REMARKS AT A. B. LAFFER ASSOCIATES CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 3, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
Remarks at A.B. Laffer Associates Conference
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.
March 3, 1988
17
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be here and to continue a rela-
tionship that was started under Director Casey, a relationship I know that he
valued. It's very early in the morning, and you have already been alerted by
Congressman Gray of another subject. I will try to provoke your interest in some
of the things that we do, and where I think the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Intelligence Community fit into the process of executive decisionmaking. Then I'll
be glad to answer any questions that might have occurred to you.
In this election year, we have all heard candidates from both parties present
their views on what is needed for an effective foreign policy. It is not my role as
Director of Central Intelligence to agree or disagree with their views. I have my
own opinions, of course, as I know you do, but it is also not the role of the
Director of Central Intelligence to develop foreign policy. But I would like to take
this opportunity to clarify some of those issues that surround the foreign policy
debate today.
Specifically, I would like to discuss the role that the CIA plays in supporting
and implementing foreign policy-which is not the same as making policy-and I
also would like to discuss how the CIA's relationship with Congress has changed
since the days before legislated congressional oversight. There are a lot of
assumptions that the CIA is making policy. Whenever I see a newspaper article at-
tacking something we are doing on the basis of a policy issue, I find it ironic be-
cause we do not make policy. We are only implementing the declared foreign poli-
cy of this country.
The CIA's primary role is, as I am sure you are aware, to provide support to
our nation's policymakers. We do that by providing intelligence that is useful,
timely, and objective in order that policymakers-not the CIA-may make wise
decisions affecting our foreign policy and other governmental issues.
Today our government depends heavily on useful, accurate intelligence:
intelligence to formulate and implement our foreign policy, intelligence to verify the
arms agreements that we have signed, and intelligence to understand both the in-
tentions and the capabilities of our adversaries. I have recently testified before
Congress on the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the Soviet Union's
compliance with the provisions of the INF treaty. While I think it would be
inappropriate for me to try to discuss those details here, I can assure you that in-
Migence, the ability to monitor and to verify, is absolutely vital to these
decisions--both to INF and to the prospect of a START treaty.
18
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
Intelligence must also be timely. Last summer I visited our NORAD facility in
the Cheyenne Mountains and I also visited SAC Headquarters. These are principal
early warning systems for our military defense, as you know. A day there can't
help but make one aware of the critical importance of early and accurate
intelligence for our national defense. Given the speed at which nuclear missies are
able to travel, we now think of survival warnings not in terms of weeks or months
but in terms of minutes-minutes in which we must make critical decisions
affecting our survival.
But not only must intelligence be useful and timely, it is important that the
information that is collected be developed in an objective way. The Director of
Central Intelligence and the people who analyze the information must be seen as
giving the best estimates, not "cooking the books" or shaping or attempting to in-
fluence our foreign policy decisions, but rather providing the kind of information
upon which wise decisions can be made in the interests of our national security.
Because the quality and objectivity of the intelligence we provide is so
important, I have taken a number of steps to ensure that the Intelligence
Community preserves its objectivity and its integrity. We have and will continue to
""tell it as it is," avoiding bias as much as we can. On the other side of the coin,
policymakers may not like the message they hear from us, especially if they have a
different point of view. My position is that in the preparation of intelligence
judgments, particularly in National Intelligence Estimates, we will provide them for
the use of policymakers. They can be used in whole or in part. They can be ig-
nored, torn up, or thrown away, but they may not be changed.
Let me give you an example which might be helpful. In June 1987, we pro-
vided a National Intelligence Estimate to the policy community on Iran and the su-
perpowers in the Gulf. This was after the decision to flag had been made. We
were working on the estimates, but the decision to flag was made without it. The
intelligence estimate represented the coordinated views of all of the members of
the Intelligence Community, but our position-our estimate-was not a popular
one. This estimate assessed not only the probable immediate actions that Iran
could take in an effort to head off the U.S. protection for Kuwaiti shipping, but also
the probable Iranian strategy once the reflagging project was implemented.
Although our view was not one that the policy community welcomed, we did not
change it.
I think this kind of insistence upon objectivity must be one of the most sig-
nificant contributions that I or any Director of Central Intelligence could make in
galvanizing a cohesive Intelligence Community without compromising the integrity
of the individual analysts or the program managers. Those estimates have stood
the test of experience.
