STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 6588 THE "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980" MARCH 18, 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300020001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 6588
THE "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980"
MARCH 18, 1980
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MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM PLEASED TO BE HERE TODAY ON BEHALF
OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS KEY ISSUES RELATED TO H.R. 6588,
THE PROPOSED STATUTORY CHARTER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
THE PRESIDENT AND I STRONGLY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF INTELLI-
GENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION.
THE GUIDING LEGISLATION WHICH EXISTS TODAY, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AS AMENDED, IS OUTMODED. THE EVOLUTION
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS NOT CONFORMED WITH THE
IMAGE THAT THE DRAFTERS OF THAT LEGISLATION HAD IN MIND. WE
CERTAINLY ARE NOT ENGAGED IN ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, BUT THE
PICTURE THAT CURRENT LAW PORTRAYS OF WHAT THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IS AND HOW IT FUNCTIONS IS NOT FULLY IN ACCORD
WITH CURRENT REALITIES. THE TIME HAS COME FOR CONGRESS TO
ENUNCIATE TO US AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHAT KIND OF AN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IT WANTS.
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BEYOND THIS MR. CHAIRMAN, WE NEED AN INTELLIGENCE CHARTER
TO DELINEATE AUTHORITIES AND TO PROVIDE WORKABLE GUIDANCE TO
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. INTELLIGENCE IS BY ITS VERY NATURE
A RISK-TAKING BUSINESS. INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS ARE READY TO
TAKE THOSE RISKS ON BEHALF OF THEIR COUNTRY. THEY DESERVE, I
BELIEVE, AS EXPRESS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THEY ARE EXPECTED
TO DO AND NOT TO DO AS IT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO CREATE.
THESESTANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND SPECIFIC PROHIBITIONS ARE ESPECIALLY
IMPORTANT WHEN THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
NATION'S NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE.
AN INTELLIGENCE CHARTER MUST ALSO TIE TOGETHER THE AUTHORITIES
AND THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IT ESTABLISHES WITH A STRONG SYSTEM
OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY BY WHICH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AND THE CONGRESS WILL STAND WATCH OVER THE INTELLIGENCE-COMMUNITY'S
USE OF THOSE AUTHORITIES AND ADHERENCE TO THOSE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT.
I BELIEVE IN AND SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT OF AUTHORITIES, STANDARDS,
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AND OVERSIGHT. IT FITS OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, AND PROPERLY
BRINGS THE CONGRESS INTO OUR INTELLIGENCE PROCESS.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE ISSUE OF HOW CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
WILL BE EXERCISED HAS SOMEHOW ACHIEVED A PROMINENCE IN RECENT
DAYS ENTIRELY OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS IN THE BILL BEFORE US
AND WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO SEE. I AM DISTRESSED
BY THIS TURN OF EVENTS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST, MY
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 21sT
AND THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION BOTH HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY
MISREPRESENTED IN THE PRESS. SECOND, AS A RESULT OF CONSEQUENT
MISUNDERSTANDINGS, THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THREE YEARS OF
EXCELLENT OVERSIGHT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND THE TWO SELECT COMMITTEES ARE BEING PUT AT
RISK.
THIS IS WHY I AM SO SADDENED THAT THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN
GIVEN THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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HAS WITHHELD INFORMATION IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS. I HAVE
DEDICATED MYSELF OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TO DEVELOPING
WHAT I BELIEVE HAS BEEN A HIGHLY SATISFACTORY PROCESS OF
EXCHANGING INFORMATION WITH YOUR COMMITTEE, AND WITH THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE FULLY
SATISFIED EVERY REQUEST FOR INFORMATION LEVIED ON US BY THE
TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES, AND THAT THE PUBLIC HAS EVERY
REASON TO REPOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS AS CARRIED
OUT BY YOUR COMMITTEE AND ITS COUNTERPART IN THE SENATE. IT IS
ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE, AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED IN THE PRESS, THAT I
HAVE PROVIDED TO EITHER OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES LESS INFORMATION
ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA OR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THAN THOSE COMMITTEES THOUGHT THEY WERE GETTING. AS THE MEMBERS
OF THIS COMMITTEE WELL KNOW, YOUR INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN SEARCHING,
AND YOUR ACCESS TO INFORMATION HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE. IN RARE CASES
WHEN INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEES HAS HAD TO BE LIMITED
OR HAS REQUIRED SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED HANDLING BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL
OR SECURITY REASONS, THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN EXPLICITY ADVISED.
