HERE ARE THE PROPOSED REMARKS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OUR SPEECHWRITERS PREPARED FOR YOU.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 27, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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PAO 88-0024
27 January 1988
Here are the proposed remarks on technology transfer our speechwriters
prepared for you. They worked from draft remarks and background material
supplied by McClellan A. DuBois, chief of the Technology Transfer Assessment
Center (TTAC) in the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. I have
attached the background material as well, including the most recent Agency
White Paper on the technology transfer issue.
The speech addresses two basic themes: the large-scale, highly successful
campaign by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology; and the role
played by the CIA in the debate on technology transfer. Specifically, there
is reference to the new CIA methodology developed by TTAC which simulates the
Soviet decision-making process for weapons design, development, production,
and'deployment. This approach attempts to identify Soviet collection-
requirements by assessing Soviet needs, and TTAC believes it would yield a
list of truly critical items--from the Soviet view. While this methodology is
still in its early stages and further development depends on funding approval,
TTAC believes that a discussion of the Agency's approach would be most
appropriate before an audience such as the American Electronics Association.
Bill Baker
Attachments:
As Stated
DCI/PAO/WMB
Distribution:
Orig. - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/PAO
1 - PAO Registry
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PROPOSED REMARKS BY
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ON
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
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GOOD AFTERNOON. I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TODAY ABOUT AN
ISSUE THAT IS IMPORTANT TO ME AND I THINK CERTAINLY TO YOU
-- TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER -- SPECIFICALLY, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT
STATES. WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE
SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF MILITARILY USEFUL
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT FOR SOME 40
YEARS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF
DEBATE AND DISHARMONY. DEPENDING ON YOUR POINT OF VIEW,
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS EITHER HURT OR HELPED
THE DEBATE ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; IN ANY CASE, WE HAVE
PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE. I PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS ROLE IN
DETAIL, AS WELL AS A METHODOLOGY WE AT THE CIA HAVE
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DEVELOPED THAT ANTICIPATES SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL NEEDS IN
THE FUTURE. BUT FIRST I WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE
LARGE-SCALE, HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN BY THE SOVIET
UNION TO ACQUIRE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY FOR ITS MILITARY
PROJECTS. THE SUCCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE ENJOYED IN USING
OUR KNOW-HOW TO DEVELOP AND ENHANCE THEIR OWN SYSTEMS
POSES A REAL THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.
TWO RECENT CASES ILLUSTRATE THIS THREAT. YOU WILL
REMEMBER THE ILLEGAL SALE BY JAPAN'S TOSHIBA CORPORATION
AND NORWAY'S KONGSBERG COMPANY OF MILLING MACHINES AND
COMPUTER CONTROLS THAT MAY HELP THE SOVIETS PRODUCE
QUIETER SUBMARINE PROPELLERS. WE NEVER WANT TO REPEAT THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG CASE. THERE, THROUGH
SELLING SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS, THE
JAPANESE AND NORWEGIAN FIRMS SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED
AMERICA'S MULTIBILLION DOLLAR SUBMARINE DEFENSES, AS WELL
AS THE SECURITY OF THEIR OWN NATIONS.
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THE CONSARC CASE IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SENSITIVE
AND SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY WINDING UP IN THE WRONG
HANDS. THE SCOTTISH SUBSIDIARY OF CONSARC, AN AMERICAN
COMPANY, PROVIDED THE SOVIETS WITH EQUIPMENT USEFUL FOR
THE PRODUCTION OF CARBON-CARBON, AN ADVANCED,
HEAT-RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT CAN INCREASE THE ACCURACY OF
NUCLEAR WARHEADS.
THE WELL-ORGANIZED AND WELL-FINANCED EFFORT BY THE
SOVIET UNION TO.OBTAIN WESTERN HARDWARE AND KNOW-HOW IS
DOCUMENTED IN THE WIDELY AVAILABLE PUBLICATION SOVIET
ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY:
AN UPDATE. ALTHOUGH RELEASED BY FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE WEINBERGER IN SEPTEMBER 1985, IT IS ONE OF THE
WORST KEPT SECRETS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CIA WROTE IT. I
URGE ANYONE WHO HAS NOT YET SEEN IT TO READ IT.
