I'D SOONER RESIGN THAN FOOL CONGRESS, SAYS CIA NOMINEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270082-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: February 18, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270082-6
ARTICLE APPEAl_se _
ON PAGE
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
18 February 1987
I'd sooner resign than fool
'Congress, says CIA nominee
WASHINGTON [AP]?Rob-
ert M. Gates, President
Reagan's nominee to run the
CIA, said Tuesday he would
consider resigning if he ever
were asked to hide a covert ac-
lion from Congress for more-
ithan a few days.
In close questioning during
his confirmation hearing about
the administration's Iran arms
.sales, Gates acknowledged for
,the first time that the Central
'Intelligence Agency had violat-
ed its understanding with Con-
gress by waiting more than 10
,months to disclose the Iran ini-
tiative.
A 1980 agreement made it
clear that key members of Con-
gress expected to be notified
;within "a few days" of covert
iintelligence actions, but the
Reagan administration never
conceded that interpretation,
Gates said.
In the case of the Iran deal,
"I believe the long period of
withholding went beyond the
bounds of the compromise of
1980," Gates said. "I believe it
stretched the comity between
the two branches to the
breaking point."
He promised to the Senate
Intelligence Committee that in
the future he would not con-
sider such a long delay in con-
gressional notification.
"The President could decide
otherwise, and the committee
needs to know that I would not
be disloyal or insubordinate to
the President," he said.
But if such a presidential
directive would hurt CIA rela-
tions with Congress, "I would
contemplate resignation under
those circumstances."
Gates also acknowledged that
the agency had shown
"shortcomings" during the en-
tire Iran-Contra affair.
"Our officers violated our
own internal regulations in
facilitating a flight in Novem-
ber, 1985" that carried weapons
to Iran, he said. "We did not
communicate well enough in-
ternally about what was going
on. We should have protested
more vigorously our involve-
ment in an operation where
there were significant elements
unknown to us and where we
mistrusted key figures.
"We tolerated ground rules
suggested by others that ex-
cluded our own experts. ... I
also believe the CIA made an
error in not pressing to reverse
the directive to withhold prior
notification once the operation
began to string out in February,
1986. The entire undertaking
was a unique activity that we
are all determined not to re-
peat."
In response to questions,
Gates told the panel that re-
visions made in then-director
William J. Casey's prepared tes-
timony for the panel late last
year were made not because
there had been an attempt to
mislead Congress but because
the agency itself was having dif-
ficulty in determining the facts.
A reference in an early draft
of the testimony stated that no
one in the agency had been
aware that there were weapons
on a plane which the CIA had
arranged to fly to Tehran in
November, 1985. "In fact,
some of our overseas officers
had known or suspected what
was on that plane," Gates said.
He said his own lack of
knowledge about details of the
Iran initiative was due in part
to an "informal division of
labor" in which Casey took the
lead on Iran and Central Amer-
ican matters.
Gates also told the panel that
he had heard only "flimsy
speculation" about the diver-
sion of Iranian arms sales pro-
fits to Nicaraguan guerrillas be-
fore the matter became public
in November.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270082-6