REMARKS AT INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF BARRISTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000401050003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 16, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at International Society of Barristers
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Naples, Florida
March 16, 1989
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,
Thank you, Fred.* I appreciate all that you said. Fred very carefully distanced
himself from our own association, and I want to acknowledge it because it has
meant a lot to me. We were in law school together. When I became a United
States Attorney, I found that Fred was in the United States Attorney's Office, hav-
ing served with distinction for about five years as a Special Agent of the FBI. He
became my first assistant and, ultimately, although we didn't get to practice law
together, when I went to the bench Fred joined my old firm as a partner. He's a
very dear friend and one that I always look forward to seeing.
If I may, I'd like to introduce Bill Baker, who came with me from the FBI and
now heads the Public Affairs Office of the Central Intelligence Agency. Bill, could
you please stand up? I can't think of anything more challenging than trying to rep-
resent an agency that consistently says "no comment" to the press. But he does
it.
I was really pleased to see that you had my good friend Pete Fay on your
program and also Tony Kennedy, two of the real stars in the judicial system.**
It's fun to be back with you again. This membership has a reputation not
only in the art of trial lawyering but also in the art of selecting a great site for an
annual meeting. I hope you will someday invite me back again.
Those of you who have been following the events around the world know
that Gorbachev is keeping us very, very busy. He somehow has mastered the art
of public relations. As Larry Eagleburger said in his testimony yesterday, Gorba-
chev is able to control propaganda better than we are, and he's able to get his
ideas out more quickly. It's still a challenge for President Bush?as it was for Presi-
dent Reagan?to deal with these constant initiatives which are captivating and
hypnotizing a good part of central Europe. I saw the article in this morning's New
York Times noting that Gorbachev is making new demands for agricultural reforms.
These are important issues, and they emphasize the central role that he is playing
now on the world screen. The words perestroika and glasnost are clearly words
that have become popular as a result of Gorbachev and his activities. In fact, we
have begun collecting stories about both perestroika and glasnost, and I will tell
you only one of them.
? Frederick Mayer, member of the Society ofBarristers Board of Governors.
** Peter T. Fay, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit; Anthony M. Kennedy,
Judge, United States Supreme Court.
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According to this story, Gorbachev sent a representative out into the Urals
to check on the progress of perestroika. The man went to a village and asked to
see the mayor. He talked around the subject for a while, and then he said, "How is
perestroika getting along?" And the mayor said, "We like perestroika; we like it
very much." And the representative said, "Tell me, do you have any television
sets here in the village?" And the mayor said, "Oh yes, we have television sets
here. We have television sets, I believe, in every hut in the hamlet. In fact, in some
huts there are two or three television sets." "Tell me about refrigerators." "Oh
yes, we have plenty of refrigerators here in this village." The representative said,
-By the way, do you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I know
who you are. Who else but a CIA agent would come into a village with no
electricity and ask questions like that?"
- The last time I had the pleasure of talking to you was in Phoenix in-1982,
when I was Director of the FBI. In that speech I discussed?from a law
enforcement perspective?the balance that must be maintained between each
_ citizen's right to be let alone and the right to be kept safe and free. When I spoke
at the American Bar Association's annual meeting in Toronto last August, I
addressed this topic from my vantage point at CIA. And today, in the context of
recent events, I would like to discuss how the work of intelligence can provide
greater safety without unreasonable sacrifice of individual liberty.
The CIA and other components of the Intelligence Community collect
information on a host of issues that affect our national security. Two of the issues
that most clearly touch on the relationship between safety and liberty?issues that
therefore demand special safeguards?are the threats posed by hostile intelli-
gence services operating against this country worldwide, and the threats posed
by international terrorists. Our activities in these and other areas are governed by
Executive Order 12333, which specifies the duties and responsibilities of the CIA
as well as the limitations upon intelligence activities undertaken by the Agency.
The Order reflects the requirements of the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA
Act of 1949, and other laws, regulations, and directives, as well as intelligence
policies.
In addition to observing the Executive Order, the CIA and other agencies
within the Intelligence Community are required to develop and have approved by
the Attorney General their own guidelines and procedures. The procedures at the
CIA were developed to:
? encourage legitimate intelligence activities;
? provide legal protection to employees by providing authority for
intelligence activities;
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? and?I think this is of major importance?assure the American public and
the intelligence oversight committees that all CIA activities involving U.S.
persons are lawful and related to legitimate intelligence objectives. For
instance, we file an annual report with the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on any involvement with U.S. persons, and we
follow up with briefings if necessary. Our activity in this area is closely
monitored by the oversight committees, which act as surrogates for the
Congress as a whole and, indeed, for the American people.
