INTELLIGENCE: THE RIGHT RULES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200030028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: October 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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INTELLIGENCE:
THE RIGHT RULES
FOREIGN POLICY
FALL 1982
by Stanfield Turner and George Thibault
The Israeli raid at Entebbe, the hostage res-
cue mission to Iran, and the rescue of Brigadier
General James Dozier had one thing in com-
mon: No one in the public and few in the
governments concerned knew anything about
these actions beforehand. The need for secrecy
in such military operations seems obvious. Less
clear, but equally vital, is the importance of
secrecy in other government activities such as
intelligence operations during peacetime. This
need has not changed significantly since 1777
when George Washington wrote: "The neces-
sity of procuring good intelligence is apparent
and need not be further urged-all that re-
mains for me to add is that you keep the whole
matter as secret as possible."
America's first president perhaps did not
anticipate how difficult it would later become
to reconcile the necessity for secrecy in intelli-
gence activities with the constitutional provi-
sions for open government and the guaranteed
rights of Americans. The secret work of intel-
ligence agencies inherently conflicts with the
idea of openness; such secrecy can easily un-
dermine individual rights in the name of pro-
tecting them. Consequently, every American
administration has had to seek a balance be-
tween secrecy and openness.
From Washington's day until World War II,
U.S. intelligence activities did not arouse sig-
nificant concern because they were sufficiently
limited. But in 1947, recalling the govern-
ment's inability to bring together available in-
telligence that might have alerted the country
to the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, Pres-
ident Truman centralized American intelli-
gence activities. The president established the
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER (ret.) was director of
central intelligence (DCl) in the Carter administration.
CAPTAIN GEORGE THIBAULT, U.S. Nary, was special
assistant to the DCI in the Carter administration and is now
chairman o the department of military strategy at the
National War College.
position of director of central intelligence (DCI)
to coordinate the various foreign intelligence
efforts spread across the Department of De-
fense, the Department of State, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and elsewhere.
The director would also head a new Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) through which all
foreign intelligence data would flow.
The concentration of power in a single direc-
tor and the creation of a new intelligence
agency clearly increased the amount of secret
government activity and thus the probability of
conflicts between secrecy and open democracy.
In the climate of concern for the adequacy of
U.S. intelligence operations, the CIA opened
mail to and from the Soviet Union, infiltrated
domestic organizations suspected of threaten-
ing national security, and tested on unsuspect-
ing Americans drugs that it thought might be
used on its own agents. When these activities
came to light in the mid-1970s, the executive
and legislative branches of the U.S. govern-
ment moved quickly to tighten controls on in-
telligence operations and to restore traditional
guarantees of personal rights. The destructive
criticism of all secret intelligence activity dur-
ing this period demonstrated how far the na-
tional attitude had shifted toward a concern for
individual rights and high standards of legality
even at the cost of national security.
In February 1976 President Ford issued an
executive order governing the conduct of intel-
ligence activities. In particular, the order laid
down rules severely limiting intrusions into the
lives of Americans. In January 1978 President
Carter revised the Ford executive order,
making minor changes in existing domestic
constraints and establishing new procedures
requiring the CIA director to clear sensitive col-
lection activities in advance with the National
Security Council (NSC). Congress established a
requirement to review certain intelligence
operations and set up two permanent commit-
tees to, oversee intelligence activities.
But four years after the Ford executive
order, concern that intelligence agencies might
abuse secrecy began to diminish. The country
was shaking itself free of the inhibiting conse-
quences of its debacle in Vietnam and was
ready to acknowledge once again the need to
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deal more effectively with a world often hostile
to American interests. In the 1980 presidential
campaign, Ronald Reagan charged that the
Ford and Carter executive orders, undue criti-
cism from the public and media, and excessive
congressional oversight had hobbled intelli-
gence capabilities. Once elected, President
Reagan set out to correct these problems by
loosening many of the controls on U.S. intelli-
gence activities.
There are four types of controls and
oversight:
? internal controls created and enforced
within the intelligence agencies themselves;
? presidential controls such as the executive
orders;
? controls that come from Congress in its
role as overseer of intelligence; and
? controls that flow from public scrutiny of
intelligence activities.