19
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
In addition to providing intelligence that is useful, timely, and objective, the
CIA plays an important role in the implementation of our foreign policy. This is
done through our covert action programs. These may include political work
through communications-getting the message out-training, supplying important
materials for those who need support, and giving advice.
Although covert action is not defined by law, the term has come to be un-
derstood to refer to activities conducted in support of national policy in such a
way that the role of the United States Government is not apparent.
Covert capability, essential in our foreign policy, provides needed support
for liberation movements, often supplies support for governments under siege
whom we favor, and allows us to work in collaboration with governments who do
not wish, for legitimate political reasons of their own, to have the U.S. role and in-
volvement publicly known.
From President Franklin Roosevelt forward, every President in my lifetime
has endorsed and used covert action to support the foreign policy of this country.
Although covert actions traditionally claim only a very small part of the resources
of the Intelligence Community-less than three percent-they are the focus, as
you know, of the greatest public and congressional attention.
And Congress is very interested in what the CIA does. I recently addressed
a group of retired intelligence officers, and they recalled the days when no
classified papers went from the CIA to either branch of Congress and the only
classified briefings to congressional committees were given by the Director
himself, or with the Director present. At one time, the Senate Appropriations
Committee had one cleared staffer, the House Appropriations Committee one or
two. Today, four congressional committees closely examine the Agency's activi-
ties, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the one
or two of the past. Fifteen years ago the CIA gave 175 briefings to Congress; last
year we gave over 1,000 briefings on a variety of topics. These topics included
arms control, Soviet weapons, the Persian Gulf situation, and conflict in Central
America. We provide information on topics of current interest to Congress, but
we also like to anticipate the information Congress and the policy community will
need in the future. We provide such information in the form of National Intelligence
Estimates or research papers. Virtually all CIA assessments go to the two
congressional intelligence committees, most also go to the Appropriations,
Foreign Relations, and Armed Services committees. Eight congressional commit-
tees get the CIA's daily national intelligence report. In the last year, the CIA sent
more than 5,000 intelligence reports to Congress.
have tried to speculate on how this circle works because, as you know, we
flow have, or it is said that we have, 500 secretaries of state. I suppose that if this
20
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
is true it is very important that our 500 secretaries of state at least have the best
information that we can supply. Others might argue that if we supplied less
information, we would have fewer secretaries of state, but that is a choice I won't
try to make today.
In addition to briefings and papers, we also testify before Congress. I have
spent a fair amount of time on the Hill lately, and I suppose that there is no end in
sight. Because I know of the need to be absolutely candid with Congress and of
the responsibility that intelligence professionals have to protect sources and
methods, I have established guidelines governing our dealings with Congress. And
I have made it absolutely clear that in dealing with Congress there is no excuse for
deception. There will be occasions, and there have been occasions, when I myself
have declined to answer questions or said that I had an answer, but did not think it
was appropriate to make it in that forum, and have given my reasons. This at least
gives Congress and the committees involved the opportunity to raise it, to apply
heat if necessary, or to accept my judgment and my reasons. There is not going to
be any more occasion for saying that we failed to answer because they didn't ask
precisely the right question or that we answered in some disingenuous way.
I firmly believe that the oversight responsibilities exercised by Congress are
both beneficial and necessary. There must be a dependable system of oversight
and one that builds, rather than erodes, trust between those who have the
intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representatives of our
people.
As part of my effort to establish an open relationship with the Congress, I
make a point of meeting with the leaders of our oversight committees at least
monthly. It might interest you to know what percentage of our Senators and
Members of the House have served, or are now serving, on intelligence commit-
tees. Twenty-six percent of the Senators now in the Senate have been on the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is a rotating committee and a
Senator may only serve six years. Only five percent of those now serving in the
House have been on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The
Members of Congress I have just mentioned share with the Intelligence Communi-
ty the responsibility of preserving the nation's intelligence secrets.
I have been talking a good deal about disclosures in the oversight process.
Now I would like to say a few words about secrecy. It seems quite clear to me that
It Would be impossible to carry out our clandestine activities as a part of our collec-
ftn intelligence or to carry out covert action without secrecy.
Both Congress and the judiciary have recognized the need for secrecy in
rs of national security. The main purpose of secrecy is to preserve and
wot sources and methods. If we cannot protect our sources, we will not get
information that we need. If we cannot protect the sensitive methods by which
21
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
we collect the information, both in terms of individuals on the ground and satellites
in space, we will cease to have the means of collecting information. It seems to
me to be that simple.
