ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER AT WABASH COLLEGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200050015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 11, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Admiral Stansfield Turner at Wabash College
~/ iV0 U -2 7
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Q: Admiral Turner, I gather from what Richard Helms had
to say after his sentencing this week that he doesn't feet any
particular remorse about lying to the Congress. He seems to think
that he's more of a tragic figure, that he was just sort of unfor-
tunately caught between his duty to obey the law and his duty to
protect the nation's security.
Do you think that's kind of a fair characterization of
the position that he was in? And if you found yourself in a
similar position, would you see your duty the same way?
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Well, let me say that I feel
very, very fortunate today that I'm in quite a different position
than Richard Helms because of the changes that have been made in
what we call our oversight procedures since his day. Today there
Is a committee in each House of Congress dedicated only to re-
viewing intelligence and overseeing intelligence. So that com-
mittee has 'total jurisdiction, and we share as much as we can
with each of those committees. And were I put in the kind of
position that Richard Helms was before a different committee -- I
think it was the Foreign Relations Committee, or some other one --
in a public hearing, or in a closed hearing, and was asked ques-
tions about the process of intelligence, I would respond that
that's the jurisdiction of the intelligence Committee and that
they should get that information from them, not from me. And that
would be of tremendous help
And so that's one of the reasons we're pleased. And I
will be talking to the students here tonight about these new over-
sight procedures that have been established and really are a help
to us, as well as a check.
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Q: Those committees existed in Helms's day, though, as
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, no. This oversight committee from
the Senate was founded in May of 1976, and the one for the House
in August of 1977. The oversight in those days, such as there
was, was done by the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services
Committee, sort of combined; but nobody had real jurisdiction. it
was divided between them.
And today it's quite clear one committee has -- now, I
report to the others. I have to get the money out of the Appro-
priations Committee, I keep the Foreign Relations Committee in-
formed about substantive intelligence; you know, what's going on
in the world. And the same with the Armed Services Committee. But
overseeing how I do my business, answering questions such as they
asked Mr. Helms -- What are you doing in a certain country? -- is
really the business of the Select Committees on intelligence.
Q: Admiral, i think LunintelligibleJ specific answer.
Two questions: First of all, do you think that it was a badge
of honor for Mr. Helms to lie before...
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm not going to, with benefit of hind-
sight, either criticize or praise my predecessors, because there're
so many factors, that it's difficult to reconstruct. But let me
give you my reaction to the Helms decision that was made. May I?
I mean that, I think, is what's relevant and what should be impor-
tant to all of you, because I'm now bearing the load that Helms
had.
First -- I have two reactions. First, I believe the way
the decision on Mr. Helms was worked out has been very salutary in
reminding me and all the others in authority in the intelligence
community once again that none of us, or any government servant,
is above the law or authorized to lie. And this was a good reminder.
But my second reaction is that because the case did not
come to public trial, the country is spared the necessity of re-
vealing what would have been a lot of highly classified information
that would have been necessary, in my opinion, to do justice to
both the prosecution and the defense, If there were a trial.
So I think the country has benefited in both directions:
a reminder of the importance of law, and the preservation of our
national secrets and national interest in this case.
Q: As I understand, It's sort of your job to reshape the
American intelligence operation, priorities, etcetera. First off,
LunintelligibleJ, what type of, quote, health, end quote, do you
think the CIA was when you took It over? And number two, what are
some of the priorities that you have set up LunintelligibleJ?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the health of the CIA was fine,
was good when I took it over, and I think It still is. It's not
easy on any organization when it undergoes as much public criticism
and investigation as the CIA has over the last 2 1/2-3 years. But
one of the first things President Carter did was establish a group
to look in to how to strengthen the intelligence community, which
extends far past the CIA Itself. And in August he made decisions,
as a result of that study, and he did try to strengthen my role as
the Director of Central Intelligence. Not the Director of the CIA.
I have two jobs. As the Director of Central intelligence, he
strengthened my role in coordinating all of the intelligence acti-
vities of the country.
That's one of my key objectives today, is to bring it all
working together; not only because we want to be efficient, save
money, and so on, but if we don't all work in a concerted way, we
can drop the ball between the cracks, like Pearl Harbor, or we can
duplicate and waste a lot of money.