The internal controls that intelligence agen-
cies impose on their own activities generally are
easy to devise, involve only minimal risks to
intelligence operations, and can be very effec-
tive. The control most widely used is the prac-
tice called compartmentation, which severely
limits the number of people who know about a
sensitive project to sometimes as few as a
dozen. Compartmentation not only limits ac-
cess to information, but also segregates the files
relating to the project. No single document re-
veals every initiative an agency undertakes.
But protections such as compartmentation
have their costs. By the time of the intelligence
investigations in the mid-1970s, compartmen-
tation within the CIA had become excessive and
dangerous. The few individuals who had the
most knowledge of sensitive programs had ac-
cumulated undue power. CIA directors learned
about some operations only after they took
place. Sometimes the lack of adequate coordi-
nation permitted conflicting or duplicative
activities. There is no foolproof way to guard
against these kinds of problems, but directors
can help the situation by establishing an in-
ternal system of checks and controls.
Between 1977 and 1981, for instance, we
adopted a corporate decision-making style in
the CIA. Previously, the originating office for-
warded important proposals to the director; the
decision process included only those other of-
fices with a direct interest in the proposal. To
reduce the liabilities of extreme compartmenta-
tion, we began to involve a small, regular group
of offices in most major decisions. We estab-
lished specific levels of approval for various
degrees of risk, encouraged the agency's
inspector-general to probe widely, and sought
to inculcate by example a tone of high ethical
standards. Even with these steps to make in-
ternal procedures more open, the danger of
leaks remained small because intelligence agen-
cies in general are highly conscious of security.
The most significant danger of such steps is
rather that they may encourage undue caution
in an organization that must take risks. A direc-
tor has to counter this inclination toward exces-
sive caution by encouraging subordinates to
present bold and imaginative proposals when
the results may justify taking high risks.
NSC Review
At the presidential level two major types of
formal external controls have been exercised:
constraints on the authority of intelligence
agencies to intrude on the privacy of Ameri-
cans, and a requirement that the DCI clear sen-
sitive intelligence collection operations with
the NSC and present the council with an an-
nual review of those activities. Regular NSC
review may dull the effectiveness of intelligence
operations, especially those involving high risk
but also high payoff. Since NSC members are
not as familiar with intelligence operations as
the director, sometimes they do not appreciate
the potential benefits of high-risk operations,
especially when the benefits may be realized
only in the long run. Timidity and parochial
interests may supplant sound judgment.
There is a compensating advantage in re-
viewing and clearing sensitive collection opera-
tions through the NSC: It strengthens the DCI's
control in an area where decisions are not black
or white and where there exist enormous pres-
sures to take high risks. Deciding which risks
are worth taking is perhaps the most difficult
decision a director must make. The historical
record is replete with schemes that might have
endangered American lives, money, and pres-
tige with little prospect of a commensurate re-
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turn. Yet in general, risk taking is essential in
intelligence work and must be encouraged
when the potential payoff is worth it.
All techniques for collecting intelligence be-
come compromised to some degree over time.
Only constant innovation will keep the art of
collection ahead of the art of counterintelli-
gence. But innovation means trying something
that has never been tried before. A brilliant and
original idea may at first seem unorthodox and
untenable. The director, then, must separate
the wheat from the chaff among the many pro-
posals that cross his desk. At times it is useful
for the director to solicit outside advice. Like
the head of any bureaucracy, he feels pressure
to support his subordinates, to demonstrate his
confidence in them and to encourage them to
exercise initiative. If the director does not sup-
port enough innovative proposals, subordi-
nates will stop offering them and initiative will
wane.
The requirement of an NSC review provides
a useful exercise for both the director and his
subordinates. Those presenting the new ideas
must do their homework better than they
might otherwise because a rejection from the
NSC is more difficult to appeal than one from
the director. The requirement also forces the
director, who must be able to present the
scheme persuasively to an outside review
board, to think the proposal through rigor-
ously. The line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable risks is a fine one. To determine what
risks are acceptable, the DCI must look beyond
the short-term success or failure of an isolated
intelligence operation to the long-term effect on
U.S. foreign policy if the operation fails. An
example of this distinction is the question of
spying on allies. The United States had to bal-
ance the potential value of information it could
gain by, for example, spying on the regime of
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran with the
risk of damaging Iranian-American relations if
the operation were exposed. In most cases, the
United States deems such risks unacceptable.
