LETTER TO THOMAS VAIL FROM HERBERT E. HETU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300050010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 15, 1980
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
Mr. Thomas Vail
Publisher and Editor
The Plain Dealer
1801 Superior Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Dear Mr. Vail:
15 February 1980
Admiral Turner has just completed the enclosed article for the
opposite-editorial page of The Plain Dealer as you suggested. It
updates many of the same points he made in Cleveland in November in
the context of the President's remarks about intelligence in his State
of.the Union speech. We hope it is what you had in mind.
We greatly appreciate your kind offer and your support. It was
a pleasure meeting you. Please call me if you feel I can help you
or The Plain Dealer in any way.
-Herbert E. etu
Director of Public Affairs
STAT
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C1
SEEKING A BALANCE IN INTELLIGENCE
by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
15 February 1980
"We need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define
the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies.
We will guarantee the abuses do not recur, but we must tighten
our controls on sensitive intelligence information and we need to
remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect
intelligence."
President Carter's call in his State of the Union address
to strengthen intelligence capabilities would have been unthinkable
not so long ago. It represents the completion of a cycle begun in
the mid-1970's, and is important recognition that the controls
and oversight imposed on intelligence activities since that time
are working. The time has now come to remove the restraints
which encumber effective intelligence work and to seek a better
balance between necessary controls and the freedom which intelli-
gence agencies need to operate in the world as it is today.
From 1974 to 1976, beginning with the Rockefeller Commission,
and followed by the Church and the Pike Committees, American
intelligence activities were investigated exhaustively. Without
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gping into the problems which were reported - they have been well
publicized - or their genesis, both the Congress and the President
saw the need for better controls and oversight.
Executive Orders were issued by President Ford (February
1976), and later by President Carter (January 1978), making intelli-
gence authorities and prohibitions specific for the first
time. The Intelligence Oversight Board was established to which
anyone could bring allegations of wrongdoing. It would serve as the
President's watchdog, looking into the legality and propriety of
intelligence activities. The National Security Council was made
responsible to determine which questions intelligence would try to
answer, and to review proposals for sensitive clandestine activities.
Finally, the budget and actual tasking of intelligence assets was
consolidated under the Director of Central Intelligence.
At the same time, the Senate and House of Representatives
each established a permanent intelligence committee to act as a
proxy for the people in overseeing intelligence activities on a
continuing basis.
These measures have worked. Both the Administration and
the Congress have worked earnestly to rebuild mutual trust and
to take any extra steps which were needed to guarantee that the
new oversight procedures functioned effectively. Nonetheless,
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I think all would agree that the determination of the President
to make intelligence truly responsive to the oversight needs
of the Congress has been crucial to the progress which has been
made. Over the past three years, the White House and the Select
Intelligence Committees of the Congress have closely overseen
intelligence operations. Appreciation of the problems involved in
doing sound intelligence work has gone hand in hand with the firm
application of the high standards by which all intelligence initiatives
must be judged.
The genuine success of this renaissance in how American
intelligence will be accomplished now permits the President to ask
for the removal of some unwarranted restraints on intelligence
activity. This is as much a vindication of the correctness of
the steps which have been taken and the important progress which
has been made, as it is a recognition that the pendulum has swung
too far. Excessive controls limit intelligence collection and
adversely affect our relationships with foreign intelligence
services.
For example, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires as many as
eight Congressional committees to be briefed on every covert action.
Reducing that to just the two special intelligence committees (both
created after the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was enacted) would diminish the risk
to human life of leaks without reducing our accountability to the
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Congress. The Freedom of Information Act requires the detailed
review of all CIA files to satisfy FOIA requests, including those
which contain information from our most sensitive sources. Limiting
that review primarily to information about US persons and finished
intelligence would reassure important sources overseas who are
becoming more reluctant to cooperate with us that there is no
danger their identities will become publicly known. The discovery process
in courts of law can require us to reveal more sensitive, classified
information in open court to prosecute an alleged espionage case
than was compromised in the first place by the accused. Often,
rather than taking that risk, the Government will choose not to
prosecute. This form of "graymail" could be prevented if special
rules and procedures were established governing the use of classified
information in espionage and other criminal cases. Finally, the
absence of legislation which would specifically prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of the identities of undercover U.S.
intelligence officers and secret agents, informants, and sources
has hampered our ability to recruit new sources of intelligence.
Intelligence reform has taken place. American intelligence
services operate under the informed control of the elected representatives
of the people in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. No
one proposes that be changed. However, today, we are moving closer
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to the enactment of permanent charters which will formally legislate
the authority and the limits of this country's intelligence activity.
The moment is right not only to assure ourselves that the safeguards
to civil liberties and Constitutional rights are firmly in place,
but that we have balanced these important guarantees against the
practical imperative of maintaining the best intelligence arm of
which we are capable. A strong CIA is more important to the
national security of this country today than ever before.