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THUS, I AM CONVINCED THAT THE CURRENT OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS
ARE WORKING WELL, AND I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS VIEW
IS NOT SHARED BY THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE AND ITS COUNTERPART
IN THE SENATE. THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT TO CHANGE OR TO
DIMINISH PRESENT OVERSIGHT RELATIONSHIPS. THE ADMINISTRATION
IS MERELY SEEKING TO MAINTAIN THE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF COVERT ACTIONS AND
COMMITTEE ACCESS TO INFORMATION WHICH ARE PRESENTLY IN FORCE.
CONFUSION AND DISAGREEMENT HAVE ARISEN OVER THE MANNER IN
WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP WE ENJOY TODAY IS TO BE REFLECTED IN
STATUTE. THIS HAS HAPPENED, I BELIEVE, BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A
MISPLACED EMPHASIS ON INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSENSUS ON THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT PRACTICES.
THE DRAFTERS OF THE OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS IN THE BILL BEFORE US
APPEAR TO HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THESE PROVISIONS MERELY CODIFY
EXISTING REQUIREMENTS. IN THE VIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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AND THE ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, THESE PROVISIONS DEPART FROM
EXISTING REQUIREMENTS IN A MANNER THAT IS UNNECESSARY, IMPROPER,
AND UNWISE.
THE MAIN POINT OF CONFUSION HAS BEEN THE ISSUE OF
INFORMING THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS
WHICH AUTHORIZE COVERT ACTIONS. ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE HAS
BEEN TO REPORT PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS IN ADVANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE ACTION. IN THE PAST 3 YEARS THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE
INSTANCE, ALREADY WELL KNOWN TO YOU, IN WHICH THE REPORT
WAS SUBSEQUENT TO IMPLEMENTATION. I WISH TO STATE CATEGORI-
CALLY THAT THIS INSTANCE IS THE ONLY SUCH OCCURRENCE TO
DATE. IT WAS A CASE IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT
NOTIFICATION BE WITHHELD UNTIL ANY RISK TO THE OPERATION HAD
PASSED. WE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE NOTIFICATION OF THE FINDING WITHIN
HOURS OF THE RISKS BEING BEHIND US. RECENT PRESS REPORTING
GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE BEEN WITHHOLDING INFORMA-
TION ON SPECIAL ACTIVIITES FROM YOU IS PATENTLY FALSE AND
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MISLEADING. THE ONLY ISSUE IS WHEN WE NOTIFY YOU, NOT WHETHER
WE DO.
IT IS CLEAR THAT SECTIONS 125 AND 142 OF THE BILL
BEFORE US WOULD REQUIRE NOTICE TO THE SELECT COMMITTEES OF
PRESIDENTIALLY AUTHORIZED SPECIAL ACTIVITIES (OR COVERT
ACTIONS) AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THEIR INITIATION. WE SEE
THIS AS A CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM EXISTING REQUIREMENTS. SECTION 142
(A)(1) OF H.R. 6588 STIPULATES THAT THE REQUIREMENT TO KEEP
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF
SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED ACTIVITIES "SHALL NOT REQUIRE
APPROVA OF SUCH COMMITTEES AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE
INITIATION OF ANY SUCH ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY."
IN OTHER WORDS, WHILE THE COMMITTEES NEED NOT APPROV THE
ACTIVITY, THEY MUST BE NOTIFIED BEFORE IT CAN BEGIN. SECTION
125, IN REFERRING TO SECTION 142, USES THE PHRASE "SUCH
PRIOR NOTICE." THIS IS A DEPARTURE FROM THE LANGUAGE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036, WHICH STATES THAT THE REQUIREMENT
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TO KEEP THE SELECT COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED
CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIITES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. SECTION
3-401 OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IN WHICH THIS REQUIREMENT APPEARS,
IS, MOREOVER, CONDITIONED UPON SECTION 3-4, WHICH MAKES REFERENCE
TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO MY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS. THIS SOURCES AND METHODS PROVISION DOES NOT APPEAR IN
SECTION 125 OR SECTION 142 OF THE BILL. THE SO CALLED "PRIOR
NOTICE" REQUIREMENT, IS, WE BELIEVE, ALSO A DISTINCT DEPARTURE FROM
THE "TIMELY" REPORTING CALLED FOR UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT.
THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS ALTERNATIVE PROVISIONS WHICH
WOULD CONFIRM CURRENT OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS BY REQUIRING
THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES BE KEPT FULLY AND CURRENTLY
INFORMED OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD CONTINUE THE CURRENT REPORTING STANDARD
UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT BY REQUIRING THAT SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES BE REPORTED "IN A TIMELY FASHION," BUT WOULD LIMIT
SUCH REPORTING TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES
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r
ON INTELLIGENCE. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION
TO MAKING CLEAR IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT IN PRACTICE
NOTIFICATION WOULD ALMOST ALWAYS BE GIVEN BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION.
A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTICE WOULD, HOWEVER,
BE UNWISE, BECAUSE IT WOULD HAMPER THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY
TO DEAL WITH SITUATIONS INVOLVING GRAVE DANGER TO PERSONAL
SAFETY OR WHICH NECESSITATED THE UTMOST SPEED AND SECRECY.
IT WOULD ALSO HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF
INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED
STATES IN THESE ENDEAVORS.
A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTICE WOULD BE IMPROPER
AS WELL. IT WOULD AMOUNT TO EXCESSIVE INTRUSION BY THE CONGRESS
INTO THE PRESIDENT'S EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
THE TIMING OF NOTIFICATION IS NOT CRUCIAL FOR PURPOSES OF
OVERSIGHT AS LONG AS THE COMMITTEE IS ASSURED OF RECEIVING
SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ALLOW A JUDGEMENT AS TO LEGALITY AND
PROPRIETY. PRIOR NOTICE IS NECESSARY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT
IS INTENDED TO ENSURE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS,
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? -AND THIS CLEARLY RAISES QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. LET ME
ALSO NOTE THAT AS SECTION 142 IS NOW DRAFTED, THE PROVISO. THAT
PRIOR COMMITTEE PROVA IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO IMPLE-
MENTATION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS, BECAUSE EVERY INDIVIDUAL WITH
ACCESS TO THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO VETO
THE ACTIVITY THROUGH A THREAT TO DISCLOSE IT.
MR. CHAIRMAN, AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED, SECTION 142 OF THE BILL
WOULD ALSO REQUIRE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES. THIS IS POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME
THAN PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S EXERCISE OF HIS
RESPONSIBLITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE PROTECTION
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY. A PRIOR NOTICE REQUIREMENT WOULD BE A
SERIOUS INTRUSION INTO EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THESE AREAS.
THE NEED FOR SPEED AND SECRECY IS OFTEN GREATER FOR CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES THAN FOR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES, AND IT WOULD
NOT APPEAR THAT PRIOR NOTICE OF SPECIFIC COLLECTION OPERATIONS
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IS NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT, GIVEN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES' ACTIVITIES IN THE BUDGET AUTHORIZATION PROCESS AND
THE OTHER EXTENSIVE OVERSIGHT AUTHORITIES ALREADY BEING EXERCISED
BY THE COMMITTEES.
HERE AGAIN, THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT IT IS ADVISABLE
TO CODIFY CURRENT PRACTICE. THE "FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED"
REQUIREMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED SECTION 142 AND THE
CONTINUED EXERCISE OF BUDGET AUTHORIZATION AUTHORITY WOULD ENSURE
THAT APPROPRIATE INFORMATION IS PROVIDED CONCERNING CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION PROGRAMS, OFTEN WELL IN ADVANCE OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF COVERT
ACTIONS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS
OTHER CONCERNS WITH H.R. 6588 THAT CENTER ON SECTION 142? SUBSECTION
142(A)(2) WOULD REQUIRE THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO FURNISH ANY
INFORMATION OR MATERIAL WHATSOEVER WHEN REQUESTED BY THE TWO
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES. WHILE THERE IS A SIMILAR PROVISION IN
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036, IT IS CONDITIONED ON MY RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS, AS WELL AS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENT.
