REMARKS AT WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302380004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 25, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.
October 25, 1988
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Intelligence collection may be in the eye of the beholder. About two months
ago then KGB Director Chebrikov made one of his rare, perhaps even one of his
first, appearances to talk about intelligence. And he quoted a speech that I made
last year-or at least a press interview, I think with The Los Angeles Times-in
which I was asked whether, following the problem with our Moscow Embassy, it
was still possible to collect inside the Soviet Union. And I had said yes, that we
were indeed able to recruit assets who would supply needed intelligence for that
purpose. And then Chebrikov said that nothing could be plainer-this makes the
point for why the Soviet Union should spend more money on counterintelligence. I
suppose you've heard us make the same argument in this country. A few days
ago, the chief of the KGB in Leningrad made a similar statement.
It brings to mind one of the stories collected for the President as part of his
perestroika collection. This story was about Gorbachev's desire to find out how his
program of perestroika was working in the outer areas. Gorbachev sent a
representative out into the Ukraine to visit some of the smaller villages. The
representative went to the mayor of one of the villages and, after talking to the
mayor for a moment, he said, "Do you have any television sets in this village?"
The mayor looked at him and said, "Of course we have television sets. In fact,
there may be two television sets in many of these huts." The representative said,
"That is very interesting. What about refrigerators?" And the mayor said, "Of
course. We all have refrigerators." The representative looked the mayor in the eye
and said, "Do you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who
else but a CIA agent would come into a village with no electricity and ask
questions like that?"
Frank Carlucci, Crowe, Shultz and others are going around having bilaterals,
but I have to tell you we have no planned bilaterals with the KGB.
It is the fall of 1988. We edge toward the end of the year and the end of the
decade. I have been asked rather frequently in recent months to reflect on what
the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be. The question reminds
me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist who said, "Prediction is
very difficult, especially about the future." With that cautionary note in mind, I will
make a few predictions about some of the key issues that now confront the
Intelligence Community-issues that we expect to be with us well into the next
decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, who was Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and is now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a
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view held by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have
always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened,
they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as
somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security, I
think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a whole range of
issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention-international
terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced weapons, the transfer
of strategic technology to the Soviet Bloc-to name just a few intelligence issues
that are global in nature.
Our interests around the world as a free superpower require our awareness
of happenings, plans, capabilities, and intentions in many regions of the world
where insurgencies, war, and political change are going on-such as in the many
different countries in Latin American and in Africa, the problems in the Middle
East, the struggle in Cambodia, to name just a few.
This evening, I want to concentrate on three geographical areas that are-
and will continue to be-of great interest to U.S. policymakers and, thus, to the In-
telligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union, South Asia, and the
Persian Gulf.
The nations of these three areas have many common borders. Their
interests are, necessarily, interrelated. Yet it is really a region without boundaries,
for the force of developments there is felt far beyond Moscow, or Islamabad, or
Tehran. Gorbachev's plans for reform, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict-one of the bloodiest wars
of our time and one that breached the international restraint against the use of
chemical weapons-have an impact far beyond the immediate region. All these
events have major implications not only for regional peace and stability, but for the
interests of the United States and the West and, indeed, for the entire world.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence collection
and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to increase global
influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities continue to pose security
challenges to United States interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to U.S.
intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew-bringing new life and dynamism to
Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us could have foreseen
.even five years ago.
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The forces of democracy are making some Poli
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward t~cal and economic inroads.
day's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering largely
to-
room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
enough breathing room- room to innovate,
Change is occurring in the area of foreign Policy Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and they are eli as well. For example, the a weapons under the INF treaty- minatin a inspections of Soviet military facile eSCess that includesu Here whole
ear
on-site
The dramatic nature of these
versy within the Soviet Union. A policy changes clearly has provoked contro-
formers,
formers, who believe radical changes are necessa
major power struggle is under way between re-
make the for system r ,who believe
e-ry to
conservatives
very system the , who fear such changes could destabilize Communist
y are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will aff the
far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to hive
relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and h central authorityest how
system will be over the next few decades. ow competitive
the Soviet
Just
individuals
in a fee weeks hierarchy-undertaking Gorbachev successfully challenged the top the most sweeping number
l
P party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents The changes made should allow Gorbachev to overhaul of
abroad with renewed momentum. push his policy agenda at home and
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term system. his The process be long and drawn u at baest, re king q reform the
Gorbachev to overcome enormous
political, economic, t and cultural obs uiring
There are strong reasons to question whether a tacles.