And so, that's, I think, my key point in what I would like
to achieve in the next few years, is to make the multiplicity of
intelligence organizations mesh together and work together, be a
real team, and let me be the coach and just call the signals, and
let them run their own plays, just like Wabash and...
Q: What do you...
Q: What do you plan to do to prevent past abuses, such
as drug experiments, dirty tricks, domestic spying, etcetera, from
happening again? I think I should rephrase that alleged past
abuses.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. Thank you. I really appre-
ciate that, because a lot of them are alleged. Some of them are
true.
As you know, I went to the Congress when I found documents
on drug testing, and said, "Here's something we've uncovered in our
files." Some of it was unfortunate.
There are a number of things that have been done and are
being done. The oversight committees that I've mentioned to you
are a very important part of it. Another very important part Is
what's known as the intelligence Oversight Board, which was estab-
lished a year and three quarters ago. These are three distinguished
American citizens who are there only to look into the legality and
the propriety of the entire Intelligence operation of our country,
and who report only to the President.
If after I've been on your campus here much longer you
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decide you think I'm a scurrilous Individual, you write to them
and say so. They'll look into your allegation and turn It over
to the President with their finding, for Instance.
But beyond that -- and you're really listening to my
whole speech for tonight, so don't come, if you were planning to.
But seriously, beyond that, we're trying to open up the intelli-
gence operation a little bit more, lift some of the mystique, so
that people understand why we're doing what we're doing, so that
we're in better rapport and understanding with the American public
and know what they want, the kind of an intelligence operation
they would prepare to have.
And finally, beyond that, I think my job requires that
every morning I get up and ask myself: What could go wrong? And
use my Intuition and sixth sense, and probe around and ask ques-
tions, set an example of what standards I want, feel are Impor-
tant. And then go to bed at night and decide to start all over
again the next day. You just have to be vigilant. You have to
watch and look.
I say that not because I think anybody is really trying
to do anything other than the way we've asked them to do It, but
that it's a big operation, it's an operation that you must take
risks in in some areas; and so you have to watch it carefully and
you have to ask each of your principal subordinates to do the same,
and you have to select them carefully and have confidence in them
that they will do that. And I am confident that that's the case
today. But if you ever get so confident you relax, then you're
not doing your job.
Q: Admiral Turner, I was curious to ask you about the
CIA's role in the SALT negotiations. I guess any general comments
you'd have about that would be helpful, but I'm chiefly curious
about one point. If the accounts that have appeared so far in
the media are to be believed, apparently the United States Is
going to be permitted a certain number of both air-based and land-
based cruise missiles. And what I don't understand, if that's true,
is how are the Soviets possibly going to verify the range limita-
tions on those cruise missiles, or, for that matter, even the number
of them? I mean it seems to me that's a well-nigh Insuperable
problem for them. And if it Is, how are they going to be dumb
enough to let us have that many cruise missiles?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you're getting into a very complex
field. My role as an intelligence officer in SALT is to advise
on what we think the Soviets have in the way of force structure,
what they're planning and are building, and what we can do to
verify their side of the agreement. And I will be very candid
with you that verifying the specifics on a cruise missile Is going
to be difficult. There are ways we can do parts of it. Unfor-
tunately, I'm unable to get Into great detail about that, but i
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will be In classified sessions with the Congress when they come to
debate this, I'm sure. It isn't totally impossible but it's diffi-
cult, as you brought out. There are many other provisions of SALT
that are difficult. But the difficulties do go in both directions,
as you said.
Q: Admiral Turner, Senator Bayh has written a letter to
President Carter asking him to stop the CIA activity that he says
can be embarrassing. Are you aware of that letter?
ADMIRAL TURNER: A letter?
Q: A letter, or has said to President Carter. It was
reported on the national media last...
ADMIRAL TURNER: Nope. Anybody heard about it? Does he
say in the letter what...
Q: He didn't say what it was. He wouldn't reveal what
it was, but he said It was embarrassing -- it was an operation
that could be embarrassing for the U.S.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm in close contact with Senator Bayh
because he's one of the people on our oversight committee. I
talked to him about some intelligence operations just recently,
so I think I know what he may -- I think -- I'll guess at what
he's talking about, but I didn't know he's written any letter on
that.