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AS YOU WELL KNOW, IN SEVERAL YEARS OF EVOLVING OVERSIGHT
RELATIONSHIPS, THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER LANGUAGE HAS NOT PROVED TO POSE
ANY IMPEDIMENT TO YOUR COMMITTEE'S ACCESS TO INFORMATION WHICH IT
REQUIRED. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, WE HAVE NEVER HAD A UNRESOLVABLE
PROBLEM OVER THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION. THE COMMITTEE
HAS GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM REQUESTING INFORMATION THAT WOULD
IDENTIFY SPECIFIC SOURCES, AGENTS; OR RELATIONSHIPS. ON THE OTHER
HAND, WE HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING WITH SENSITIVE INFORMATION WHEN THE
COMMITTEE HAS HAD A CLEAR NEED FOR IT.
THE DESIRE FOR A STATUTORY RIGHT TO TOTAL ACCESS, WHILE
PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE AS A SYMBOL OF OVERSIGHT, MUST BE BALANCED
AGAINST THE DAMAGE IT WOULD DO TO OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. WE
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT A RIGID STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF FULL CONGRESSIONAL
ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WOULD HAVE AN INHIBITING EFFECT
UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS TO COOPERATE
WITH OUR COUNTRY.
OUR CONCERN IS THAT SECTION 142 OF THE BILL FAILS TO SPECIFICALLY
MENTION THE DUTY OF THE DNI TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
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METHODS. OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT FOREIGN SOURCES AND TO DEAL WITH
FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY
IMPAIRED BY THE SIGNAL THAT THE OMISSION OF THIS LONGSTANDING
PROVISION WOULD GIVE. THIS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR ASSURANCES
TO SUCH INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT WE CAN AND WILL PROVDE
PROTECTION FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. THE SECTION 142 LANGUAGE
FAVORED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IS SET FORTH IN THE APPENDIX TO MY
STATEMENT.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE INFORMATION WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS OF
THE KIND WHICH THIS COMMITTEE HAS SAGACIOUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY
INDICATED IT WOULD NEVER SEEK TO OBTAIN. THE NAMES OF HUMAN SOURCES
IS ONE GOOD EXAMPLE. THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISO! THAT WOULD THEORETICALLY
REQUIRE US TO PROVIDE SUCH A NAME COULD HAVE A VERY CHILLING EFFECT
UPON THE CONFIDENCE WHICH WE CAN INSTILL IN SUCH INDIVIDUALS THAT
WORKING WITH US IS A REASONABLY SAFE PROPOSITION. WE ARE ASKING YOU
FOR RELIEF FROM THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, FROM THE MORE ONEROUS
PROVISONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, AND FOR LEGISLATION TO
DEAL WITH INSTANCES OF THE REVELATION OF THE IDENTITIES OF OUR
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PERSONNEL. ALL OF THESE MEASURES WILL BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO US
IN DEVELOPING CONFIDENCE IN FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS AND INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES. THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION FOR ALL-ENCOMPASSING ACCESS
TO OUR DATA WOULD RUN DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THESE STEPS AND WOULD IN
LARGE MEASURE NULLIFY THEM.
THE OMISSION OF REFERENCE TO THE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND
METHODS IN SECTION 142 MUST, MOREOVER, BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH.
THE PROVISIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION IN SECTION
143, WHICH PROVIDE FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SENATE
RESOLUTION 400 AND HOUSE RESOLUTION 658. THESE RESOLUTIONS PROVIDE
FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DESPITE PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTION. MR. CHAIRMAN,
AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHICH CANNOT ASSURE ITS SOURCES OF INFORMATION
AND ASSISTANCE THAT THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES IS
SAFE FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE THE KIND OF
INTELLIGENCE WHICH OUR COUNTRY MUST HAVE IN THE DANGEROUS DECADES
AHEAD.
THE KIND OF INFORMATION AT ISSUE HERE WOULD RARELY BE
NECESSARY FOR OVERSIGHT PURPOSES, AND REFERENCE TO SOURCES
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AND METHODS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE DETERMINATIVE IN ANY FUTURE
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OVER PROVISION OF INFORMATION. BUT THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD BE
DONE BY OMITTING THE LANGUAGE WOULD BE. REAL AND IMMEDIATE.
