CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301250007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for- In'tellig6rice,
Central Intelligence Agency
Speech at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
13 February 1986
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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak. about the relationship
between the Central Intelligence Agency, especially its analytical/research arm, and the
academic community. Recent events here have again sparked broad discussion of both the
propriety and wisdom of university scholars cooperating in any way with American
intelligence. On December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works
for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar."
These are strong words. In my view they are absolutely wrong. Nonetheless, there are real
concerns that should be addressed.
My remarks tonight center on two simple propositions:
- First, preserving the liberty of this nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the
preservation of academic freedom; the university community. cannot prosper and
f
protect
reedom of inquiry Oblivious to the fortunes`at.
- Second, in defending the nation and our liberties, the Federal Government needs to
have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic
community. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense,
intelligence and academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or
elimination of such tensions.
The History of CIA-University Relations
In discussing the relationship between the academic community and American
intelligence, and specifically the research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to
go back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to Harvard. In the
summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded President Roosevelt of the need to
organize a coordinated foreign intelligence service to inform the government about fast
moving world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the universities for experts
with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages and
general conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and created the Office
of the Coordinator of Information, later renamed the Office of Special Services, under
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Donovan's leadership. The prominent Harvard historian, William L. Langer, was recruited as
the Director of Research and he in turn, recruited some of the finest scholars in America for
the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Universities.
When CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, this pattern was
repeated. Langer returned to establish the Board of National Estimates. Robert. Amory of the
Harvard Law School faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1952, and
served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other academicians who joined included:
historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van
Slyck; economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic intelligence effort; economist
Richard Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane Coffin
who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for the duration of the Korean War
before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He is quoted as recalling that he joined the Agency
because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for
academicians to join the Agency in the early years.
Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were cordial throughout the
1950s. The cold war was at its height and faculty or students rarely questioned the nation's
need for the Agency and its activities. Some of the most noted university professors of the
time served on a regular basis as unpaid consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of
probable trends in world politics.
These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some criticism on campuses over
CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961. But the real deterioration in rela-
tions between CIA and the academe paralleled the wrenching divisions in the country over
the Vietnam War, despite continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of
Intelligence. The decline in CIA-academia ties accelerated with the February 1967
disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the foreign activities of the
National Student Association for a number of years.
Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more frequent in the media in
the early 1970s, culminating in the establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and
subsequently both the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the
House of Representatives.
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Even the Church Committee, however, so critical, of other intelligence activities,
recognized that CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our
universities can produce." The Committee recommended that academic advice and judgment
of academics be openly sought. The Committee concluded that the principal responsibility
for setting the terms of the relationship between CIA and academe should rest with college
administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the
responsibility of ... the American academic community to set the professional and ethical
standards of its members."
This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks and numerous articles about
the relationship between the universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President
of the American Association of University Professors, then CIA Director George Bush
replied that the Agency sought "only the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals
who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director. stated that
where relationships are confidential they are usually so at the request of the scholars, rather
than the Agency, and he refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
Adopting this approach, Director Stansfield Turner engaged in a long and eventually
unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President Bok of Harvard on relations between
this university and the Agency. (Ironically, at this time, another Harvard professor, Robert
Bowie, was my predecessor as head of the analytical element of the Agency.) Some
academic institutions adopted guidelines similar to the restrictive regulations established at
Harvard; in most cases less severe guidelines were proposed. In a great majority of schools
where the issue arose, however, the faculty and administration rejected any guidelines,
usually on the grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate to protect both
the institution and individuals.
The Agency's relations with the academic world have improved in recent years for a
variety of reasons, including developments abroad and recognition in the academic
community that CIA, together with the Departments of State and Defense, has been an im-
portent and useful supporter of area and regional studies and foreign language studies in the
United States. The agencies of the American intelligence community as well as the
Department of State have long been a primary source of employment for specialists in these
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areas. The academic community also consulted closely with senior officials of the
intelligence community in their successful campaign to win support for a Congressional-ap-
proved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence agencies informally strongly supported
this endeavor.
In some areas of research, such as on the Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40
years has remained both close and constant. This also has been the case often in the fields
of economics and physical sciences. On the other hand, there have been much more
pronounced ups and downs in our relationships with political scientists and allied social
sciences, particularly among those with expertise in the Third World.