tone centralize l resources authority,
cauthority, maximize government control o
trate
on building system designed n
strength people, and concen-
decentralized and democratic up thesnnation's military over
can become more
decisionmaking and more solicitous of its
the nationem The the USSR will ational untestre resst in the Soviet Baltic states, Armenia,
and other ork. of
But if the last three system's ability to make reforms work.
years have taught us anything at all, it is that
~maae highly skilled politician, and we cannot r
Y. pull off a "revolution from above" ale out the Gorbachev
below' that actuallypinceases authorityen, ul_
th
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence $Or'n v sry formidable challenges. We must tte Communi
truggles and issues being raised as Gcon ' tll with
Pal established interests of individuals a pay Gorbachev closer attention than ever to the
and institutions. continues to challenge the
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We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and-perhaps even more difficult-how it may
change Moscow's foreign policy.
In the Intelligence Community, we must manage the information explosion
that glasnost has produced which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out what
is important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations
progress, the Intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess Soviet
motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of agreements.
And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty has required
the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities. Monitoring the
START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could involve as many as
2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the United States makes with the
Soviet Union, our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers will
depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments-
and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected
initiatives, such as the proposal that he made recently to give up Cam Ranh Bay if
we would give up the Philippines, or to withdraw troops from Hungary if we would
give up our fighters based in Italy.
Moving south, intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important to
policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet influence in
the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan
demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue other objectives.
But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan is going to remain a key for-
eign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the Soviets' continued interest and its
strategic location, Afghanistan will remain an important concern in Washington as
well.
I recall a meeting with President Zia this time last year. He went to his library
shelf and pulled off a book showing a map of the region over which he had put a
red celluloid overlay to illustrate Soviet influence in Afghanistan and show the
strategic wedge that further occupation of that territory represented not only to
Iran, but to Pakistan and nations further south.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest
of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. That has not
changed, despite the Soviets' pause in their withdrawal. At the same time,
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Moscow will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic and
political means. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan just
a few weeks ago indicates that Afghanistan remains a priority concern in
Moscow.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The Soviet-
backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the withdrawal
will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance will continue
its effort to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the ruling party's
fragmentation may be as large a factor in the. regime's collapse as the military ini-
tiatives of the resistance. We believe that the military could probably last for a
longer period of time than we have predicted for the political structure itself.
The post-Soviet period will also find the Afghan rebels fighting among
themselves. That has been historically so. They did it throughout the Soviet
occupation and we expect that it will continue. Given that most ethnic groups are
better armed than ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons from
the disintegrating Afghan army, we could expect to see tribal conflict continue for
some time after the Soviet withdrawal.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the post-
Soviet era well-armed and well-organized. Whatever the composition of a future
government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a larger role in
its operations and its policies. But the nature and traditions of Afghanistan make
the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
I think it's important to say that the United States cannot dictate who will fi-
nally emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central government is
unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually be matched by the re-
turn of historical suspicions about the West. Perhaps the good news about events
in Afghanistan is not so much what has been gained, but what has been averted.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are the
primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts by
neighboring countries to exert influence there will also receive our attention. In the
longer term, we will examine the future Afghan government's attempts to rebuild
the country and resettle the world's largest refugee population-more than five
million people.
About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country that
has fully. supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of strategic
interest to the United States and to its policymakers, but the death of President
Zia in August has raised new issues.
