REMARKS AT TRINITY UNIVERISTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302290002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 4, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at Trinity University
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
San Antonio, Texas
October 4, 1988
1-9; 4
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Thank you very much, President Calgaard. It's a great pleasure as well as a
privilege for me to come back to San Antonio and to speak to you tonight. As
President Calgaard said, I had the pleasure of watching my son graduate from this
university 10 years ago. In fact, he was back for his 10th reunion this spring. I am
grateful to this university for what it did for him and I am also grateful for what it
did for me-he never took me seriously until you extended this invitation to speak
tonight.
There is another reason that I am glad to be back in San Antonio. It brings
back a somber, but triumphant, memory of a very difficult investigation-perhaps
the most difficult one ever undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation-the
assassination of Judge John Wood. The first federal judge assassinated in this
century with no crime-scene evidence and no eyewitnesses. It was an excruciating
experience for the FBI to take on such a case. I came down to San Antonio a cou-
ple of years after I watched Bill graduate to try to see what I could do to support
the FBI effort here. Two hundred thousand bits and pieces of intelligence had been
collected in a computer, but there were no solutions at that time. In the end, as
you know, the case was solved and justice was done. The very able judge who
tried that case was Judge William Sessions. And now you have given us your
great judge, and my great friend, to lead the FBI. We're just delighted to have Bill
and Alice Sessions in Washington. He has been doing a distinguished job, and I
am very proud to have him succeed me.
Well, during the 10 and 1 /2 years that I've been in Washington I cannot re-
member a time when more things were going on around the world-from Soviet
troops leaving Afghanistan, to worker strikes in Poland, to military coups in Burma
and Haiti; the prospects, finally, of some kind of settlement in Angola and possibly
Cambodia; the winding down of hostilities in the Persian Gulf to mention just a
few. The prospect of additional arms agreements with the Soviets has enormous
significance to us, and I'll be talking about that in a moment. And, of course, you
watched the events of last week as the Soviets made significant changes in their
government. All of these events will continue to make intelligence vitally important
to our government.
I might mention a word about intelligence that my good friend, General
Vernon Walters, our Ambassador to the United Nations, once said. He said,
11 Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When
they feel threatened, they want a lot of it. And when they don't, they tend to re-
gard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
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Intelligence has always been sought after in one form or another. During the
Spanish-American War, publisher William Randolph Hearst sent this telegram to
his on-the-spot reporter: "Send all the juicy details. Never mind the facts."
Well, tonight I'd like to give you both the facts and some details about the
Central Intelligence Agency and how we do our job of supporting United States
foreign policy and protecting our national security.
A major part of our job is to provide intelligence to policymakers on a wide
range of issues. To give you some insight into that job, I want to focus briefly on
recent events in the Soviet Union and what they mean for intelligence. Then I'd like
to concentrate on two problems that threaten all nations-problems that have
grown substantially in the last decade-terrorism and narcotics.
Although the range of intelligence issues that we face today is broad, the
Soviet Union is-and I think will continue to be-the primary focus of our
intelligence collection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to increase
global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are a serious threat to
United States interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. In fact, the Soviet reform effort presents the Intelligence Community
with some formidable challenges.
We must now pay closer attention than ever to the political struggles and
issues being raised as Gorbachev challenges the established interests of individ-
uals and institutions within his country.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and-even more difficult-how it may change
Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced
which, though welcome, challenges us within the Community to sort out what is
important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations
progress, the Intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess Soviet
motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of agreements.
And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty has required
the United States to conduct inspections at 1 17 Soviet facilities. Monitoring the
START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could involve as many as
2,500 weapon locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.
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Yet whatever arms control agreements the U.S. makes with the Soviets,
our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers will depend-on the
Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments-and even to
anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected initiatives.
This past weekend Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of individ-
uals in the Soviet hierarchy. The changes made should allow the Soviet leader to
push his policy agenda at home and abroad with renewed momentum.
Yet, this is only one victory in a very long war to reform the Soviet system.
Gorbachev's real test will be his ability to implement his policies and their
effectiveness-and the jury will be deliberating on this verdict for a long time to
come.
The Soviet Union is, of course, not our only focus. Two problems of
increasing importance to United States policymakers are terrorism and narcotics-
problems that threaten not only our citizens but people in all nations.
Terrorism has been with us for centuries, but its nature has changed in
recent years. It has become more intense and more widespread, and its targets
have grown. Terrorists have attacked diplomats in embassies, passengers on
airplanes, travelers on trains and ships, tourists in hotels and restaurants, and
clerics in churches and synagogues.