Why CIA Needs Academe
There is, however, one constant in the history of this relationship and in its future as
well: our need for your help, and the opportunity you have to contribute to a better informed
policymaking process by cooperating with us. Let me describe how and why.
In just the last dozen years, we have been confronted with. a large number of new
issues and developments and also have had to pay attention to problems too long neglected.
The oil embargo of 1973, the subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices and now their plunge;
the related dramatic changes in the international economic system, the growth of debt in
Third World countries and now repayment problems; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa; new Soviet beachheads
and surrogates in the Third World; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth
of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and terrorism all have demonstrated
vividly that our national security is greatly affected by developments and events in addition
to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering in their diversity. They
include problems such as the implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World
countries; problems of political, economic and social instability and how to forecast them;
human rights; narcotics; the illicit arms market; the implications of immigration flows in
various regions of the world; population trends and their political and security implications;
the global food supply; water resources; energy; technology transfer; terrorism; proliferation
of chemical/biological and nuclear weapons; changing commodity markets and their
implications for Third World countries; and others too numerous to recount.
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But nearly all of these problems have something in common: while CIA has experts in
virtually all subjects of concern, there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and
insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the Ameri-
can government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for in-
ternational stability.
With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the Directorate of Intelligence
several years ago initiated an intensified effort to reach out to the academic community,
think tanks of every stripe, and the business community for information, analysis and advice.
- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive areas were directed to
undertake an expanded program of sponsorship of conferences on substantive
issues of concern to us and to encourage participation of our .analysts in such
conferences sponsored by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more
than 300 conferences; nearly all of them involving considerable participation by the
academic community and touching on many of the issues I noted. In addition, we
have recorded more than 1500 instances of our analysts attending conferences
sponsored by the private sector-and doing so as openly acknowledged CIA
employees. . .
- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to test our assessments in
ways consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have helped
scholars get security clearances so that they could examine the actual draftS-of our
studies. A growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists outside the
government-in the academic community and various think tanks, and by retired se-
nior military officers, independent specialists, and others.
- We have established panels of security cleared specialists from business and the
academic community to meet with us regularly not only to help improve specific re-
search papers but to help develop new research methods, review performance, and
help us test new approaches and hypotheses.
- Our analysts are required to refresh their own substantive credentials and expand
their horizons by obtaining outside training at least every two years. This
requirement can be met through taking university courses, participating in business
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or other outside sponsored seminars and conferences, attending military training
courses, and so forth.
Our involvement with the academic community takes several forms:
- Consulting: This is the most prevalent.. It can be formal, under a contractual
arrangement in which the individual is paid a set government rate, or it can be in-
formal and unpaid-an exchange of views between interested specialists. We are
particularly interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or orthodoxy.
We know what we think, but we need to know what others think also.
- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our own, but occasionally we
contract with others to organize a conference for us. And, of course, our analysts
attend conferences sponsored by business, academic and professional organiza-
tions, think tanks, and universities.
- Research: In some areas, scholars in universities have the ::experience and expertise
to carryout basic research for us, for example;.Yon demographic and economic,
subjects. The recent controversy at Harvard and the media have focused on this area
of cooperation. In fact, it presently is a very minor element in our overall
relationship with the academic community. It is hardly a program, as recently
alleged, of "covert fees and fellowships" with which we can "buy scholastic
priorities."
- Scholars in Residence: We have had a scholars-in-residence program for a number
of years under which individuals from the academic world can spend a year or two
working with us, with full security clearances, on topics of interest to them and us.
- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with scholars who are willing to
share with us their impressions after traveling to places of interest or participating
in events of interest abroad.
A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars is our perception that quality
analysis on the incredible range of issues with which we must cope requires not only
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dogged research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large organizations, and
particularly government bureaucracies, are not famous for their encouragement of these
characteristics--although there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to rely
solely on information funneled through government channels inevitably would constrict the
range of views and information needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views,
to argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to make us think and defend
and to go back to the drawing board when we have missed something important. In short,
we don't want scholars to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would make our
entire effort pointless.
Finally, this relationship is not necessarily a one-way street. Just as we are conscious
of our need for the injection of ideas and information from outside government channels, I
believe you should concede that there is at least the possibility that you might learn
something from discussions with us.
