SOVIET-STYLE COMMUNISM ABUSES CUBANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301230005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Here is your personal copy of
NAT ?o SECURITY
_~EPORT
Compliments of the Reserve Officers
Association of the United States
IN THIS ISSUE
WALTERS: Soviet-style
Communism Abuses Cubans
I
WRAP-UP: Commissary
Victory Aids Retention
2
GOLDWATER: Goldwater and
His Final Defense Budget
5
GATES: Soviets Know That
SDI Will Work
8
GOTODA: Japanese Position -
SDI Aids Deterrence
9
BUCKELEW: Terrorism Will
Continue Indefinitely
14
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NAtIONAL$ECURITY
R(~A
Soviet-style
Communism
Abuses Cubans
For 200 years the United States has
rested on the principles of the
people's right to select their
government, of respect for the individual
and his rights, and the belief that the best
way to ensure those rights is to limit
government's power.
Our long tradition of democratic rule
also leads us at times to take our freedom
for granted. It can make us slow to
recognize that certain regimes and
ideologies not only systematically violate
human rights but that they rely upon the
power to violate those rights as the
principal tool of government.
It took too many people too many years
to recognize the horror and danger posed
by Nazi Germany. It took many more
people even longer to appreciate the
horror and danger posed by the Soviet
Union.
Many today, in the West and
Mr. Walters, a retired
Army lieutenant
general, is the United
States ambassador to
the United Nations.
This is drawn from a
recent UN address.
Cuban commandos deploying from a Soviet-built Cuban Air Force AN-26
transport plane during training exercises. Photo from DoD Still Photo
Collection.
elsewhere, have not yet awakened to the
danger that Soviet communism poses to
freedom. Those who still have doubts
should talk to the millions of refugees,
orphans, widows and bereaved parents
and siblings produced by that system, all
of whom know what communism does to
those it has conquered. They cannot ask
the millions who have been murdered or
who reside in labor camps, prisons and
mental "hospitals" for daring to think.
Those who did not believe that con-
centration camps and plans for the ex-
termination of whole peoples existed in
Nazi Germany came to realize their
error - again, too late for the victims.
What will be said about us: That we
refused to see what was in front of us?
That we ignored the pleas of millions of
victims?
Let us consider the question of human
rights in Cuba. If there is a regime guilty
of the human long-term, flagrant, and
massive violations of human rights
envisioned in past resolutions adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly, it
is the regime of the Castro brothers in
Cuba.
No other regime in this hemisphere has
as dismal a record as that compiled by
the Castro government. Since it took
control on Jan.1, 1959, this regime has
become a brutal dictatorship. Unlike the
evolving democracies throughout the
Americas, Cuba is, according to the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, "a totalitarian political system."
For nearly three decades, this regime
has abused the Cuban people with im-
punity without even a cursory in-
vestigation by the United Nations. In
fact, Cuba has cosponsored a number of
UN resolutions concerning human rights.
No one in the UN can claim ignorance
of what is happening in Cuba. On at least
two occasions - 1961 and 1974 -
significant pieces of that evidence came
before organs of the United Nations.
WALTERS: Soviet-style
Communism Abuses Cubans
WRAP-UP: Commissary
Victory Aids Retention 2
GOLDWATER: Goldwater and
His Final Defense Budget 5
GATES: Soviets Know That
SDI Will Work 8
GOTODA: Japanese Position -
SDI Aids Deterrence 9
BUCKELEW: Terrorism Will
Continue Indefinitely 14
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WRAP-UP
Commissary
victory Aids
Retention
"Quality of Life" and "Year of the
Family" are two slogans that are im-
portant aspects of today's military, the
"Total Force" of both the active and
reserve components.
These two factors have significant
impacts on personnel retention in that
Total Force. In turn, retention affects
readiness and - in the case of reserve
components - also the mobilization
potential and effectiveness.
It is for this reason - personnel
retention's impact on national security -
that the Reserve Officers Association
this fall took the lead in informing
Congress of the need to make practical
the authority for drilling reservists to use-
the commissary system.
The Congress earlier had authorized
this use but restricted it to the periods of
active duty, regardless of whether a
commissary existed at the location or
whether it was feasible to visit any
commissary.
Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery and
Sen. J. James Exon amended the
Defense authorization bill to provide a
spreading out of the commissary use
based on the number of drill days per-
formed: Even though not every drilling
reservist will find it possible to use this
benefit, the fact is that the potential for
use soon will exist. The perception of
even handed treatment of the reserve
components of the Total Force should go
a long way to aid retention.
When Maj. Gen. William F. Ward, Jr.,
became Chief of the Army Reserve in
December, he cited retention as his "No.
1 priority."
Vice Admiral Cecil J. Kempf, Chief of
the Naval Reserve, told this column that
retention is his greatest problem. "We
used to lose a third of our force, or 33,000,
a year," he remarked, "but now it has
been cut to 20 per cent or 20,000. A
quarter of those who leave blame family
matters. The improved commissary
program definitely will help in this
area."
National security is the name of ROA's
mission as spelled out in the
Congressional Charter. Improved
retention, and how it is influenced by
such matters as the commissary
legislation, is an integral element of that
national security. HMH
Cuban President Fidel
Castro, after 26 years,
is still committed to
violent revolution and a
close alignment with the
Soviet Union. Photo
from DoD Still Photo
Collection.
Continued from page 1.
That evidence was ignored. This failure
to call the Castro regime to account is
beyond understanding.
The United States accuses the
government of Cuba of systematic and
"The political structure of the
state and the role of the
Communist Party in Cuba,
however, bear no resemblance
to those principles. In Cuba
this democratic dream has
become .a totalitarian nightmare -
a revolution betrayed."
flagrant abuses of basic human rights
and freedoms so offensive that they
demand universal condemnation. We ask
the international community to consider,
carefully and objectively, the over-
whelming evidence supporting this ac-
cusation.
Thirty years ago, the 26th of July
Movement, fighting to overthrow the
Batista dictatorship, issued its
"Manifesto" with the goals and prin-
ciples guiding the revolution.
The "Manifesto" expressed a deter-
mination to have the following in Cuba:
? "A democratic republic, inspired by
the credo of freedom and founded on the
character and capacity of its citizens;
? "A form of the government and a
system of public and individual rights
that will be fully practiced in real life and
not forgotten in written constitutions and
laws;"
? An inauguration of "true political
democracy; that is, the competition of
ideas between political parties and a
representative government based on the
genuine expression of the general will."
These principles of democracy have
taken root throughout most of the
Americas. The political structure of the
state and the role of the Communist
Party in Cuba, however, bear no
resemblance to those principles. In Cuba
this democratic dream has become a
totalitarian nightmare - a revolution
betrayed.
How are fundamental freedoms af-
fected? Although the "Manifesto" placed
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the Cuban revolution within the liberal
tradition, for the past 28 years such
freedoms have been abridged or
abolished in every sphere of Cuban life.
Basic "rights" are limited to the "ex-
clusive service of the working people and
the interest of the society," as defined by
the party.
Dr. Ricardo Bofill, the Cuban human
rights activist now in his third month in
the Freedom Embassy in Havana, wrote
from prison in August 1983 that "the most
frequently violated articles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in Cuba are those concerning freedom of
thought, freedom of conscience, freedom
of religion, freedom of opinion and ex-
pression; as well as the right to receive
and transmit information and ideas
through any means available to the
people." The possession or distribution
of the Universal Declaration constitutes
a crime.
The freedoms of expression and
assembly do not exist. An innocuous
education and all but menial forms of
employment.
