PROPOSED REMARKS BY WILLIAM H. WEBSTER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE YALE POLITICAL UNION NEW HAVEN. CONNECTICUT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302450003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 16, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
YALE POLITICAL UNION
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
NOVEMBER 16, 1988
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During the 11 years I have been in Washington, I cannot remember a
time when so many things were going on around the world requiring our
attention -- Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan, the elections in Pakistan,
ethnic unrest in Yugoslavia, the emergence of China as a major arms supplier --
a whole range of issues. These issues continue to make intelligence vital to
our government.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view
held by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have
always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel
threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard
the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security,
I think the American people want a lot of intelligence. And tonight I'd like
to talk about how the Central Intelligence Agency does its job of supporting
U.S. foreign policy and protecting our national security. I want to focus on
recent events in the Soviet Union and what they mean for intelligence. Then
I'd like to concentrate on two problems that are not confined to national
or regional borders -- problems that have grown substantially in the last
decade -- terrorism and narcotics.
As you might expect, those of us in the intelligence business have been
keeping a close watch on leadership changes and reform efforts in the Soviet
Union.
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Although the range of intelligence issues that we face today is broad, the
Soviet Union is -- and will continue to be -- the primary focus of our
intelligence collection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are
still serious threats to U.S. interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. Arguably, they make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads.
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it,
today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering
largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to
innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For example,
the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan, however petulantly. And in the area of
arms control, they are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under the
INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented on-site inspections of
Soviet military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle continues between
reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist
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system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affect
how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central authority
is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and how competitive the
Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
Just six weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of
individuals in the Soviet hierarchy -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul
of the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in
1957. The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at
home and abroad with renewed momentum.
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform the
Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring
Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become
more decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of
its people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other
regions of the USSR is currently testing the Soviet system's ability to make
reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
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The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever-to the
political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev challenges the
established interests of individuals and institutions within his country.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- even more difficult -- how it may
change Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced which,
though welcome, challenges us to sort out what is important and what is not,
what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
We must provide intelligence and analysis for U.S.-Soviet arms control
talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be
increasingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance
with the provisions of agreements. And the amount of support required is
tremendous. The INF treaty has required the United States to monitor about
120 facilities declared by the Soviets. Monitoring the START treaty, which is
being negotiated in Geneva, could involve as many as 2,500 weapon locations
spread throughout the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the U.S. makes with the Soviets, our
relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers will depend on the
Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments -- and even to
anticipate Gorbchev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected initiatives.
But the Soviet Union is certainly not our only focus. Two problems of
increasing importance to U.S. policymakers are terrorism and narcotics --
problems that threaten not only our citizens, but people in all nations.
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Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov summed up the problem of terrorism this way:
"No matter how high the aims predicted by terrorists . . . their activities
are always criminal, always destructive, throwing humankind back to a time of
lawlessness and chaos, providing internal and international complications,
contradicting the goals of-peace and progress."
Terrorism has been with us for centuries, but its nature has changed in
recent years. It has become more intense and more widespread, and its targets
have grown. Terrorists today take advantage of sophisticated weaponry,
advanced electronics, and improved communications. Perhaps even more
important, terrorism has become a tool of international politics, as some
countries direct or sponsor terrorism as part of their foreign policy.
Last year the citizens and property of over 84 nations were the victims or
targets of international terrorist attacks -- attacks that resulted in nearly
3,000 casualties. Information collected for this year indicated that the
citizens and property of almost 70 countries have already been the victims of
international terrorism. We anticipate that the total number of incidents
could rise from 800 -- an all-time high two years ago -- to 900 by the end of
1988.
The number of terrorist incidents that occur within the United States has
remained very low in recent years. Yet our nation remains a prime target of
terrorist acts overseas. Our citizens and facilities are accessible to the
public; our national policies are directly opposed to the interests of many
terrorist groups; and our nation frequently supports governments that
terrorists are trying to destabilize.
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Intelligence helps us understand terrorism and take effective measures
to promote our security and safety. The CIA, cooperating with other
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, has collected valuable
information about terrorist groups. Some of the most useful information has
come from walk-ins -- terrorists who wish to defect from their organizations.