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The response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constituonal
transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken oven as
Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new
30 days after Parliamentary elections. President Ipshaq has president must be announced that
elected within
elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule. A series
ings have removed the constraints placed on Pakistan's of judicial rul-
politic
1985 elections, and the November elections have become the most Clo in the
contested in Pakistan's history. closely
I think I should also add that the military vacancies through constitutional means. I think the asprealesuppo effort
the
process. Pakistan is plagued by problems of terrorism port for ths
this
partly in support of the Afghan resistance. But I do not think, as long ass th the tee to r its role
under control, that this will change the military's willingness think, rrorism is
the issue. oeto let voters decide
Because of the close relationship between the
and because of Pakistan's strategic importance United States and Pakistan
, the U.S. will be following these developments with the keenest interest. Community
Further south is another region of great strategic interest for the
States-the Persian Gulf-an area where tensions remain high des United
fire between Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the pits the cease-
nations have been fitful and difficult. The animosities built up over ei the two
bitter conflict are not easy to dispel. g ht
years of
The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than $350 billion, and
even
more in human costs-more than one million casualties and one and a half million
refugees. This was one of the bloodiest wars of the ce
years for the two nations to recover. ntury, and it will take many
The conflict has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Ir
Iraq. Both economies have been weakened by the loss of oil revs an and
have borne the expense of large-scale arms purchases. Hues and both
exhausted their financial reserves and have been com elle
Both d countries have
development programs. P .led to cut economic
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resu
all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
each
~ness.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities conflics,
the implications for the region and the United States. When the both U.S. presence as well well in
in
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the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical intelligence support to
naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command. Our support included
reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval bases, airfields, and coastal
defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces have been better able to successfully
carry out U.S. foreign policy and protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing-questions such as what effect the
cease-fire may have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the po-
litical struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact the
cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and the long-
term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq-and the rest of the world-have learned from a war that involved the first
sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War 11-even during the most
desperate battles-both sides refrained from using chemical weapons-weapons
that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for fu-
ture wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq used
chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too, has
employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the
effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more powerful
foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and more
than 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, which is a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one of
the favored chemical agents for several reasons-its relative ease of manufacture,
its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability to incapacitate those
who are exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain and ner-
vous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as cyanide
and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while phosgene,
widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
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Most of these plants look like nothing more than pesticide plants and are
difficult to detect.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of foreign
countries to develop and produce chemical weapons, and their incentives for
using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic missiles in the Third World,
we must be alert to attempts by Third World nations to arm these missiles with
chemical warheads. Virtually every city in the Middle East would be subject to
such an attack, if these two types of weapons are combined.
The proliferation of advanced weapons affects the prospects for peace and
stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. For Israel, the
spread of chemical weapons among the Arab states-principally Iraq, Libya, and
Syria-could seriously alter the regional balance of power. This has major
implications for peace in the Middle East.
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been lifted. At
least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons, and this presents
us with another intelligence concern.
Intelligence support is also vital to the success of United States efforts to
prevent the use of chemical weapons-efforts such as restricting the export of
certain key chemicals and of ballistic missile technology. On the international front,
the United States participates in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which is
trying to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. And on September 26th, President
Reagan addressed the United Nations General Assembly. He called on the signers
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other concerned nations to convene a confer-
ence to consider actions that we can take together to reverse the serious erosion
of this treaty.
Yes, assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is one
of the most difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community-now and
into the next decade. It is also one of our most important tasks, for these weapons
may well represent one of the most serious threats to world peace in the coming
years.
The famed British writer and cynic, Somerset Maugham, once noted, "It is
bad enough to know the past; it would be intolerable to know the future." It
would, of course, be just as intolerable not to be prepared for the future. The intel-
ligence issues that I have chosen for discussion today-reform in the Soviet
Union, unrest in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf-are issues that will
be with us into the next decade. Assessing these questions and their far-reaching
effects is the critical task of intelligence.
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Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the age.
They help us to do our very difficult work. But intelligence is preeminently an affair
of people. It is the caliber of the men and women of American intelligence-their
creativity, determination, brilliance, and courage-that spells the difference be-
tween success and failure.
And I hope very much that we continue to attract those best suited to carry
out our mission-people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are
dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who understand and
play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a necessary part of
their lives,. but who can find in this difficult work an avenue to pursue their highest
aspirations for a. safer and a better world.
With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that policy-
makers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our national
security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect of us, and I can
assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
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