Baptism and catechism instruction
and attendance suffer from the shortage
of churches and priests and from
relentless intimidation by the so-called
CDR's - Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution - or what Armando
Valladares has referred to as "vigilance
committees."
Pastors and members of Protestant
denominations are persecuted and im-
prisoned for preaching, and the
reproduction or distribution of religious
materials can mean jail or execution.
The treatment of political offenders is
unrelentingly severe: preventive
detention, house arrest, forced
psychiatric treatment, confinement in a
forced labor camp, imprisonment under
strength to survive usually become
chronically ill, permanently disfigured
or disabled. When the sentence has been
served, it is likely to be arbritrarily
extended.
"A new generation of political
prisoners has emerged, primarily
youths who' have tried to
leave Cuba, insisting on being
separated from the criminals
and the political prisoners
participating in the rehabilitation
plans, thus becoming new
plantados."
"political" expression can result in
imprisonment or death. Membership in
private associations is precluded;
membership in "mass organizations" is
virtually required. . -
There is no freedom of the press. The
state controls all of the media and
publishing houses. It censors the news. It
subjects authors to rigorous political
screening before publishing any of their
works.
Artistic freedom does not exist. The
official "workshop" system for artists
and writers ensures state control. Ap-
proved subjects for creative works
demand not only ideological correctness
but active promotion of state interests.
Those who dare to create otherwise
spend years in prison.
Repression of religion is as thorough
and pervasive as repression of political
opposition. The construction of churches
is restricted; many old ones have been
closed. Believers are denied higher
ironically, in spite of the regime's
efforts - perhaps because of them - in
Cuban prisons, and among a growing
segment of Cuban society, to have been a
plantado is a badge of honor. We hear of a
new class of prisoners, sentenced for
crimes committed in the struggle to
survive, asking to be confined, not with
ordinary criminals, but with the plan-
tados.
Cuban children training with Soviet-supplied AK-47 assault rifles. Photo from DoD
Still Photo Collection.
barbaric conditions, or execution by
firing squad. Castro has learned well
from his Soviet masters.
The political prisoner does not have the
privileges available to common
criminals nor, often, even the necessities
of life. He will have cramped living
conditions, poor food, rationed water,
and inadequate medical care. He will
suffer frequent and sadistic punishment
such as deprivation of sleep and sunlight,
denial of food and medicine, and
psychological or physical torture.
If the prisoner rebels by refusing to
participate in "political rehabilitation"
programs or to wear the uniform of a
common criminal -that is, if he becomes
a "plantado" - the brutality of the
punishment escalates.
Even those with the faith and the
A new generation of political prisoners
has emerged, primarily youths who have
tried to leave Cuba, insisting on being
separated from the criminals and the
political prisoners participating in the
rehabilitation plans, thus becoming new
plantados. While there are too many who
have suffered to list here, I will mention
now a few who represent the struggle and
suffering of Cuba:
*The founder and president of the
Cuban Committee for Human Rights,
Dr. Ricardo Bofill, who is now in the
French Embassy in Havana, and his
colleagues - Domingo Jorge Delgado
Castro, Jose Luis Alvarado, Enrique
Hernandez, Adolfo Rivero Caro and
Elizardo Sanchez - who are in prison for
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The Cuban
magazine "Verde
Olivo, " captions this
picture: "The ac-
tivities of SEPM!
ensure that the new
generation learns,
among other things,
to shoot, and shoot
well!!" SEPMI is
the patriotic military
education society
that promotes
military activities
among Cuban
children.
having attempted to register their
organization.
? Renowned poets Armando
Valladares and Jorge Valls, who in verse
and personal memoir have told of the
clash in Cuba's jails between inhuman
cruelty and superhuman spirit;
? Brilliant student revolutionary
Pedro Luis Boitel and the distinguished
attorney Dr. Aramis Taboada, both of
whom were friends of Castro during their
youth. Both have lost their lives for
opposing communism.
? Jurist Vera Escalona, a judge
removed for her independence and
sympathy for political defendants, now
serving an 80-year sentence on false
charges of corruption;
? Labor leader Guido Faraninan
Hernandez, one of several who spoke
with workers about establishing an in-
dependent trade union in Cuba and who,
like Dr. Taboada, died in jail.
? Former comandante of the
revolution Huber Matos, tried and
convicted of being a counter-
revolutionary in 1960 for protesting
the revolution's betrayal; and
? Legislator Ramon Grau Alsina, a
nephew of Cuba's former president, who,
after ensuring his family's safe depar-
ture in 1960, remained to help thousands
of children to escape - a crime
described by his tormentors as worse
even than to attempt assassination of
Castro himself.
But the regime also persecutes
countless ordinary people.
? Antonio Frias Sosa, a teen-ager
arrested in Havana last August for
having a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Hours
after his arrest, his body came home; he
allegedly committed suicide.
? Teresita Diaz Gonzalez, the
secretary of a judge convicted in the
same case as Dr. Taboada, sentenced to
15 years in prison because of her loyalty
to her friend.
? Luis Gonzalez, a common soldier in
Batista's army arrested on Jan. 2, 1959,
"United Nations investigation
into the deplorable human
rights situation in Castro's
Cuba is also long overdue.
We hope that the members
of the UN will join us in
expressing our concerns over
what is happening to the
people in Cuba."
and in jail since then without a trial; he
has seen neither his wife nor his children
in all those years; whose faith in God,
like that of so many other plantados,
enables him to go on; and who worries
about his friend Ignacio Cuesta Valles,
who also languishes in prison.
These are not pleasant things. What
pleasantries can be said, however, about
a system that has driven some 15 per cent
of its population into exile; that operates
a vast network of prisons, labor camps
and firing squads to keep itself in power;
that still holds some 15,000 political
prisoners; that engages in terrorism?
What defense is there for a regime so
brutal that ordinary people try to float to
Florida on inner tubes - risking death
from exposure, thirst and sharks - in.
order to escape it? Cuba has the highest
number of political prisoners, per capita,
in the world.
On Nov. 25, the United States UN
delegation introduced a resolution on the
question of human rights in Cuba. This
draft resolution is long overdue. United
Nations investigation into the deplorable
human rights situation in Castro's Cuba
is also long overdue. We hope that the
members of the UN will join us in ex-
pressing our concerns over what is
happening to the people of Cuba. I can
assure the world that the United States
will not cease introducing the subject of
human rights in Cuba into every ap-
propriate forum.
We must not tolerate a "double stan-
dard" in human rights. Tyrannies of the
left should not be any more immune from
condemnation than those of the right. We
must shatter the "mystique" that has
surrounded the Cuban dictator. We must
let him, and those who would follow him,
know that the civilized world will not
witness their brutalities impassively.
We will not allow the awful truth to be
hidden. The world must know. ^
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Goldwater and His
Final Defense Budget
Retiring Chairman,of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator
Goldwater also is a retired Air Force Reserve major general. Official US
Navy photo.
n resolving the differences bet-
ween the House and Senate
versions of the Fiscal "Year 1987
Defense Authorization bill, the arms
control provisions in the House bill
proved to be some of the most difficult
issues the conferees faced.
The House of Representatives attached
a sweeping series of arms control
provisions to the defense bill this year.
These included:
? A moratorium on US nuclear tests
above one kiloton;
? A ban on testing of the US an-
tisatellite system against objects in
space;
? A prohibition on the expenditure of
funds that would put the US above the
numerical sublimits of the SALT II
agreement;
? Significant reductions in the
binding the US to the numerical
(SDI) program;
? A ban on the modernization of the
aging and increasingly ineffective US
chemical deterrent.