Secrecy is a necessary part of effective intelligence collection. But it is,
historically, that part of intelligence that has generated the most suspicion and dis-
trust. My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, described the view
many have not only of secrecy, but of intelligence in general. "Americans," he ob-
served, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they
feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the
whole thing as somewhat immoral."
I mentioned earlier the number of briefings and documents that we provide
Congress yearly. What I did not discuss were the laws defining the nature of the
relationship between Congress and intelligence-the laws that tell us what to
provide and when to provide it. I think it is worth summarizing so that you will un-
derstand that there are procedures and requirements already in place that if
followed effectively protect the interests we all cherish. They were not followed in
the Iran-Contra situation, but they were in place.
In 1976 and 1977, both houses of Congress established intelligence
oversight committees to monitor all significant intelligence activities and expendi-
tures. Many of the rules which govern our activities are found in the National
Security Act. The oversight committees, operating under that act, have formalized
the reporting of intelligence and covert actions to Congress. The Intelligence
Community is now required by law to keep the intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities. Under the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment, the President must find that each covert action is important to the national
security before the operation can be initiated.
Under law, it is our duty to notify the committees of any significant
intelligence activities. This includes any activities requiring a Presidential finding.
When necessary, the President can limit that notification to the chairman and
ranking minority member of the intelligence committees, to the Speaker and
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the Senate-which we refer to,,in trade parlance, as the "Gang of
Eight." And there is another statutory requirement: the intelligence committees
must be fully informed in a "timely fashion"-that is the statutory language-of in-
telligence operations for which prior notice was not given, and the President must
state the reasons for not giving prior notice in those instances.
But it is not enough just for the President to make a finding authorizing and
directing us to take some covert action. Before submitting the proposal to the
President, we in the Intelligence Community have a responsibility-and I have set
22
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
the parameters of that responsibility-to see, and to conclude, that it can be done
and done in a lawful way. And we must be sure that the individuals who are out on
the firing line, outside the protection of our Constitution and our laws in many in-
stances, can do their work with the flexibility that they need and with the clearest
understanding of their responsibilities to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the
country. Sometimes in a congressional process that flexibility is taken away from
us, but I continue to emphasize the need for it in my appearances and meeting with
congressional leaders.
Although it is dangerous to predict anything in an election year, I will spend
a moment considering the changes that are occurring in intelligence and the kind of
information we will be providing Congress and the policy community in the near
future.
There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects
the Intelligence Community is required to address. While much of our effort is still
focused on the Soviet Union, we are spending more time and resources collecting
information on Third World nations. We are interested in both the political and
economic stability of countries from Brazil to Bangladesh, from Mexico to
Malaysia, and from Turkey to Tanzania. We are also concentrating on interdisci-
plinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and technol-
ogy transfer. And a good deal of our attention is being placed on world problems
such as the spread of AIDS and the various economic problems that affect us all.
We believe the Soviet Union's appetite for American technology is grow-
ing, particularly in the area of information technology. The Soviet strategy appears
to be modernizing the electronics-based sector of the economy before moving to
invest more heavily, in the 1990s, in military production facilities. We have every
reason to believe that Soviet industrial espionage will intensify in the next decade,
and the Soviets will continue to devote whatever resources and manpower are
necessary to fulfill their critical military collection requirements, have no doubt
about that.
Issues like technology transer have changed our own collection require-
ments. That's why we must continue to attract top people to help us. We are for-
tunate, I think, in that last year over 100,000 men and women expressed an inter-
est in working for the Central Intelligence Agency. You have probably read about
some protests on college campuses when CIA recruiters are present. Interestingly
enough, these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor.
Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after each campus demon-
stration. But we are not responsible for the campus demonstrations. Actually our
aPPlications are coming in at the rate of 1,000 a month, and I have met with many
of our new trainees, both at Headquarters and at our off-site training facilities, and
found them to be extraordinarily gifted, talented, and dedicated young men and
women.
23
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1
I hope that we will be able to continue to attract those best suited to carry
out our mission-particularly those who are risk takers but not risk seekers.
People who are dedicated and responsive to our law and our discipline, people
who understand and play by the rules, people to whom fame and fortune are not
particularly a necessary part of their lives but who can find in our work an avenue
to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that policy-
makers need, observing the rules of oversight and accountability that both
Congress and the members of the Intelligence Community have a right to expect. I
believe this is what you would want of us, I believe it is what the American people
want of us, and we will do our very best to supply it.
24
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302070002-1