It may surprise you to know that last year we provided over 1,000 briefings
to the Congress. I believe we have formed an effective partnership With Congress
that has and will continue to contribute to our national security.
The first of the issues that I mentioned, counterintelligence, is critical to our
national security and is clearly a legitimate intelligence objective. Earlier this
month, I spoke to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about the
counterintelligence and security issues we now face. An effective and comprehen-
sive counterintelligence program has never been more important to our nation,
because the threat against us?despite perestroika?has grown. The number of
hostile operations against us and our allies has certainly increased, and the number
of intelligence services involved in such operations has also grown.
Over the past four years, we have discovered more penetrations of the
United States' defense and intelligence communities than at any time in our
history. The costs of these compromises are estimated in billions of dollars.
Although many countries engage in intelligence operations against the
United States, I think it is no surprise to you that the Soviet intelligence services?
the KGB and the military service, the GRU?represent by far the most significant
intelligence threats in terms of size, ability, and intent to act against U.S. interests
both at home and abroad. And despite the economic and political changes
Gorbachev is attempting to make, we have no evidence at all that the force of the
Soviet intelligence effort has in any way abated. Just last week, the State
Department ordered the expulsion of a Soviet diplomat on charges that he sought
illegally to obtain documents showing how our government protects secrets in
computer systems. It's a nice way of saying that he was caught spying. You prob-
ably read this morning that the Soviets ordered the removal of one of our defense
attaches in Moscow. This act was plain retaliation; there was no basis at all for do-
ing it.
Because-we can protect ourselves best if we understand what our adver-
sary wants, I think it's worth considering just what is being collected. This is the
important thing for those on the collection side, because counterintelligence tells
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us what our adversaries believe they need to know, and that tells us something
about their strengths and their weaknesses. The highest Soviet collection priority
is information on U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Other high-priority subjects are key
foreign policy matters, Congressional intentions, defense information, U.S. intelli-
gence sources and methods, and advanced dual-use technology?the kind of
technology that is civilian in nature but can be adapted to military purposes. The
Soviets also target NATO intensively, partly as a means to obtain U.S. foreign pol-
icy and military information, and I think also because NATO has historically been
more vulnerable and easier to penetrate because of the multilateral activities taking
place there.
And the methods employed by the Soviets to get the information they want
are becoming more sophisticated. We expect to see greater Soviet efforts to
recruit U.S. personnel abroad, and you've read about some of that already. We ex-
pect to see increasing use of third countries for clandestine meetings with
American agents?with its successful counterintelligence work in the United
States, the FBI has driven many of those meetings to Mexico and also to Vienna.
We also expect to see greater efforts to penetrate allied governments that might
be privy to U.S. secrets and greater emphasis on attempting to exploit the
intelligence collection capabilities of the Warsaw Pact allies. Many of the cases
that you've read about haven't involved the Soviets spying. They have been about
Soviet Bloc intelligence services doing the work for the Soviets. That was certainly
the case on the West Coast when efforts were being made to penetrate Hughes
Aircraft.
Soviet efforts are formidable, but I want to take this opportunity to dispute
allegations in a recently published book, also covered extensively in TIME
magazine, that the communications unit of our embassy in Moscow had been
subject to electronic eavesdropping by Soviet agents. The Soviets had consider-
able success in the Moscow embassy, but not there. There was an implication
that somehow CIA had covered up this information from the State Department.
Actually, an interagency group?which included representatives of the State
Department, the National Security Agency, the FBI, and the CIA?conducted the
investigation and found no evidence of hostile penetration of this very sensitive
equipment. It was all taken apart and carefully analyzed?this is not to say that
there may not be some microphone hidden somewhere in that room; they've
certainly been successful in doing that in other places. But the equipment itself
that transmits the communications shows no evidence at all of penetration. We
are currently working with the State Department to protect all of our embassies
from technical penetration.
The Soviet Union, of course, is by no means the only country trying to ob-
tain our secrets. Intelligence and security services throughout the world have
increased their efforts to penetrate our facilities. We have noted as well that
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several African states, among others, are cooperating with Soviet, East European,
Cuban, and Libyan services, and we are monitoring these activities closely.
I think I should emphasize, though, that the methods the U.S. Intelligence
Community uses to counter this threat are also impressive. And the most
impressive of those methods is the increased cooperation among the various
agencies within the Community. The arrest of former Army Master Sergeant
Clyde Lee Conrad in West Germany last August demonstrated the strength of the
Community pulling together. The CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Justice
worked very closely with the Army during this long and extensive investigation of
Conrad. He is now awaiting trial in Germany on charges of spying for the Soviets
and the Hungarians.