From the point of view of the Senate
conferees, the adoption of any one of
these provisions would do significant
harm to our national security. In each
case, the House provisions would con-
"In the midst of important
and delicate arms reduction
negotiations, the adoption
of these provisions by
the House of Representatives
was ill-timed and ill-advised."
strain programs that are vital to our
national security. As a result, these
provisions would undermine the US
negotiating posture in Geneva.
The Soviet Union has no Soviet military
programs. Hence, the House provisions
unilaterally constrain the US and play
into the hands of the Soviet Union and its
negotiators.
In the midst of important and delicate
arms reduction negotiations, the
adoption of these provisions by the House
of Representatives was ill-timed and ill-
advised.
The task of resolving these issues was
made all the more difficult by the in-
sistence of the House leadership that
their conferees on the defense bill be
stacked in an effort to guarantee an
This article is based
on Mr. Goldwater's
Congressional remarks
in presenting the
Defense
authorization bill this
fall in one of his final
official actions before
retiring.
S
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Defense budget provides for such sophisticated weaponry as shown in this test conducted by the Joint Cruise Missiles Project in April. At left a
Tomahawk cruise missile launched from a submerged submarine off the coast of California approaches its target, a revetted aircraft on San
Celemente Island, after a flight of more than 400 miles. Over the target, center the missile's 1000 lb bull pup conventional warhead detonates at its
prescribed altitude and flight path as preplanned at the Theater Mission Planning Center in Norfolk, VA. The subsequent explosion and blast
fragments from the warhead destroys the target below, right. DoD photo courtesy of Still Photo Collection.
outcome on key provisions that was
favorable to the House. The House had a
total of 77 conferees, just 31 of whom
were actually members of the House
Armed Services Committee.
On the arms control issues in par-
ticular, a select group of House members
were assigned exclusive responsibility,
and most of the House Armed Services
Committee conferees were not even
allowed to vote on these issues. This
deprived the conference of the expertise
on defense matters that members of the
House Armed Services Committee
possess, and it made an already.difficult
conference process even more difficult.
If the House leadership continues this
practice of stacking conferences, our
ability to work out agreements on these
important defense issues in the future is
in grave doubt. This not only threatens to
complicate conferences on the defense
bill, but to future conferences on all
issues and for all Committees.
I strongly encourage my successor as
Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, and my colleagues in the
Senate, to make it clear to the House of
Representatives that we will not tolerate
their efforts to stack defense conferences
in the future.
Under these very trying cir-
cumstances, a great deal of credit should
be given to Senator Warner and Senator
Nunn. They were assigned the unen-
viable task of trying to resolve these
arms control issues with the House. They
worked long and hard at this task, which
was made all the more important in view
of the planned meeting between
President Reagan and Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik.
The Senate felt that it was very im-
portant to resolve these issues before this
meeting in an effort to send President
Reagan to Iceland with strong domestic
support and able to deal from a position
of strength. The House was also eager to
settle these differences before the
Iceland summit.
I am not entirely satisfied with the final
outcome on these arms control issues.
"The Senate felt that it
was very important to resolve
these issues before this
meeting in an effort to send
President Reagan to Iceland
with strong domestic support
and able to deal from a
position of strength."
However, in view of the number of well
intentioned but terribly naive provisions
adopted by the House, I believe that the
Senate did a good job in limiting the
damage done to our national security.
The House agreed to drop its provisions
binding the U S to the numerical
sublimits. of the unratified and expired
SALT II agreement. Instead, the con-
ferees adopted non-binding sense of the
Congress language urging the President
to remain within these sublimits. This
provision preserves the President's
flexibility to take whatever action with
respect to the SALT II Treaty that he
judges to be in our: national security
interest.
It was astonishing' that the House
conferees insisted that the Senate drop a
provision stating that it is not in our
national interest to abide by a treaty that
the Soviet Union is clearly violating.
International law is very clear regarding
the rights of one party to a treaty to
respond in the event of a material breach
by another party. If the House truly,
believes that the US should unilaterally
adhere to a treaty that the Soviet Union is
violating, let them make that point in
public and not behind the closed doors of
a conference.
The House also agreed to drop the
binding provision in its bill prohibiting all
US nuclear tests with a yield greater than
one kiloton. Instead, the conferees
adopted a non-binding sense of the
Congress provision regarding
ratification of the Threshold Test Ban
(TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions (PNET) Treaties; and
negotiations on a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.
President Reagan has indicated that he
intends to seek ratification of the TTBT
and PNET agreements during the 100th
Congress, either with an improved
package of verification provisions that he
has negotiated with the Soviet Union, or
with a reservation stating that the
treaties do not take effect until the
6
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Aa~
Soviets agree to these verification im-
provements.
Following ratification of these
agreements, the President will begin
negotiations on further testing
limitations in parallel with our arms
reduction negotiations.
The Senate agreed to a House provision
which extended the ban on testing of the
US antisatellite (ASAT) program against
objects in space for another year. The
Senate agreed to this provision with the
greatest reluctance, because the Soviet
Union already possesses an operational
antisatellite system, and the US has no
comparable capability. No limitations
were placed on tests against points in
space.
The conferees agreed to split the dif-
ference between their bills on funding for
the President's Strategic Defense
Initiative program. As a result, $3,213.0
million was provided to the Department
of Energy, for a total of $3.53 billion.
The level agreed to by the conferees
will delay the development of options to
enhance deterrence through the in-
troduction of strategic defenses into our
deterrent posture. This figure is well
below the level required for this program
- the importance of which to US national
security was reaffirmed in Iceland.
The House agreed to drop its
prohibition on the expenditure of funds
for the binary chemical modernization
program. The conferees agreed to fully
fund production of the 155mm artillery
shell, and agreed to provide $35.0 million
for the BIGEYE binary chemical bomb.
However, they prohibited the ex-
penditure of funds for BIGEYE until Oct.
1, 1987, and prohibited the final assembly
of the BIGEYE bomb until Oct. 1, 1988.
While the President requested $320
billion for defense in 1987, the Congress
has decided to provide only $291.9 billion
in this bill - a reduction of more than $28
billion. I wish to go on record, stating in
the clearest way I can, we are cutting
TOO MUCH from defense. I remind my
colleagues that last year, instead of
providing for some reasonable growth in
the defense budget, we actually had
negative real growth of nearly four per
cent. And this year, we have again set a
level of funding which provides negative
real growth of almost three per cent.
Now let's not kid ourselves. Anyone
who thinks we can go on cutting the
defense budget to the point where we
actually have declining growth rates of
more than three per cent a year without
undermining our defense. posture, is
indulging in happy but entirely
unrealistic delusion.
Our defense budgets over the last two
years have set in motion a dangerous
trend which, if not reversed, may have
profound consequences on our future. I
have a terrible sense that we are
"I suggest that before
anyone gets carried away
by the new Soviet image,
we first look very carefully
at Soviet actions around the
world. Until those actions
are consistent with Soviet
rhetoric, I suggest we pay
more attention to their deeds,
and less to their words."
returning to the irresponsible policies of
the late 1970s.
I remind my colleagues that despite
the fact that Soviet leaders have recently
acquired a new and more sophisticated
public relations strategy, there is no
reason to believe the objectives of that
totalitarian government are any dif-
ferent nor any less threatening now than
were the objectives of their less artful
Soviets continue to test and manufacture chemical weapons despite world pressure to ban their
use. Afghanistan is one Soviet venture in which chemical weapons have been used. This is a
sketch of a nerve agent production plant captured by the Soviets during World War H. From
DodD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986. "
predecessors. And I suggest that before
anyone gets carried away by the new
Soviet image, we first look very carefully
at Soviet actions around the world. Until
those actions are consistent with Soviet
rhetoric, I suggest we pay more attention
to their deeds, and less to their words.