The filter of an NSC review helps the DCI make
this kind of judgment.
The NSC review procedure used to work as
follows: Each year the DCI would provide a list
of the sensitive operations approved by the NSC
in the past year and a second list of the next 10
most sensitive operations for which he had
thought NSC approval unnecessary. If the NSC
did not agree with the DCI's judgment on where
he drew that line, it could instruct him to seek
its approval more frequently in the future. This
process also provided the DCI with a check on
his subordinates' judgments of what to approve
on their own and what to bring to him for
approval. This is part of an important system
of small checks insuring that as operations be-
come more significant, approval and super-
visory authority automatically move upward.
Interaction with the NSC can also insure that
intelligence collection activities do not en-
danger ongoing foreign policy actions. It may
be desirable, for example, to recruit an in-
former who can tell what the negotiators from
another country will present at the next negoti-
ating session. Yet if the informer is uncovered,
the negotiations may be ruptured. The Ameri-
can negotiator, who participates in the NSC
decision, can best judge whether the potential
value of the information is worth the risks.
CIA directors learned about some
operations only after they took
place.
The new Reagan executive order drops the
requirements both for clearing sensitive collec-
tion operations with the NSC and for conduct-
ing an annual NSC review. A new subordinate
directive providing for these procedures does
not require the director to submit all proposed
sensitive operations to the NSC; he now has
considerable discretion in deciding what to
submit for review. This difference may well be
simply a matter of style, insignificant in prac-
tice. But it is difficult to understand why the
DCI's obligations should not be spelled out ex-
plicitly. What is worrisome is that behind these
changes may lie the belief that a less rigorous
process of clearance would unshackle the DCI
and permit him to conduct better intelligence.
If the Reagan administration believes this, it
does not understand the benefits of the review
process and is likely to neglect it over time with
potentially serious consequences.
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A second type of presidential control sought
to constrain intrusions into the lives of Ameri-
cans. The Reagan executive order relaxes these
constraints. The new order, for example, al-
lows intelligence agencies other than the FBI to
collect intelligence in the United States when
significant foreign intelligence is involved; it
permits physical surveillance of Americans
abroad to collect significant information that
cannot reasonably be obtained by other means;
and it authorizes covert actions within the
United States in support of foreign policy ob-
jectives as long as the actions are not intended
to influence U.S. opinion. These changes are
undoubtedly intended to take advantage of
every opportunity for the CIA to gather useful
foreign intelligence. Americans do become
involved with foreigners in activities that have
implications for intelligence, ranging from legal
commercial relations to illegal narcotics
smuggling and international terrorism. The
CIA has always been authorized to inquire into
such activities in an open manner-for ex-
ample, by talking with travellers who have
been abroad. But when Americans have pre-
ferred not to share their information, the CIA
has not previously been authorized to collect
that information covertly, except in very spe-
cific circumstances.
There is little evidence that spying on
Americans in the United States would produce
significant intelligence. And whatever intelli-
gence is available the FBI can acquire. The FBI
and the CIA already work together closely in
counterintelligence work. The CIA watches
foreign agents overseas; if an agent comes to the
United States, the CIA hands the case over to
the FBI. This concept of shared responsibility
takes advantage of the best capabilities of the
two agencies. The CIA is trained to operate
overseas while the FBI is trained to operate in
the United States where national and state laws
apply. If the CIA begins to operate alongside
the FBI in the United States, counterproductive
competition would inevitably arise for dollars
and territory; responsibility between the two
agencies could be blurred; and resentment
could build up over large and small bureau-
cratic issues. The FBI can expand its foreign
intelligence collection in the United States if
that seems necessary, rather than drawing the
CIA into domestic work.
One other presidential control is the Intelli-
gence Oversight Board, (JOB). Instituted by the
Ford executive order, the board is a three-
person panel that reports directly to the presi-
dent. Ford and Carter empowered it to review
intelligence activities that "raise questions of
legality or propriety." Anyone, including
agency employees, could use this unique chan-
nel to report known or suspected wrongdoing.
