PROPOSED REMARKS AT YALE POLITICAL UNION
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CIA-RDP99-00777R000302450001-0
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K
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9
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December 22, 2016
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Publication Date:
November 16, 1988
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Proposed Remarks at Yale Political Union
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
New Haven, Connecticut
November 1.6, 1988
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During the 11 years I have been in Washington, I cannot remember a time
when so many things were going on around the world requiring our attention-
Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan, the elections in Pakistan, ethnic unrest in
Yugoslavia, the emergence of China as a major arms supplier-a whole range of
issues. These issues continue to make intelligence vital to our government.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view held
by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have always
had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened, they
want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as some-
what immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security, I
think the American people want a lot of intelligence. And tonight I'd like to talk
about how the Central Intelligence Agency does its job of supporting U.S. foreign
policy and protecting our national security. I want to focus on recent events in the
Soviet Union and what they mean for intelligence. Then I'd like to concentrate on
two problems that are not confined to national or regional borders-problems that
have grown substantially in the last decade-terrorism and narcotics.
As you might expect, those of us in the intelligence business have been
keeping a close watch on leadership changes and reform efforts in the Soviet
Union.
Although the range of intelligence issues that we face today is broad, the
Soviet Union is-and will continue to be-the primary focus of our intelligence col-
lection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to increase global influence,
and its aggressive intelligence activities are still serious threats to U.S. interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. Arguably, they make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew-bringing new life and dynamism to So-
viet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us could have foreseen
five years ago.
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The forces of democracy are making some political and economic lthough the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we ~wroads.
day's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering know i l to-
because it has not given the people enough breathing room-roo largely
room to inquire, room to unlock creativity. m to innovate,
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For exa
Soviets are leaving Afghanistan, however petulantly. And in the mple
area the
control, they are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under of arms
treaty-a process that includes unprecedented on-site inspections of Soviet
military facilities. viet
et
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has
contro-
versy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle continues between
reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary provoked contro-
system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affe the
far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central au st how
relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and how competitive th re is
system will be over the next few decades. a Soviet
Just six weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of
individuals in the Soviet hierarch -
the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his hef opponents overhaul 1957.
The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy in
with renewed momentum. at home and
home and
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform
Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, r the
Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles. obst
acles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concen-
trate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become more
decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other solicitous of its
the USSR is currently testing the Soviet system's, ability to make reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that Gor
is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the o bacuev
uw.
mately, pull off a "revolution from above" that actually increase ls y authority can, belo w.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Int
some formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to the
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political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev challenges the established
interests of individuals and institutions within his country.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and-even more difficult-how it may change
Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced
which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out what is important and what is
not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
We must provide intelligence and analysis for U.S.-Soviet arms control
talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be increas-
ingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the
provisions of agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous.
The INF treaty has required the United States to monitor about 120 facilities
declared by the Soviets. Monitoring the START treaty, which is being negotiated
in Geneva, could involve as many as 2,500 weapon locations spread throughout
the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the U.S. makes with the Soviets,
our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers will depend on the In-
telligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments-and even to
anticipate Gorbchev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected initiatives.
But the Soviet Union is certainly not our only focus. Two problems of
increasing importance to U.S. policymakers are terrorism and narcotics-prob-
lems that threaten not only our citizens, but people in all nations. Soviet dissident
Andrei Sakharov summed up the problem of terrorism this way: "No matter how
high the aims predicted by terrorists ... their activities are always criminal, always
destructive, throwing humankind back to a time of lawlessness and chaos,
providing internal and international complications, contradicting the goals of peace
and progress."
Terrorism has been with us for centuries, but its nature has changed in
recent years. It has become more intense and more widespread, and its targets
have grown. Terrorists today take advantage of sophisticated weaponry, ad-
vanced electronics, and improved communications. Perhaps even more important,
terrorism has become a tool of international politics, as some countries direct or
sponsor terrorism as part of their foreign policy.
Last year the citizens and property of over 84 nations were the victims or
targets of international terrorist attacks-attacks that resulted in nearly 3,000
casualties. Information collected for this year indicated that the citizens and
property of almost 70 countries have already been the victims of international
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terrorism. We anticipate that the total number of incidents could rise from
800-an all-time high two years ago-to 900 by the end of 1988.