I am not at all pleased that we have had
to cut so much from defense. However,
we have complied with the budget
resolution targets adopted earlier this
year; and at the same time, have tried to
minimize the adverse consequences on
our nation's security. This has been a
very difficult task.
Our conference was without question,
the most difficult conference in which I
have ever participated. The House
leadership, in an attempt to guarantee
the outcome on several important issues
(most of which were not even germane to
our bill), stacked the conference with
several groups of exclusive conferees,
any one of which had the ability under the
rules to block a final conference report.
Despite this effort to "rig" the con-
ference, we were able to point out that
there were more than 1,600 funding
differences to be resolved, and more than
400 language differences; that is the
greatest number of issues we have ever
had to resolve in a defense conference.
7
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The Soviets' 441 SS-20 LRINF launchers are a constant reminder of the growing nuclear threat from accurate and survivable mobile missile
systems. This SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher is configured for operational deployment. Photo from DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986. "
Soviets Know That SDI Will Work
One of the most significant
developments in the nuclear age
was the President's call to the
nation in March 1983 to build a strategic
defense system to protect the United
States and' its allies. This visionary
concept and the President's deter-
mination to bring it to reality initially
was greeted with widespread skepticism
and a good deal of head shaking over his
presumed naivete.
And yet, as the nation's scientists and
engineers have been mobilized, the
technologies examined, and successful
tests carried out a growing number of
scientists and political leaders have
come not only to accept the validity of the
concept but the wisdom of implementing
it.
While skeptics and critics continue to
Mr. Gates, Deputy
Director of the
Central Intelligence
Agency, gave this
address Nov. 25 to the
World Affairs Council
of Northern
California.
voice their doubts, there is one person in
the world who believes nearly as strongly
as Ronald Reagan that SDI will work and
that America can build it if it decides to
do so - and that person is Mikhail
Gorbachev.
Observers are surprised by the breadth
and depth of the Soviet program and the
long term commitment they have made
"The Soviets believe that
nuclear war could occur and,
in light of that act, they
have designed their military
programs to try to enable
the Soviet Union to survive
and to prevail."
to strategic defense, including advanced
technologies. It is, ironic that the US
effort to achieve strategic defense is the
focus of world attention, as if the Soviet
program had never existed. Indeed the
principal question is why we have waited
so long to create a defense for our
country - to prevent nuclear weapons
from reaching their targets.
Until March 1983, the United States
developed its strategic military
programs within the strategic reality
that the existence of huge nuclear ar-
senals and the vulnerability of both sides
to those. weapons would lead each side to
calculate that a nuclear attack would be
suicidal - that even if one side preemp-
ted, the other side would have enough
weapons remaining to destroy the still-
vulnerable initiator of the conflict. This is
the concept we have known as mutual
assured destruction. Even though this
has not been out official policy, it has
been the reality.
There are two problems with this
concept. First, the Soviets never ac-
cepted it. The Soviets believe that
nuclear war could occur and, in light of
that fact, they have designed their
military programs to try to enable the
Soviet Union to survive and to prevail.
This includes the development over
many years, and continuing until today,
of a massive national strategic air
defense against bombers and cruise
missiles, a ballistic missile defense of
Moscow and a vigorous R&D program as
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well as large scale measures for
leadership protection, civil defense, and
protection of vital elements of the
national economy.
It speaks volumes that in a relationship
in which for 20 or more years strategic
stability presumably has been working to
eliminate its own vulnerability and
consolidate a unilateral strategic ad-
vantage.
Second, the offensive balance has not
been maintained. To take just one
example, the Soviets have continued to
improve their heavy ICBM force in order
to be able to take out all of the US ICBM
force, other nuclear force installations,
and the few hardened leadership
facilities we have. Their heavy ICBM
force is designed in order for the Soviets
to strike first, and effectively, despite
their propaganda claim that they would
not use nuclear weapons first.
The Soviet concept, an initial strike by
their heavy ICBMs, is the essential lead
element of their strategic defenses, for it
reduces the nuclear threat with which the
rest of their defenses have to contend.
.Only by understanding the scope of this
Soviet effort, our own vulnerability, and
"The Soviet concept, an
initial strike by their heavy
ICBMs, is the essential lead
element of their strategic
defenses, for it reduces the
nuclear threat with which the
rest -of their defenses
have to contend."
the destabilizing effect of this imbalance
-recognized for years by our own
military as a serious flaw - can one fully
understand the significance of the
President's initiative.
The Soviets have devoted considerable
resources to strategic defense. Over .the
last two decades, the Soviet Union has
spent roughly as much on strategic
defense as it has on its massive strategic
offensive forces.
While estimates of Soviet spending on
their military programs are based on an
arcane and in absolute terms not par-
ticularly reliable science, there is some
value in it for comparative purposes. For
example, it is our judgement that over
the past 10 years the Soviet Union has
W
ii ;
JAPANESE POSITION
SDI Aids Det
As a nation committed to peace, we
earnestly aspire to the enhanced
stability in the East-West
relations through substantial reduction
of nuclear arsenals, and to the ultimate
elimination of all nuclear weapons from
the world.
At the beginning of last year, President
Reagan explained to the Prime Minister
that the objective of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) was the
ultimate elimination of all nuclear
weapons by rendering ballistic missiles
ineffective through the means of non-
nuclear defensive systems and we have
expressed our understanding for such a
research program. We have since
received an invitation from the United
States Government to participate in this
research program, and have been
carefully considering our response
thereto.
In the meantime, Prime Minister
Nakasone, at his meeting with President
Reagan at Bonn in May last year, con-
firmed with the President that
? The Initiative was not designed to
seek unilateral superiority over the
Soviet Union;
? The Initiative should contribute to
the maintenance and strengthening of
the deterrence of the West as a whole;
? The aim of the Initiative was to bring
about substantial reduction of offensive
nuclear weapons;
? The Initiative should be carried out
in conformity with the ABM Treaty and
? Consultation with allies and
negotiations with the Soviet Union should
precede deployment.
Since then, the United States has
consistently explained to us that the SDI
is a research program designed to
provide technical knowledge for the
future US decision on the development
and deployment of the strategic defense
systems and that the basic thrust of the
This is the official
Japanese policy on
SDI as prepared by
Mr. Gotoda, Minister
of State and Chief
Cabinet Secretary.
erre nce
program is to conduct research on
sophisticated non-nuclear defensive
systems in parallel with the efforts in
arms control and disarmament talks,
and, ultimately, to eliminate all nuclear
weapons.
We think that such basic ideas of the
United States are in conformity with the
position of Japan committed to peace as
described above.
The United States' pursuit of the
research under such a program and
consequent progress of technologies
related to non-nuclear defensive systems
would possibly contribute to the
deterrence of not only the United States
but the Westas a whole, including Japan.
Furthermore, our participation, in this
research program will lead to further
enhancement of mutual cooperation
between our two countries under the
Japan-US Security Treaty, and thus is
conducive to the effective operations of
the Japan-US security system.
The SDI comprises a multitude of
research projects conducted
simultaneously and on a large scale to
explore the feasibility of related
technologies. Furthermore, if our par-
ticipation in this research program
enables us to utilize its fruits in an ap-
propriate manner, it may have sub-
stantial effects on the progress of related
technologies in our country.
We expect that Japan's participation
will be related to particular phases of
specific projects designed by the United
.States. In the light of the significance of
our participation as stated previously,
we consider it appropriate to deal with
the question of participation within the
framework of existing domestic laws of
Japan and bilateral agreements with the
United States, and in the similar way the
exchange of defense-related technologies
has so far been dealt with.