Reagan has considerably weakened the JOB,
limiting it to advising the president on matters
of legality but not matters of propriety. Yet the
investigations of 1975-1976 questioned the pro-
priety of some of the CIA's actions as much as
their legality. Again, apparently an impression
exists that less scrutiny will somehow result in
better intelligence.
Congress's Job
Congress exercises the third major set of
controls over intelligence. Since their establish-
ment in 1976 and 1977, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence have
reversed the tradition of perfunctory oversight
by two or three congressional leaders who pre-
ferred not to know the ungentlemanly details of
intelligence activities. Instead, the two com-
mittes have acted as aggressive and respon-
sible overseers while at the same time providing
valuable advice and guidance for the intelli-
gence agencies.
Nonetheless, congressional oversight does
present considerable dangers. To a greater ex-
tent than with executive branch oversight, the
fear that information will leak may inhibit the
agencies from taking risks. The danger of leaks
is particularly high because the committees are
larger than necessary; sensitive material cannot
be restricted to only a few committee members.
Moreover, secrecy goes against the grain of
most politicians. And even with the best of
intentions, it is seldom easy to keep classified
information separated in one's mind from un-
classified information. Consequently, although
the committee members seem to realize the
need for security and have a good record of
preserving secrecy, the requirement of dis-
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closing information to Congress inhibits intel-
ligence officers. In particular, the intelligence
agencies fear leaks about highly controversial
activities such as plans for covert action to in-
fluence political events in a foreign country.
The other danger of congressional oversight
comes from the impulse of congressional com-
mittees to manage rather than just oversee. The
distinction is easily blurred over such issues as
whether the intelligence committees must al-
ways be informed of covert actions before they
take place. It is not the job of Congress to dic-
tate how the president should exercise his ex-
ecutive authorities, which include the use of
covert action. It is, however, Congress's job to
judge how well the president has used his au-
thority in the past and, if necessary, to enact
legislation that enlarges or limits that author-
ity. This distinction is central to the constitu-
tional balance of powers.
These dangers notwithstanding, congres-
sional oversight strengthens intelligence capa-
bilities. To a large degree, the widespread
impression that congressional oversight has
hobbled intelligence can be attributed to the
1980 battle over modifying the Hughes-Ryan
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.
This amendment, passed originally in 1974,
required that the president report all covert ac-
tions to "the appropriate committees of Con-
gress." Congress interpreted this to include the
appropriations, armed services, intelligence,
and foreign affairs committees in both the
House and Senate. This interpretation allowed
far too much disclosure, although sensitive co-
vert actions constitute only a relatively small
portion of the work of the intelligence com-
munity. The publicity surrounding the debate
to repeal the amendment led the public to be-
lieve that all intelligence secrets were shared
with the eight congressional committees and
that as a result U.S. intelligence was crippled.
But the Hughes-Ryan amendment was modi-
fied in 1980. Now the president reports intel-
ligence information to the Congress's two select
intelligence committees. The change has not
weakened congressional oversight since the
select committees draw some of their mem-
bership from the other six committees that
previously received intelligence information.
Intelligence officials no longer have to respond
to questions from other committees regarding
hots, intelligence was gathered or whether co-
vert actions are taking place. Such questions
fall under the jurisdiction of the select commit-
tees. The members of these two committees
understand intelligence matters better than do
other congressmen; the former can cite this ex-
pertise to generate vital support among their
colleagues when needed. -
Perhaps the least recognized benefit of con-
gressional oversight is that it can strengthen the
control of the DCI. Directors have sometimes
uncovered situations where their orders had
been overlooked or ignored. While in the past
some subordinates may have sought to hold
back information from the DCI, today they
know they may be called to testify before Con-
gress where they would face the choice of dis-
closure or perjury. Few intelligence officials
would care to explain why the director had to
learn from a congressional hearing what he
should have learned from his staff. There has
been no evidence of deliberate withholding of
information since the Ford executive order
established the emphasis on checks and con-
trols; still, inhibiting pressure from Congress in
this area benefits everyone.
An impression exists that less scru-
tiny will somehow result in better
intelligence.
Finally, all intelligence officials who testify
before the congressional intelligence commit-
tees benefit from the exchange. Like any spe-
cialists, intelligence officers can become too
narrow in their outlook. Past mistakes have fre-
quently resulted from insularity and from an
absorbing dedication to getting the job done.