The number of terrorist incidents that occur within the United States has re-
mained very low in recent years. Yet our nation remains a prime target of terrorist
acts overseas. Our citizens and facilities are accessible to the public; our national
policies are directly opposed to the interests of many terrorist groups; and our na-
tion frequently supports governments that terrorists are trying to destabilize.
Intelligence helps us understand terrorism and take effective measures to
promote our security and safety. The CIA, cooperating with other intelligence and
law enforcement organizations, has collected valuable information about terrorist
groups. Some of the most useful information has come from walk-ins-terrorists
who wish to defect from their organizations. By protectin and in some cases re-
settling these individuals, we have been able to gain the rcooperation. They have
told us much about their former colleagues and organizations.
Such information helps protect both U.S. and Allied interests. We learned,
for example, that the Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, had an extensive international
commercial network that dealt in the gray arms market. This network had key of-
fices in Poland, East Germany, and several other countries. Using this information,
the U.S. State Department approached the governments of these countries
expressing concern about the presence of these businesses. As a result, the
companies were closed down.
We also keep track of the movements of terrorists and provide informatio
to our own judicial authorities and to foreign governments. In some cases, the n
United States asks for extradition. In the case of Fawaz Yunis, wanted for the
June, 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner that carried U.S. citizens, our
information enabled the FBI to find and arrest Yunis. Information has also been
used to deny entry and safe haven to known terrorists and their associates.
During the past three and a half years, there have been over 250 cases in
which some sort of counterterrorist action was taken on the basis of intelligence
information collected and disseminated by the CIA. In one such case, the Agenc
received a report that terrorists planned to assassinate a senior American y
diplomat in a Middle Eastern country when he arrived for a meeting. When the dip-
lomat was informed of the report, he confirmed that he had such an appointment.
the last moment, he changed the location of the meeting and escaped 'an.
attempt on his life.
In recent years, the Agency has received reports of planned terrorist
attacks on our embassies in several different Latin American countries. In each
case, the embassy, upon receiving such a report, increased its security. On several
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occasions, a source has subsequently informed us that this increased security
persuaded the terrorist group involved to cancel its plans to attack.
Due to hard work, vigilance, and effective cooperation between CIA's
Counterterrorist Center and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, both
within the U.S. and internationally, we have made some progress against
terrorism. There are far more terrorists in prison in various parts of the world than
there were just two years ago. Countries around the world have spent billions of
dollars making their people and property safer and more secure.
Yet all of the current trends indicate that international terrorism is a
continuing threat and an unpredictable one. It will remain a priority issue for the
Intelligence Community.
Like terrorism, the narcotics problem is not confined to a single nation or re-
gion. Like terrorism, narcotics is a serious threat to our national security. It, too, is
characterized by violence and intimidation and it, too, can exact great human cost.
Narcotics, like terrorism, is an important issue for the Intelligence Community. And
our intelligence support has been vital to U.S. counternarcotics efforts.
You are all aware of the alarming extent of narcotics abuse in our own coun-
try. Almost 40 percent of organized-crime activity in our country is related to
drugs, generating an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.
On the international scene, we have documented ever-increasing rates of
drug production and trafficking. Narcotics activity has been accompanied by a
horrifying increase in violence and intimidation-especially in Latin America. Drug
traffickers in Colombia routinely use violence. Judges and other government
officials, businessmen and journalists in that country have been the targets of
bribery, intimidation, and assassination. I suppose this was symbolized especially
in the destruction of the Supreme Court building by drug dealers or terrorists
employed for that purpose who literally assaulted the Supreme Court building with
artillery.
The Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on every step
in the operation of narcotics production, processing, distribution, and the launder-
ing of profits. Our efforts are designed both to meet immediate needs for
intelligence and to help fashion longer-term drug control strategies.
We provide intelligence to the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to assist them in their drug interdiction
and enforcement efforts.
Our intelligence also assists foreign governments in their counter-narcotics
programs. Several Latin American countries are undertaking a major cooperative
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effort to destroy drug processing laboratories, airstrips, and chemical holding
areas. We are also supporting an interdiction operation at the southwest border
that. involves federal, state, and local authorities in both countries.