I URGE YOU TO BALANCE THESE COMPETING INTERESTS AND TO MAKE
YOUR DECISION ON THIS ISSUE ACCORDINGLY. MR. CHAIRMAN, ONCE
AGAIN I BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LANGUAGE BEST SERVES TO
ACCOMPLISH OUR COMMON INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY
STATUS QUO.
MR. CHAIRMAN, BEFORE I LEAVE THIS SUBJECT I WOULD SUGGEST
TO YOU THAT ANY EFFORT TO ATTAIN EXCESSIVE PRECISION OF
STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN AN AREA THAT ULTIMATELY RESTS ON BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES IS BOUND TO BE
DEVISIVE AND FRUITLESS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT, IN MY VIEW, DEPENDS PRINCIPALLY ON THE DEGREE OF
VIGOR, INTEREST AND PROFESSIONALISM WHICH THE CONGRESS BRINGS TO
THE JOB, RATHER THAN ON STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR COOPERATION
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BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. AS LONG AS THIS COMMITTEE AND ITS
COUNTERPART IN THE SENATE CONTINUE TO BE VIGROUS, TO HAVE
MEMBERS WHO TAKE AN ACTIVE AND INFORMED INTEREST IN THE SUBJECTS
UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION AND TO HAVE A DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL
STAFF, THERE WILL BE FULL AND EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT. PERSONALLY, I
AM NOT PERSUADED THAT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS
DEPENDS ON ANY PARTICULAR FORM OF WORDS IN THIS CHARTER; IT
DEPENDS RATHER ON THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION THAT THE CONGRESS IS IN
FACT DOING A JOB WHICH IT HAS AMPLE POWERS TO DO WITHOUT ANY
STATUTORY LANGUAGE AT ALL. I WOULD REMIND YOU IN THIS REGARD THAT
THE POWER OF THE PURSE IS THE MOST POTENT SOURCE OF AUTHORITY.
THE GREATEST ADVANCE IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HAS BEEN THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS, UNDER WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUDGETS
ARE EXAMINED BY THIS COMMITTEE AND OTHERS IN MICROSCOPIC DETAIL.
THAT EXAMINATION, WITHOUT ANYTHING MORE, IS A STRONG PROTECTION
AGAINST MISMANAGEMENT OR ABUSE.
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WITH THIS IN MIND, LET ME REFER BRIEFLY TO THE OTHER SPECIFIC
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH HAVE PREVENTED THE FULL ENDORSEMENT OF
H.R. 6588 BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION.
FIRST, I AM TROUBLED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BILL. I
BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION
FOLLOW THE LOGICAL SEQUENCE OF DEALING SUCCESSIVELY WITH AUTHORITIES,
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, AND THE SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
I THINK THAT THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF H.R. 6588 TENDS TO
OBSCURE THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS SOMEWHAT BUT THAT THESE STRUCTURAL
PROBLEMS CAN BE EASILY REMEDIED.
SECOND, A COMPREHENSIVE CHARTER SHOULD CONTAIN AUTHORITY
FOR THE PRESIDENT TO WAIVE ANY PROVISION OF THAT ACT IN TIME
OF WAR OR DURING A PERIOD COVERED BY A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
UNDER THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO
CARRY OUT THE ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE REPORT. H.R. 6588 STILL
CONTAINS A VARIETY OF RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, BOTH PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE, WHICH IN TIME OF WAR COULD IMPEDE NECESSARY
ACTION. THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS A WARTIME WAIVER WHICH WOULD
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ALLOW NECESSARY ACTIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN QUICKLY IN EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PREVENTING ANY POTENTIAL
FOR ABUSE BY REQUIRING NOTIFICATION TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE WHEN THE PROVISION IS INVOKED.
THIRD, SECTION 132 OF THE BILL, CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE
RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF MEDIA, RELIGIOUS,
OR ACADEMIC ORGANIZATIONS OR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, STANDS OUT AS
ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF UNWARRANTED LIMITATION OF FLEXIBILITY.
