WAR BY ANOTHER NAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: November 26, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
?ARTICLEAPP?ARED WASHINGTON TIA11ES
ONPAGE-Z!)I . 26 November 198?6.
ROBERT GATES
he most divisive and
controversial part of
American foreign
policy for nearly four
decades has been our
effort in the Third
World to preserve and defend pro-
Western governments. to resist
Communist aggression and subver-
sion, and to promote economic devel-
opment and democracy
Our continuing difficulty in for-
mulating a coherent and sustainable
bipartisan strategy for the Third
World over two generations con-
trasts sharply with the Soviet
Union's relentless effort there to
eliminate Western influence, to es-
tablish strategically located client
Communist states, and to gain
access to strategic resources.
But while we may debate strategy
and how to respond, the facts of So-
viet involvement in major Third
World conflicts are undeniable. Con-
sider two very painful memories:
? It is clear that the Soviet Union.
and Josef Stalin personally, played a
central role in prompting North Ko-
rea's invasion of the South in 1950,
the cause of our first great postwar
debate over strategy in the Third
World.
? Although the strategic conse-
quences of a victory by North Viet-
nam were hotly debated in the
United States, we now see the Soviet
navy well-entrenched in the great
naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, and
Vietnam's economic and military
dependence on the Soviet Union: we
recall the Soviet military supply line
that made Hanoi's victory possible,
and remember Soviet help in the
conquest of Laos and Cambodia. The
resulting human suffering in
Southeast Asia was even more horri-
fying than predicted.
Somehow, many Americans
thought their first loss of a major
foreign war - Vietnam - would
have no important consequences, es-
pecially as it was accompanied by
Robert Gates is deputy director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
This article is excerpted from a
speech last night before the Com-
monwealth Club of California.
so-called "detente" with the Soviet
Union and the opening to China. Yet,
it was in fact a major watershed in
post-World War II history, especially
as it coincided with the collapse of
Portugal's colonial empire in Africa,
revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua, and congressional ac-
tions in the mid-1970s cutting off all
U.S. assistance to the non-
Communist forces in Angola, thus
signaling the withdrawal of Amer-
ican support for opponents of
Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third
World.
The effects of American defeat in
Vietnam, the revolutions in Iran and
Nicaragua, and the coming to power
of bitterly antagonistic and aggres-
sively destabilizing governments in
all three countries undermined the
confidence of U.S. friends and allies
in the Third World (not to mention in
Europe and Japan) and ensured that
an opportunistic Soviet Union would
see in the Third World its principal
foreign-policy opportunities for
years to come.
And they moved aggressively to
create or exploit such opportunities.
Throughout the Third World. the So-
viet Union and its clients for the past
10 years have incited violence and
disorder and sponsored subversion
of neutral or pro-Western govern-
ments in El Salvador, Honduras, Co-
lombia, various Caribbean states,
Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Ye-
men. Oman, Pakistan, New Caledo-
nia, South Korea, Grenada, and
many others.
The Soviet Union has affixed
itself as a parasite to legiti-
mate nationalist, anti-
colonial movements or to
those who have overthrown repres-
sive or incompetent regimes. and
tried wherever possible to convertor
consolidate them into Marxist-
Leninist dictatorships, as in Nicara-
gua, Angola, Ethiopia, and
Afghanistan. And now, these same
regimes, in the process of consoli-
dating power, are fighting their own
people.
Open warfare by invading Com-
munist armies is being waged in
Cambodia and Afghanistan. And in
most instances of state support for
terrorism, the government involved
is tied in some way to the U.S.S.R.
These contemporary challenges
to international order and stability
- and to democratic values - cer-
tainly grow primarily out of local-
ized and specific circumstances. 'Ib
be sure, there are local economic,
social, racial, human-rights, and
other injustices. And many - too
many - governments have demon-
strated their capacity to inflict hard-
ship and violence on their own peo-
ple. But, that said, we cannot close
our eyes to a common theme across
the entire Third World, and that is
the pervasively destructive role of
the Soviet Union and its clients.