Q: You mean you are aware that he's concerned about some
operation?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, not a specific operation. No. I
just have talked to him about the generalities of our operations.
Q: There's been a certain amount of concern aroused
lately -- I guess It hasn't gotten very much in the public media --
about some mathematical research that's been done in academic
circles that seems to have serious implications, I guess, for the
making and breaking of codes. I realize that you don't run the
NSA; but still, do you have some feel for what the implications
of this might be. I gather it means that almost any country with
money enough to buy a halfway-decent computer can soon have an
unbreakable code. Now, do you think that's going to have any
serious repercussions on American Intelligence-gathering operations?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, throughout history, I guess, code
making and breaking has been a constant game, like offense and
defense in football. In one era of history one side is ahead, in
the next era the other side. Apparently there are some mathe-
matical and electronic developments here that are going to make
code breaking more difficult, or code making easier. But I don't
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think we ever see a pendulum stop steady and one place, and there
usually are all kinds of alternative measures that can be taken.
I don't know in this particular case, and these new technologies
are pretty fresh right now. But there's no question, if you look
back at the history of World War ii, many books have come out in
the last few years on code breaking on the European scene, code
breaking on the Japanese scene, how critical that was to the suc-
cess of our military campaigns.
So, yes, we're watching this kind of thing with consider-
able interest and it could be very important.
Q: Admiral, the New York Times has reported the President
will be receiving a report on Intelligence in the next several
weeks and will recommend, apparently contrary to your wishes, that
you not be appointed as a sort of a super head of Intelligence
operations.
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think this is concerned with the Presi-
dent's decision on reorganization...
Q: Right.
August.
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...which was announced on the 4th of
Q: LUnintelligibleJ
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I can explain what's happening.
You see, he wrote a decision and delivered it to all of us, and
it was a very good one. And I am not upset with it, as some people
maybe have Indicated.
Now, we translate that decision into a redraft of a
basic executive oder President Ford signed a couple of years ago,
February '76, that is the basic guideline, the basic instruction
under which I operate. The new decision, which will not be trans-
lated into this executive order, is the one I mentioned that gives
me more authority -- didn't I mention that? I had another press
conference today. Sorry.
Anyway...
MAN: The presidential decision language is in that Lunin-
telligibleJ.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, okay.
Anyway, that's an elaboration on what's in your folder
here that the President made his decision on 4 August; not only
an elaboration, but a lot of other topics that didn't require the
President's decision that get put into this charter, sort of, for
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us. And we've all been working on that for some time -- well,
since August. And it's coming close to being Issued. And I think
that's what they're talking about. But this is nothing new that
wasn't announced in the decision in August. It's the implemen-
tation of that and more specifics and details. There may be a few
new things in it but nothing...
Q: LUnintelligibleJ...you have final budget authority
over the entire Intelligence community. What power does that
give you? And isn't there a danger of putting too much control
over intelligence activities in one man? i think we saw that
happen, in a way, with J. Edgar Hoover.
ADMIRAL TURNER: If you ever work in Washington, you'll
know that no one man ever controls any budget. What's happened
here Is that up until this August 4th, I was chairman of the
committee that set the budget for NSA, CIA, and all the other
intelligence activities that are national, as opposed to the
military ones that are with the troops and the ships. Now I'm
simply the committee.
What does this mean? It means that I have a greater
responsibility today to be sure I hear the views of all the other
people before I make a decision. it's easier, in some ways, to
make a decision with a committee. So we hope we will get crisper,
better decisions.
But I can't, in as large an organization as ours, our
government, expect just to sign my name and make decisions on
hundreds of millions of dollars and not have to take lots of
other people's views into account, not have to allow for their
right to express dissenting views or try to make decisions that
they don't agree with.
So, my decisions go to the Office of Management and Budget,
the other Cabinet -- the Cabinet officers involved can go to him
and say, "Look, Turner did a bad job." They can go to the Presi-
dent. Then you've got the Congress. There are lots of checks on
this process.
Let me say one other thing about the concern -- and it's
a legitimate one. I understand that -- that you might be aggre-
gating too much authority in one person. I have been given more
authority on budgets, more authority in what we call tasking,
directing what people are going to do in collecting Information.
Intelligence Is a twofold process. You collect information and
then you analyze It and come up with estimates and evaluations.
