STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1977 (S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300020014-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 14, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Statement of Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence,
At Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1977 (S. 1566)
14 June 1977
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, for your
invitation to appear and express my views on S. 1566, the proposed legislation
which deals with electronic surveillance undertaken in the United States to
obtain foreign intelligence. I have a brief statement that I would like to
present and I will then be happy to expand on any particular aspect of my
statement or to respond to any other question which may be of interest to
the subcommittee.
I support the proposed legislation. I support it because I believe it
strikes a fair balance between intelligence needs and privacy interests,
both of which are critically important. I support it as well because I believe
it will place the activities with which it deals on a solid and reliable legal
footing, and thus hopefully bring an end to the uncertainty about the limits
of legitimate authority with respect to these activities, and about how, by
whom, and under what circumstances that authority can rightfully be exercised.
I favor the proposed legislation for additional reasons, not the least of which
is my view that its enactment will help to rebuild public confidence in the
national intelligence collection effort and in the agencies of Government
principally engaged in that effort.
Electronic surveillance is of course an intrusive technique, involving
as it does the interception of non-public communications. At the same time it is
a necessary technique, and in my opinion a proper one, so far as concerns
the gathering of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence within the
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United States. The fundamental issue therefore, as I see it, is how to regulate
the use of electronic surveillance so as to safeguard against abuse and over-
reaching without crippling the ability to acquire information that is vital
to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and to the national defense and
the protection of the national security. In part that is a legal issue. In
larger part, however, the question is political.
As matters now stand, electronic surveillance in the field of foreign
intelligence is carried out without judicial warrant, under a written
delegation of authority from the President and pursuant to procedures
issued by the Attorney General. Under the delegation and the procedures,
all surveillance requests must be submitted to the Attorney General. No
surveillance may be undertaken without the prior approval of the Attorney
General, or the Acting Attorney General, based on his determination that
the request satisfies specific criteria relating to the quality of the information
sought to be obtained, the means of acquisition, and the character of the
target as a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. These criteria closely
resemble the standards that would apply, by force of statute, were the pro-
posed legislation to be enacted. Indeed, to the extent I have knowledge of
these matters, I am not aware of any electronic surveillance now being
conducted for foreign intelligence purposes under circumstances that would
not justify the issuance of a judicial warrant were S. 1566 to become law,
barring any significant amendments.
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I am advised that the present practices conform to all applicable legal
requirements, including the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. However,
assuming as I do that the President has the constitutional power to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence, it must
still be answered whether the present arrangements, under which the approval
authority is reserved to the executive branch, represent the wisest public
policy given the privacy values that are at stake and given the potential
for the subversion of those values.
The proposed legislation reflects a conclusion that the existing arrange-
ments do not represent the wisest policy and that the power to approve national
security electronic surveillance within the United States should be shared
with the courts. I accept that conclusion, as does the President, and I
accept as well the warrant requirement that is the central feature of the
bill. As the Director of Central Intelligence, of course, I am necessarily
concerned about the capacity of the U.S. intelligence establishment to
collect and provide a flow of accurate and timely foreign intelligence
information, and I have a responsibility to prevent the unauthorized dis-
closure of the sources of that information and the methods by which it is
obtained. I have therefore tried to assess what the enactment of S. 1566
might cost in terms of lost intelligence or reduced security. Based on my
careful review of the bill, I cannot say to you flatly that there will not be
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such costs. It is possible, for example, that the bill's definitions of foreign
intelligence information will prove to be too narrow, or will be too narrowly
construed, to permit the acquisition of genuinely significant communications.
It is likewise possible that justified warrant applications will be denied,
or that the application papers will be mishandled and compromised. These
possibilities are difficult to measure, but they are risks. In the end, however,
I think they are risks worth taking. The fact of the matter is that we are
already paying a price, equally difficult to measure but nonetheless real,
in terms of public suspicions and perceptions that surround the present
arrangements. A release from these burdens of mistrust is itself a consideration
that argues in favor of the bill. In addition, as I read the bill, specifically
sections 2523(c) and 2525(b), the Director of Central Intelligence will have
a role in determining the security procedures that will apply to the warrant
application papers and the records of any resulting surveillance, and that
is a responsibility to which I intend to devote serious attention.
As the subcommittee knows, much of the information that is likely to
be obtained from electronic surveillance covered by this bill will not relate,
even incidentally, to U.S. persons, with whose privacy rights the bill is
specially concerned. Even so, an assurance that all such activity within
the United States is conducted lawfully, under rigid controls, and with
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full accountability for the action taken, whether or not it impinges in any
way on the communications of U.S. persons, would be a major step forward,
and in my estimation this bill will provide that assurance.
In sum, I regard the proposed legislation as desirable and urge its
early consideration and adoption.