We had similar cooperation in the case of Army Warrant Officer James W.
Hall, who was just recently sentenced to 40 years in prison for providing
information about military operations and technical collection activities to the
Soviets and the East Germans.
Here at home, the FBI in recent years has made great strides in countering
the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union and Bloc countries. The FBI has
improved the quality and sophistication of its capabilities and, as a result, has suc-
ceeded in disrupting hostile intelligence operations aimed at critical U.S. targets.
The FBI's main strategy has been to "spiderweb" known or suspected
intelligence operatives. And this is an important approach. It's not one of
suspecting and following and watching American citizens who have access to
secrets, but one of trying to make it difficult enough, if not impossible, for that rare
traitor to make contact with a Soviet intelligence officer without our knowing
about it. And so we focus on those who would target us. That's called
"spiderwebbing." In spinning webs with physical and electronic surveillance?
and, incidentally, all electronic surveillance must be court authorized under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act?U.S. intelligence has been able to weave a
barrier between the hostile agents and our citizens. Those of you who are familiar
with FISA, as we call it, will recall that there's a much higher threshold required to
direct electronic surveillance against U.S. persons. The "spiderweb" system is
working and that is one of the reasons why so many of the "meets" are now tak-
ing place outside of the United States. This puts an extra burden on hostile
intelligence services, and it also weakens the resolve of those who want to sell se-
crets, because they have to go through that extra risk and trouble.
To provide the information that will allow enforcement agencies to protect
our citizens, we have bolstered counterintelligence efforts both at home and
abroad. For the CIA, such efforts include collecting information outside the United
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States on hostile intelligence activities directed against Americans. We adhere to
the laws and regulations for operations outside the United States that involve U.S.
citizens.
To improve the effectiveness of counterintelligence activities both within
the CIA and the Intelligence Community, I created a new Counterintelligence
Center last April. The center works to protect the Agency's foreign operations
and the security of all Agency components against penetration by foreign security
or intelligence services. The Counterintelligence Center not only provides analysis
of hostile intelligence threats and past espionage cases, it also provides guidance
for our people going abroad.
The CIA is authorized to collect information on another major concern?the
activities of international terrorists.
Some 15 years ago, while I was sitting On the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, I had occasion to review a statute which made it unlawful to carry or at-
tempt to carry a firearm aboard a commercial aircraft. In the opinion that I wrote, I
discussed the evolution of the airport inspection or checkpoint system?a system
that at that time, remarkably enough, had been challenged as a gross intrusion into
personal privacy. I think I even ruminated that if under those circumstances
Americans should suddenly find that all checkpoints at airports had been taken
away, there would probably be a cry of outrage. It's that balancing that we have to
deal with in determining the minimum amount of intrusion that is appropriate to ac-
complish significant security gains. Subsequent to that opinion, a rash of hijack-
ings brought home the reality of the terrorist threat and the need to balance
individual privacy interests with legitimate security interests. The bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 last December, which killed 270 people, was a tragic reminder of
that threat.
During the past four years, there have been nearly 300 cases in which some
form of counterterrorist actions?efforts to prevent terrorism?were taken on the
basis of intelligence information collected and disseminated by the Central
Intelligence Agency. We can't say, of course, in all of those cases that the
information or measures taken were the sole reason for the preventions, but they
clearly had a role and this is important to us.
In one of these cases, the Agency received a report that terrorists planned
to assassinate a senior American diplomat in a Middle Eastern country when he ar-
rived for a meeting. When we told the diplomat about the report, he confirmed
that he was to have such a meeting. At the last minute, he arranged for the meet-
ing to be held elsewhere, a prudent measure that may have saved his life.
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On numerous occasions in recent years, the Agency has received reports of
planned terrorist attacks on our embassies in several parts of the world, including
the Latin American countries of Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador. In each case, the
embassy, upon receiving this kind of report, increased its security. On several
occasions, we've had source information coming back to us that the increased se-
curity persuaded the terrorist group to cancel its plans to attack. I've observed
that terrorists want to do these things the easy way. They will back off and wait
for another occasion if they think the challenge has become too difficult. So, we
want to keep them thinking that it is too difficult.
But in spite of the success we've had, in 1988 the property and citizens of
some 70 nations were the victims or targets of international terrorist attacks?at-
tacks that killed 658 people and wounded more than 1,100. There were .856 at-
tacks in 1988 and 835 in 1987. And I think that we should keep in mind that about
one of five terrorist attacks last year was aimed at United States citizens, United
States property, or United States institutions around the world.