Your Concerns
Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been raised by scholars,
deans, and institutions about dealing with us. I would note that certain of these concerns
reach well beyond just CIA and involve the entire question of relations between outside
sources of funds and the university community.
1. Doesn't research or analysis under . CIA auspices of events abroad inevitably
compromise academic freedom and the honesty of academic research?
- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist on honest work. We do not
permit our analysts to cook the books and we would never consult or contract
with a scholar a second time who did that. Our research and analysis must stand
up to close scrutiny, not only by other intelligence agencies, but by other
elements of the executive branch, the oversight committees of the Congress, the
Congress as a whole, the President's Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a
variety of other panels and organizations that have access to our information.
While we acknowledge we can be. and have been wrong in the past, our very
existence depends on our reputation for integrity and for reliable and objective
assessments. Any research we use should have the same qualities.
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Second, it seems to me that academic freedom depends on a scholar not being
beholden to anM r outside influence or rigid ideological conceptions but only to
the pursuit of truth. The scholar should be free to search where he or she wish-
es and should not be constrained by any improper influences, including the
preferences of colleagues or prevailing cultural winds. Actually,. improper
influence potentially can be exerted on a scholar in a number of ways: funding
from contracts and consultantships with business, foundations and foreign
governments-or even the threat of withholding tenure. American academics
have long consulted with officials of foreign governments of all stripes. In light
of this, singling out a US government agency as a particular threat to honest in-
quiry represents a double standard if not outright hypocrisy. If a university
requires public exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely logic and eq-
uity require a similar practice for relationships with foreign governments and, in
fact, all other outside relationships. And, indeed, if our funding should be openly
acknowledged, should not all outside funding, of whatever source, be openly ac-
knowledged? You are rightly proud of your ability to do objective research. CIA
does not threaten it.
- Third, I agree with the proposition that it is the responsibility of the university
itself to establish and monitor the rules governing all these relationships. It is
both foolish and irresponsible to do so by isolating the scholar from any outside
contact under the guise of protecting academic freedom.
2. Won't publicly acknowledged convects with C/A hinder a scholar's access and
freedom of inquiry overseas? I acknowledge this might be a problem for some
individuals. Indeed, in some places around the world, all Americans are suspected of
working for CIA. However, many who have worked with us for years have not had
any difficulty.
3. Can't a colleague's contacts even with CIA analysts compromise an entire depart-
ment? I have been asked before about the danger of one scholar's association with
us involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I
would simply offer two observations. First, the university community is a remark-
ably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments there are scholars who are
involved in some sort of activity with which their colleagues disagree or which they
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do not support. So, again, this problem is not limited just to CIA. Some form of
reporting to the university on such relationships that could be kept confidential
.would seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My second
observation, however, is that at some point some courage is called for. The
freedom of those who do wish to consult with us can be. infringed upon by the fears
of their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your government to help
bring about better informed policy is shameful; indeed, it should be a source of
pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a better understanding of some of the most
difficult and occasionally dangerous problems of the world, in my view, is
responsive to the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount to CIA censorship of independent ideas,
opinions and judgments? No. Our review is only to ensure that no classified
information is included in a book or article and that the text does not reveal
intelligence sources and methods. We have no interest in altering the substance or
conclusions of writings we review and take great care to avoid asking for such
changes. And the fact is: we don't. Where a consultant has no access to classified
information, there is no prepublication review.
5. What about the view that CIA engages in covert action as well as collection and anal-
ysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and therefore association with any part of CIA is
unacceptable? Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the approval of
appropriate authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They are activities
mandated by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive and legislative
branches. As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds for legal
intelligence activities with which they disagree, thereby terminating such activities.
- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy instrument of the elected rep-
resentatives of the American people, just like the military, USIA or the
Department of State. If you find some element of the government's foreign
policy or activity inconsistent with your professional judgment, I would
encourage you first to do all you can to test the validity of your position. You
also can decline to have any association with us at all. But in the latter case, the
decision whether to associate with us should be left to the individual. One
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individual's freedom of association should not be denied because of another's
personal point of view. A university steps on precarious ground and itself
endangers academic freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with-and, I would add,
especially if one of those organizations is a branch of our society's own
democratically chosen government.