Our intelligence can help foreign countries measure the extent of their own
drug problem. Using some of our intelligence analysis, U.S. diplomats were able to
show one foreign government the extent of environmental damage done by the
slash-and-burn agriculture of its narcotics growers. The government intensified its
eradication efforts and made a major dent in drug production. But the narcotics in-
dustry is resilient. In this case, narcotics production came down, but the country
has increasingly become a regional transit point for narcotics.
Intelligence is also used to help implement anti-drug laws. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 and the bill recently passed by Congress call for the United
States to withhold some foreign assistance from nations that are not working to
counter drug activity within their borders. To support such legislation, we monitor
the activities of the drug traffickers and analyze how well other countries'
counternarcotics measures are working.
But policymakers recognize that intelligence, important as it is, does not
provide a solution to the narcotics problem. Intelligence can illuminate an
issue-track, clarify, and predict an outcome. But the only real solution-in this
country and worldwide-is a reduced demand for narcotics, coupled with a real
reduction in supply.
Perhaps most important, international cooperation in fighting the drug
problem has increased considerably. In 1987, 23 nations joined the U.S. in
eradicating drug crops-in 1981, there were only two.
Efforts to reduce supply are designed to cause as much pain, confusion,
and frustration as possible among drug producers, traffickers, and money launder-
ers. This international effort relies on accurate information about drug traffickers,
their activities, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. Narcotics-worldwide
cultivation, processing, transport, sale, and use-will remain an important issue
for the Intelligence Community.
I have been making the point that effective counterterrorism and counter-
narcotics programs are critical to our national security, and they are certainly
critical to the safety of our citizens. But I want to emphasize as well that how the
CIA and other intelligence agencies carry out their responsibilities is of equal
importance to our country. We are subject to specific laws and are governed by
oversight.
Our mission is to provide intelligence to policymakers. We do not make pol-
ICY? We do, however, play a role in implementing policy. This is done through
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covert action programs, and I want to discuss with you the proper, legal role of
covert action in advancing U.S. foreign policy, as well as the type of accountability
that governs our actions. As I do so, I think I should add that although our covert
action programs attract a great deal of interest and criticism, they represent only
three percent of the Intelligence Community's resources.
The capability for covert action is essential to our foreign policy. Fashioned
effectively, covert action programs complement other instruments of U.S. foreign
policy, including diplomacy and economic activities, and they offer an alternative
to military action.
Proposals for covert action are examined within the CIA by the Covert
Action Review Group. The group asks three basic questions in considering
whether to recommend a covert action: is it legal? Will it effectively promote
United States foreign policy? And, if disclosed, would it make sense?
If these questions are answered satisfactorily, the proposal is forwarded for
consideration by the National Security Council-first by a working group and then
by the National Security Planning Group, which is chaired by the President.
I want to emphasize that the decision to use covert action is a policy
decision made by the President after consultation with the National Security
Council. Under the law, the President must sign a document called a finding to au-
thorize the covert action. And, by law, it is CIA's responsibility to implement the
covert action. Findings are shared with the congressional oversight committees-
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The CIA is governed by oversight as well as by law. In fact, oversight
occurs at three levels. The first is an internal one, directed by the Agency's Office
of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General. Strengthening the mandate
and resources of these offices was one of my first priorities upon being appointed
director in May, 1987.
The CIA is also subject to oversight within the executive branch, and then,
of course, there are the statutory oversight committees in Congress.
I believe in this system of oversight-it builds, rather than erodes, trust
between those who have the intelligence responsibility and those who are elected
to represent the American people.
There is another important point I want to make about our work, and it is
that the intelligence we provide to policymakers on terrorism, narcotics, and many
other issues is not easy to come by. In fact, it sometimes comes at great cost to
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the men and women of American intelligence. And it is their creativity, their
determination, their brilliance, and their courage that spell the difference between
success and failure.
I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our mission.
We are looking for people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who
are dedicated and responsive to our law. People to whom fame and fortune are
not a necessary part of their lives, but who can find in our work an avenue to pur-
sue their highest aspirations for a safer and better world.
This blend of requirements was best expressed by an old friend, Sir William
Stephenson. In the introduction to the book, A Man Called Intrepid, which
chronicled his remarkable intelligence accomplishments during the Second World
War, Sir William wrote this: "Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the
world, intelligence is an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is,
being secret, the most dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be
devised, revised, and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and
wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that
guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail."
I subscribe fully to this statement, and I believe deeply that a nation
dedicated to the rule of law can protect itself and its heritage in no other way.
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