TIME TO REMOVE CIA RESTRAINTS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 5, 2007
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 28, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4.pdf | 184.31 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4
THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
28 February 1980
Excessive controls limit effectiveness
- By Stansfield Turner
authority and accountability of our
intelligence agencies. We will
guarantee that abuses do not recur,
of a new charter to define the legal..
"We need clear and quick passage
Executive orders were issued.by
President Ford (February.1976) and
later by President Carter (January,
? 1978};''making. intelligence author=:'
ities; and prohibitions ' specific for:
the.: first -time -The.:.Intelligence.
Oversight-Board was established to.
which' anyone could. bring, allega
tions of wrongdoing:. It would-serve
as the president's watchdog, looking>
into the' legality' `and propriety ofd
intelligence activities
a
butFwe must. tighten our. controls
on''sensitive intelligence informs
Lion' and `we need ...to"'?remove'
unwarranted restraints on Ameri
ca's ability to collect- intelligence."
President. Carter's call:: in-, his
State of: the'-Union -address to
strengthen intelligence` capabilities
would have been 'unthinkable not
so long ago. It'represents the com-
,pletion of a cycle -begun in the
mid-1970s and is important recog-
nition that the controls and over-
sight imposed on intelligence ac-
_tivities since that time are
working.-
The time has now come to re-
move the restraints which encum-
ber effective intelligence work and
to, seek a - better' balance between
necessary controls and the freedom
which intelligence agencies need to'
operate in the world as it is today.
From 1974`" to -"1976, beginning
with the Rockefeller Commission;
and'-followed -by the Church=- and
the-~Pike'?'committees .'American
intelligence activities were roves-
.tigated exhaustively. Without going,
into the ,problems which. ? were. re-
ported = they' have been ' well
publicized - or their genesis,, both
the Congress and the president saw
The - National Security Council
was made responsible to determine
which questions intelligence would
try to; answer and to review
proposals for sensitive=. clandestine-
activities. Finally, the budget and
actual tasking of intelligence assets
was consolidated under the director
of central intelligence.
At the same time, the Senate
and House each established a
permanent intelligence committee
to oversee intelligence activities.
These measures: have' worked.
Both' the administration and Con-
gress have worked earnestly to re-
build mutual trust and to take any
extra steps which were needed to
guarantee that the new oversight
procedures functioned effectively.
Nonetheless, I think all would
agree that the determination of the
president to make intelligence truly
responsive to the oversight needs
of the-"Congress has been crucial
to the- progress- which has been
made.' Over the past three years,
the White House- and the select I
intelligence committees of Con-
gress have closely overseen intelli
gence operations.
Appreciation' of the problems in
volved in sound intelligence work'
has gone, hand in hand with the
.firm application of-the high stand-'
ards by which all intelligence initi-
' ._
atives must be judged.,.,,,"
The genuine success of this re-
naissance in,how American intelli-
gence will,,be' accomplished 'now
permits the president-. to ask for
the removal of --some unwarranted
restraints on intelligence activity.-
This both vindicates the correctness
of the steps- which have been taken
and the :important progress which
has been made and'recognizes-that
the pendulum has swung too far.
=
Excessive,. controls limit 'intelli
genre collection" and adversely af-
fect our' relationships with foreign
intelligence `services
For example, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment requires as many as
eight congressional committees to
be briefed on every,covert_,action.
Reducing that. to just the two spe-
cial intelligence committees (both
created. after the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment was 'enacted) would
diminish-the risk to human life of
leaks without reducing our- ac-
countability to Congress.
requires the detailed review of all
Central Intelligence Agency files
to satisfy FOIA requests, including
those which contain information
from our most. sensitive. sources.:
Limiting that review primarily to
information about U.S. persons and
finished intelligence would reassure'
important sources overseas, :who
are becoming more reluctant to
cooperate with us, that there is no
danger that their identities will..'
become publicly known.
The discovery process. in courts
of law. can require us to reveal
more sensitive, classified informa-"
tion in open court to prosecute an
alleged espionage case than was
compromised in the first place by,
the accused.. Often, ` rather than
taking' that risk, the governmeni
will choose not to prosecute.',
,
This form of "graymail" could
be, prevented :if special rules were,-
established ' for the use of classified
information in espionage, and other,
criminal cases.'
Finally, the absence of legislation
that- would `specifically prohibit
unauthorized disclosure of the
identities of, undercover'.U.S. in'tel-
ligence officers and-secret agents,'
informants and sources has ham-
pered, our ; ability to -recruit .,new
sources of intelligence.
Intelligence.--'reform has taken
.place. American intelligence sere-
ices operate under the informed
control of the-elected representa-
tives of the people in both: the
executive and legislative branches',
No one proposes that be changed.
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4
which will formally legislate the,.
authority and'the limits of.thisa
country's intelligence activity. The
moment is right not only to assure
ourselves that the safeguards to
civil. liberties and constitutional
rights are firmly in place, but that
we have balanced these important
guarantees against the practical
imperative of maintaining the best.
intelligence arm of which? we are.
capable. A strong.CIA. is -more:
important to the national security
of this. country today;-.than- ever
,.: .
before.
Turnert:j retired' U:S . Navy
admiral, is [IS-. directorr, ofcentral,
intelli ence
Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050012-4 4vn l ~L r Wy,--