REMARKS AT AMERICAN BUSINESS CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302120002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 23, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at American Business Conference
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
March 23, 1988
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I'm glad to have the chance to be with you, and I want to be very careful not
to keep you from your next appointment. You're getting a little of the flavor of
Washington. I can't tell you how many times I'm advised that my schedule has just
changed, and I'm due at the White House in 20 minutes. So I want to be sure that
you keep on schedule.
It's a pleasure to be here. I will soon complete my first year as Director of
Central Intelligence, and it is a very interesting job. I think very few people have a
job where they could wear a button that says: "My job is so secret that even I
don't know what I'm doing."
But I want to talk to you this morning primarily about the role of the Central
Intelligence Agency in foreign policy. This is a greatly misunderstood role, and one
that must be handled in a correct way. I think this group will be a good sounding
board for my perspective, because we count on people like you to understand our
role. Most of you have international relationships, and from time to time we may
be talking to you, asking for your assistance, and helping you wherever we can. I
think it is important for you to understand that the CIA does not have a foreign pol-
icy. To the extent that we are engaged in activities to implement a foreign policy, it
is the foreign policy of the United States.
Today our government depends heavily on useful, accurate, and objective
intelligence. Intelligence to formulate and implement our foreign policy, intelligence
to verify the arms agreements that we have signed, and intelligence to understand
both the military capabilities and the intentions of our adversaries. Intelligence is
very important today as we approach the INF agreement, and will be perhaps even
more important in verifying a START agreement. I have recently testified before
Congress on the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the Soviet Union's
compliance with the provisions of the INF Treaty. While I cannot discuss details
here, I can assure you that Congress is giving very careful attention to our
monitoring capabilities, because if the treaty can't be verified, I doubt if we'll have
a treaty.
Intelligence must also be timely. Last summer I visited NORAD at Colorado
Springs, and SAC Headquarters in Omaha. These are the sites of the principal ear-
ly warning systems for our country's national defense. A day there can't help but
make one aware of the critical importance of early and accurate intelligence for our
national defense. Given the speed at which nuclear missiles are able to travel,
when we think in terms of survival warnings, we think not in terms of months or
weeks or even days, but minutes.
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Not only must intelligence be useful and timely, it is important that the
information that is collected be developed in an objective way. The Director of
Central Intelligence and the people who analyze information must be seen as
giving the best estimates, and not as "cooking the books''-as is so often
suspected-or trying to shape or influence the policy of this country. We must
provide policymakers with the kind of information upon which they can make wise
decisions in the interests of our national security.
Because the quality and objectivity of the intelligence we provide is so
important, I have taken a number of steps this past year to ensure that the
Intelligence Community preserves its objectivity and protects its integrity. We
have and will continue to "tell it like it is," avoiding bias as much as we can. On the
other side of the coin, policymakers may not like the message they hear from us,
especially if they have a different point of view or have already acted before
receiving our information. My position is that in the preparation of intelligence
judgments, particularly in National Intelligence Estimates, we will provide them for
the use of policymakers. They can be used in whole or in part. They can be filed
away, ignored, torn up, or thrown away, but they may not be changed. That's not
always a popular position, but I think it is the only way for our analysts and schol-
ars to protect their integrity and to have confidence that they, in turn, are being
protected.
Let me give you an example. In June 1987, we provided a National
Intelligence Estimate to the policy community on Iran and the superpowers in the
Gulf. That estimate came after the decision to flag the Kuwaiti tankers had been
made. And I must say that the estimate was not a popular one. It dealt extensively
with Iranian intentions and capabilities, and what their likely responses might be.
Our estimate was not comforting in terms of the length of time that we predicted
the situation would go on. It was suggested that we might want to modify the es-
timate, because it might implicate the War Powers Act, which raised some other
problems with the Congress. But we did not change the estimate.
Currently we are experiencing a similar kind of pressure from the Hill in
Connection with the Toshiba case. We've been providing objective intelligence on
the activities of Toshiba in relation to COCOM, and we've been seeing part of our
formation leaked in the press. Those who are leaking the information are trying
tO achieve their own political objectives. But the leaks are not coming out in full
ind objective form. There isn't much we can do about that, except to say that the
afire intelligence package remains our best estimate. Some people welcome
pats of our estimate; others think it is an, unnecessary impediment to important
national relationships. Nevertheless; to protect our integrity, these reports will
~Sftiin unchanged.
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I think this insistence on objectivity may be one of the most significant
contributions that I could make in galvanizing a cohesive Intelligence Community-
not just CIA, but DIA, NSA, all the military intelligence components, and so on-
without compromising the integrity of the individual analysts or program
managers.
In addition to providing intelligence that is useful, timely, and objective, the
CIA plays an important role in implementing foreign policy. This is done through its
covert action programs. These may include political work through communica-
tions-getting the message' out-training, supplying important materials for those
who need support, and simply giving advice. Although covert action is not defined
by law, the term has come to be understood to refer to activities conducted in
support of national policy in such a way that the role of the United States
Government is not apparent.
Covert capability, especially in our foreign policy, provides needed support
for liberation movements, often provides support to governments, and allows us
to work in collaboration with those governments who do not wish, for legitimate
political reasons of their own, to have the U.S. role and involvement publicly
known.