On such a standpoint, we have decided
to enter into consultations with the
United States Government on specific
measures to ensure that the participation
be carried out smoothly.
Although the authoritative in-
terpretation of the Diet resolutions can
only be made by the Diet, it is the un-
derstanding of the government that
Japan's participation in the SDI research
program in the manner described here is
not inconsistent with the 1969 Diet
Resolution concerning the exploration
and use of the outer space. ^
9
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WZW
JAPAN
Prime Minister
To the Diet
61
In parallel with its negotiating efforts for arms control and
disarmament, the United States is conducting research on
advanced, non-nuclear defense systems and promoting
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research in line with the
basic ideal of ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons, work
which is consistent with Japan's position as a nation of peace.
Believing that Japanese participation in SDI research could
contribute to the more effective operation of our security
arrangements with the United States and that it has the
potential for influencing progress in related technological fields
in Japan, the administration has recently decided to enter into
consultations with the United States on specific measures to
facilitate Japanese participation. 95
-Prime Minister Yashiro Nakasone to the 107th Session of the
National Diet, Sept. 12, 1986.
spent nearly $150 billion on strategic
defense, or almost 15 times what the
United States has spent.
And what have they bought for their
money? They have the world's only
operational ballistic missile defense
system, installed around Moscow. Six
years ago they began to upgrade and
expand that system - actually, to
replace it with a completely new system
- to the limits allowed by the 1972 ABM
Treaty.
When completed the modernized
Moscow ABM system will be a two-layer
defense composed of silo-based long-
range modified Galosh interceptors; silo-
based, high-acceleration Gazelle in-
terceptors designed to engage targets
within the atmosphere; associated
engagement and guidance radars; and a
new large radar at Pushkino designed to
control ABM engagements. The silo-
based launchers may be reloadable. The
new system will have the 100 ABM
launchers permitted by the Treaty and
could be fully operational in 1988.
The Soviet system for detection and
tracking of . ballistic missile attacks
consists of three layers - a launch
detection satellite network, two over-the-
horizon radars directed at US ICBM
fields, and two networks of large ballistic
missile detection and tracking radars.
The current layer of ballistic missile
detection radars consists of 11 large
ballistic missile early warning radars at
locations on the periphery of the USSR.
These radars can distinguish the size of
an attack, confirm the warning from the
satellite network and the over-the-
horizon radar .systems, and provide
target tracking data.
The Soviets are now constructing a
network of nine new large phased array
radars - three new ones have been
detected this year - that can track more
ballistic missiles with greater accuracy
than the existing network. Most of these
duplicate or supplement the coverage of
the earlier network but with greatly
enhanced capability. The radar under
construction near Krasnoyarsk in
Siberia, however, closes the final gap in
the Soviet early warning radar coverage
against ballistic missile attacks.
Together the nine new larged phased
array radars cover almost all ap-
proaches to the Soviet Union; the Soviets
will undoubtedly build one or two more
such radars to complete this coverage.
(It is the Krasnoyarsk radar, by the way,
that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is
not located within 150 kilometer radius of
the national capital as required of ABM
radars, nor is it located on the-periphery
of the Soviet Union or pointed outward,
as required by the Treaty for early
warning radars. That is why the Soviets
made the preposterous claim that it was
a space tracking radar.)
The growing network of new large
phased array ballistic missile detection
and tracking radars of which
Krasnoyarsk is a part, is of particular
concern when linked with other Soviet
ABM efforts. Such radars take years to
Foreign Affairs
And Parliament
It seems that Mr. Gorbachev is now trying to make progress of
any sort depend -on progress on SDI. He wants a super-
restrictive interpretation -more probably a revision - of the
ABM Treaty, and a veto over any future deployments before
questions about their feasibility are answered.
"This, approach carefully overlooks the Russians' own ac=
tivities in these areas. The United Kingdom therefore continues
to support research within the restrictive interpretation of the
ABM Treaty. 55
-Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, to the House of Commons, Nov. 14, 1986.
in
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construct and the existence of highly
capable radars might allow the Soviet
Union to move rather quickly to con-
struct a nationwide ABM defense based
on these radars, if it chooses to do so.
The Soviets also are developing
components of a new ABM system which
are apparently designed to allow them to
construct individual ABM sites in a
matter of months rather than the years
that are required for the silo-based ABM
systems going into Moscow.
Soviet activities in this regard
potentially violate the ABM system or
components. We estimate that by using
these components the Soviets could
undertake rapidly paced ABM
deployments 'to strengthen the defenses
of Moscow and defend key targets in the
Western USSR and east of the Urals by
'the early 1900s.
In addition to these developments, the
SA-X-12 surface to air missile system, to
be deployed with the Soviet ground forces
at any time, can engage conventional
aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical
ballistic missiles. It could also have
capabilities to intercept some types of US
strategic ballistic missile re-entry
vehicles. Its technical capabilities bring
to the forefront the problem that im-
proving technology is blurring the
distinction between air defense and ABM
systems. This problem will be further
complicated as newer, more complex air
defense missile systems are developed.
? 1e are concerned that the
Soviets' continuing development efforts
give them the potential for widespread
ABM deployments. The Soviets have the
major components for an ABM system
that could be used for widespread ABM
deployments well in excess of ABM
Treaty. limits. The components include
radars, an above ground launcher, and
the high acceleration missile that will be
deployed around Moscow. The potential
exists for the production lines associated
with the upgrade of the Moscow ABM
system to be used to support widespread
deployment.
Taken together, all of the Soviet
Union's ABM and ABM related activities
are more significant and more ominous
than any one considered individually.
Cumulatively, they suggest that the
USSR may be preparing an ABM defense
of its national territory. Such a defense,
while not as comprehensive an approach
as our own SDI efforts, could provide an
UNITED STATES
President Reagan's
Official Statement
In light of the continuing Soviet offensive buildup, the
longstanding and extensive Soviet programs in strategic
defense, and continued Soviet non-compliance with existing
arms control agreements, SDI is crucial to the future security
of the United States and our allies.
"Americans recognize that SDI was essential in getting the
Soviets to return to the negotiating table, and that it is essential
as well to our prospects for concluding an agreement with the
Soviets to reduce nuclear arms. Effective strategic defenses
would be insurance against Soviet cheating or abrogation of
such an agreement. In addition, they would provide a con-
tinuing incentive to the Soviets to pursue further reductions in
offensive weapons.
"SDI is, therefore, a vital insurance policy that we cannot, and
will not, bargain away. That is a commitment which I have
made to the American people, and I stand by it. 35
-Statement of President Ronald Reagan at the White House, Nov. 12, 1986.
important degree of protection and would
fit well into the Soviet scheme for
strategic defense - this is the only
missing element in their defenses.
Although the United States dismantled
most of its defenses against Soviet
"Taken together, all of the
Soviet Union's ABM and
ABM related activities are
more significant and more
ominous than any one
considered individually.
Cumulatively, they suggest that
the USSR may be preparing
an ABM defense of its
national territory."
bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union
has continued to invest enormous
resources in a wide array of strategic air
defense weapons systems. Currently the
Soviets have nearly 12,000 surface to air
missile launchers at more than 1200
sites; 10,000 air defense radars and more
than 1200 interceptor aircraft dedicated
to strategic defense. An additional 2800
interceptors assigned to Soviet air forces
could also be employed in strategic
defense missions.
The newest Soviet air defense in-
terceptor aircraft, the MIG-31-Foxhound,
has a lookdown, shootdown and multiple
target engagement capability. More than
85 Foxhounds are now operationally
deployed. In contrast, the US has ap-
proximately 300 interceptor aircraft
based in the US, dedicated to strategic
defense, 118 strategic air defense war-
ning radars and no operational strategic
surface to air missile launchers. And this
in the face of the modernization of the
Soviet heavy bomber force and
development of a new Soviet strategic
bomber, the Blackjack, similar in design
to the B-1 but larger and faster.
