo
talked over drinks at Biscayne
Bay's Rusty Pelican. Chamorro,
shocked by discoveries of multiple
murders of contra combatants by
their officers, was having doubts.
Maybe the contras were no good,
and they should negotiate with the
Sandinistas. be suggested.
Castillo reacted sharply. An.
accommodation with the Sandinis-
tas? impossible. "They're Comm.
nists. They're evil.' Chamorro
quoted Castillo.
"Castillo said that communism
was an international conspiracy."
he said. "He wanted everyone to
be defined. ideologically. He
couldn't discuss anything that
didn't fit into his world of black
and white."
CIA's main liaison
'Throughout most of 1984. Cas-
tillo was known as the rebels'
main CIA liaison, traveling to
Miami and Central America from
Langley. It WAS a trying year for
the program, beginning in January
with a rebellion by more than two
dozen contra field commanders in
Honduras. They complained that
corruption in their general staff
was causing hunger in the camps.
CIA headquarters backed the
general staff despite the com-
plaints. and Hugo Villagra, the
most important dissident, was
forced to leave Honduras. His
arrival in Miami caused a stir
among exiles. Castillo. fearing
Villagra would take his allegations
to the press, drove to the former
contra commander's Kendall home
and invited him to dinner.
Over macs de puerto, as Villa-
gra recalls it. Castillo was all
sympathy. He offered to intercede
with immigration. He arranged for
Villagra to fly to Washington to
pass on his complaints. He assured
Villagra that his allegations were
being taken seriously.
"He wanted me to believe he
was very concerned with the
corruption. But they just wanted
to neutralize me." VIllagra said.
Later the same year. a CIA
contract employee under Castillo's
supervision wrote a psychological.
warfare manual, counseling the
COULTAS on the "selective use of
violence" to -neutralize" Sandinis-
ta officials. Congressional outrage
led President Reagan to discipline
several CIA employees for "poor
judgment and lapses In oversight."
Disciplined over manual
Castillo was among them. His
punishment involved a demotion
from Ins Langley-based position to
a new post in 1985: station chief in
Costa Rica.
Castillo's tenure in San Jae
roughly coincided with that of
US. Ambassador Lewis Tambs.
Shortly after Tambs' arrival in
July 1985, Tambs called Cartillo
and two other embassy officials
together to say "he had really only
one mission in Costa Rica, and that
was to form a Nicaraguan resis-
tance southern front." Castillo
later told the Tower panel. The
two men worked closely on that
mission.
His cover as an Embassy first
secretary didn't last. Soon after
Castillo's arrival, a minor rebel
official emerged from a meeting to
boast widely that he had been
consulting with the CIA station
chief: Castillo was instantly
known in the rebel ranks.
Castillo worked closely with
Costa Rica's then-security minis-
ter. Beniamin Pith. overhauling
the Intelligence and Security Di-
rectorate, the Costa Rican equiva-
lent of the FBI and CIA. In two
recent interviews, Piza called Cas-
tillo a "good friend." Costa Rican
officials called Pia Casillio's key
to obtaining cooperation for the
contras from the government of
Costa Rican President Luis Alberto
Monge.
Taking stock of his generous
assistance. Piza OW day told
Castillo that he wanted to meet
President Reagan. Personally.
Piza keeps a framed photograph
of his handshake with President
Reagan on the wall of his presi-
dent's office at Seagrams. Costa
Rica. Castillo's presence at the
session came to light in the Jan. n
Senate Intelligence Committee re-
port on the Iran-contra affair.
which noted that a "Central
American security official and his
wife" and "the senior CIA officer"
In the same country had met with
Reagan. White House chief of staff
Donald Regan. Adm. John Poin-
dexter and North. Piza said he.
Castillo and their wives had
topped off the trip with a weekend
in Miami.