From President Franklin Roosevelt forward, every President in my lifetime
has endorsed and used covert action to support the foreign policy of this country.
Although covert actions traditionally claim only a very small fraction of the CIA's
total resources and expenditures (less than three percent) they are the focus of the
greatest congressional and public attention.
And Congress is very interested in what the CIA does. I recently addressed
a group of retired intelligence officers, and they recalled the days when no
classified papers went from the CIA to either branch of Congress and the only
classified briefings to congressional committees were given by the Director
himself, or with the Director present. At one time, the Senate Appropriations
Committee had one cleared staffer, the House Appropriations Committee one or
two. Today, four congressional committees closely examine the Agency's activi-
ties, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the one
or two of the past.
Fifteen years ago the CIA gave 175 briefings to Congress; last year we gave
over 1,000 briefings on a variety of topics. These topics included arms control,
Soviet weapons, the Persian Gulf situation, the conflict in Central America, and
even the spread of AIDS in Africa. We provide information on topics of current in-
terest to Congress, but we also like to anticipate the information that Congress
and the policy community will need in the future-what they want to know, and
what they should know. We provide such information in the form of National
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Intelligence Estimates. These are not simply research papers; they represent the
considered judgments of our experts-the experts of the entire Intelligence
Community. They are carefully assembled in an objective way. Dissenting opin-
ions are not cast to the back of the report in small-print footnotes, but are carefully
reflected in the text or in clear footnotes below the text so that those reading the
estimates-particularly the President-will know the differences of opinion wher-
ever they may exist. We do not seek the lowest common denominator of opinion,
but try to reflect the best judgment of the Community as a whole. Virtually all CIA
assessments go to the two congressional intelligence committees. Most also go
to the Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees, and
they are widely read. Eight congressional committees get the CIA's daily national
intelligence report. In the last year the CIA sent more than 5,000 intelligence
reports to Congress.
In addition to briefings and papers, we also testify before Congress. I have
spent a fair amount of time on the Hill, lately, myself. I was talking to two of my
top executives yesterday and I estimated 15 percent of my time and they
estimated 25 percent of their time was spent dealing with Congress. Because I
know of the need to be absolutely candid with Congress and the responsibility in-
telligence professionals have to protect sources and methods, I have established
guidelines for others governing our dealings with Congress. Many of our people
are not experienced in testifying before Congress, and they need a very clear road
map of what they can and cannot say. And I have made it absolutely clear that in
dealing with Congress there is no excuse for deception. In order to protect our
sources and methods, there are going to be some questions on which they will
have to demur and refer back to me. I will take the heat or work out arrangements
with Congress. But we will not give half-answers or around-the-corner answers. If
there is a problem, we will say there is a problem, and we cannot answer the
question at this time. We may ultimately have to provide an answer, and it may
mean negotiation. But we will not leave the Congress feeling that in some way
anyone in the CIA has been disingenuous in dealing with them.
I firmly believe that the oversight responsibilities exercised by Congress are
both necessary and beneficial. There must be a dependable system of oversight
and accountability which builds, rather than erodes, trust and confidence between
the Intelligence Community, those who have the responsibility for protecting it,
and those who are the elected representatives of the American people.
As part of my effort to establish an open relationship with the Congress, I
meet with the leaders of our oversight committees at least monthly. It might
interest you to know what percentage .of our Senators and Members of the House
have served or are serving on intelligence committees. Twenty-six percent of the
Senators now in the Senate have been on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. That's a pretty good percentage. Only five percent of those now
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serving in the House have been on the House Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, which we call the HPSCI. The Members of Congress I have just
mentioned share with the Intelligence Community the responsibility of preserving
the nation's intelligence secrets. And they do it pretty well, although there are oc-
casional blips. When these have occurred, we've been very quick to protest, and
the chairman and vice chairman have been very good about following up.
I've been talking a good deal about disclosures in the oversight process.
Now I'd like to say a few words about secrecy. It seems quite clear to me that it
would be impossible to carry out clandestine activities-either to collect informa-
tion or to carry out authorized covert action-without secrecy.
Both Congress and the judiciary have recognized the need for secrecy in
matters of national security. The main purpose of secrecy is to preserve and
protect sources and methods-two words that were not terribly important to me
when I was on the bench. Only when I came to the FBI did I realize how crucial
these two words could be in terms of our counterintelligence responsibilities. If we
cannot protect our sources, we will simply not get the information that we need. If
we cannot protect the sensitive methods by which we collect the information,
both in terms of individuals on the ground and satellites in space, we will cease to
have the means for collecting information.
Secrecy is a necessary part of effective intelligence collection. But it is,
historically, that part of intelligence that has generated the most suspicion and dis-
trust. My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now Ambassador to the United Nations, described the view many
have not only of secrecy, but of intelligence in general. "Americans," he
observed, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When
they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to re-
gard the whole thing as somewhat immoral." That's a very good summing up of
what we have to deal with.