By protecting and in some cases resettling these individuals, we have been
able to gain their cooperation. They have told us much about their former
colleagues and organizations.
Such information helps protect both U.S. and Allied interests. We
learned, for example, that the Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, had an
extensive international commercial network that dealt in the gray arms
market. This network had key offices in Poland, East Germany, and several
other countries. Using this information, the U.S. State Department approached
the governments of these countries expressing concern about the presence of
these businesses. As a result, the companies were closed down.
We also keep track of the movements of terrorists and provide information
to our own judicial authorities and to foreign governments. In some cases,
the United States asks for extradition. In the case of Fawaz Yunis, wanted
for the June, 1985 hijacking of aJordanian airliner that carried U.S.
citizens, our information enabled the FBI to find and arrest Yunis.
Information has also been used to deny entry and safe haven to known
terrorists and their associates.
During the past three and a half years, there have been over 250 cases in
which some sort of counterterrorist action was taken on the basis of
intelligence information collected and disseminated by the CIA. In one such
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case, the Agency received a report that terrorists planned to assassinate a
senior American diplomat in a Middle Eastern country when he arrived for a
meeting. When the diplomat was informed of the report, he confirmed that he
had such an appointment. At the last moment, he changed the location of the
meeting and escaped an attempt on his life.
In recent years, the Agency has received reports of planned terrorist
attacks on our embassies in several different Latin American countries. In
each case, the embassy, upon receiving such a report, increased its security.
On several occasions, a source has subsequently informed us that this
increased security persuaded the terrorist group involved to cancel its plans
to attack.
Due to hard work, vigilance, and effective cooperation between CIA's
Counterterrorist Center and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies,
both within the U.S. and internationally, we have made some progress against
terrorism. There are far more terrorists in'prison in various parts of the
world than there were just two years ago. Countries around the world have
spent billions of dollars making their people and property safer and more
secure.
Yet all of the current trends. indicate that international terrorism is a
continuing threat and an unpredictable one. It will remain a priority issue
for the Intelligence Community.
Like terrorism, the narcotics problem is not confined to a single nation
or region. Like terrorism, narcotics is a serious threat to our national
security. It, too, is characterized by violence and intimidation and it, too,
can exact great human cost. Narcotics, like terrorism, is an important issue
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for the Intelligence Community. And our intelligence support has been vital
to U.S. counternarcotics efforts.
You are all aware of the alarming extent of narcotics abuse in our own
country. Almost 40 percent of organized-crime activity in our country is
related to drugs, generating an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.
On the international scene, we have documented ever-increasing rates of
drug production and trafficking. Narcotics activity has been accompanied by a
horrifying increase in violence and intimidation -- especially in Latin
America. Drug traffickers in Colombia routinely use violence. Judges and
other government officials, businessmen and journalists in that country have
been the targets of bribery, intimidation, and assassination. I suppose this
was symbolized especially in the destruction of the Supreme Court building by
drug dealers or terrorists employed for that purpose who literally assaulted
the Supreme Court building with artillery.
The Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on every step
in'the operation of narcotics production, processing, distribution, and the
laundering of profits. Our efforts are designed both to meet immediate needs
for intelligence and to help fashion longer-term drug control strategies.
We provide intelligence to the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to assist them in their drug
interdiction and enforcement efforts.
Our intelligence also assists foreign governments in their counter-
narcotics programs. Several Latin American countries are undertaking a major
cooperative effort to destroy drug processing laboratories, airstrips, and
chemical holding areas. We are also supporting an interdiction operation at
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the southwest border that involves federal, state, and local authorities in
both countries.
Our intelligence can help foreign countries measure the extent of their
own drug problem. Using some of our intelligence analysis, U.S. diplomats
were able to show one foreign government the extent of environmental damage
done by the slash-and-burn agriculture of its narcotics growers. The
government intensified its eradication efforts and made a major dent in drug
production. But the narcotics industry is resilient. In this case, narcotics
production came down, but the country has increasingly become a regional
transit point for narcotics.