The members of the two intelligence commit-
tees are detached enough from the intelligence
process to offer a valuable perspective.
On balance, congressional oversight is bene-
ficial. The Ford and Carter executive orders
acknowledged this by designating the DCI the
intelligence community's spokesman to Con-
gress. The Reagan executive order, however,
includes no such designation. In addition, the
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CIA's congressional liaison office has been
downgraded. If the Reagan administration
places less emphasis on congressional oversight
and if an attitude develops that congressional
oversight hobbles intelligence, Congress could
lose its enthusiasm for playing this vital role.
Politicians receive little thanks for membership
on a committee whose actions are largely
secret. So far, members on both committees
have been conscientious and interested in their
work. It is important to maintain this high level
of congressional involvement by assuring pres-
ent and future committee members that the
executive branch values their role.
The Safe Course
The fourth type of controls are those exer-
cised by the public. They go to the heart of the
conflict between secrecy and open democracy.
These controls are certainly the most contro-
versial and the least understood. The Reagan
administration has eliminated the provision
of previous executive orders making the DCI the
intelligence community's spokesman to the
media. It has also drastically curtailed the re-
lease of unclassified intelligence reports to the
public. Such attempts to hide intelligence ac-
tivities from the public or simply to ignore the
public are undesirable. They deprive Ameri-
cans of a valuable source of information on na-
tional issues without good reason and deprive
the intelligence community of a valuable source
of outside stimulus and dialogue. -
Many of the intelligence community's anal-
yses are, or can be, declassified. Releasing
them to the public can contribute to a well-
informed citizenry. Two arguments are often
made against providing sanitized analyses to
the public. One is that preparing information
for the public involves a significant additional
burden for analysts, detracting from their abil-
ity to do their primary job of providing classi-
fied intelligence to the executive branch. This
argument is spurious. Intelligence officials can
sanitize most reports of interest to the public
with minimal deletions and editing. And distri-
bution is handled by other agencies.
The other argument, though not compelling,
is more reasonable: It is difficult to determine
what should be released. On the one hand, if
intelligence information supports an adminis-
tration's policy, it will be criticized as slanted to
that purpose. On the other hand, if information
appears to undercut policy, the administration
will not appreciate its release. Good policy
should be able to withstand objective criticism.
But sometimes difficult situations will arise
when the analysis that supports the current
policy cannot be declassified while the analysis
that undercuts the policy can.
One answer is to take no risks and publish
nothing. This approach, however, is clearly
unacceptable. The Defense and State depart-
ments continually publish intelligence analyses
and information. Even with the purest inten-
tions, there is a danger that these departments
will release only selective information favoring
their policy objectives. A better answer is for
the DCI to take the initiative by releasing what-
ever will be useful to the public. The director
should not let himself be pressured into sup-
porting administration policy or intimidated
into withholding information when policy
makers do not like his news. In 1977 the CIA
published an intelligence estimate on the world
energy situation. Even though the CIA had
begun preparing the estimate well before the
Carter administration took office, we were
criticized for supporting the president's energy
program. Since it was released, that estimate
has provided a valuable reference point for the
public. Similarly, in 1978 we published an ap-
praisal of the Polish economy showing that
Poland was a potential credit risk. This report
enraged policy makers who at the time were
then encouraging investment in Poland. Today
some bankers wish they had read the report
more carefully.
The greatest payoff from public release lies
in the area of economic intelligence. The U.S.
business community, facing intense competi-
tion from foreign producers, can greatly bene-
fit from intelligence information on trends in
research and production, pricing mechanisms,
and other areas. There is little doubt that other
nations use their intelligence capabilities to
support their international businesses; it is
shortsighted for the United States not to do the
same.
The past six years have witnessed major ex-
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perimentation and change in the U.S. intelli-
gence community. It has shifted away from an
environment of maximum secrecy and begun
to address the inherent problem of secrecy in a
democracy. No change of such proportions
comes easily to a large bureaucracy where tra-
ditions run deep and dialogue is constrained. It
is no surprise, therefore, that some real damage
to U.S. intelligence capabilities occurred dur-
ing this transitional period.