Our Rules
Before I close, let me review the rules and policies of the analytical arm of CIA for
dealing with the university community. We continually review our regulations and policies in
the light of new opportunities, new problems and new issues. For example, well before the
recent controversy here at Harvard, we revised our contract language with respect to
prepublication review, narrowing that review-which again, is simply to avoid the
compromise of- classed information-to the specific subject area in which a scholar had
access to classified information. For example, if a scholar consults with us about nuclear
proliferation and has access to classified information, writings on unrelated subjects need
not be submitted.
We have again looked at our rules and policies as a result of the controversy here at
Harvard, and this too has produced some modifications. For example, the Directorate of
Intelligence now explicitly tells any organization or individual organizing a conference on our
behalf that the participants in the conference should be informed in advance of our
sponsoring role. Quite frankly, because we organize the overwhelming majority of our
conferences ourselves, this problem had not arisen -before.
Let me review three key policies of particular interest to the university community:
- First, while the Directorate of Intelligence presently has no contracts for classified
research at any academic institution, we can and will let contracts for classified
research where university rules permit, where appropriate facilities and circum-
stances allow, and when a genuine need exists.
- Second, when we contract for unclassified research, we spell out explicitly for the
scholar the conditions governing use of that research. In some cases, the research
will be done strictly for us, and we will be the only recipient. In other cases, once
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we have received the research and assured ourselves that the terms of the contract
have been carried out, we will acquiesce in a scholar's request to publish a book or
article drawing on that research. We do not commission or contract for books or
articles. We are realistic about pressures on scholars to publish, however, and, in
order to attract some of the best people to work with us, we try to, accommodate
their desire to draw on unclassified research they have done for us for publication
for their own purposes. And, finally, there are cases where we allow research done
for us later to be published under the scholar's name without any prepublication re-
view on our part.
But in any of these circumstances, our review is simply to ensure that the work we
contracted to be done has been done, meets appropriate standards of quality and
does not contain classified information. Taxpayers justifiably would be displeased if
we were not to ensure that we had received true value for their money.
- Third, we also have looked again at the question of whether our funding of research
that is subsequently used in a publication by a scholar should be openly
acknowledged. There are several good reasons that argue .such:;anapproach,
including the possibility of difficulty with a foreign government *by virtue of
acknowledged CIA interest in its internal affairs; the possibility that acknowledged
CIA interest in a specific subject-such as the financial stability of a particular
country-could affect the situation itself; and, finally, concern that readers might
assume the scholar's conclusions were, in fact, CIA's.
As a result of the controversy here at Harvard and expressions of concern about this
policy, we reexamined this issue with considerable care. In the first place, there are
certain circumstances under which disclosure of our funding of research may be re-
quired, and we of course comply. Beyond this, we have decided that our interest in
obtaining the cooperation of this country's scholars and allaying the misunderstand-
ings and suspicions that have grown out of our earlier approach warrants at least
some change in our policy. Accordingly, CIA will henceforth permit acknowledge-
ment of our funding of research that is later independently published by a scholar
unless (1) the scholar requests privacy or (2) we determine that formal, public asso-
ciation of CIA with a specific topic or subject would prove damaging to the United
States. Any acknowledgement of CIA funding would be accompanied by a statement
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to the effect that the views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of CIA or of the US government. I assume, of course,
that universities also will press hard for public disclosure of other sources of
funding for research.
- Fourth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults or works with us to abide
fully by the rules of his or her home institution in terms of reporting the relationship
with us. But, in our view, it is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the institu-
tion to set such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to
comply.
Conclusions
The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the security and well being of the
American people are increasingly diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the
Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees believe that contacts with
universities and others in the private sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively
to carry out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and warning the government
about deveu ments around the world-the same mission identified by General Donovan
and Presider z Roosevelt. Our ability to carry out our mission, as in the days of Langer and
Donovan, der-ends on voluntary cooperation between those of us who carry this responsibil-
ity in intelligence, and those in the university, business, retired military, and others who can
help us understand these challenges better and forecast them more accurately. Our country
is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the problems this nation faces abroad do not
threaten academic freedom. However, I believe that freedom of inquiry is limited, a desire to
render public service sometimes tragically thwarted, and our nation disadvantaged, by those
who would deny a scholar's willingness to work with the American intelligence service in
assessing the world around us.
The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department
of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prevented
by academic institutions or colleagues from doing so. And none should have to worry that
his or her reputation will suffer because of a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to help us
better understand and forecast developments abroad affecting our national well-being and
the forces that threaten our freedom.
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