Intelligence is also used to help implement anti-drug laws. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 and the bill recently passed by Congress call for the United
States to withhold some foreign assistance from nations that are not working
to counter drug activity within their borders. To support such legislation,
we monitor the activities of the drug traffickers and analyze how well other
countries' counternarcotics measures are working.
But policymakers recognize that intelligence, important as it is, does not
provide a solution to the narcotics problem. Intelligence can illuminate an
issue -- track, clarify, and predict an outcome. But the only real
solution -- in this country and worldwide -- is a reduced demand for
narcotics, coupled with a real reduction in supply.
Perhaps most important, international cooperation in fighting the drug
problem has increased considerably. In 1987, 23 nations joined the U.S. in
eradicating drug crops -- in 1981, there were only two.
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Efforts to reduce supply are designed to cause as much pain, confusion,
and frustration as possible among drug producers, traffickers, and money
launderers. This international effort relies on accurate information about
drug traffickers, their activities, and the effectiveness of countermeasures.
Narcotics -- worldwide cultivation, processing, transport, sale, and use --
will remain an important issue for the Intelligence Community.
I have been making the point that effective counterterrorism and
counternarcotics programs are critical to our national security, and they are
certainly critical to the safety of our citizens. But I want to emphasize as
well that how the CIA and other intelligence agencies carry out their
responsibilities is of equal importance to our country. We are subject to
specific laws and are governed by oversight.
Our mission is to provide intelligence to policymakers. We do not make
policy. We do, however, play a role in implementing policy. This is done
through covert action programs, and I want to discuss with you the proper,
legal role of covert action in advancing U.S. foreign policy, as well as the
type of accountability that governs our actions. As I do so, I think I should
add that although our covert action programs attract a great deal of interest
and criticism, they represent only three percent of the Intelligence
Community's resources.
The capability for covert action is essential to our foreign policy.
Fashioned effectively, covert action programs complement other instruments of
U.S. foreign policy, including diplomacy and economic activities, and they
offer an alternative to military action.
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Proposals for covert action are examined within the CIA by the Covert
Action Review Group. The group asks three basic questions in considering
whether to recommend a covert action: is it legal? Will it effectively
promote United States foreign policy? And, if disclosed, would it make
sense?
If these questions are answered satisfactorily, the proposal is forwarded
for consideration by the National Security Council -- first by a working group
and then by the National Security Planning Group, which is chaired by the
President.
I want to emphasize that the decision to use covert action is a policy
decision made by the President after consultation with the National Security
Council. Under the law, the President must sign a document called a finding
to authorize the covert action. And, by law, it is CIA's responsibility to
implement the covert action. Findings are shared with the congressional
oversight committees -- the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The CIA is governed by oversight as well as by law. In fact, oversight
occurs at three levels. The first is an internal one, directed by the
Agency's Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General.
Strengthening the mandate and resources of these offices was one of my first
priorities upon being appointed director in May, 1987.
The CIA is also subject to oversight within the executive branch, and
then, of course, there are the statutory oversight committees in Congress.
I believe in this system of oversight -- it builds, rather than erodes,
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trust between those who have the intelligence responsibility and those who are
elected to represent the American people.
There-is another important point I want to make about our work, and it is
that the intelligence we provide to policymakers on terrorism, narcotics, and
many other issues is not easy to come by. In fact, it sometimes comes at
great cost to the men and women of American intelligence. And it is their
creativity, their determination, their brilliance, and their courage that
spell the difference between success and failure.
I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our
mission. We are looking for people who are risk takers, but not risk
seekers. People who are dedicated and responsive to our law. People to whom
fame and fortune are not a necessary part of their lives, but who can find in
our work an avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and better
world.
This blend of requirements was best expressed by an old friend,
Sir William Stephenson. In the introduction to the book, A Man Called
Intrepid, which chronicled his remarkable intelligence accomplishments during
the Second World War, Sir William wrote this:
"Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence
is an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret,
the most dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised,
and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and wisdom of
those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that
guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail."
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I subscribe fully to this statement, and I believe deeply that a nation
dedicated to the rule of law can protect itself and its heritage in no other
way.
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