The important is an Important and a risky area. And I'm given
more authority now to be sure we're doing the right things and
doing them in good coordination. But I don't have any authority
to suppress the research, the analysis, the estimating that goes
on In the Department of Defense and the Department of State. They
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have their own analytic organizations, their own research organi-
zations. They're run by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State. And we want that and we want some overlap, so that
there are different views coming forward on the interpretation
of the Intelligence that we collect. And if i should try to sup-
press those in producing a national estimate, let's say, which I
don't want to do, but let's assume somebody thinks I do, you've
got two Cabinet officers, the Secretary of Defense and the Secre-
tary of State, who won't be bashful in making sure their views
get to the President If Turner is riding roughshod over them.
So, I don't believe we're in any jeopardy of concentra-
ting too much authority in one Individual with the present organi-
zation.
Q: Also, in another area, there've been reports in the
press that Israel has nuclear weapons. Do you be -- what does
your intelligence tell you now, and do you believe, also, reports
that some nuclear material from the U.S. was diverted to Israel?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't comment on that one. I'm sorry.
Q: Okay. Well, is the CIA actively investigating this?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I can't comment on that. We really
don't comment on the kind of things that we're working on and
Involved in. And I just can't get into that. I'm sorry.
Q: This is sort of a trite question.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
Q: LUnintelligibleJ
ADMIRAL TURNER: Don't worry about that.
Q: How much knowledge is the President supposed to have
of CIA operations?
Q: All that he wants. I mean he has to -- does he have
to come to you, or, you know, do you report to him?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I go to him. I mean if he comes to me,
I say, "Aye-aye,' and snap to and answer up. But I feel an obli-
gation to keep him posted about what's going on in our organization.
You know, not every detail, because he's got very many things on
his mind. But we have specific rules, that will be spelled out in
this executive order that comes out, and some in the law, which
require his knowledge and Involvement in our activities.
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What the CIA was criticized for most In the past Is what
we call covert action; not collecting intelligence, but conducting
programs to influence events in other parts of the world. Today,
if we're going to do any covert action, and we do very little, the
President himself must sign that he wants this done. I must then
go notify a number of committees of the Congress. So these are
typical checks, and it's a typical area where it's very sensitive,
and there's no question that the President gets Involved in it
in any detail.
Q: How many times has the President signed a statement
that he wanted covert action?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That, again, is something I can't discuss.
Q: Numbers?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Pardon me?
Q: Just raw numbers?
Q: How do you feel about this, really, making the CIA
more answerable to the President than it has in the past? That's
what these new laws, or whatever do -- correct?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, not really, because the CIA has
always been totally answerable.
Q: LUnintelligiblej
ADMIRAL TURNER: I feel they're good. I think the degree
of extra controls that have been instituted in the last few years
are desirable.
And let me point out, there are two sides to controls.
One is it does limit your freedom of action in the intelligence
world, but on the other it gives you a check, it gives you a sharing
of responsibility. When somebody else has to approve the action,
he then is In part responsible for it. So it takes some burden off
my shoulders. But mainly it helps to be sure that we're aware of
what the people of this country want for an intelligence activity.
A lot of the things that were done in the '50s were perfectly
acceptable to the country in the '50s. And attitudes and outlooks
and circumstances have changed, and people don't want that same
kind of activity today. That means, if you were an Intelligence
officer throught that period, that you have to change, you have
to adapt to what the mores and attitudes of the country are. And
these oversight procedures, these controls are one of the ways that
we do keep in touch: have other people who are outside our sort
of cloistered, secretive atmosphere to help.
Time to go? One more?
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LConfusion of voices
MAN: I wish you'd told me. I would have worn regular
LLaughterJ
ADMIRAL TURNER: I just took mine off. I played tennis
this afternoon.
MAN: I did too. How about that. We can have a game
ADMIRAL TURNER: All right.
Q: The CIA's estimates on a Soviet possible first strike,
I gather, were essentially negative; and that there was this so-
called B team formed, under the chairmanship of Professor Pipes
from Harvard, to challenge those estimates.
Isn't that, in historical perspective, for the CIA, rather
irregular procedure to go outside the agency to have people evalu-
ate an agency intelligence conclusion?