But Castillo's main work in-
volved the contras, and it brought
a showdown with Commander
Pastore. The Southern Front had
flourished, briefly, in late 1983.
when the CIA had been funneling
millions of dollars in cash and
weaponry to Pastora's growing
Democratic Revolutionary Alli-
ance army. But even in those glory
days Castillo had disdained the
charismatic "Commander Zero."
Chamorro. who noticed Castil-
lo's dislike for Pastors early on.
chalked It up to Castillo's overall
ideological rigidity. Castillo
couldn't understand, or control, a
political chameleon like Pastors. a
Sandinista guerrilla hero who only
turned against his former com-
rades in 1982.
"He was uncomfortable with
Eden's imagination." Chamorro
said.
In September 1984. Castillo had
dealt with Pastore face to face,
arbitrating the terms of a tense
divorce in a San Jose safe house
between Pastore and his former
ally, Alfonso Robelo.
Ordered purge
But Castillo's final encounter
with Pastore in June 1985 was
apparently another exasperation,
according to Pastors. Pastora's
combatants seized a barge packed
with American pacifists on the
San Juan River, part of Nicara-
gua's southern border; Castillo
radioed from San Jose. ordering
Pastore not to harm them. The
station chief's concern went be-
yond the obvious: The CIA had
also infiltrated one of its agents
into the group.
While Castillo had been infiltrat-
ing the pacifists, the Sandinistas
had been infiltrating Pastore. The
southern front was riddled with
spies: even Pastora's lover was a
Sandinista agent. In late 1985. the
CIA ordered. the leaks staunched.
Castillo ordered lie detector tests.
Technicians and machines were
sent down from Langley. and over
a period of weeks, nearly 20
contras were brought to a San
Jose safe house and strapped in.
More than a dozen rebels flunked
the polygraphs, and a purge
followed in the contras' southern
front hierarchy.
Purged rebel officials said they
learned later that their dismissals
had been ordered by Castillo.
The CIA's strategy was to
sideline Pastors and put his troops
at the disposal of Fernando "El
Negro" Chamorro, a lesser com-
mander known for exploitable
weaknesses of the flesh.
Since mid-1985, Castillo's CIA
agents had been meeting with
Pastora's field lieutenants in San
Jose. always emphasizing that
they were only seeking informa-
tion about contra needs, about
where the rebels were operating
In Nicaragua. The CIA was not
offering weapons, they said.
Then Castillo's agents changed
their tune, offering weapons to
commanders who would leave
Pastore. Castillo demonstrated the
seriousness of his offers, rebel
officials said, by sending Pastora's
men in southern Nicaragua at least
two air drops and two small
boatloads of weapons and supplies
between February and April of
1986. ?
In a final, personal pitch. Castil-
lo stood before the Paaora lieuten-
ants in a May 1986 meeting in a
San Jose safe house, telling them
they could get more US. aid only
If they abandoned Pastore for
Chamorro.
Six consented. According to
several contra officials. Castillo
funneled each of them cash rei
wards of as much as 65.000.
To supply the commanders.
Castillo played a key role in
negotiations in the final months of
the Monge administration in Costa
Rica to gain permission for the use
of the secret airstrip, according to
two senior Costa Rican officials.
The "private" strip was built by a
company tied to North and used by
planes based in El Salvador.
With the strip in operation.
Castillo dispatched air drops to the
rebels.
From rebel officers, he learned
contra troop movements inside
Nicaragua. then passed the coordi-
nates to North in the White House
over an encryption device North
had provided him. Castillo cid the
Tower Commission.
Castillo told the Tower Commis-
sion he had asked North about the
legality of this work. "Aft you
sure this is OK'? He said 'yes, yes,
all you're doing is passing infor-
mation.' " Castillo told the Tower
Commission.
In one April 1986 message
quoted by the Tower Commission,
Castillo confirmed the success of
one air drop to North. then went
on grandly: "My objective is the
creation of 2.500 man force ...
realize this may be overly ambi-
tious planning, but with your help,
believe we can pull it off."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301290090-5