Without a charter defining its
mandate, the CIA cannot resist
pressure from an administration
to undertake potentially question.
able activities.
Three significant causes of damage arose: a
wave of public criticism, numerous leaks of
security information, and some excessively de-
tailed and restrictive procedures for conducting
intelligence operations. Harsh public criticism
followed the revelations of the Rockefeller
Commission and of the investigative commit-
tees led by then Senator Frank Church
(D.-Idaho) and then Representative Otis Pike
(D.-New York). The criticism fed the media's
post-Watergate appetite to uncover malfea-
sance in government. The impact of this criti-
cism on the CIA has generally been portrayed as
a blow to morale. In the long term, however,
that effect was minor. The more serious dam-
age was to diminish enthusiasm within the
agency for taking risks. The vast majority of
intelligence professionals was unaware of the
reported transgressions when they were oc-
curring. In response to public criticism, these
officials began avoiding activities that might ex-
pose the agency to further censure. Officers in
the field feared punishment if they accepted
risks and failed, or if they undertook what
might later be judged the wrong risks. Because
of a conscientious desire to protect the CIA,
intelligence officers often chose the safe course.
The CIA as a whole retrenched its activities lest
it do anything that would bring on more
criticism.
Fortunately, by late 1978 the media's eager-
ness to criticize the CIA began to diminish. At
the same time, the public attitude toward na-
tional defense and intelligence was becoming
more supportive. For the moment the night-
mare of the mid-1970s seems over. The new
concern, however, is whether the Reagan
administration, by loosening controls on intru-
sions into the lives of Americans, risks damag-
ing the public confidence that the intelligence
community has earned over the past few years.
Leaks of security information were the sec-
ond cause of damage during the 1970s. These
leaks have generated an impression that U.S.
intelligence agencies cannot be trusted with
sensitive information. Since Watergate and
Vietnam, American society has virtually en-
shrined the so-called whistle blowers as heroes.
Some of them may have done great service for
their country. But others are simply self-
ser.'ing individuals promoting their own spe-
cial causes. Fortunately, while several leaks
about actual espionage in the past six or seven
years have involved serious breaches of secur-
ity, very little information harmful to U.S. in-
telligence interests has been revealed. In short,
the impression that intelligence agencies cannot
keep secrets is highly exaggerated.
The problem of leaks has another dimension:
the many books and pamphlets written by in-
siders in recent years. These authors include
former CIA professionals who write about their
past experiences and irresponsible individuals
who deliberately disclose classified informa-
tion. The writings of former professionals
usually complain about perceived problems,
past and present. The Supreme Court decision
in the case ofSnepp v. United States has put these
people on notice that they must fulfill their
contractual obligation to permit the CIA to re-
view their manuscripts for legitimately clas-
sified information. Frank Snepp, the CIA's
chief strategy analyst in Saigon from 1973 to
1975, published a book in 1978 entitled Decent
Interval recounting the last years of U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam war. The Court
voted to deprive Snepp of the profits from his
book about intelligence experiences not be-
cause he criticized the CIA but because he did
not fulfill the contract he signed of his own
volition to submit his manuscript for a security
review prior to publication.
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The CIA has a responsibility to protect clas-
sified information; therefore it must insist on
controlling the dissemination of security in-
formation acquired while individuals are in its
employ. Others who cannot be held to a con-
tractual obligation, either because they are
beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement
agencies or because they never worked in the
CIA, still pose a problem. The most notable
example is Philip Agee, who has published two
books exposing CIA agents and activities.
The third cause of damage was a set of de-
tailed procedures created in recent years to im-
plement the provisions of executive orders. In
some cases these established tighter controls
than the order required. Overseas operations to
detect the flow of narcotics to the United
States, for example, were curtailed if intelli-
gence officers had to invade the privacy of a
known American smuggler. The new Reagan
executive order revises these procedures and
creates a better balance between the DCI and
the attorney general by having them jointly set
the rules and procedures for intelligence agen-
cies. Although the attorney general plays a key
role in controlling and regulating intelligence,
it is unwise to give him final authority over
operating procedures. Since the attorney gen-
eral's office is not a principal user of foreign
intelligence, it has an institutional inclination
to tighten controls and to curtail intelligence
activity rather than to let the CIA take risks.