Q: What were the pressures involved for forming that B
team, and what effect has there somewhat contrary conclusion had
on you all?
ADMIRAL TURNER: i don't think It's unusual to go outside.
I'm not really too sure how far back this goes, but I know that for
many years they've had outside consultants and reviewers. And what
I have established, instead of a B team, Is a group of people whom
I call upon at different times, different numbers of them, to par-
ticipate in a major study effort that we're doing, to get them in
at the beginning, when we write the terms of reference and say,
"This Is what you're supposed to do In this study"; bring them back
in the middle and say, "How's it coming?" and, "Are you going In
the right direction?" And then you bring them back towards the
end and say, "Does it hang together? Does It make sense? Is it
logical?"
Some of the people you get are experts In that field. Some
of the people I want to get are just good thinkers who are not well
informed in that particular area, but who will sit back and took
and say, "Can we see the woods for the trees here?"
So, I think there's a great value, particularly in going
out to places like this and getting academic people to come and
participate and consult with us.
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The B team experiment didn't work out very well because
it all blew into the press, and so the B team experiment was never
completed. So I can't tell whether it failed or worked.
Q: The study was never completed?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No. They got through one topic out of,
I think it was five or six they were supposed to be working on, and
It all appeared in the newspapers. And, of course, they folded up
the operation at that point because it was a great big breach of
security. And I think that was in part because it was so polarized
by A and B. And I don't intend to use the A and B, but I don't
want to eschew it completely either, because there may be some
circumstances when that sort of competitive thing is good.
I prefer to be sure that in my consulting groups and in
my study groups we have all sort of basic views represented right
within the group, and they have to hammer it out right there. And
when they can't agree, then we try to write majority and minority
views.
Time to go?
I wish we could stay longer, but i....
Q: The capabilities of the CIA and the KGB. What -- how
important is verification now in the arms negotiations between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, you certainly wouldn't want to be
without any capability to verify. But then you have to ask your-
self: How close do I have to be able to verify? If they have one
more missile out of 2000, does it make any difference to me?
Q: How close can you verify right now? Can you verify
one missile out of 2000?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I think, you know, that would be
very difficult to get down to that precision. But I'm confident
that with missiles we can verify within a reasonable range that
it isn't going to upset the strategic balance of the situation.
LStart of speech]
ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't tell you how exciting it is to
be here on your campus, not only because it's Lunintelligiblej
game weekend, but because this is Wabash. Wabash is an exciting
place, and I'm pleased to be with you.
LLaughter and applause
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ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm very serious in this. I'm most
pleased to be here. I'm pleased because you would have me, you
would invite me. I'm pleased because you would tolerate me on
this busy weekend. And I'm pleased because you would let me In
the door after I've been to another academic institution...
LLaughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: ... In Indiana this very day, one that
some -- I can't quite remember the name. It's a little town
called -- is it Greenhouse?
LLaughter and applause
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't know how it's going to end
up tomorrow night, but I'm glad it's ending up for me tonight
at Wabash.
LLaughterJ
LCassette turned
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...college community like this play an
extraordinarily important role in our country In helping to shape
public opinion and attitudes. And public opinion and attitudes
towards intelligence, after the years of battering and criticism
and investigations that we have had, are very Important to us;
not because we want to feel good and popular, but because every
one of us in authority in the Intelligence game knows that we can
only have a good foundation for our Intelligence activities if
they rest in the moral and ethical attitudes of our country. And
it isn't always easy for us to discern just what those attitudes
are with respect to Intelligence operations, because the ethical
standards and values of our country, and I suppose any country,
do change with time and circumstance. What was approved of in
Intelligence work Lunintelligiblej 20 years ago may well be un-
acceptable or criticized today.
And beyond that, we have Impediment in testing public
opinion with respect to intelligence activities because we can't
put up trial balloons, as you can in some other areas of govern-
ment work. We can't take a sounding into what public opinion
may want or accept, simply because so much of what we do either
Is kept secret or you don't do it at all.
As a result, there is a burden upon us to exercise judg-
ment and to try to decide what the country does want today and
what It will continue to approve as it looks In retrospect In the
years ahead.
