REMARKS AT WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 19, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at World Affairs Council of Northern California
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
San Francisco, California
September 19, 1988
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It really is a pleasure to be back again. I had the privilege of addressing this
organization a few years ago when Shirley Black, whose brother was a career FBI
agent, was on your Board of Trustees. It was good to hear from my old friend and
colleague, Phil Habib, that you might be willing to have me come back again and
talk to you.
When Phil Habib asked me to speak to you, he suggested that I discuss
what the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be. What Phil
suggested reminded me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist:
"Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that cautionary note
in mind, I will make a few predictions about some of the key issues that now con-
front the Intelligence Community-issues that we expect to be with us well into
the next decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view held
by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have always
had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened, they
want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as some-
what immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security, I
think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a whole range of
issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention-international
terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced weapons, and
technology transfer, to name just some of the issues that are global in nature.
This evening, I want to concentrate on three connecting geographical areas
that are and will continue to be of great interest to U.S. policymakers and, thus, of
great interest to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union,
South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. And I would also like to discuss two issues that
are tied to these geographical areas-the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons and our continuing need for effective counterintelligence.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence collection
and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to increase global
influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are a continuing and serious
threat to U.S. interests.
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Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to U.S.
intelligence.
The President told me an interesting story recently. Gorbachev sent a
representative out into one of the Ukrainian states to see how perestroika was get-
ting along. He went to one of the small hamlets and asked to see the mayor. After
talking to the mayor for a moment he said, "Do you have any television sets in this
village?" The mayor looked at him and said, "Of course we have television sets.
There is a television set in every hut in this village. In fact, there may be two televi-
sion sets in many of these huts." The representative said, ."That is very
interesting. What about refrigerators?" And he said, "Of course. We all have
refrigerators." The representative looked him in the eye and said, "Do you know
who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA agent would
come into a village with no electricity and ask questions like that?"
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew-bringing new life and dynamism to
Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us could have foreseen
five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads.
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it, to-
day's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering largely
because it has not given the people enough breathing room-room to innovate,
room to inquire, and room to investigate.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. The Soviets are
leaving Afghanistan and eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under the
INF treaty-a process that includes unprecedented on-site inspections of Soviet
military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked contro-
versy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way between re-
formers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist
system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affect how
far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central authority is
relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and how competitive the Soviet
system will be over the next few decades.
Neither we nor the Soviets know for certain where this reform is leading.
The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring Gorbachev to
enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles. overcome
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There are strong reasons to doubt whether a system designed to centralize
authority, maximize government control over its people, and concentrate re-
sources on building up the nation's military strength can become more decentral-
ized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of its people. The
nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other regions of the USSR will
test the Soviet system's ability to make reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything, it is that Gorbachev is a
highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the possibility that he can pull off a
"revolution from above" that actually increases authority below. He must act with
boldness-and he is acting with boldness-if he hopes to alter the course of the
huge, sluggish, Soviet leviathan.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some formidable challenges in analyzing the Soviet Union. We must pay closer at-
tention than ever to the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev
challenges the established interests of individuals and institutions. Clearly, before
he can speed up his reforms, he must capture some of the sinews of power exer-
cised by the party. This was, in our view, his primary objective at the summer par-
ty conference.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect
Moscow's military and economic capabilities and-even more difficult just how
serious the Soviets are about moderating their international behavior.
Glasnost has produced an information explosion which, though welcome,
challenges us to sort out what is important and what is not, what is real versus
what Moscow wants us to hear.
U.S.-Soviet arms control talks provide the Intelligence Community with
further tasks. As these negotiations progress, we will increasingly be asked to as-
sess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of
agreements. As we are finding out with the INF treaty, this task is manpower in-
tensive for the Intelligence Community.
Yet whatever Gorbachev's specific domestic and foreign policies, the
adversarial relationship we have with the USSR will remain. Gorbachev aims to
make the Soviet Union more competitive with the West-both economically and
militarily-and more influential in world affairs. For these reasons, Soviet inten-
tions and capabilities will remain the Intelligence Community's primary focus.
Intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important to policymakers
for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet influence in the region.
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Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan demonstrates
his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue other objectives. But despite the
Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan will remain a key foreign policy concern in
Moscow. Because of the Soviets' continued interest and its strategic location,
Afghanistan will remain an important concern in Washington as well.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest
of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. At the same time,
Moscow will try to retain its influence with. Kabul through both economic and
political means.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The Soviet-
backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the withdrawal
will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance will continue
its efforts to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the ruling party's
fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse as the military ini-
tiatives of the resistance.
The post-Soviet period will probably find the Afghan rebels fighting among
themselves-as they did throughout the Soviet occupation-for political power in
Afghanistan. Given that most ethnic groups are better armed than ever before and
are likely to capture additional weapons from the disintegrating Afghan army, we
would expect to see tribal conflict continue for some time after the Soviet
withdrawal.