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FROM THE SCOPE AND VOLUME OF TRANSACTIONS WE HAVE
OBSERVED, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET APPETITE FOR WESTERN
TECHNOLOGY IS ENORMOUS. FOR EXAMPLE:
? TO IMPROVE DESIGNS OF FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND
TO HELP DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES FOR WESTERN
SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS COLLECTED 6,000-10,000
HARDWARE ITEMS AND 100,000 DOCUMENTS EACH YEAR IN
THE LATE 1970s AND EARLY 1980s.
TO BOLSTER THE ACTUAL PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS
SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS ACQUIRED -- ILLEGALLY --
HUNDREDS AND IN SOME CASES THOUSANDS OF MACHINE
TOOLS, COMPUTER, AND MICROELECTRONIC
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT.
? TO ENHANCE THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT AND IN SOME CASES
WEAPON SYSTEMS, THEY ACQUIRE AT LEAST 50 MILLION
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS ILLICITLY EACH YEAR.
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IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE
DOCUMENTS AND HARDWARE ACQUISITIONS CONSIDERED TO BE THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT TO THE SOVIETS IS OF U.S. ORIGIN. THESE
ACQUISITIONS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT NECESSARILY COLLECTED IN
THE UNITED STATES.
THE BENEFITS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY FOR THE WARSAW PACT
HAVE BEEN TREMENDOUS.
? IN THE EARLY 1980s. FOR EXAMPLE. MORE THAN 5,000
MILITARILY RELATED PROJECTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
BENEFITED FROM WESTERN HARDWARE AND TECHNICAL
DOCUMENTS EACH YEAR. OVER HALF OF THESE PROJECTS
WERE IN THE ELECTRONICS AND THE ARMOR AND
ELECTRO-OPTICS INDUSTRIES.
? IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE HAVE
SEEN THE IMPACT OF PURLOINED WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
IN SOVIET RADARS, GUIDANCE SYSTEMS, CRUISE
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MISSILES, ANTI-SUBMARINE WEAPONS, LASER-GUIDED
ARTILLERY SHELLS, AND ANTI-TANK MISSILES, TO NAME
A FEW.
THE SOVIET ACQUISITION EFFORT CONSISTS OF THREE
DISTINCT, BUT SOMEWHAT OVERLAPPING.CHANNE,LS. WE REFER TO
ONE AS THE OPEN SOURCE CHANNEL. WE ESTIMATE THAT EVERY
YEAR NEARLY HALF A MILLION UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ON
TECHNICAL SUBJECTS ARE ACQUIRED BY THE SOVIETS. THIS
CHANNEL IS THE LEAST IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF MILITARY
CRITICALITY, BUT IT IS USED TO SUPPORT AND IMPROVE THE
TARGETING OF THE OTHER CHANNELS. OTHER THAN A MORE
THOROUGH REVIEW OF UNCLASSIFIED GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS,
THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO TO PREVENT THE LOSS OF KNOW-HOW
THROUGH THIS CHANNEL. WE CONSIDER THIS THE COST OF DOING
BUSINESS IN A FREE SOCIETY.