LMIcrophone difficulties)
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ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't mean to say that we don't have
instructions, guidance and regulation from above, because surely
we do. For instance, we have laws in this country particularly
to regulate the activities of the intelligence community with
respect to American citizens. There has been for some time a
law about wiretapping the telephones of American citizens. And
this Administration, this spring, sent a revision of that law
to the Congress, where it's being debated. This is an attempt
to strengthen the controls, to strengthen the rights of privacy
of the average citizen of our country, while at the same time
maintaining the possibility of the government obtaining infor-
mation that is genuinely deemed to be of importance to the national
interest. I think a balance is being struck here that will be
very useful.
Beyond the walls of the Congress, we have some orders of
the President of the United States, orders specifically, for In-
stance, that no member of the intelligence community will contem-
plate, plot, or conduct assassinations.
And from these laws and from these orders we then set
out our own internal regulations to guide our activities and to
tell our people what they may and may not do. You might be inter-
ested in a couple of examples of that.
One is with respect to members of the American media,
television, radio, newspapers, news magazines. We simply do not
have any paid contractual relationships with accredited American
media representatives. We will not use this type of person as
an agent of intelligence.
Now, let me balance that by telling you that we still
look on American media representatives as citizens, with all rights
and privileges, despite their profession. And by that I simply mean
I believe any citizen, and every citizen, is entitled to share with
his government information which he has and which he believes will
be of value to it. So if a newsman voluntarily comes to us and
says he has something of value -- of information that would be of
value, we're happy to see him, we're happy to talk with him. We
do not task him. We do not ask him to do things for us.
More to home for you, perhaps: our relationships with
academia. Now, here we do have paid and contractual relationships.
We have professors who do research for us, write for us, and come
and work with us for short periods of time. Obviously, we have to
pay them. It's unfortunate -- not the we pay them.
LLaughterJ
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think they're overpaid.
It's unfortunate that there is an attitude in some areas
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of academia in the United States today that any relationship between
the academic community and the intelligence community is improper.
I think that is choking off some of the useful interchange and proper
interchange that can be had between these communities. And I hope
very much in the next few years to redress that and to open up
those channels again.
I believe the intellectual capabilities of our academic
community in the United States are so great that they must be
shared with all areas and all levels of our government's activities.
Let me dwell on this for just a bit more, because It's not
only Important, relevant here in the college community, but it's
controversial. I do not want in any way to undermine American
academia, either by influencing curricula or teaching procedures,
or by tarnishing the image of the American academic. Thus, we will
not enter Into paid or contractual relationships which would pre-
judice teaching responsibilities or which would deliberately try
to utilize an academic -- status as an academic to hide intelli-
gence activities.
But still, within these limits, there is lots of room,
in my opinion, for associations between the academic and the in-
telligence world which will not cast into doubt the authenticity
or the credibility of the academic community.
Recently, for Instance, I asked a Sovietologist of eminent
renown to do some work for us on a difficult problem about the
Soviet Union. I think it would have been a great shame if regula-
tions at his university had precluded his doing so, because he
brought to us new insights, new attitudes, assurance that we weren't
getting set in our bureaucratic ways and attitudes and outlook, that
we were taking into account all of the most important and relevant
factors that we could. Let me suggest that when he went back to
his academic campus, I think he too was in a better position,
because he had seen how the Soviet government works from greater
sources of information than perhaps he had on his campus. He had
a greater depth of understanding of that process. Now, there was
lots that he maybe couldn't share with his students when he came
back because it was classified information, but I believe his
teaching at that point would inevitably be more relevant and en-
hance his ultimate worth to his students because of the deeper
Insights that he had from his activities with us.
But this also raises another controversial question. Some
academic institutions require that any relationship between a member
of their faculty or administration and an intelligence activity be
reported, at least to the administration, if not to the public. I
think this is not a reasonable position for an academic institution
to take.
I haven't asked President Seymour. Maybe my neck is out
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here -- what your rules are here at Wabash.
Let me say, I think it's unreasonable that intelligence
Is singled out. there are some institutions where any relationship
that a professor has with an outside activity must be reported. I
can't question that. But I don't think it's fair to the individual
or to us to single out an intelligence relationship and treat it in
a biased way.
Let me also point out just briefly that this isn't always
a one-way street. There are real benefits to the academic world of
association with the intelligence world.