Finally, the Soviets also have a wide
range of passive defenses to ensure
wartime survivability and continuity of
Soviet nuclear forces, leadership,
military command and control units,
war-related industrial production and
services, the essential work force, and as
much of the population as possible.
The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos,
launch facilities and key command and
11
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 Declassified and Approved ease
control centers to an unprecedented
degree. Much of today's US retaliatory
force would be ineffective against those
hardened targets. Soviet leaders and
managers at all levels of the government
and Party are provided hardened
alternate command posts located well
away from the urban centers, in addition
to many deep bunkers and blast shelters
in Soviet cities.
This comprehensive and redundant
system provides hardened alternate
facilities for more than 175,000 key Party
and government personnel. Elaborate
plans also have been made for the full
mobilization of the national economy in
support of a war effort. Reserves of vital
materials are maintained, many in
hardened underground structures.
Redundant industrial facilities have been
equipped with blast shelters for the work
force and detailed procedures have been
developed for the relocation of selected
plants and equipment.
As if all these developments were not
worrisome enough, since the late 1960s
the Soviet Union also has been pursuing
advanced technologies for strategic
defense - technologies which the US is
intending to explore in its strategic
defense initiative program. The Soviets
expect that military applications of
directed energy technologies hold
promise of overcoming weaknesses in
their conventional air and missile
defenses.
The Soviets have been working as long
as the United States in laser, particle
beam, kinetic energy and microwave
technologies applicable to strategic
weapons.
The Soviet laser weapons program
began in the 1960s. Many Soviet
organizations, both civilian and military,
are involved. The Soviet laser weapon
effort is guided and supported by some of
the best scientists and engineers in the
Soviet Union.
Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising vice
president of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences made his early mark in directed
energy related weapons research.
Velikhov is, by the way, the same
Velikhov who was one of 200 Soviet
signatories of a full page ad in the New
York Times which stated that SDI would
not work. He, and some of the others,
made their mark by demonstrating the
value of these technologies.
The level of effort that the Soviets have
applied to their laser weapons program
is great. While it is difficult for us to
measure the size of this program
precisely, we estimate roughly $1 billion
per year for the laser effort. It is clear,
based on the observed scale and scope of
W
n;
the Soviet effort, that their program is
considerably larger than that of the
United States. For example, the Soviets
have built more than half of a dozen
major R&D facilities and test ranges and
have an estimated 10,000 scientists and
engineers associated with the develop-
ment of lasers for weapons.
The Soviets have conducted research
in the three types of gas lasers that the
This illustrates the coverage of the Soviet
Union's ballistic missile early warning, target-
tracking, and battle management radars. From
DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986. "
US considers promising for weapons
applications: a gas dynamic laser, the
electric discharge laser, and the
chemical laser. Soviet achievements are
impressive. The Soviets have not only
followed suit with the US in their work on
these three kinds of lasers, they have
continued to work on certain types of
lasers which the US abandoned.
The Soviets have been working on
other types of lasers that the US has not
seriously considered for weapons ap-
plication until very recently. They also
are investing excimer, free electron and
x-ray lasers and have been developing
argon ion lasers for over a decade. The
Soviets appear generally capable of
supplying the prime power, energy
storage and auxiliary components
needed for most laser and other directed
energy weapons.
They have developed a rocket-driven
generator which produces more than 15
megawatts of electrical power - a
device that has no counterpart in the
West. The Soviets may also have the
capability to develop the optical systems
necessary for laser weapons to track and
attack their target.
The USSR has now progressed, in some
cases, beyond technology research. It
already has ground-based lasers that
1448R000301230005-5
10JY
could be used to interfere with US
satellites and could have prototype
space-based anti-satellite laser weapons
by the early 1990s. We expect the Soviets
to test the feasibility of ground-based
lasers for defense against ballistic
missiles by the late 1980s and could begin
testing components for a large scale
deployment system in the 1990s.
The remaining difficulties in fielding
an operational system will require still
more development time. An operational
ground-based laser for defense against
ballistic missiles probably could not be
deployed until after the year 2000. If
technology developments prove suc-
cessful, the Soviets may deploy
operational space-based anti-satellite
lasers in the 1990s and might be able to
deploy space-based lasers systems for
defense against ballistic missiles after
the year 2000.
Soviet research and developments
of those technologies that could support a
particle beam weapon also have been
impressive. We estimate that they may
be able to test a prototype particle beam
weapon intended to disrupt the elec-
tronics of satellites in the late 1990s. A
weapon designed to destroy satellites
could follow later. A weapon capable of
physically destroying missile boosters or
warheads probably would require ad-
ditional years of research and
development.
The USSR also has conducted research
in the use of strong radiofrequency
signals that have the potential to in-
terfere with or destroy critical electronic
components of ballistic missile
warheads. The Soviets could test a
ground-based radiofrequency weapon
capable of damaging satellites in the
1990s. Soviet capabilities to develop
micro-wave weapons or radiofrequency
weapons are on a par if not superior to
those of the US.
The Soviets also have a variety of
research programs underway in the area
of kinetic energy weapons using the high
speed collision of a small mass with the
target as the kill mechanism. Long
range, space-based kinetic energy
systems for defense against ballistic
missiles probably could not be developed
until the mid-1990s or even later. The
USSR could, however, deploy in the near
term a short-range space-based system
useful for satellite or space station
defense or for close-in attack by a
maneuvering satellite.
12
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1i'li1UG'v1tvJ\Ii\PER7, 9104Ds7AR11CiI U 1J11I1Cl
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet
success in these advanced defenses
against ballistic missiles are remote
sensor and computer technologies -
currently more highly developed in the
West than in the USSR. The Soviets are
devoting considerable resources to
improving their abilities and expertise in
these technologies. An important part of
that effort involves increasing ex-
ploitation of open and clandestine access
to Western technology. For example, the
Soviets have long been engaged in well
funded efforts to purchase US high
technology computers, ' test and
calibration equipment, and sensors
illegally through third parties.
The Soviets have had a near monopoly
on strategic defenses for many years.
Their primary motivation for engaging
initially in the strategic arms limitation
talks with the United States in 1969 was to
". . . the Soviets, have long
been engaged in well funded
efforts to purchase US high
technology computers, test
and calibration equipment,
and sensors illegally through
third parties."
kill the US anti-ballistic missile program.
Indeed, for many months in the early
stages of SALT, the Soviets refused even
to discuss limits on offensive strategic
systems.
The Soviet effort we see today to kill
SDI is of a piece with the effort nearly 20
years ago to kill ABM. The Soviets
simply do not want the United States to
be able to defend itself against strategic
nuclear weapons. Limited though the
current Soviet anti-ballistic missile
system is, the Soviets are laying the
foundation that will give them the option
of a relatively rapidly deployable
nationwide ABM system - a system that
despite deficiencies would give the
Soviets a significant unilateral ad-
vantage both politically and in time of
war.
Through an intensive worldwide
propaganda campaign, the USSR hopes
that it can dissuade the United States
from pursuing the SDI research program
and thereby preserve the Soviet
monopoly in defense against ballistic
missiles. Indeed, the same Soviet covert
action structure that was used against
the enhanced radiation weapon in the
late 1970s and the deployment of in-
termediate nuclear forces to Europe in
This Dog House radar provides battle management for the antiballistic missile interceptors
around Moscow. Sketch from DoD's "Soviet Military Power, 1986."
the early 80s is now being used against
SDI.