The United States cannot dictate or materially influence who will finally
emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central government is unlikely, and
residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually be matched by some historical
suspicions about the West. The good news in all of this for us is not so much what
has been gained, but what has been averted.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the post-
Soviet era well armed and well organized. Whatever the composition of a future
government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a larger role in
its operations and policies. But the nature and traditions of Afghanistan make the
imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are the
primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts by
neighboring countries to exert influence in Afghanistan will also receive our
attention. In the longer term, we will examine the future government's attempts to
rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee population-more than
five million people.
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About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country that
has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of strategic
interest to U.S. policymakers, but the death of President Zia in a plane crash last
month raises new issues.
The initial response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constitu-
tional transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken over
as Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president must be elected
within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. Ishaq Khan has announced that the
elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule.
Because of the closeness of our relationship and the strategic importance of
Pakistan, naturally, the U.S. Intelligence Community will be following these
developments with the keenest interest.
Another region of great strategic interest for the United States is the
Persian Gulf-an area where tensions remain high despite the cease-fire between
Iran and Iraq. Although we are encouraged that the two nations are holding peace
talks in Geneva, these negotiations are likely to be protracted and difficult. Both
countries have sharply divergent views about the way the talks should proceed
and the key issues involved. The animosities built up over eight years of bitter con-
flict will not suddenly disappear.
The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than $350 billion, and even
more in human costs-more than 1 million casualties and 1.5 million refugees.
This war was one of the bloodiest of the century, and it will take many years for
the two nations to recover.
The war has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran and Iraq.
The loss of oil revenues-the primary source of foreign exchange and economic
growth in both countries-has dragged both economies down. Large-scale arms
purchases have also weakened both economies, and the costs of reconstruction
will be a further drain.
Financing the war has virtually exhausted both states' financial reserves.
Both countries have imposed strict austerity measures and cut economic develop-
ment programs.
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resuming an
all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust each
other and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq conflict,
providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities of both sides as well as
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the implications for the region and the United States. When the U.S. presence in
the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical intelligence support to
naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command. Our support has included
reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval bases, airfields, and coastal
defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces have been able to successfully carry
out U.S. foreign policy and protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing-questions such as what effect the
cease-fire will have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the
political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact the
cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and even the
long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq-and the rest of the world-have learned from a war that involved the first
sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II-even during the most
desperate battles-both sides refrained from using chemical weapons-weapons
that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for fu-
ture wars. I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the
effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more powerful
foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and as many
as 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one of the fa-
vored agents for several reasons-its relative ease of manufacture, its long life in
storage and on the battlefield, and its ability to incapacitate those exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain and ner-
vous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as cyanide
and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while phosgene,
widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of other
countries to develop and produce chemical weapons. And with the increase of
ballistic missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to attempts by Third World
nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads.
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It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons. And
this presents us with another intelligence concern.
Along with assessing capabilities to develop and produce chemical and
biological weapons, we must make judgments about what could prompt foreign
countries to use them. The United States supports including international efforts to prevent
participation in the Disarmament, which is trying to negotiate a chemical wapons ban. The U. on
restricts the export of certain key chemicals and ballistic missile technology also
Intelligence support is vital to the success of these U.S. efforts.
For Israel, the spread of this capability among the Arab states-principally
Iraq, Libya, and Syria, represents a serious readjustment in this strategic balance
of power-and has major implications for prospects for a peaceful solution in the
Middle East.
Assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missile
proliferation constitute some of the most difficult intelligence challenges we
face-now and into the next decade. Any pesticide plant can become, in a covert
way, the producer of these deadly weapons. It is also one of our most important
tasks, and we will continue to provide U.S. policymakers with accurate and timely
information on this issue.
Another matter of great concern to the Intelligence Community is the threat
posed by hostile intelligence services. I want to briefly mention this today, in light
of the recent arrest in West Germany of former Army Sergeant Clyde Lee Conrad,
who was charged with passing classified documents to the Soviet Bloc.
This case reinforces the fact that an effective counterintelligence program
requires vigilance on both the defensive and the offensive fronts. First, we must
protect sensitive information, technology,
must detect, monitor, and counter the actions of hostile intelligence lservi es. A we
s
the Soviet Bloc intelligence services become more sophisticated, our counterintel-
ligence measures must grow correspondingly stronger.
The Conrad case also points to the importance of tenacity and of close co-
operation among the various agencies within the Intelligence Community. The FBI,
the CIA, the Department of Justice, and Army counterintelligence worked togeth-
er for over five years in the investigation that resulted in Conrad's arrest. In fact,
most counterintelligence cases, including those that the public hears about, are the
result of years of careful work.
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Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the age.
But intelligence is preeminently an affair of people. It is the caliber of the men and
women of American intelligence-their creativity, determination, brilliance, and
courage-that spells the difference between success and failure.
I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our
mission-people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are
dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who understand and
play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a necessary part of
their lives, but who can find in this difficult work an avenue to pursue their highest
aspirations for a safer and better world.
With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that policy-
makers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our national
security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect of us, and I can
assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
Thank you.
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