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IN TERMS OF DIRECT IMPACT ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, THE
OTHER TWO CHANNELS ARE MORE IMPORTANT. THE FIRST OF THESE
IS HEADED BY THE USSR MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, OR
VPK, AND SUPPORTS THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL MINISTRIES. THE
VPK SEEKS ONE-OF-A-KIND MILITARY AND DUAL-USE HARDWARE,
BLUEPRINTS, PRODUCT SAMPLES, AND TEST EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE
THE TECHNICAL LEVELS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET WEAPONS AND
MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS PROGRAM, A $1.4 BILLION SOVIET
INDUSTRY, INVOLVES ESPIONAGE BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS, OVERT COLLECTION BY BLOC OFFICIALS, ACQUISITION
BY SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS, AND ILLEGAL
TRADE-RELATED ACTIVITY. IN THE LATE 1970s AND EARLY
1980s. THE VPK PROGRAM REDIRECTED SOVIET TECHNICAL
APPROACHES IN ABOUT 100 PROJECTS EACH YEAR FOR ONGOING
WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND KEY MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IT ALSO
INITIATED SEVERAL HUNDRED NEW RESEARCH PROJECTS ANNUALLY
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ON TOPICS THAT HAD NOT BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE VPK
PROGRAM RAISED THE TECHNICAL LEVELS OF SEVERAL THOUSAND
DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS EVERY YEAR. MOREOVER, IT
ELIMINATED OR SHORTENED PHASES OF MORE THAN A THOUSAND
MILITARY RESEARCH PROJECTS EACH YEAR.
THE OTHER PROGRAM, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT
FROM THE VPK PROGRAM, INVOLVES THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN TRADE AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THEY
MANAGE AN ELABORATE TRADE DIVERSION PROGRAM TO OBTAIN --
LEGALLY AND ILLEGALLY -- DUAL-USE MANUFACTURING AND TEST
EQUIPMENT FOR DIRECT USE IN SOVIET PRODUCTION LINES. THIS
PROGRAM SEEKS EXPORT CONTROLLED COMPUTERS,
MICROELECTRONICS, MACHINE TOOLS, ROBOTICS, AND OTHER
EQUIPMENT TO INCREASE THE OUTPUT OF SOVIET DEFENSE-RELATED
INDUSTRIES. THE SOVIETS USE WESTERN BUSINESSMEN AND TRADE
BROKERS, DUMMY FIRMS, DECEPTIVE EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS,
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FALSE LICENSES, AND OTHER METHODS TO ACQUIRE THIS
EQUIPMENT.
THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE GREAT STRIDES IN
MICROELECTRONICS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS BY RELYING ON
THESE SCHEMES. THIS SOVIET PROGRESS HAS REDUCED THE
OVERALL WESTERN LEAD IN MICROELECTRONICS FROM 10-12 YEARS
IN THE MID-1970s TO 4 To 6 YEARS TODAY.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND TWO POINTS ABOUT THE
VPK AND TRADE DIVERSION PROGRAMS I HAVE DESCRIBED:
? FIRST, THE VPK PROGRAM HAS ITS BIGGEST IMPACT IN
THE DESIGN STAGE OF A SOVIET WEAPON, WHILE THE
TRADE DIVERSION EFFORT HAS ITS IMPACT IN THE
PRODUCTION/DEPLOYMENT STAGES.
? SECOND, BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY COLLECT AND WHO
COLLECTS IT, THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST THE VPK
PROGRAM IS GOOD COUNTERINTELLIGENGE AND GOOD
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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY; THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST THE
TRADE DIVERSION PROGRAM IS EXPORT ENFORCEMENT.
NOW THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF
THE SOVIET EFFORT TO ACQUIRE WESTERN EQUIPMENT AND
KNOW-HOW, I'D LIKE TO DISCUSS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY'S ROLE IN STEMMING THE FLOW OF MILITARILY-USEFUL
TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS.
OUR BIGGEST ROLE HAS BEEN AS A COLLECTOR AND ANALYST
OF INFORMATION. TWICE IN THE PAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE MADE
A LARGE VOLUME OF FACTS OPENLY AVAILABLE ABOUT THE SOVIET
EFFORT TO ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY, AND WE HAVE PROVIDED
ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THIS EFFORT ON
THE EAST-WEST STRATEGIC BALANCE. SOME OF OUR ANALYSIS HAS
MADE PEOPLE ANGRY, SOMETIMES AT US. FOR EXAMPLE:
OUR DISCOVERY AND ANALYSIS OF THE
TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG CASE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE
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CONGRESSIONAL DRIVE TO MAKE COCOM A MORE
EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION.