The Soviets wish that the President's
March 23rd announcement had never
been made and that they could pursue
their own solitary development of an
anti-ballistic missile defense and
research on advanced strategic defense
without competition from the United
States. The advent of SDI, however,
faces the Soviets with the mobilization of
an American effort to build a strategic
missile defense in the United States and
they are moving heaven and earth to
convince or pressure the United States to
drop it. They believe we can develop a
highly effective strategic defense, in part
because they are doing large elements of
such a program themselves.
In the Soviet view, a US decision at this
point to give up on defense and to rely
solely on offensive weapons for
deterrence not only would preserve their
monopoly in strategic defense, but would
be a key indicator of a loss of US will to
compete militarily. Moreover, failure to
proceed with an American strategic
defense would- hand the Soviets a
unilateral military advantage of historic
consequence - with awesomely negative
implications for strategic stability and
peace. 0
Russia's northern borders are monitored by this installation at Pechora which includes this
receiver and transmitter of a large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar.
Sketch from DoD's `Soviet Military Power, 1986. "
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301230005-5 -
Terrorism Will Continue, Indefinitely
By Dr. Alvin H. Buckelew
American tourists aboard a
Trans World Airlines plane
leaving Greece are suddenly
thrust into the limelight: one is killed,
and the rest become captives in Beirut,
Lebanon. Other American tourists on an
Italian luxury liner in the Mediterranean
become the victims. of a terrorist act of
piracy on the high seas; again, one
American is killed, all other passengers
become hostages.
The actions of terrorists command
world attention as one incident succeeds
another. Most people consider these
incidents unjustified, but others regard
them as heroic. To illustrate, various
radical Palestinian groups have sworn
publicly to retaliate for the recent
American hijacking of an Egyptian plane
taking Palestine Liberation Front
(PLF) terrorists, Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) officials, and a
number of Egyptian security guards and
officials to Tunisia. The American action
was in retaliation for the Palestinians'
seizure of the Italian liner Achille L auro,
which was meant as a retaliation for the
Israeli destruction of the PLO's
headquarters in Tunisia, which in turn
was intended to retaliate for a
Palestinian terrorist action in Cyprus.
The ripples caused by any given in-
cident never disappear, for each stone
cast into the waters prompts someone
else to cast another stone, keeping the
waters permanently troubled. It
therefore seems certain that the recent
cycle of violence did not end with the
capture of the Palestinians on the
Egyptian plane; terrorism promises to
continue indefinitely.
Less-publicized terrorist incidents also
take their toll. On July 22, 1985, for in-
stance, bombings at the oldest synagogue
in Scandinavia and at a Northwest
Mr. Buckelew heads
Management
Information Research,
a San Francisco
company specializing
in anti-terrorism
matters. This is based
on his talk to the fall
ROA co-sponsored
Bay Area national
security seminar and
an article.
Airlines office in Copenhagen, Denmark,
wounded 27 persons. An organization
calling itself the Islamic Holy War took
the credit for the attack. Two months
later, on September 23, 1985, three men
boarded a yacht moored in a Cyprus
harbor, staged a 10-hour seige, and
killed three Israelis aboard the vessel.
Scarcely a day goes by without some
terrorist incident disturbing the peace of
western Europe - and of the United
States.
All the terrorist incidents mentioned
earlierrelateto the Arab-Israeli conflict,
probably the most intractable current
source of terrorism and coun-
terterrorism. There are, however, many
more sore spots, and a brief description
of the principal terrorist actors currently
operating in western Europe may help
assess the likelihood of future terrorism
in that part of the world.
Of the numerous non-Arab terrorist
"The ripples caused by any
given incident never disappear,
for each stone cast into the
waters prompts someone
else to case another stone,
keeping the waters
permanently troubled."
groups, the most dreaded is the
Provisional Irish Republican Army,
whose members are commonly called
Proves. The group poses as the nemesis
of British rule in Northern Ireland, but
its broader, long-term objectives include
establishing a Marxist state that would
unite Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland under communist rule. For the
past decade, the Provos have murdered,
blackmailed, firebombed, and fought
with local police and with the British
Army.
The innocent bystander cannot escape
merely by staying out of Northern
Ireland, for the Provos have extended
their terrorist campaign to England,
periodically perpetrating bombings and
murders there. It will surprise no one, in
fact, if the Provos eventually manage to
assassinate the British prime minister or
a member of the royal family. The
Provos have close ties with other in-
ternational .terrorist groups, receiving
support from the Soviet Union, its
satellites, Arab terrorist groups, and
even some American sources.
Many indigenous terrorist groups
operate in western Europe, sometimes in
cooperation with the Proves and the
Palestinians. In Spain the most im-
portant of these groups is the extreme
wing of the Basque nationalist
movement. Since the Middle Ages,
Basques living on the Spanish side of the
French-Spanish border have regarded
themselves as a conquered nation.
The terrorism-oriented Euzkadi Ta
Askatasuna ("Basques for Freedom for
the Basque Homeland") has gradually
evolved into another Marxist group with
international connections. Recent
government concessions to Basque
nationalist sensitivities - legalizing the
Basque language and flag, offering
certain amnesty measures, and
bestowing certain political freedoms -
have helped reduce terrorist actions by
the Basques during the past few years.
On the other hand, various less im-
portant regional and political groups are
also responsible for continuing terrorism
in Spain.
The principal sponsor of terrorism in
West Germany is the Red Army Faction
of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Small in
number, extremely left-wing in its views,
and extensively tied to other in-
ternational terrorist groups, the Faction
has largely been kept under control by
the German government. However, the
Faction was part of the terrorist team
that attacked an Israeli El Al jet plane
with a rocket, and part of the group that
assaulted the headquarters of the
Organization of Oil Producing States in
Vienna, Austria. German police
periodically arrest or kill most of the
organization's members, but it always
regroups and strikes again. The Faction
is much more likely than the Basques to
attack American targets, and it has an
affiliated branch in the Netherlands -
the so-called Red Help Group. Perhaps
as many as a dozen left- and right-wing
terrorist groups operate in Italy. The
to
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most destructive of these is known as the
Red Brigades, a group responsible for,
among other things, the abduction and
murder of former Prime Minister Aldo
Moro in 1978, the kidnapping of US
General James Dozier in 1981, the
assassination of Leamon Hunt, director
general of the Sinai Peacekeeping
Forces in 1984, and the assassination of
trade unionist and Christian Democrat
economist Ezio Tarantelli in 1985.
The Brigades receives support from
the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Arab
terrorist groups, but its closest ties are
with the Red Army Faction in West
Germany. Like the Faction, they ad-
vocate the complete destruction of the
existing national social order and its
replacement by an extreme form of
briefly. Only Switzerland, with its ef-
ficient security forces and tolerance for
all shades of political opinion, has
escaped comparatively unscathed.
Elsewhere, anyone at all can be window
shopping, dining in a restaurant, or
traveling by car, train, plane,or ship -
and suddenly become a victim of
terrorist attack.
Statistics maintained by the Rand
Corporation show that, while terrorist
incidents fluctuate in number year by
year, the long-range trend is attributed
solely to chance or better reporting
techniques. The annual rate of increase
in international terrorist incidents during
the first three years of the current
decade was on the order of 30 per cent,
with 1985 another banner year.
beings. By the 1980s, about half of all
such attacks had become directed
against people. Terrorists have shifted
from bombing empty offices to using car
bombs killing large numbers of people.
The fact that more and more civilian
bystanders are dying provides additional
evidence of the increasing callousness
and barbarism of the terrorists. Over the
past two decades, terrorism has ex-
panded in scope and become immensely
more dangerous.