In 1919, Leon Trotsky said, "The
road to London and Paris lies
through Calcutta." This conviction
that the West could more easily and
effectively be weakened and made
vulnerable through the Third World
than by direct confrontation re-
mains central to Soviet foreign
policy. And if you question how
critical this is for Moscow, remem-
ber that the Soviets allowed detente
with the United States, which was
highly advantageous to them, to
founder substantially with succes-
sive presidents in the 1970s because
the U.S.S.R. refused to moderate its
aggressive pursuit of Third World
opportunities - in Angola, Ethiopia,
Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.
In the mid-1970s, the new Soviet
tactics in the Third World, combined
with historic events and opportuni-
ties, emerged to challenge Western
presence, progress toward democ-
racy, and sound economic develop-
ment in the Third World.
The new tactics were designed to
minimize the chance of a repetition
of disastrous setbacks such as their
expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and
the ouster of a Marxist regime in
Chile in 1973. The strategy has five
parts:
First, the cornerstone of the new
Soviet approach was the use of Cu-
ban forces to establish and sustain
the power of "revolutionary govern-
ments." They first helped consoli-
date radical power in Angola. This
was followed by the dispatch of thou-
sands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia,
where that regime also became de-
pendent on their support.
This tactic of using Third World
Communist or radical states as sur-
rogates in the Third World subse-
quently involved assisting Vietnam's
conquest of the remainder of Indo-
china; Libya's designs in Chad and
plotting against Sudan; South Ye-
men's aggression against Oman and
North Yemen; and Cuba's support of
regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada, and
Suriname, as well as the insurgency
in El Salvador.
Second, when radical govern-
ments came to power without the aid
of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua,
Soviets directly or through surro-
gates such as East Germany helped
in the establishment of an internal
security structure to ensure that any
possible challenge from within
would be stamped out.
Panf'iasal
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
supplement these tactics with more
traditional offerings such as tech-
nical and political training in the
U.S.S.R., the rapid supply of weap-
ons, and the use of a wide range of
covert actions to support friends and
to help defeat or destabilize un-
friendly challengers or govern-
ments.
Fourth, the U.S.S.R. proved in
Afghanistan that it would still be
willing to launch its own forces at
targets on its periphery - and per-
haps elsewhere - when and if cir-
cumstances were right.
Fifth, and finally, the Soviets ad-
vised new radical regimes to mute
their revolutionary rhetoric and to
try to keep their links to Western
commercial resources, foreign as-
sistance, and international financial
institutions. Soviet ambitions did not
cloud their recognition that they
could not afford more economic de-
pendents such as Cuba and Vietnam.
Soviet support for the radical
regimes it has helped estab-
lish has been sustained. The
Soviets and their East Euro-
pean allies have provided military
and economic assistance to Nicara-
gua over the past five years ap-
proaching $2.5 billion. Compare this
with the highly controversial $100
million American program to assist
the resistance in that country. The
Soviets have provided a full range of
military weapons and support and
also have become Nicaragua's major
source of economic aid.
In Angola, total Communist mili-
tary and economic assistance now
stands at almost $3.5 billion, most of
it since 1984. Almost all of that assis-
tance is military.
It is in Afghanistan, however, that
the full measure of Soviet ambitions
in the Third World can be taken most
clearly. More than 100,000 Soviet
troops are in Afghanistan, with
more than a million troops having
served. The cost to Afghanistan has
been high. Some 4 million people,
more than a quarter of the pop-
ulation, have had to flee their coun-
try. Thousands of children are being
sent to the Soviet Union for educa-
tion and ideological training.
et, after seven years, the
Soviets are still unable to
create a regime that can
gain public support -
and, in fact, just last week dumped
Babrak Karmal, whom they brought
in from exile in Moscow after the
KGB assassinated his predecessor.
The Soviets' aggressive strategy
in the Third World has, in my view,
four ultimate targets - first, the oil
fields of the Middle East, which are
second, the Isthmus and Canal of Pa-
nama between North and South
America; and, third, the mineral
wealth of Southern Africa.
The fourth target is the West itself
- to use conflict in the Third World
to exploit divisions in the Alliance
and to try to recreate the internal
divisions caused by Vietnam in or-
der to weaken the Western response
and provoke disagreement over
larger national security and defense
policies.