Today, terrorists take advantage of sophisticated weaponry, advanced
electronics and improved communications. Perhaps even more important, terror-
ism has become a tool of international politics, as some countries direct or
sponsor terrorism as part of their foreign policy. Terrorists with state sponsorship
are especially difficult to deal with. They obtain real and false documentation for
travel and for cover. They receive training and intelligence. They gain a safe haven
in the sponsoring country. And, of course, they get funding.
Last year the citizens and property of over 84 nations were the victims or
targets of international terrorist attacks-attacks that resulted in nearly 3,000
casualties. Information collected for this year indicates that the citizens and
property of almost 70 countries have already been the victims of international
terrorism. We anticipate that the total number of incidents will rise from 800-an
all-time high two years ago-to 900 by the end of 1988.
The number of terrorist incidents that occur within the United States has
thankfully and, I think, largely thanks to the FBI, remained low in recent years. Last
year there was not a single international terrorist incident in the United States.
There were three domestic terrorist incidents in Puerto Rico, but no one was
killed. Yet our nation remains a prime target of terrorist acts overseas. Our citizens
and facilities are accessible to the public; our national policies are directly opposed
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to the interests of many terrorist groups; and our nation frequently
governments that terrorists are trying to destabilize. Some 40 percent of
incidents worldwide have been acts directed against United States citizens,
property or institutions. terrorist
,
Intelligence is vital to understanding terrorism and taking effective to promote our security and our safety. The CIA, cooperating with other
measures
er
and law enforcement organizations, has collected valuable information
about terrorist groups. Some of the most useful information has come from
walkins-terrorists who wish to defect from their organizations. B r
in some cases resettling these individuals, y p otecting and
tion. And they've told us about their former
we've been to olle colleagues able
those who heir
finance and
protect their organizations, the location of their headquarters, and the names and
their leaders. mes of
Such information helps protect both U.S. and allied interests. W,
for example, that the Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, had an exten a learned,
commercial network that dealt in the gray arms market. This network had of-
fices in Poland, East Germany, and several other c slue international
the United States State Department a r ountries. Using this information,
countries expressing concern about the presence of these businesef these
the companies were closed down. es. As a result,
We also keep track of the movements of terrorists. If our
an outstanding warrant for the arrest of a suspected terrorist, we can
information available to judicial authorities so that the government has
apprehend
him. In some cases the United States asks for extradition. In the case of make
Yunis, wanted for the June 1985 hijacking of a they
Fawaz
Jordanian can airliner locate that and carried U.S.
citizens, our information led the FBI to find and arrest Yunis. T
Hammadi is now on trial in Germany. Another terrorist na he terrorist
up an airplane en route from Tokyo to Honolulu a few years aggo ashid,who blew
arrest in Greece. , is currently under
It has taken quite a long time to bring the countries of the wor
the principle that there should be no sanctuary for terrorists, Id around o
only a Political issue, it is a criminal one. And the cooperation that terrorism is not
should be given in the arrest, apprehension of every nation
Director and trial of terrorists. When I was
of the FBI, I made m
D any trips to Europe to talk to officials at INTERPOL, attend the United Nations Congress on Crime in Milan, a to
Group, the ministers of interior and of justice of the ~ nd to meet with the Trevi
the concept came to be accepted both in the Unit European Community. Finally
Cannot trade peace for sanctuary. ed Nations and in Europe that we
We also share information with foreign governments c
end Potential terrorists, including aliases used oncerning known
and false documertation, enabling
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those countries to add such individuals to their watchlists. Such improved border
control enabled one government to arrest a well-known supporter of several
terrorist organizations. Information has also been used to deny entry and safe
haven to known terrorists and their associates.
During the past three and a half years, there have been over 250 cases in
which some form of counterterrorist action was taken on the basis of intelligence
information collected and disseminated by the CIA. In one such case, the agency
received a report that terrorists planned to assassinate a senior American
diplomat in a Middle Eastern country when he arrived for a meeting. When the dip-
lomat was informed of the report, he confirmed that he had such an appointment.
At the last moment, he changed the location of the meeting and escaped an
attempt on his life.
In recent years, the Agency has received reports of planned terrorist
attacks on our embassies in several different Latin American countries, including
Colombia, Peru and El Salvador. In each case when we got the report and gave it
to the embassy, they increased their security. And on several occasions we've
learned from our sources that the increased security persuaded the terrorist group
involved to cancel its plans to attack.
