REMARKS BY WILLIAM H. WEBSTER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C. WASHINGTON, D.C.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302380001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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REMARKS
BY
WILLiAM H. WEBSTER
DIRfCTOR~OF CENTRAL INTELLfiGENCE
AT THE
WWORLD AFFAIRS'COl1NCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25., 1988
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Intelligence collection may be in the eye of the beholder. About two
months ago then KGB director Chebrikov made one of his rare, perhaps even-one
of his first, appearances to talk about intelligence. And he quoted a speech
that I made last year -- or at least a press interview, I think with
The Los Angeles Times -- in which I was asked whether, following the problem
with our Moscow Embassy, it was still possible to collect inside the Soviet
Union. And I fi ad said yes, that we were indeed able to recruit assets who
would supply needed intelligence for that purpose. And then Chebrikov staid
that noth ing could be plainer -- this makes the point for why the Soviet Union
should spend more money on counterintelligence. I suppose you've heard us
make the same argument in this country. A few days ago, the chief of the KGB
in Leningrad made a similar statement.
It brings to mind one of the stories collected for the President as part
of his perestroika collection. This story was about Gorbachev's desire to
find out how his program of perestroika was working in the outer areas.
Gorbachev sent a representative out into the Ukraine to visit some of the
smaller villages. The representative went to the mayor of one of the villages
and, after talking to the mayor for a moment, he said, "Do you have any
television sets in this village?" The mayor looked at. him and said, "Of
course we have television sets. in fact, there may be two television sets in
many of these huts." The representative said, "That is very interesting.
What about refrigerators?" And the mayor said, "Of course. We all have
refrigerators." The representative looked the mayor in the eye and said, "Do
you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA
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agent would ,come into a village with no electricity and ask questions like
that?"
Frank Carlucci, Crowe, Shultz and others are going around having
bilaterals, but I have to tell you we have no planned bilaterals with the KGB.
It is the fall of 1988. We edge toward the end of the year and the end
of the decade. I have been asked rather frequently in recent months to
reflect on what the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s wi]1 be.
The question reminds me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist who
said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that
cautionary note in mind, i will make a few predictions about some of the key
issues that now confront the Intelligence Community -- issues that we expect
to be with us well into the next decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, who was Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and is now our Ambassador to the United Nations,
describes a view held by many in this country about intelligence.
"Americans," he said, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward
intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they
don't, they 'tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national
security, I think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. -And a
whole range of issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention --
international terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced
weapons, the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Bloc -- to name
just a few intelligence issues that are global in nature.
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Our interests around the world as a free superpower require our awareness
of happenings, plans, capabilities, and intentions in many regions of the
world where insurgencies, war,-and political change are going on -- such as in
the many. different countries i.n Latin American and in Africa, the problems in
the Middle East, the struggle in Cambodia, to name dust a few.
This evening, I want to concentrate on three geographical areas that
are -- and will continue to be -- of great interest to U.S. policymakers and,
thus, to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union, South
Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
The nations of these three areas have many common borders. Their
interests are, necessarily, interrelated. Yet it is really a region without
boundaries, for the force of developments there is felt far beyond Moscow, :or
Islamabad, or Tehran. Gorbachev's plans for reform, the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- one
of the bloodiest wars of our time and .one that breached the international
restraint against the use of chemical weapons -- have an impact far beyond the
immediate region. All these events have mayor implications not only for
regional peace and stability, but.for the interests of the United States and
the West and, indeed, for the entire world.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence
collection and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities continue
to pose security challenges to United States interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
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Like many of you, I have .been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none. of us
could have foreseen even five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads..
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it,
today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering
largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to
innovate, -room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For example,
the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and they are eliminating a whole class of
nuclear weapons under the INF treaty --- a process that includes unprecedented
on-site inspections of Soviet military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way
between reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the
Communist system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could
destabilize the very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this
struggle will affect how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to
which central authority is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and
how competitive the Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
Just a few weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of
individuals in the Soviet hierarchy -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul
of the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in
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1957. The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at
home and abroad with renewed momentum.
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform
the Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring
Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There :are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become
more decentralized 'and democratic in its decisionmaking .and more solicitous of
its people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other
regions of the USSR will further test the Soviet system's ability to make
reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. intelligence Community with
some very formidable challenges. .We must pay closer attention than ever to
the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev continues to
challenge the established interests of individuals and institutions.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- perhaps even more difficult -- how
it may change Moscow's foreign policy.
In the Intelligence Community, we must manage the information explosion
that glasnost has produced which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out
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what is important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to
We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations
progress, the intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess
Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions~of
agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty
has required the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities.
Monitoring the START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could
involve as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Unison.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the United States makes with the
Soviet Union, our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers
will depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate
assessments -- and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and
.unexpected initiatives, such as the proposal that he made recently to give up
Cam Ranh Bay if we would give up the Phi lippines, or to withdraw troops from
Hungary if we would give up our fighters based in Italy.