? OUR RESEARCH SHOWING THAT KEY COCOM COUNTRIES
LACK THE MEANS AND IN SOME CASES THE WILL TO
ENFORCE EXPORT CONTROLS DID NOT MAKE US MANY.
FRIENDS OVERSEAS.
? OUR DATA SHOWING THAT THE SOVIETS STILL WANT U.S.
TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT MORE THAN ANY OTHER
SOURCE GIVES A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE TO U.S.
INDUSTRY. BUT IT NECESSARILY UNDERCUTS INDUSTRY
EFFORTS FOR WIDESPREAD DECONTROL OF THEIR
PRODUCTS.
THESE CONCLUSIONS HAVE EVOKED DIFFERENT REACTIONS FROM
AMERICAN SCHOLARS, INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, POLICYMAKERS.
AND BUSINESSMEN. ALMOST EVERYONE AGREES, HOWEVER, THAT
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE -- WHERE THE WARSAW PACT ACTUALLY
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STEALS MILITARY AND MILITARY RELATED TECHNOLOGY -- IS
HARMFUL AND U.S. ACTION TO STOP IT AND PUNISH OFFENDERS IS
NOT ONLY APPROPRIATE BUT LAUDABLE.
BEYOND THAT, THE AGREEMENT STOPS. THE GREAT DEBATE
TENDS TO FOCUS ON WHAT AND HOW TO CONTROL DUAL-USE,
UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS, AND
PRODUCTS. I KNOW THAT THIS GROUP FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT THE
PROBLEMS RELATED TO EXPORT CONTROLS. MINDFUL OF THESE
CONCERNS, I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S SPECIFIC ROLE IN THIS DEBATE.
OUR ROLE -- AND IT HAS GROWN MARKEDLY IN RECENT YEARS
-- IS MAKING JUDGMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE MOSCOW ATTACHES
TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY, NOW
AND IN THE FUTURE. CIA'S WORK SHOWS THAT ILLEGAL ACCESS
TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY THROUGH VIOLATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL
LAWS HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON SOVIET WEAPONS
SYSTEMS. THERE ARE MANY EXAMPLES.
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? AS A RESULT OF THE TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG ILLEGAL
TRANSFER I .MENTIONED EARLIER AND OTHER SALES,
WESTERN MACHINE TOOLS ARE HELPING PRODUCE SOVIET
SUBMARINE PROPELLERS AT A RATE AND QUALITY FAR
BEYOND SOVIET CAPABILITIES.
? ACCESS TO WESTERN MICROELECTRONIC PRODUCTION
EQUIPMENT HAS SOLVED SOME OF THE MAJOR QUALITY
CONTROL AND YIELD PROBLEMS THE SOVIETS HAD FOR
MILITARY-SPECIFIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICs).
? WESTERN COMPUTERS AND SOFTWARE HAVE GIVEN MOSCOW
THE ABILITY TO DESIGN THEIR OWN MILITARY-SPECIFIC
ICs.
FINALLY, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE
MOSCOW'S APPETITE FOR THIS TECHNOLOGY IS GROWING,
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. THE
SOVIET STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE MODERNIZING THE
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ELECTRONICS-BASED SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY BEFORE MOVING TO
INVEST MORE HEAVILY, IN THE 1990's, IN MILITARY PRODUCTION
FACILITIES.
IN THE EARLY 1980s, CONGRESS DIRECTED THEN-DCI CASEY
TO.ENSURE THAT ALL RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE WAS BEING
FACTORED-INTO EXPORT LICENSING DECISIONS. IN RESPONSE TO
THIS AND REFLECTING THE LATE-DCI'.s HIGH INTEREST IN THIS
ISSUE, THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ASSESSMENT CENTER AT CIA
SET UP AN EXTENSIVE ALL-SOURCE DATABASE ON FOREIGN
DIVERTERS OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH WE USE TO ADVISE THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS IN THE EXPORT CONTROL
COMMUNITY ON THE RISKS OF DIVERSION.