Due to hard work, vigilance and effective cooperation between the intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies, both within the U.S. and internationally, we
have made some progress against terrorism. There are far more terrorists in
prison in various parts of the world than there were just two years ago. Countries
around the world have spent billions of dollars to provide greater protection for
their people and property. And, very thankfully, the international community was
spared any terrorist incidents at the summer Olympic games in South Korea. I
couldn't help but think of the six years that Peter Ueberroth and I worked together
to be sure that there were no terrorist incidents at the Los Angeles Olympic
Games or the Statue of Liberty event in New York Harbor just a couple of years
ago.
Yet terrorist groups and their state sponsors remain active. In June, a U.S.
naval attache, Captain Nordeen, was assassinated in Athens. In July, the Abu
Nidal organization attacked a cruise ship. Both attacks showed ruthlessness and
sophisticated planning.
All of the current trends indicate that international terrorism is a continuing
threat and an unpredictable one. But I can report that, through the efforts of the
Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center and in coordination with our
sister agencies in law enforcement and in intelligence, and with cooperating
nations around the world, we are coming to grips with this problem.
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Narcotics presents a related threat to our national security. Like terrorism,
narcotics is a problem of international dimension. It, too, is characterized by
violence and intimidation and it, too, can exact great human cost. Narcotics, like
terrorism, is an important issue for the Intelligence Community as well as the law
enforcement community. Our intelligence support has been vital to U.S. counter-
narcotics efforts-and will be even more vital in the future.
You are all aware of the alarming extent of narcotics abuse in our own coun-
try. More than 70 million Americans have tried an illegal drug, and 12 percent of
the population is thought to have used an illegal drug in the past month. Almost 40
percent of organized-crime activity in our country is related to drugs, generating an
income estimated to be as high as $110 billion. New York City, which has more
AIDS cases than any other United States city, has estimated that intravenous drug
use was responsible for 35 percent of known AIDS cases.
On the international scene, we have documented ever-increasing rates of
narcotics production, trafficking and usage. This activity has been accompanied
by a frightening increase in violence and intimidation-especially in Latin America.
Drug traffickers in Colombia routinely use violence to further their activities.
Judges and other government officials, businessmen, and even journalists in that
country have been the targets of bribery, intimidation and assassination.
I am really preaching to the choir here, because those of you who were here
in 1979 know that drugs and drug trafficking were behind the assassination of
Judge John Wood-an act of intimidation which we could not and did not accept.
The Intelligence Community is actively involved in United States counternar-
cotics efforts for several reasons. The United States cannot develop its foreign
policy without having an understanding of the role that narcotics plays in a
country's political, economic, and social systems. Intelligence provides that kind
of information. For example, we can provide information on the problems in
getting opium farmers in northern Thailand to grow coffee instead. Opium is a
product that requires no distribution; smugglers simply come along and buy it. It
does not decay or perish either. And now those farmers are being asked to grow
coffee, a product that's three years away from its first crop and is perishable. In-
telligence can help our policymakers understand such problems and consider
solutions.
Narcotics threatens our national security and that of our allies. Drug abuse
and related activities have had a devastating effect in this country. Our allies
around the world have faced a similar threat and some of them, as regional centers
for narcotics production and trafficking, must also cope with escalating levels of
violence, corruption and social discorder. Intelligence helps describe the nature of
this threat and helps in developing countermeasures.
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The Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on every step
in the operation of. narcotics production, processing, distribution and the launder-
ing of profits abroad. Our efforts are designed both to meet immediate needs for
intelligence and to help fashion longer-term drug control strategies.
We provide intelligence to the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to assist them in their drug interdiction
and enforcement efforts. Just this fall, the U.S. Coast Guard acted on our
intelligence to seize over 1,200 pounds of cocaine and arrest five people.
I'd like to give another example that I was aware of at the time it was hap-
pening, for it illustrates what good work can result from effective cooperation
between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The case involved ethyl
ether, which is a chemical used in refining cocaine. A transmitter was placed in
barrels of the chemical, and the barrels were tracked from Indiana to Louisiana,
where they were shipped to Cartagena, Colombia. From there, the barrels were
tracked electronically to Caqueta, Colombia, where intelligence analysts had
identified a cocaine manufacturing site located 500 miles from the nearest road.