As terrorism has become more
widespread and bloodier, and as it has
been directed ever more obviously
against Americans and their interests,
the anti-terrorist rhetoric of the United
States has escalated. A National Security
Council directive issued April 3, 1984,
The remains of American victims of terrorism arrive at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J. Official
DoD photo..
Maoist (Chinese) communism. Although
the Italian government has experienced
some success recently in suppressing
that nation's terrorist, the activities of
the Red Brigades are continuing.
The steady increase in terrorist ac-
tivity brings new groups on the scene in
western Europe. The past year has
witnessed attacks on NATO and other
defense-related targets across northern
,Europe by groups such as France's
Direct Action and Belgium's Fighting
Communist Cells. These groups have
formed a loose working alliance with
each other and with West Germany's Red
Army Faction. They are also believed to
have links to Italian, Portuguese, Dutch,
and Middle Eastern Terrorists. A Soviet
connection is also possible, although
Moscow may be encouraging the anti-
NATO attacks only passively.
In western Europe, terrorism may
erupt almost anywhere, at any time.
Nations such as France formerly tried to
escape the scrouge of terrorism by
providing safe havens for terrorists, but
succeeded only in delaying that scrouge
Americans have, moreover, in-
creasingly become the targets of
terrorism. Nearly two out of every five
terrorist incidents now involve US
citizens or proper ty. In recent hijacking,
American passengers have been singled
out for the worst treatment.. American
victims have included military per-
sonnel, diplomats, businessmen, and
ordinary tourists. The disproportionate
number of American victims is ex-
plained by the unusual extent to which
Americans serve and travel overseas
and by the fact that they present ex-
cellent targets of opportunity.
For some of the terrorist groups most
active in recent years, identifying the
United States with the interests of Israel,
Great Britain, or even the capitalist
system in general provides a sufficient
pretext for attacks on American targets.
Furthermore, the chronic unwillingness
or inability of the US government to
retaliate effectively makes American
targets particularly attractive to
terrorists.
During the past two decades, terrorism
has become progressively more lethal. In
the early 1970s, 80 per cent of all terrorist
attacks were directed against property
and only 20 per cent against human
"Americans have, moreover,
increasingly become the targets
of terrorism. Nearly two out of
every five terrorist incidents now
involve US citizens or property.
In recent hijacking, American
passengers have been singled
out for the worst treatment."
ordered the US government to develop
options for using military force against
the instigators and perpetrators of
terrorist attacks.
American actions have not, however,
matched the nation's rhetoric, giving the
United States the image of a paper tiger.
Even when it knew who had instigated a
particular act, the United States shrank
from taking the promised action. The
bombing of the American Marine
barracks in Beirut in 1983 was the
deadliest single incident in the annals .of
international terrorism. There was very
strong circumstantial evidence that a
particular Shi'ite Muslim group sup-
ported by Iran and Syria was responsible
for the slaughter.
Swift and effective retaliation is not,
however, a solution to the problem of
terrorism. As a matter of firm policy, for
example, the Israelis never negotiate
with terrorists and always retaliate
immediately. Yet their policy has not
curbed terrorist attacks against Israel
and its citizens; it has instead resulted in
repeated escalation of such attacks,
culminating in a series of wars with
surrounding Arab states. Israel remains
in a technical state of war with most of its
neighbors.
While the United States has great
military capabilities, it appears in-
capable of bringing them to bear against
terrorists, as much less powerful nations
iS
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/22: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301230005-5
such as Israel and France are able to do.
During each terrorist incident involving
Americans, reports circulate that the
dispatched to the vicinity of such in-
cidents, but the conditions for its use
never actually been used.
In the meantime, the United States
continues hardening its facilities in
Europe and elsewhere. Security
measures around official American
establishments in Europe have been
improved, but many American em-
vulnerable to resourceful terrorist at-
tacks. Even if the security measures
taken prove effective, they can only
protect those Americans inside the newly
created fortresses. Those leaving the
fortresses to attend to their duties, and
in the nations of western Europe, remain
targets for terrorist attack.
state of affairs? No, there is none.
Most of the terrorism rampant in
Europe and the Middle East today ' is
including those of Bulgaria, Syria, Iran,
Libya, and Tunisia (which gives the
possible additional support from the
governments of Cuba and Nicaragua.
The terrorist activities of these nations
are, in turn, supported by the war of
international communism against the
United States and all other capitalist
nations, by the relentless drive of the
Soviet Union toward world hegemony, by.
the intense nationalism of Arab states,
damentalists.
The Soviet Union, in particular, is
groups throughout the world as part of a
strategic and utilitarian policy aimed at
European supporters.
Why has the Soviet Union turned away
from conventional warfare, replacing it
to a large, extent with terrorism con-
ducted by its surrogates? Because
technology has made conventional
ween even minor nations ir%yariably
involve the vital interests of a major
regional power; the interests of regional
both superpowers; and a confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet
Union could end with nothing less than
thermonuclear war.
Union is sponsoring terrorism on a large
scale not to cause a world revolution but
to destabilize the West. The existence of
a stable democratic, and prosperous
West necessarily destabilizes the East
bloc. Therefore, in order to stabilize its
East, the Soviet Union must destabilize
the West. According to another analysis,
the Soviet Union tolerates, encourages,
and supports terrorism on the part of its
surrogates, exploiting low-intensity
operations around the world, as a way of
continuing the revolutionary process
against the democratic pluralism of the
Free World.
Terrorism is Moscow's indispensable
tactical tool in its struggle for power and
influence within and among nations. It
"The Sovet Union, in particular,
is systematically supporting
terrorist groups throughout the
world as part of a strategic and
utilitarian policy aimed at
the United States and its
western European supporters."
perceives small terrorist groups, sup-
ported by national states friendly to
Moscow, as capable of conducting
political warfare at the national level and
eventually altering the international
balance of power. Where conventional
warfare is no longer an effective means
of advancing international political in-
terests, indirect means take over:
terrorism,' guerrilla warfare, and sub-
version.
Since the'Sovietsurrogate nations have
unlimited numbers of terrorists at their
disposal, capturing, imprisoning, and
killing the perpetrators of specific acts of
terrorism, and even destroying specific
terrorist groups, can never diminish the
volume of terrorism directed against the
West. To defeat terrorism, it would be
necessary to overthrow the governments
of the states sponsoring terrorism. Since
any attempt to do so would bring on a
confrontation, one that would be unac-
ceptable to either superpower, there is no
way of curbing international terrorism.
The West can only intensify what it has
been doing: spending increasing billions
of dollars annually on improved security
and increased protection for its citizens
and civilian and military facilities;
adopting special defensive measures for
the protection of government officials
and diplomats; creating commando units
designed to fight terrorists and rescue
hostages; and encouraging multinational
corporations to spend large sums of
money protecting their investments and
their executives and employees; in-
and employees.
These measures have failed up to now,
and they will continue to fail, but there is
nothing more effective the West can do,
nations are indifferent to the plight of the
West. These nations envy and resent the
United States for its wealth, culture, and
power, and almost automatically side
against the West on any issue dividing
The United States cannot, however,
retreat back into Fortress America
because of terrorist threats or attacks.
terrorism and would carry a higher
economic, political, and strategic cost.
Terrorism may, sooner or later, spread
the nation will be capable of dealing
within its own borders, even if
regimented existence than they do today.
grimmer in the future. Only an un-
foreseen collapse of communism,-
especially in the Soviet Union, could
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Ritter, 11, USAR; Capt. Judith P. Larsen,
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Assistant Editors
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Association of the United States, 1 Constitution Avenue,
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