A New Charter
Thus the United States has made substantial
progress in removing the obstacles inhibiting
intelligence capabilities in recent years. Three
areas, however, still require attention. First,
the public must continue to recognize the im-
portance of good intelligence. Of course, the
intelligence community has to merit public
support by avoiding the mistakes of the past
and by providing the anticipatory and objective
reporting that the nation needs. The intelli-
gence agencies can further help the public ap-
preciate good intelligence by providing it with
a greater understanding of their unclassified
activities.
Second, the United States should enforce
legislation to curb people like Agee who pub-
lish the names of U. S. intelligence agents. The
bill passed by Congress in June 1982 making it
a crime to identify covert agents represents a
major step in the right direction. The media
reflexively oppose any limits on what can be
written or said; but this represents a parochial
and unrealistic viewpoint. The new legislation
can protect U.S. intelligence officers without
jeopardizing the fundamental freedom of the
press.
Third, Congress can .prevent the pendulum
from swinging too far in the direction of letting
the CIA spy on Americans and relaxing execu-
tive and congressional oversight. Congress can
insure continuing awareness of the value of
controls and accountability by keeping its two
intelligence committees alert and active. These
committees must maintain a relationship with
the intelligence agencies that is supportive but
at the same time adversarial. Each committee,
for example, might probe into one area of intel-
ligence activity each year. The uncertainty
about the subject of the next probe would re-
inforce the idea of accountability.
Congress can also decide whether the new
rules on intrusions into American lives reflect
the national consensus on the balance between
good intelligence and the right of privacy.
Since the problems must be discussed publicly
and the American people must have a voice in
the decision, Congress is better suited to re-
solve this issue than the president. There are,
of course, some considerations that cannot be
discussed in public and some assessments that
only those with a good understanding of the
intelligence profession can make; these can be
handled by the two congressional intelligence
committees, whose members are well qualified
to act as surrogates for the public.
The two committees should also work to
codify the national consensus on intelligence
into a basic charter for the intelligence com-
munity. The legal charter that was adopted in
1949 is now badly outdated; it does not de-
scribe the constitution or the operations of the
intelligence community as it exists today. That
is why U. S. intelligence activities are governed
by executive orders that each administration
can alter or discard. A congressional charter
setting specific guidelines on how the govern-
.CONMIUM I?
 Approved For Release 2007/04/06: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200030028-0
ment wants the CIA to operate should come
first. Periodic changes in executive orders are
inevitable. But a permanent charter can in-
sulate the intelligence community from the sea-
sonal vogues of domestic politics. Without a
charter defining its mandate, the CIA cannot
resist pressure from an administration to un-
dertake potentially questionable activities.
During 1979-1980 the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and the Carter adminis-
tration worked assiduously to develop a charter
satisfactory to both branches. There were
numerous thorny issues such as whether to pre-
clude the CIA's use of newsmen to collect intel-
ligence. While we came close to agreeing on a
reasonable charter, time ran out before we
could resolve every difficult issue. A new at-
tempt to devise a charter does risk opening
another broad examination of intelligence. Yet
the climate in the country and in Congress is
quite different today. Prospects for a balanced
judgment are considerably better than they
were three years ago. And Congress could
minimize the risks of reopening the charter
issue by establishing in advance that the major
issue to resolve is the degree of intrusion the
public must accept. Instead of trying to con-
struct a list of activities that the CIA would not
be allowed to conduct, Congress should devise
a set of positive guidelines on what the CIA
should do and how it should act.
In taking on the difficult task of devising a
new charter, Congress should understand the
great danger the Reagan administration's new
rules have created for U. S. intelligence capa-
bilities. The United States cannot afford to ig-
nore once again the inherent conflict between
secrecy and democracy. A consistent and
stable system of controls and oversight for
intelligence is needed, for the sake of intelli-
gence professionals who have been trying to do
their jobs while never knowing exactly what
they were authorized to do, and for the sake of
the American people who discovered a few
years ago that their blind trust in the intelli-
gence community had been unwise. If the CIA
ever again were to overstep its bounds and vio-
late the rights of Americans and if another
wave of intense public-criticism were to follow,
the agency could be mortally wounded.