I SHARE THE VIEW OF CONGRESS THAT THESE INSTITUTIONS PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN OUR DEMOCRACY AND MUST HAVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE
PRESERVED, BUT THERE CAN ARISE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEMBERS OF THESE INSTITUTIONS ARE
NOT ONLY WARRANTED, BUT MAY BE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE FOR
ACCOMPLISHING IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES. THUS, IN ORDER
TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL FLEXIBILITY THERE SHOULD BE NO BLANKET
PROHIBITION IN STATUTE. IN THIS REGARD, IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ACTUAL INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEMBERS
OF SUCH GROUPS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF COVER. WHILE
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COVER USE SHOULD BE KEPT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, CIRCUMSTANCES ARE
CONCEIVABLE IN WHICH SUCH USE WOULD BE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO
THE GOVERNMENT IN A SITUATION OF THE HIGHEST URGENCY AND NATIONAL
IMPORTANCE. THE WAY TO DEAL WITH SUCH SITUATIONS IS THROUGH
INTERNAL GUIDELINES. THUS, THE ADMINISTRATION CANNOT SUPPORT
SECTION 132 AS WRITTEN. COVER AND INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS.
INVOLVING THESE INSTITUTIONS SHOULD INSTEAD BE REGULATED BY
EXECUTIVE BRANCH GUIDELINES. THESE GUIDELINES WOULD BE AVAILABLE
TO THE SELECT COMMITTEES, AS IS NOW THE CASE.
FOURTH, A MAJOR SHORTCOMING OF H.R. 6588 IS ITS FAILURE TO
ADEQUATELY CONFIRM OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS, AND TO ENSURE THE NECESSARY SECRECY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE TWO MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN HERE. ONE IS
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE OTHER IS THE UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.
WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO APPLY GOVERNMENT-
WIDE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONCEPTS TO
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT MUST REMAIN SECRET. THE BILL DOES
EXEMPT CERTAIN CIA OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL FILES FROM THE
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300020001-9
`SEARCH, REVIEW, AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT, EXCEPT FOR REQUESTS BY U.S. PERSONS FOR
INFORMATION ON THEMSELVES. IT FAILS, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ANY RELIEF
FOR OTHER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPONENTS, WHICH FACE THE SAME
PROBLEMS AS THE CIA IN THIS REGARD. THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS
BROADER RELIEF THAN THAT WHICH APPEARS IN THE BILL BEFORE US. THE
PROPOSAL WHICH I SUGGESTED ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION DURING
MY TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE LAST MONTH IS ONE
SUCH FORMULATION. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING OTHER FORMULATIONS AS
WELL, AND WE ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES WITH
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHO HAS BEEN REVIEWING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SINCE LAST YEAR. I
WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WILL PROPOSE SPECIFIC
LANGUAGE WHEN HE TESTIFIES BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE.
AN AREA OF EVEN MORE SERIOUS CONCERN IS THE FAILURE OF
H.R. 6588 TO EFFECTIVELY PROSCRIBE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
OF THE IDENTITIES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS AND
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SOURCES. SECTION 701 OF THE BILL WOULD MAKE THIS PERVERSE ACTIVITY
AN OFFENSE ONLY FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE HAD AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT IDENTIFIES INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, AND
WOULD SPECIFICALLY BAR PROSECUTION OF ACCOMPLICES AND CONSPIRATORS
WHOSE ACCESS TO SUCH INFORMATION IS UNAUTHORIZED. THIS APPROACH
FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SERVE
OUR NATION IN DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS ASSIGNMENTS AND IT IS, IN MY
PERSONAL VIEW, ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BILL. TO
ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE WE ARE BUILDING TODAY REMAINS
EFFECTIVE IN THE FUTURE, THE ADMINISTRATION FAVORS BROADER PROTECTION
.FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL. WE MUST WEIGH THE ABSENCE OF ANY
LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE IN THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE
IDENTITIES AGAINST THE REAL AND CERTAIN DAMAGE SUCH DISCLOSURES
CAUSE, AND WE MUST ACCEPT THE NECESSITY TO MORE EFFECTIVELY DETER,
WITH CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
OF THE CLASSIFIED IDENTITIES OF OUR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS,
AND SOURCES. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PREFERRED STATUTORY LANGUAGE FOR
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FOR SECTION 701 IS THAT PROPOSED BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BEFORE
THIS COMMITTEE IN TESTIMONY ON H.R. 5615, THE COMMITTEE'S "INTELLIGENCE
IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT." THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL WOULD
PROHIBIT DISCLOSURES OF INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES WHICH ARE KNOWINGLY
BASED ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, OR WHICH ARE MADE BY CURRENT OR
FORMER EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE HAD ACCESS TO INFORMATION REVEALING
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES. IT WOULD NOT PROHIBIT PROSECUTION OF THOSE
WHO ARE ACCOMPLICES OF OR CONSPIRATORS WITH PERSONS MAKING SUCH
DISCLOSURES.
