DEFINING SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301210004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 8, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301210004-8
Letters
WASHINGTON TIMES
8 October 1985
Defining Soviet defense spending
Richard Garwin stated in his Sept.
? 24 letter that I was all wrong in say-
ing the CIA has reported Soviet
spending on strategic defense to be
10 times the size of the Strategic
Defense Initiative program.
Here is the CIA testimony, pre-
sented by Robert Gates in the June
25 Senate hearings: "Strategic offen-
sive and defensive forces account for'
about one-fifth of total [Soviet]
defense spending ? about one-tenth
each:' The Soviet defense budget is
about $350 to $400 billion in terms of
the amount the United States would
have to spend for the same pro-
grams. That means Soviet expendi-
tures on strategic defense are $35 to
$40 billion, or about 10 times the
requested SDI funding of $3.7 bil-
lion, as I stated to Diana West.
Dr. Garwin further says that
Soviet spending on military lasers ?
about $1 billion per year; according
to the CIA testimony ? is "just about
the magnitude of our own." But actu-
ally, this Soviet laser program is
nearly three times the current SDI
expenditures on lasers, which are
$342 million, according to the latest
SDI report to Congress.
Further, the CIA estimate of $1
billion per year for the Soviet laser
program is too low, according to Pen-
tagon sources. Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger has stated that
the Soviets have 10,000 defense sci-
entists and engineers working on
lasers, which is about five times the
current level of effort in Gen. James
A. Abrahamson's laser program.
? .Nothing in the discussion of SDI
is more important than the enor-
mous Soviet effort in this area,
which parallels the SDI program in
lasers, particle beams, and every
other line of research and dwarfs
the American program in magni-
tude. If we don't get cracking on SDI
at the full funding level recom-
mended by the Fletcher panel and
requested by the Reagan adminis-
tration, we can find ourselves in the
1990s in a world in which the Soviets
have a defense against American
missiles, but the United States has
no defense against Soviet missiles.
That's a very dangerous prospect for
America.
Dr. Gamin was wise to challenge
my numbers for Soviet spending on
strategic defense, because they indi-
cate that his advice to the senators to
cut SDI funding from $3.7 billion
back to $1.4 billion is very bad advice
indeed. It is fortunate for America
that the Senate did not heed his coun-
sel.
Regarding the number of laser
satellites needed to counter a Soviet
nuclear attack, Dr. Garwin's latest
answer ? 79 satellites ? is close to
the result computed by defense sci-
entists doing research in this field,
but 30 times smaller than the 2,400
.satellites which was his original
answer. It has taken Dr. Garwin
nearly a year, reducing his results
with each new report and sliding
down his personal learning curve, to
come up with the answer accepted
all along by the defense theorists
working full-time on these prob-
lems.
With laser satellites estimated to
cost $1 billion or so apiece, the dif-
ference between 2,400 satellites and
70 satellites is a big piece of change.
It makes all the difference in the
world for the critically important
marginal cost ratio ? i.e., how many
dollars we have to spend on defense
for every dollar the Soviets spend on
offense.
Dr. Garwin said in his letter that
we would need many more of these
expensive satellites if the Soviets
were to scrap their present arsenal
of SS-18s and SS-19s and also the
SS-24s and SS-25s which are about to
go into service, and build a new
arsenal of "fast burn" missiles. In
his Senate committee testimony, Dr.
Gamin estimated that this could be
done by the Soviets in as little as six
years. When Sen. Warren Rudman
pointed out that Gen. Abrahamson,
director of SDI, had testified it
would be well into the next century
before the Soviets could deploy
these missiles, Dr. Garwin replied,
"Gen. Abrahamson, although a fine
officer, is new to this field:'
In other words, Gen. Abrahamson
doesn't know one end of his anatomy
from the other in regard to these
vital technical matters in his pro-
gram. I don't think Dr. Garwin will
find anyone to agree with him in that
judgment of Gen. Abrahamson's
technical competence.
ROBERT JASTROW
Dartmouth College
Hanover, N.H.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/68/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301210004-8