The Colombian national police were tipped off, and they successfully raided the
site and seized about 10 tons of cocaine. In fact, we also advised the Colombians,
based on intelligence, that barrels had been placed on the airstrip at the cocaine
lab. They were then able to fly in with helicopters, rather than fixed-wing aircraft,
and clear the runway. Those are the kind of results that good intelligence can bring
to the narcotics fighting effort.
Our intelligence also assists foreign governments in their counternarcotics
programs. Several Latin American countries are currently undertaking a major
cooperative effort to destroy drug processing laboratories, airstrips and chemical
holding areas. We are supporting an interdiction operation at the southwest
border of the United States that involves federal, state and local authorities in both
the U.S. and Mexico.
Our intelligence can also help foreign countries measure the extent of their
own drug problem. Using some of our intelligence analysis, U.S. diplomats were
able to show one foreign government the extent of the environmental damage
done by the slash-and-burn agriculture of its narcotics growers. The government
intensified its eradication efforts and got immediate results. But the narcotics
industry is resilient. In this case, narcotics production came down, but the country
has increasingly become a regional transit point for drugs. This illustrates the
extensive nature of the narcotics problem-it may be suppressed in one area and
yet remain in another.
Intelligence is also used to help implement the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986. This legislation requires the United States to withhold some foreign
assistance from nations that are not working to counter drug production,
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trafficking or money laundering within their borders. To support this act, we
monitor the activities of the drug., traffickers and analyze how well other countries'
counternarcotics measures are working. We also give policymakers any informa-
tion we have on the involvement of foreign governments in drug activities-
information that can affect a number of U.S. policies and decisions. For example,
in late 1987 the United States asked one country to withdraw its nominee for a
high-level diplomatic position in Washington, based on evidence he was involved
in drug trafficking.
But policymakers recognize that intelligence, important as it is, does not
provide a solution to the narcotics problem. Intelligence can illuminate an issue-
track, clarify, even predict an outcome. But the only solution-in this country and
worldwide-is a reduced demand for narcotics, coupled with a real reduction in
supply.
How are we doing on reducing the demand for drugs? A recent survey of
American high school seniors suggests we are making some progress. In 1987,
for the first time since the survey began, the number of high school seniors
reporting cocaine use in the past year went down. And attitudes seem to be
changing as well-about half of the students surveyed felt that even one-time use
of cocaine could be dangerous. Fewer of the students surveyed are using
marijuana, and more believe that even limited use of that drug could be harmful.
Educational programs are being complemented with initiatives in law enforcement
and legislation.
There is progress. The Drug Enforcement Administration achieved about a
15-percent increase in arrests in 1987 over 1986, and convictions in 1987 were
higher than they were the previous year. In 1987, the FBI achieved over 2,800
convictions-an increase of about 200 over the 1986 level and a huge increase
over the 1983 figure of 471. In 1987, 23 nations joined the United States in eradi-
cating drug crops-in 1981, there were only two.
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, the worldwide production and trafficking of
narcotics has also risen. Efforts to reduce supply are designed to cause as much
pain, confusion and frustration as possible among drug producers, traffickers and
money launderers. This international effort relies on accurate information about
drug traffickers and their activities. It also requires understanding the effectiveness
of countermeasures. Narcotics-worldwide cultivation, processing, transport,
sale and use-will remain an important issue for the Intelligence Community.
I have been trying to make the point that effective counterterrorism and
counternarcotics programs are critical to our national security, and they are
certainly critical to the safety.of our citizens. But I want to emphasize as well that
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how the CIA and other intelligence agencies carry out their responsibilities is of
equal importance to our country. We are subject to specific laws and governed by
congressional and executive oversight.
Our mission is to provide intelligence to policymakers. We do not make
policy. We do, however, play a role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. This is
done through covert action programs. And I want to discuss with you the proper,
legal role of covert action in advancing U.S. foreign policy, as well as the type of
accountability that governs our actions. As I do so, I think I should add that
although our covert action programs attract the most interest and the most
criticism, they represent only three percent of the Intelligence Community's
resources.
The capability for covert action is essential to our foreign policy. Fashioned
effectively, covert action programs complement other instruments of U.S. foreign
policy, including diplomacy and economic activities, and they offer an important al-
ternative to military action. Sometimes the country that the United States wishes
to support through our foreign policy, or the insurgent group seeking democracy in
a totalitarian country, wants our support only if it can be given without public ac-
knowledgement. This is when covert action comes into play.