Moving south., intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important
to policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet
influence in the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue
other objectives. But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal., Afghanistan is
going to remain a key foreign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the
Soviets' continued interest and its strategic location, Afghanistan will
remain an important concern in Washington as well. _
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I recall a meeting with President Zia this time last .year. He went to
his library shelf and pulled off a book showing a map of the region over which
he had put a red celluloid overlay to illustrate Soviet inf luence in
Afghanistan and show the strategic wedge that further occupation of that
territory represented not only to Iran, but to Pakistan and nations further
south.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest
of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. That has not
changed, despite the Soviets'' pause in their withdrawa 1. At the same time,
Moscow-will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic and
political means. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan
just a few weeks ago indicates that Afghanistan remains a priority concern in
Moscow.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The
Soviet-backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the
wi"thdrawal will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance
will continue its effort to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the
ruling party's fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse
as the military initiatives of the resistance. We believe that the military
could probably last for a longer period of time than we have predicted for the
political structure itself
The post-Soviet period will also find the Afghan rebels fighting among
themselves. That has been historically so. They did it throughout the Soviet
occupation and we expect that it will continue. Given that most ethnic groups
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are better armed than ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons
from the disintegrating Afghan army, we could expect to see tribal conflict
continue for some time after the Soviet withdrawal.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the
post-Soviet era well-armed and well-organized. Whatever the composition of a
future government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a
larger role in its operations and its policies. But the nature and traditions
of Afghanistan make the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
I think it's important to say that the United States cannot dictate who
will finally emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central
government is unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually
be matched by the return of historical suspicions about the West. Perhaps the
good news about events in Afghanistan is not so much what has been gained, but
what has been averted.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are
the primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. Sut efforts
by neighboring countries to exert influence there will also receive our
attention. In the longer term, we will-examine the future Afghan government's
attempts to rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee
population -- more than five million people.
About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country
that has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of
strategic interest to the United States and to its policymakers, but the death
of President Zia in August has raised new issues.
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The response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constitutional.
transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken over as
Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president must be elected
within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. President Ishaq has announced
that elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule. A series of
judicial rulings have removed the constraints placed on Pakistan's politic-al
parties in the 1985 elections, and the November elections have become the most
.closely contested in Pakistan's history.
i think I should also add that the military has supported this effort to
fill the vacancies through constitutional means. I think there is real
support for this-process. Pakistan is plagued by problems of terrorism,
partly as a result of its role in support of the Afghan resistance. But I do
not think., as long as the terrorism is under control, that this will change
the military's willingness to let voters decide the issue.
Because of the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan
and because of Pakistan's strategic importance, the U.S. Inte lligence
Community will be following these developments with the keenest interest.
Further south is another region of great strategic interest for the
United States -- the Persian Gulf -- an area where tens-ions remain high
despite the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the peace
talks between the two nations have been fitful and difficult. The animosities
built up over eight years of bitter conflict are not easy to dispel.
The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than $350 billion, and even
more in human costs -- more than one million casualties and one and a half
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million refugees. This was one of the bloodiest wars of the century, and it
will take many years for the two nations to recover.
The conflict -has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran
and Iraq. Both economies have been weakened by the loss of oil revenues and
both have borne the expense of large-scale arms purchases. Both countries
have exhausted their financial reserves and have been compelled to cut
economic development programs.
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides .from resuming an
all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust
each other, and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
The U.S. intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq
conflict, providing assessments of the intentions and c:a~pa~bilities of both
sides, as well as the implications for the region and the United .States. When
the U.S. presence in the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical
intelligence support to naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command.
Our support included reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval
bases, airfields, and coastal defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces
have been better able to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy and
protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing -- questions such as what effect the
cease-fire may have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the
political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact
the cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and
the long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
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Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq -- and the rest of the world -- :have learned from a war that involved the
first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First -World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint anal set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
has employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the
effects of chemical weapons.. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more
powerful foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and
more than 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, which is a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one
of the favored chemical agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of
manufacture, its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability
to incapacitate those. who are exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain
and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as
cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while
phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
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Most of these plants look like nothing more than gestic ide plants .and are
difficult to detect.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of
foreign countrfies to deve lop andproduce chemical weapons, and their
incentives for using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic
missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to .attempts by Third World
nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads. Virtually every city in
'the Middle East would be subject to such an attack, if these two types of
weapons are combined.
The proliferation of advanced weapons affects the prospects for peace and
stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. For Israel,
the spread of chemical weapons among the A ab states -- principally Iraq,
Libya, and Syria --could seriously alter the regional balance of power. This
has major implications for peace in the Middle East.
It also appears that the moral barrier to biolog cal warfare 'has been
lifted. At least 10 countries are -working to produce biological weapons, and
this presents us with another intelligence concern.
Intelligence support is also vital to the success of United States
efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons -- efforts such as restricting
the export of certain key chemicals and of ballistic missile technology. On
the international front, the United States participates in the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, which is trying to negotiate a chemical weapons
ban. And on September 26th, President Reagan addressed the United Nations
General Assembly. He called on the signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
other concerned nations to convene a conference to consider actions that we
can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty.
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Yes, assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is
one of the most difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community --
now and into the -next decade. It i~s also one of our most important tasks, for
these weapons may well represent one of the most serious threats to world
peace in the coming years.
The famed British writer and cynic, Somerset Maugham, once noted, "It is
bad enough to know the past; it would be intolerable to know the future." It
would, of course, be just as intolerable not to be prepared for the future.
The intelligence issues that I have chosen for discussion today -- reform in
the Soviet Union, unrest in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf --
-are issues that will b~e with us into the next decade. Assessing these
questions and their far-reaching effects is the critical task of intelligence.
Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the
age. They help us to do our very difficult work. But intelligence is
preeminently an affair of people. it is the caliber of the men and women of
American intelligence -- their creativity, determination, brilliance, and
courage -- that spells the difference between success and failure.
And I hope very much that we. continue to attract those best suited to
carry out our miss-ion -- people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers.
People who .are dedicated and responsive to our iaw and discipline. People who
understand and play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a
necessary part of their life, but who can find in this difficult work an
avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
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With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our
national security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect
of us, and i can assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
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