FIFTH AND FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO BELIEVES
THAT AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)
IN ADDITION TO THOSE PROPOSED BY HR. 6588 ARE WARRANTED. OVER THE
COURSE OF THE CHARTER PROCESS SIGNIFICANT INADEQUACIES IN THE FISA
HAVE BECOME APPARENT. THESE DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT FORESEEN AT THE
TIME FISA WAS ENACTED AND THEY SHOULD BE REMEDIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
THE ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS INCLUDE:
A. MODIFICATION OF THE TARGETING STANDARDS TO PERMIT
TARGETING OF DUAL NATIONALS WHO OCCUPY SENIOR POSITIONS IN
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THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY FORCES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS,
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RETAINING UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP.
B. MODIFICATION OF THE TARGETING STANDARDS TO PERMIT
TARGETING OF FORMER SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EVEN
IF THEY ARE NOT ACTING IN THE UNITED STATES AS MEMBERS OF A
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR FACTION.
C. EXTENSION OF THE EMERGENCY SURVEILLANCE PERIOD
FROM 24 ro 48 HOURS.
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR THESE FISA AMENDMENTS AND OTHER AREAS
I HAVE MENTIONED ARE SET FORTH IN THE APPENDIX TO MY STATEMENT.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF AN
IMPORTANT EVOLUTION. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO INTEGRATE THE LEGISLATURE
OF THIS COUNTRY MORE INTIMATELY INTO THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS THAN
HAS EVEN BEEN ATTEMPTED ANYWHERE BEFORE. THIS NEW PROCESS HAS
BEEN EVOLVING OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS NOW. I KNOW THAT WE IN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH'ARE PLEASED WITH THE WAY THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS
DEVELOPED. I HOPE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE ARE ALSO.
THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD CHARTER OUR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ANEW WOULD CODIFY THE PRACTICES WE HAVE DEVELOPED AND
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ENSURE THEIR PERPETUATION. IN THIS LIGHT, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE
THAT:
-- A STRONG SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY ALREADY
EXISTS AND IS FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY. THIS COMMITTEE AND
ITS COUNTERPART IN THE SENATE ARE KEY ELEMENTS IN THAT SYSTEM.
-- EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036 AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES
WHICH HAVE BEEN ISSUED PURSUANT TO IT SET FORTH RIGOROUS
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THE PROPER
EXECUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES IS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, AS WOULD BE
THE GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED UNDER TITLE II
CONCERNING COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT UNITED STATES
PERSONS.
-- THE ONE AREA WHERE PRESENT PRACTICES ARE INADEQUATE
IS THE SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS AND SUBSTANTIVE DATA. AN
ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUPPORT HERE IS NOT NOW IN EXISTENCE
AND IS URGENTLY NEEDED.
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I MAKE THESE POINTS BECAUSE THE CHARTER IS A COMPLEX PIECE OF
LEGISLATION. CAREFUL STUDY AND ANALYSIS WILL BE REQUIRED. THIS IS,
AS WE ALL KNOW, A SHORT LEGISLATIVE YEAR, AND THERE IS SOME QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE UP
AND PASS THE CHARTER EVEN IF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES ON THE KEY OVERSIGHT ISSUES IS ACHIEVED QUICKLY.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE PRESIDENT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
AND I ARE COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION.
CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY OVER WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EXPECT FROM
THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO DO ITS JOB EFFECTIVELY. I AM
CONFIDENT THAT THIS COMMITTEE WILL REPORT OUT A BILL WHICH PROVIDES
ESSENTIAL AUTHORITIES, REINFORCES NEEDED GUIDELINES, ENSURES PROPER
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, CONFIRMS OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS, AND CAN BE ENACTED THIS YEAR.