The decision to use covert action is a policy decision made by the National
Security Council-the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State
and Defense. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I also participate in those sessions. And, by law, it
is CIA's responsibility to implement the covert action decisions of the NSC.
Proposals for covert action often originate in a request by the State
Department to support diplomatic initiatives that are vitally important to our
national interests. The proposals that we design are put through a real scrubbing
process which includes review within the CIA by the Covert Action Review Group,
or CARG. A proposal is examined not only for practical considerations but for le-
gality and for whether the proposed action is consistent with our overt foreign pol-
icy. We also consider whether it's consistent with American values and if, should
it become public, it would make sense to the American people.
If a covert action proposal passes all these tests, it is forwarded for
consideration by the National Security Council-first by a working group and then
by the National Security Planning Group, which is chaired by the President.
Following the debate, a document called a finding is written to authorize the covert
action.
Under the law, the President must sign this finding before a covert action
can be implemented. These findings are shared with the congressional oversight
committees-the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Under a recently established procedure,
the President and the National Security Council review all the CIA's covert action
programs on an annual basis.
It has been our practice to notify the congressional oversight committees
within 48 hours after a finding is authorized. There is a bill under consideration in
Congress to make that 48-hour notification mandatory. The President has asked
that it not be mandatory because there are rare cases when lives may be at stake
or when vital, foreign support is conditioned on delaying congressional notifica-
tion. In such cases, the President has pledged to review the finding every 10 days
with his senior advisers to see whether it can be presented to Congress. It's very
important that you understand the procedures that govern covert action, especial-
ly in reference to what happened in the Iran-Contra situation, where decisions
were made in the National Security Council, an organization not designed to be op-
erational. The professionals within the CIA and others subject to these laws and
procedures understand and carefully observe them.
The Central Intelligence Agency is governed by oversight as well as by law.
This occurs at three levels. The first is an internal one, which I've described, and
which includes our General Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General.
Strengthening the mandate and the resources of these offices was one of my first
priorities upon becoming Director in May 1987.
The CIA is also subject to oversight within the executive branch: by the In-
telligence Oversight Board, which reports directly to the President, and by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is headed by Anne
Armstrong, who ably oversees intelligence in the President's and the country's
best interests. And then, of course, there are the statutory oversight committees
in Congress.
I believe in this system of oversight. A dependable system of oversight and
accountability builds rather than erodes trust and confidence between those who
have the intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representativ
of the American people. es
In explaining how we do our job at the Central Intelligence Agency, I want to
emphasize that we operate with fidelity to our laws and to the Constitution. But
there is another important point I want to make about our work, and it is that
intelligence we provide to policymakers on terrorism, narcotics and myriad ottee
her
issues is not easy to come by. In fact, it sometimes comes at great cost to the
men and women of American intelligence. And I think of that every time that I as
the wall in our Headquarters building where stars have been etched for p s
those
have given their life in the line of duty. It is their creativity, their determination, brilliance, and their courage that spell the difference between success and failure.
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A German poet was once asked how the medieval Ger
lofty cathedrals. He replied, "Men in those days had m
they felt a commitment. " mans ever built their
ore than just an opinion,
I think our people show a similar commitment, and I hope to attract those best suited to carry out our mission. We are who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People that we continue
responsive to our law. People to whom fame and looking for people
who are dedicated and
tolives, but who can find People
in our impo
fortune are not a necessary highest aspirations for a safer and better woald work an avenue to pursue theipra~
This blend of requirements was best expressed
S William Stephenson.
Sir William Stephenson. In the introduction to the book
mine-
Wod cWar, S hronicled
his remarkable rod intelligence by an accomplishments old during friend of mine-
the which
William wrote: "Perhaps Man Caned Second
any a day will dawn when tyrants can no
people. When the functions of all nations,
however varied their ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it. If such a
condition is possible it is in a future too far distant to foresee. bet-
ter day, the democracies will avoid disaster, and Until that safer, bet-
by maintaining their dAmong the increasingly intricate
world, intelligence their is an defense.
s tonly
essential weapon, Possibly total arsenals across the
being secret, the most dangerous. Safeguards to Breve most ost important. arsenals
devised, revised, and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, But it is,
wisdom of those to whom it is entrust a nt its abuse must be
hope the character and
guardianship lies the oit
entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that
free
people to endure and prevail."
Ladies and gentlemen, I subscribe fully to this statemen
deeply that a nation dedicated to the rule of law can protect t- and I believe
in no other way, itself and its heritage
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