Let me now turn to terrorism. Ter-
rorism, including state-supported
terrorism, is not a new phenomenon.
Unhappily, it is a familiar fact of life
in the internal affairs of too many
countries - as well as in nearly all
wars. And when it becomes the pri-
mary means of waging war for
smaller states, it becomes a real dan-
ger.
Let there be no mistake or am-
biguity about it: the Soviet Union
supports terrorism, It has directly
and indirectly trained, funded,
armed, and even operationally as-
sisted terrorist organizations such
as Fatah, Abu Nidal, and others.
Nearly every terrorist group in the
Middle East has links to the U.S.S.R.
or one of its clients.
It is this umbrella of Soviet sup-
port, and the associated role of So-
viet clients such as Syria, Libya,
Vietnam, and Nicaragua that allows
large-scale terrorist operations to
continue. And, finally, in addition to
their support of these groups, the
Soviets refuse to play any role in in-
ternational efforts to curtail terror-
ism.
What is to be done?
As we reflect on the last 40 years
of war, subversion, instability, and
terrorism in the Third World, it is
clear that the Soviet Union and its
surrogates have played and are con-
tinuing to play a major role. Their
involvement is a common feature, as
is their ability to sustain their par-
ticipation relentlessly over many
years.
It is imperative that, at long last,
Americans recognize the strategic
significance of the Soviet offensive
- that it is in reality a war, a war
waged between nations and against
Western influence and presence,
against economic development, and
against the growth of democratic
values. It is war without declaration,
without mobilization, without mas-
sive armies.
It is, in fact, that long twilight war
described nearly a quarter of a cen-
tury ago by President John F. Ken-
nedy.
What are we to do?
From Harry Truman to Ronald
Reagan, our presidents have recog-
nized the importance of this
struggle in the Third World - some
suuuci Uldil oilers. Dui puouc ana
congressional understanding and
support have waxed and waned.
What we need is a vigorous
strategy we can sustain in a struggle
Secretary of State George Shulz has
said is "the prime challenge we will
face, at least through the remainder
of this century." I would like to sug-
gest several steps, none of them new,
and many of them in train now, that
should be integrated into a strategy
to meet the long-term Soviet chal-
lenge and promote democracy and
freedom in the Third World.
1. First. Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch, Republicans and Demo-
crats, must collaborate more closely
in the setting of strategy. There
seems to be more agreement on the
nature of the threat than on what to
do about it. Cooperation and support
in recent years has been good in
some areas; not so good in others.
2. Second, more must be done to
educate the public, the Congress,
and Third World governments about
Soviet strategy in the Third World. A
continuing information program to
inform and tie together develop-
ments in areas widely distant is
needed and must be pursued over a
long term.
3. We must, as a country, give pri-
ority to learning more about devel-
opments in the Third World and to
providing early warning of eco-
nomic, social, and political problems
that foreshadow instability and op-
portunities for exploitation by the
U.S.S.R. or its clients.
4. The United States must estab-
lish priorities in terms of major
commitments. If our early help fails
to prevent serious trouble, for which
countries are we prepared to put our
chips on the table? Also, I believe we
should at least try to make such
choices in consultation with key
members of Congress so that their
support at crucial moments is more
likely.
S. We must be - and are - pre-
pared to demand firmly, but tact-
fully and privately, that our friends
observe certain standards of behav-
ior with regard to basic human
rights. It is required by our own
principles and essential to political
support in the United States. We
have a right and responsibility to
condition our support - but must do
so in ways that make it possible po-
litically for the recipient to comply.
6. We need to change our ap-
proach to foreign military sales so
that the United States can provide
arms more quickly to our friends in
need - provide them the tools to do
the job - and to do so without hang-
ing out all the dirty linen for the
world to see.
12.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448ROO0301220028-1 '
7. Covert action can be used, as in
the past, to create problems for hos-
tile governments, and to provide dis-
creet help to friendly organizations
and governments. Indeed, at times it
may be the only means we have to
help them.
8. We must be prepared to use
overt military forces where circum-
stances are appropriate, as in Gre-
nada and Libya.