OUR SOURCES ARE VARIED AND EXTENSIVE. THROUGHOUT THE.
EXPORT CONTROL COMMUNITY, THE KEY SOURCES ARE U.S.
BUSINESSMEN WHO PROVIDE TIP-OFFS ON POTENTIAL DIVERTERS
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AND QUESTIONABLE SALES INQUIRIES. WITHOUT THIS
INFORMATION THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED.
WE AT CIA ARE WELL AWARE OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE
LENGTH OF THE EXPORT CONTROL LIST AND THE ECONOMIC AND
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS OFTEN CITED. THE RECENT NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE REPORT DETAILS THESE POINTS. WE ARE
ALSO AWARE OF U.S. BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR A PROGRAM THAT
KEEPS TRULY CRITICAL MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OUT OF SOVIET
HANDS. IN REALITY, THE LENGTH OF THE EXPORT CONTROL LIST
IS A POLICY'DECISION IN WHICH CIA CORRECTLY HAS NO VOTE.
NONETHELESS, I WOULD BE MISLEADING YOU. IF I SAID WE HAVE
NO ROLE. OUR ROLE IS TO ADVISE POLICYMAKERS AS TO WHAT IS
ON THE SOVIET SHOPPING LIST AND WE HAVE BEGUN, INDEPENDENT
OF THE POLICY COMMUNITY, TO TEST A NEW METHODOLOGY THAT
WOULD FORECAST WHAT MOSCOW ACTUALLY NEEDS.
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UNDERSCORING THIS WORK IS OUR BELIEF THAT NEITHER THE
UNITED STATES NOR COCOM CAN STOP THE SOVIET UNION FROM
ACQUIRING WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. RATHER, THE GOAL IS TO SLOW
THE ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY BY THE
SOVIETS TO A RATE THAT MORE CLOSELY RESEMBLES THE PACE OF
INDIGENOUS DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION. AND DEPLOYMENT
IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE KEY ASSUMPTION, HOWEVER, IS THAT
COCOM -- PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES -- CAN DETERMINE
"WHAT IS CRITICAL" SO AS TO DETERMINE WHAT CAN AND SHOULD
BE CONTROLLED.
WE HAVE DEVELOPED A METHODOLOGY THAT SIMULATES THE
SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR WEAPONS DESIGN,
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT, WHICH OVER RECENT
HISTORY HAS BEEN FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. USING THIS
SIMULATION, WE FORMULATED A LIST OF SOVIET MILITARY
SYSTEMS -- CURRENT ONES TO BE ENHANCED OR NEW ONES ABOUT
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TO ENTER PRODUCTION OR TESTING. BUILDING ON THIS, CIA
WEAPONS ANALYSTS DEVELOPED A LIST OF NECESSARY
TECHNOLOGIES -- IN PRIORITY ORDER -- TO ACHIEVE
PERFORMANCE LEVELS. FROM THAT LIST, CURRENT SOVIET
CAPABILITIES COULD BE SUBTRACTED TO DETERMINE.WHAT MOSCOW
NEEDS FROM THE WEST. WHAT WOULD BE LEFT IS A LIST THAT
COCOM SHOULD CONSIDER CONTROLLING, IN A PRIORITY ORDER OF
IMPORTANCE FROM MOSCOW'S VIEW.
"SHOULD CONSIDER" IS THE KEY. FROM'THIS LIST, COCOM
COULD SUBTRACT ITEMS THAT CANNOT BE CONTROLLED OR ITEMS
WITH SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN AVAILABILITY. ADDED TO THE LIST
WOULD BE NEW, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THAT AS YET HAVE NO
MILITARY APPLICATION. A "SUNSET" CLAUSE COULD REMOVE THE
TECHNOLOGIES IF NO MILITARY APPLICATION IS FOUND.