I mentioned earlier the number of briefings and documents that we provide
Congress yearly. What I did not discuss were the laws defining the nature of the
relationship between Congress and intelligence-the laws that tell us what to
provide and when to provide it. Let me briefly summarize this, because I think it is
important for you to understand that we do operate within very clearly defined
rules, and not according to our own rules.
In 1976 and 1977 both houses of Congress established intelligence
oversight committees to monitor all significant intelligence activities and expendi-
tures. Many of the rules which govern-our activities are found in the National
Security Act, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, and the Intelligence Oversight Act.
The oversight committees, operating under those acts, have formalized the
reporting of intelligence and covert actions to Congress. The Intelligence
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Community is now required by law to keep the intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities. Under the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment, the President must find that each covert action is important to the national
security before the operation can be initiated.
Under law it is our duty to notify the committees of any significant
intelligence activities. This includes any activity requiring a Presidential finding.
When necessary, the President can limit that notification to the chairman and
ranking minority member of the intelligence committees, to the Speaker and
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the Senate-referred to, in trade parlance, as the "Gang of Eight." And
there is another statutory requirement. The intelligence committees must be fully
informed in a "timely fashion" of intelligence operations for which prior notice
was not given-and the President must state the reasons for not giving prior
notice in those instances.
Just what constitutes "timely" is an understandable matter of concern. The
House is considering and the Senate has recently approved legislation that would
require notification of a special activity to Congress within 48 hours of a
Presidential finding. I have opposed this because I believe some reasonable
allowance must be made for that rare case where limited delay in congressional
notification is critical to preserve the absolute security of an operation-when, for
example, lives are at stake. The 48-hour rule is not a problem mechanically. In fact,
the only three instances that anyone can recall in which such notice was not given
concerned Iran-the Iranian rescue effort with the Canadian Embassy; the hos-
tage-rescue attempt; and, more recently, the Iran-Contra matter. But such legisla-
tion is unnecessary because a National Security Decision Directive already re-
quires-as I have long urged-the National Security Planning Group to reevaluate,
at least every 10 days, a decision to delay congressional notification of a given
finding.
I'm sure you've had similar procedures in your own businesses.. Perhaps
you make a threshold decision, but you know that it's important enough to be re-
thought, and at the earliest opportunity, you do so. And that's what the National
Security Decision Directive provides.
Further, the Intelligence Community believes that it is not enough just for the
President to make a finding authorizing and directing us to take some covert
action. Indeed, within our own procedures, we pass through a Covert Action
Review Group within the CIA that operates under the same principles as the
National Security Council Planning Group.' Before submitting the proposal to the
President, we in the Intelligence Community have a responsibility to determine that
the proposed covert action can be done. And done in a lawful way. And that it is
consistent with our overt foreign policy. And we must determine that the proposal
would make sense to the American people if it became public. Then and only then
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should we recommend the proposal to the President. And we must be sure that
the individuals-my officers and their agents-who are out on the firing line,
outside the protection of our Constitution and our laws, can do their work with the
flexibility that they need, and with the clearest understanding of their responsibil-
ities to the CIA and to the country.
Although it is dangerous to predict anything in an election year, I will spend
a moment considering the changes that are occurring in intelligence and the kind of
information we will be providing Congress, and the policy community in the near
future.
There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects
the Intelligence Community is required to address. While much of our effort is still
focused on the Soviet Union, we are spending more time and resources collecting
information on Third World nations, on regional conflicts that implicate the United
States, as we've seen all over the world. We are interested in both the political
and economic stability of countries from Brazil to Bangladesh, from Mexico to
Malaysia, and from Turkey to Tanzania. We are also concentrating on interdisci-
plinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and technol-
ogy transfer.
We believe the Soviet Union's appetite for American technology is grow-
ing, particularly in the area of information technology. The Soviet strategy appears
to be modernizing the electronics-based sector of the economy before moving to
invest more heavily, in the 1990s, in military production facilities. We have every
reason to believe that Soviet industrial espionage will intensify in the next decade.
And the Soviets will continue to devote whatever resources and manpower are
necessary to fulfill their most critical military collection requirements.
Issues like technology transfer have changed our own collection require-
ments. That's why we must continue to attract top people to help us. We are for-
tunate in that last year, over 100,000 men and women expressed an interest in
working for the Central Intelligence Agency. You have no doubt read about the
protests on some college campuses when CIA recruits. Interestingly enough,
these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor. Our
recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after campus demonstrations. But
we're not responsible for the campus demonstrations. Strange things are happen-
ing. At Colby, the faculty voted to bar CIA recruiting on campus and the students
voted to have our recruiters come. Now the trustees must decide which way
they're going to go. We're getting applications every month from over 1,000
brilliant, talented, dedicated young men and women. These are serious applica-
tions, not just expressions of interest.
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I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our
mission-those who are risk takers but not risk seekers, people who are
dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline, people who understand and
play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not particularly necessary
parts of their lives, but who can find in our work an avenue to pursue their highest
aspirations for a safer and better world.
With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that policy-
makers need, observing the rules of oversight and accountability that both the
Congress and the members of the Intelligence Community have a right to expect.
This is what you would want of us, what all American people would want of us,
and we are doing our very best to supply it.
Thank you.
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