The CIA collects valuable information about terrorist groups and cooperates
with other U.S. government agencies to use that information to check and
minimize the capabilities of terrorist organizations. We learned, for example, that
the Palestinian terrorist organization, Abu Nidal, had an extensive international
. commercial network that dealt in the gray arms market. This network had key of-
fices in Poland, East Germany, and several other countries. We used this
information. The State Department delivered a series of diplomatic demarches to
the governments of these countries expressing our concern about the presence of
these businesses and, as a result, the companies were shut down and one of the
means of financing terrorism was dried up.
It's our job to keep track of the movements of wanted terrorists when we
have an outstanding warrant for the arrest of terrorist individuals. The Agency can
make any information that we have available to judicial authorities so that they can
locate and apprehend them. In some cases, the United States asks for extradition.
Sometimes we're successful and sometimes we're not. There's still a political
aspect to terrorist law enforcement that keeps some countries, for a variety of
reasons, just a little reluctant to be full players in the system. But in a case such as
Fawaz Yunis, who was wanted for the June 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner
which carried United States citizens, the information the Agency was able to
supply enabled the FBI to arrest Yunis in the Mediterranean Ocean and bring him to
trial.
We also glare information with foreign governments on names of potential
terrorists, including the aliases that they used. This is an important and evolving
computer base that will be extremely helpful. Information has also been used to
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deny entry and safe haven to known terrorists and their associates in various parts
of the world. Finally, after years of effort in which I have participated on both the
law enforcement and the intelligence side, countries are coming to the view that
we have always held, as have the British, that denying sanctuary is one of the keys
to reducing the threat of terrorism. It simply doesn't work to offer a "leave us
alone and we'll leave you alone" exchange.
I have been trying to make the point that effective counterintelligence and
counterterrorism programs are critical to our national security. And they are
certainly critical to the safety of our citizens. But I'd like to emphasize as well that
how the CIA and the other intelligence agencies carry out their responsibilities is of
equal importance to our country. We are subject to specific laws and we operate
under internal procedures approved by the Attorney General. In addition, my
General Counsel's staff briefs employees?both at home and abroad?to ensure
that those who deal with issues that affect the constitutional rights of American
citizens know what our laws are and what otlir procedures are and that full
compliance is expected. My Office of General Counsel also works closely with the
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review at the Department of Justice in dealing
with types of activities that may require Attorney General authorization. They
work together to examine relevant issues and obtain the necessary approvals,
consistent with applicable requirements of our law. We want to catch spies and
we want to curb terrorism, but we will not circumvent our own laws to do so. We
must maintain absolute fidelity to our laws and our rules?rules that are imposed
to assure our citizens that we are indeed accountable. I do not think the CIA, or the
FBI, or any member of the Intelligence Community is exempt from this principle. In
fact, I believe that it is the key to public acceptance of our vitally important work.
We must, in the end, have both safety and liberty. The balance between the
right to be let alone and the right to be kept safe and free is central to our profes-
sion and to our heritage. And in our ability to strike that balance true, lies our fu-
ture as a land of ordered liberty. Former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson
must have had this balance in mind when he observed that the United States Con-
stitution with its Bill of Rights was not a suicide pact. The protections it includes
and affords to us must be rationally applied if we are to prevail against those who
would threaten our national security.
I really believe that we have sufficient legislative restraints and that we
should stop looking for legislative solutions to problems as they emerge, because
such "solutions" can impede necessary work in the interest of national security.
Rather, what is needed is a better understanding of the requirements of existing
law and the discirDline?indeed the iron -determination?to see that our laws are
scrupulously followed.
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I've been at the CIA for nearly two years now, and during that time, I've got-
ten to know many of our dedicated people, both here and overseas. These are
people who are risk takers, but are not risk seekers. People who are not
particularly interested in fame or fortune, but who see in our work an opportunity
to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
When I consider their commitment and integrity, I often come back to the
words of my old friend, Sir William Stephenson, who died earlier this year at the
age of 93. In the introduction to the book, A Man Called Intrepid, which chronicled
his remarkable intelligence accomplishments during the Second World War, Sir
William wrote:
"Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants can no longer threaten the liberty of
any people. When the functions of all nations, however varied their ideologies, will
be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a condition is possible, it is in a future
too far distant to foresee. Until that safer, better day, the democracies will avoid
disaster, and possibly total destruction, only by maintaining their defenses.
"Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is
an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, the most
dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised, and rigidly
applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and wisdom of those to whom it is
entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that guardianship lies the hope of free
people to endure and prevail."
It seems to me that a nation dedicated to the rule of law can protect itself
and its heritage in no other way, and that is the way we are trying to serve you.
401.
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