9. We must find a way to mobilize
and use our greatest asset in the
Third World - private business. No
one in the Third World wants to
adopt the Soviet economic system.
Neither we nor the Soviets can of-
fer unlimited or. even large-scale
economic assistance to the Third
World. Investment is the key to eco-
nomic success or at least survival in
the Third World and we, our NATO
allies, and Japan need to develop a
common strategy to promote invest-
ment in the Third World. The Soviets
are helpless to compete with private
capital in these countries.
10. Finally, we need to have a
strategy supported with consistency
through more than one presidency.
This administration and Congress in
recent years have gone further than
any of their predecessors in develop-
ing and sustaining a coherent
strategy. But more must be done,
and it must endure.
We are engaged in a historic
struggle with the Soviet Union, a
struggle between age-old tyranny -
to use an old-fashioned word - and
the concept that the highest goal of
the state is to protect and foster the
creative capabilities and liberties of
the individual. The battle lines are
most sharply drawn in the Third
World. We have enormous assets and
advantages in this struggle. We offer
an economic model based on private
enterprise for long-term develop-
ment, independence,. stability, and
prosperity. We offer a model of free-
dom and democratic ideals; we offer
religious tolerance and spiritual val-
ues; and we have democratic allies
willing to help.
In contrast, the Soviet Union of-
fers a model police state, a new form
of colonial subservience, the moral-
ity of the gun, and the austerity of
totalitarian socialism.
The East-West struggle to influ-
ence the future of the Third World is
a classic confrontation of the Soviet
capacity to destroy arrayed against
the democratic nations' capacity to
build.
Americans cannot and must not
be indifferent to the outcome.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448ROO0301220028-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1
V .._i
PERISCOPE
Fall 1986
A Robert s
ID1, CIA.
Openness, Changed Environment
To Shape Intelligence of Future
Ten trends seen today will dominate intelligence to the end of the
century, according to Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence,
CIA. As a panelist addressing The Future of the Intelligence Com-
munity," Gates noted that many of the trends are already established,
while others are linked to technological development certain to come.
He described the coming revolution in which intelligence will be
communicated to policy makers' desks electronically, resulting in
promptness, greater interaction between the policymaker and the pro-
ducer and having significant security advantages. Gates noted also
that intelligence data is becoming harder and harder to collect as
camouflage, denial, and the inhibiting reaction to unauthorized dis-
closures force us to seek other collection means for that once available
openly. Recruitment of personnel is also becomming more difficult, he
said, because the number of people who can meet security standards
and pass polygraph screening is declining, resulting in the need for a
greater pool of applicants at initial stages. Also influencing recruit-
ment, Gates said, is that government service is becoming less
attractive.
There has been a revolution as well, he explained, in the role of
intelligence in regard to Congress. Not only is the flow of intelligence
information to Congress as heavy as that to the Executive Branch. but
the large number of staff on the Hill makes the Congress better pre-
pared to ask questions than the Executive Branch entities receiving
the same information. There has also been an increased use of intelli-
gence by the Executive Branch for public education, a tribute to the
accuracy and integrity with which the American people view such
reporting. In the international arena, Gates indicated, there has been a
growing use of intelligence to convince our allies, and certain nations
beyond traditional allies. of the rectitude of U.S. policies.
Another challenge has been the dramatic increase in the diversity
of the subjects intelligence must now address, far from those early
days when the focus was limited to potential adversaries. Today, for
example, the Community must serve requirements dealing with
nuclear proliferation, international narcotics, foreign technological
development, human rights, technology transfer, population, religion
and the like. Similarly, there has been an immense growth in the
diversity of the users or consumers of intelligence. Gates observed
that intelligence in the past decade has become steadily more central
to national decision making, noting that in some cases there might not
be a national policy without the contributions of the Intelligence Com-
munity. He also suggested that it often appears the Intelligence Com-
munity is the only part of the government looking to the future, as one
sees the withering of long range planning in other agencies. He noted
one problem stemming from such progress: the policy maker is faced
with addressing future problems when costs are low, yet receives no
benefit from doing so. The rewards of such efforts will be seen only by
his or her successors.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220028-1