BEYOND YIELDING A LIST OF CRITICAL ITEMS, THE
METHODOLOGY COULD ENHANCE THE CONSENSUS IN COCOM.
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REFLECTING ITS ORIGINAL CHARTER, COCOM TENDS TO SUPPORT
CONTROLS ON ITEMS WITH DIRECT MILITARY VALUE. AS I NOTED,
U.S. BUSINESS DOES THE SAME. BECAUSE ONLY ITEMS WITH THIS
CONNECTION WOULD BE ON THE LIST, IT WOULD QUELL THE DEBATE
OVER "ECONOMIC WARFARE." THE CURRENT CONTROLS DO NOT MAKE -
THE LINK TO SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS THIS CLEAR AND DIRECT.
INDEED, MANY ARGUE THAT THE CURRENT SYSTEM SUFFERS FROM
"MIRROR IMAGING" -- THAT IS, ASSUMING THAT WHAT IS
CRITICAL FOR THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO CRITICAL FOR THE
SOVIETS.
WHETHER THE LIST IS LONGER OR SHORTER THAN THE CURRENT
COCOM OR U.S. COMMODITY CONTROL LIST WOULD BE A POLITICAL
DECISION. OUR LIST CONTAINS SOME PRODUCTS NOT ON THE
CURRENT LIST BUT IT ALSO EXCLUDES SOME. MOST IMPORTANT,
THE LIST WOULD BE PRIORITIZED SO THAT A POLITICAL DECISION
ON HOW MUCH TO CONTROL COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY TRIMMING
FROM THE BOTTOM.
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INTELLIGENCE HAS PLAYED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN
ACTIVE ROLE IN DEFINING EXPORT CONTROL PRIORITIES.
HOWEVER, ITS IMPACT IS OFTEN OBSCURED BY THE MANY OTHER
INTERESTS THAT RESULT IN OUR CURRENT CONTROL LIST. THE
NEW CIA METHODOLOGY, IN SUM. DEMONSTRATES HOW THE SOVIETS
ARE LIKELY TO USE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY IN FUTURE MILITARY
SYSTEMS, AND FORECASTS SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR WESTERN
TECHNOLOGY.
OUR EVIDENCE SHOWS A STRONG UNDERPINNING OF SUPPORT
FOR A.CONTROL SYSTEM THAT U.S. BUSINESS BELIEVES IS FAIR
AND THAT CONTROLS MILITARILY CRITICAL ITEMS. THE SAME
HOLDS TRUE FOR OUR ALLIES. WHENEVER THE UNITED STATES HAS
APPROACHED COCOM WITH EVIDENCE THAT A PRODUCT OR TECHOLOGY
IS BEING USED OR COULD BE USED IN A SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAM
OR MILITARY SYSTEM, WE HAVE RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT.
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LIKEWISE, WE NEED YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT, BOTH AS A
SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON TRADE DIVERTERS AND AS A SOURCE
OF INFORMATION ON TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES. IT IS CLEAR TO US
THAT TO IMPLEMENT THE METHODOLOGY WE ARE WORKING ON WE
NEED TO TALK TO PEOPLE WHO ACTUALLY TRANSLATE THE
TECHNOLOGY INTO ENGINEERING DIAGRAMS AND PRODUCTION
EQUIPMENT. WE NEED TO HAVE ACCESS TO PEOPLE WHO ACTUALLY
BUILD WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH THE DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT ON THE
CONTROL LIST.
THE CIA WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUE. AS I INDICATED, WE HAVE EVERY
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE WILL
INTENSIFY IN THE 1990's. AND THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO
DEVOTE WHATEVER RESOURCES AND MANPOWER ARE NECESSARY TO
FULFILL THEIR MOST CRITICAL MILITARY COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS.
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0
YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT AND COOPERATION IN STEMMING THE
FLOW OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER
WARSAW PACT STATES IS fi KEY PART OF OUR EFFORT. THANK YOU.
21
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302620002-0