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APPENDIX TO THE STATEMENT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Add the following new section in Title I:
Sec. 146. (a) The President may waive any or all of the
restrictions on intelligence activities set forth in this
Act during any period--
(1) in which the United States is engaged in
war declared by Act of Congress; or
(2) covered by a report from the President to the
Congress under the War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555, to
the extent necessary to carry out the activity that is the
subject of the report.
(b) When the President utilizes the waiver authority
under this section, the President shall notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
in a timely manner and inform those committees of the facts
and circumstances requiring the waiver.
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Amend sections 125 and 142 of Title I as follows:
CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
Sec. 125. A report of the description and scope of
each special activity authorized under section 123(a)(1) and
each category of special activities authorized under section
123(a)(2) shall be made in a timely fashion to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select committee on Intelligence in accordance with section
142 of this Act.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Sec. 142. (a) Consistent with all applicable authorities
and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution
upon the executive and legislative branches and by law to
protect sources and methods, the head of each entity of the
intelligence community shall--
(1) keep the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged
in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, that
entity of the intelligence community;....
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Substitute the following for the provision in Title VII:
TITLE VII - PROHIBITING THE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED OR ASSISTING IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES.
Sec. 701. (a) The Congress hereby makes the following
findings:
(1) Successful and efficiently conducted foreign
intelligence activities are essential to the national
security of the United States.
(2) Successful and efficient foreign intelligence
activities depend in large part upon concealment of relation-
ships between components of the United States government
that carry out those activities and certain of their employees
and sources of information.
(3) The disclosure of such relationships to unauthorized
persons is detrimental to the successful and efficient
conduct of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities of the United States.
(4) Individuals who have a concealed relationship with
foreign intelligence components of the United States government
may be exposed to physical danger if their identities are
disclosed to unauthorized persons.
(b) As used in this Section:
(1) "Discloses" means to communicate, provide,
impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise
make available to any unauthorized person.
(2) "Unauthorized" means without authority, right
or permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive Order concerning access to national security
information, the direction of the head of any department or
agency engaged in foreign intelligence activities, the order
of a judge of any United States court, or a resolution of
the United States Senate or House of Representatives which
assigns responsibility for the oversight of intelligence
activities.
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(3) "Covert agent" means any present or former
officer, employee, or source of an intelligence agency or a
member of the. Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelli-
gence agency (i) whose present or former relationship with
the intelligence agency is protected by the maintenance of a
cover or alias identity, or in the case of a source, is
protected by the use of a clandestine means of communication
or meeting to conceal the relationship and (ii) who is
serving outside the United States or has within the last
five years served outside the United States.
(4) "Intelligence agency" means the Central
Intelligence Agency or any foreign intelligence component of
the Department of Defense.
(5) "Classified information means any information
or material that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an executive order, statute, or
regulation, to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national security.
(c) Disclosure of Intelligence Identities.
(1) Whoever knowingly discloses information
that correctly identities another person as a covert agent,
with the knowledge that such disclosure is based on classified
information, or attempts to do so, is guilty of an offense.
(2) An offense under this section is punishable
by a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both.
(3) There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed outside the United States, if the
individual committing the offense is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence.
(d) Disclosure of Intelligence Identities by Government
Employees.
(1) Whoever, being or having been an employee of
the United States government with access to information
revealing the identites of covert agents, knowingly discloses
information that correctly identifies another person as a
covert agent, or attempts to do so, is guilty of an offense.
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(2) An offense under this section is punishable
by a fine of not more than $25,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years, or both.
(3) There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed outside the United States if the
individual committing the offense is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States
for permanent residence.
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300020001-9
Add the following additional amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:
-- Section 101(b)(2) is amended by deleting "or" at
the end of (C), changing the period at the end of (D) to a
semi-colon, adding "or" at the end of (D), and adding the
following new provision:
"(E) is a current or former senior officer
of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(1)
or (2)"
-- Section 105(e)(2) is amended by inserting
"search or" before all appearances of "surveillance,"
by inserting "physical search or" before all appearances of
"electronic surveillance," and by deleting "twenty-four"
wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "forty-eight."
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