For instance, we publish a great deal of unclassified
literature of considerable value to the academic community of our
country. Recently we put out a study on the prospects for the
Soviet economy into the 1980s. We put out another study about the
world steel market situation: where there is productive capacity
in excess, where there are shortages, and what the demands are,
and so on.
But also there are some very unusual and interesting con-
nections between Intelligence and academic research, some that you
wouldn't ever guess at. I just found out the other day that we can
be a real boon to the archaeologists of this country. There are
many areas that archaeologists would like to go that are too for-
bidding geographically or where they are forbidden politically.
But with aerial photography, you not only can get to some of those
places, but you can often find more than is visible on the ground:
the remnants, the ruins, the roads, the stadiums, and so on, are
often visible in their buried state from aerial photographs. What
a shame It would be if academic regulations on various campuses
prohibited interchange of this sort.
Now let me move on to how we judge our relationships when
we deal with non-Americans, particularly in our overseas activities,
which is, of course, the principal world of Intelligence. Here the
problem of reflecting our nation's values is a very difficult one,
and it's much more a judgmental question than it is within the
United States.
When we're dealing with an open society, like our own, any
outsider can get a very good idea of the trends and the policies,
the attitudes, the general direction that this country is going to
go. He gets it by reading the newspapers and watching television,
by having a certain number of friends and contacts within our
country, and generally keeping his eyes open. But I'm sure you
appreciate that the reverse is not the truth, is not true when it
comes to the closed societies behind the Iron Curtain.
We have the same need to sense the trends, the policies,
the attitudes in many of these closed societies, but we simply can
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not do so as readily as they can with us. The clandestine, the
secretive collection of intelligence is often the only way we can
obtain that information.
And would you want us in any way to today be negotiating
with the Soviet Union a strategic arms limitation, something that
will help reduce the probability, the possibility of nuclear war-
fare In the world, and yet not have a sense of what is going on in
that country, militarily, politically, or economically? And I
would emphasize that it is not just the military that we need to
know about. Today the world Is so interdependent economically,
that what happens in a major economy like the Soviet Union, or
our own, has ripple effects throughout the entire world. And yet,
even here, a simple world of basic economics, we have to rely,
frequently, on secret intelligence work to tell us what's going
on behind the Iron Curtain, test we be caught up in repercussions
of their activities that have an impact on everyone of us in the
United States.
Still, benefits that we gain from secretive intelligence
collection operations must be weighed carefully, they must be
weighed against our fundamental preference as a country to deal
openly and straightforwardly with other nations and to treat the
citizens of other countries with the same respect as we do our
own.
As a result, clandestine, or secretive, collection of
intelligence today is an avenue of last resort. We turn to it
when we are sure that the information Is not available In open
sources or by less risky means. And I assure you, however, that
despite all the new, wonderful technical techniques for collecting
intelligence Information, in my view the plain old spy, who's been
with us since the days of Jericho, is going to be with us well into
the future. It is an arrow in the quiver of intelligence for our
country that we cannot do without.
But the length to which we should go In spying and the
limit to which pragmatism should overrule idealism, and on whose
should we depend as to what can and should be done in this field
are important and difficult questions. And If I can come back to
the beginning, where I pointed out that we cannot launch trial
balloons, we cannot ask 210 million Americans would they approve
of this or that Intelligence operation -- I believe that what we
need In order to decide how to do these affairs Is what I would
call a surrogate for public opinion. And I also believe that out
of the crucible of the last two or three years of criticism and
investigation of the intelligence community has come a surrogate
process for testing public opinion. It comes In the form of new
oversight and control procedures. And let me cite just a few of
them to you, to tell you how we are controlled and operating today.
First, your President and your Vice President today take
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a very intensive and complete interest in what is going on in the
intelligence world, and they take the time to be informed.
Beyond that, we have in the Senate of the United States,
and have had for about a year and a half, a committee dedicated
specially to the oversight of the intelligence process. It just
so happens that both of your senators from Indiana are on that
committee. In fact, in January Senator Bayh is scheduled to become
the chairman of it; and we enjoy working with him very much, and
also with Senator Lugar, who has joined the committee this year.
This committee Is our oversight in the Congress, on the
Senate side. They check on what we're doing, they ask us about our
activities, and we keep them well posted on them. And at the same
time, they are an important and helpful buffer for us, between us
and the rest of the Senate committees. So we have a good relation-
ship here in which we both benefit: in which the Congress, through
these 17 senators, obtains a good insight into what is going on,
has an opportunity to exercise Its influence; and yet we also keep
closer in touch with the American people and the standards that
they want by our associations with this committee.
On the other side of the house, in the House of Representa-
tives, a similar committee was established last August, and we're
very pleased to be working with it.
Next, let me make a quick technical differentiation for
you of some of the terminology of intelligence. The area in which
perhaps the intelligence world has been most criticized in recent
years has been in what we call covert action. This is not intelli-
gence gathering, this is not seeking information; this is the pro-
cess of attempting, without attribution, to influence attitudes or
events in foreign countries.
There is today a very rigorous control procedure before
any covert action can be conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency has been designated
by the President as the only agency of the government that will
conduct covert actions for it. It is not part of the intelligence
agency's intelligence function; it's a separate one.
But today, before a covert action is authorized, it has
to be approved by the National Security Council, the President of
the United States must sign off that he wants that action to be
taken, and then I must go and notify a number of the committees
of the Congress.
I suggest to you that these are adequate controls to insure
that this process does not go on by itself or go on in ways that
these leaders of the American government do not desire.
Beyond these committees, beyond this process for approving
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covert action, we have another very important mechanism which is
known as the Intelligence Oversight Board, a board of three dis-
tinguished Americans whose only task is to look into the legality
and the propriety of the way Intelligence is being conducted In
our country. They report only to the President of the United
States.
Thus, if you or some member of my organization wants to
submit a criticism of me and the way I'm doing business, or any
other activity that he or she sees going on around him, they
simply write a postcard or a letter to the Intelligence Oversight
Board in Washington, D.C., and that board will look into it and
report to the President on whether they think something more should
be done. This is also, I think, very helpful and very reassuring
to all of us.
Now let me be totally honest and frank with you. Out of
this process of oversight today there are coming risks, and we have
to take those into account.
First there's the risk of what I call committeeism (?).
If as we go through and clear these activities with these various
oversight bodies we end up with what I would call least-common-
denominator intelligence, really not being willing to take risks
when they are justified, we're going to lose out. We're going to
lose what is important in terms of the kind of information I was
mentioning earlier that we frequently need and which is not avail-
able in any other way.
There's also a risk that as you proliferate the number of
people who are involved in the innermost secrets of intelligence
through this oversight process, you're going to have security leaks,
and information that should not get out to the public, should not
get out to the other people In the world may get out.
And I say to you that today I cannot assure you that we
have struck the right balance here, but we're still working on it.
And I think it will be two or three years, as we work with these
oversight boards, committees and with these procedures that I've
outlined, before this will settle down Into the right relationship.
But I am quite confident today that we are going to be able to do
that in the way that will balance the taking of these risks and the
protection of our society at the same time. I'm confident that we
are moving smoothly in that direction, but it's going to take time.
And I'm not quite satisfied to leave this surrogate process
of public review of our activities In just the surrogate stage. We
are not trying, as part of your intelligence community, to share
more with you, the American public; to be as open as we possibly can.
We have, for Instance, increased the amount of these publications
that I talked about on an unclassified basis. When today we conduct
a major study in the intelligence world, we subsequently took at it
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carefully and ask ourselves if we took out and classified the very
secretive information, would this still have meaning and import to
the American public? Would it help improve the quality of the
debate on public issues in our country? And if it does, we will
publish it.
And I believe that this sharing with the public will do
even more to help us insure that we stay in touch with our society.
What I think ism saying to you tonight is that in this
mix of greater openness, greater oversight, greater scrutiny of
the risks when we take them, and yet a willingness to take those
risks when the interests of our country determine it, Lunintelll-
giblew we are in an exciting period in American intelligence because
we are developing a new model of intelligence, an American model
of intelligence, and it's different than the traditional model of
intelligence, which has always been built on maximum secrecy.
So I say to you, in closing tonight, that I sincerely
believe and I am confident that we are today, despite the require-
ments of certain secrecy, conducting your country's intelligence
operations only in ways that will strengthen our open society.
Thank you. And I'd be happy to take your questions.
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