CUBA: APPEAL FOR CALM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180043-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: September 17, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180043-8
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17 SEPTEMBER 1979
Seventeen years after the Cuban missile
crisis, Washington was trying to avert
another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation
with Moscow over a Soviet military pres-
ence on the Communist island 90 miles off
Florida. Despite some heated rhetoric on
Capitol Hill, the longstanding posting of a
Soviet combat brigade in Cuba did not
seem to constitute a serious threat to the
U.S. or its allies in Latin America. But the
troops did pose a clear political problem
for President Carter-and a major obstacle
to Senate ratification of the, strategic
arms limitation treaty. Even some liberal
supporters of SALT II seemed to waiver.
And Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman Frank Church predicted "no
likelihood whatever" of Senate passage
Precisely what Carter could or would d
was unclear. If the Soviet troops have, in
deed, been in Cuba for years, Moscow ca
hardly be accused of violating the spirit
SALT at a critical moment. And the unit i
question was scarcely a tenth the size of th
Soviet force based on Cuba in the year
before the 1962 missile crisis-without pr
yoking a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Ac-
cordingly, while some senators called for
complete removal of the brigade, Adminis-
tration experts suggested that a downgrad-
ing of their equipment or command system
might do. "It is the combat nature of the
units which is a matter of very serious
concern to us," said Vance. At a White
House war-gaming session, even hawkish
national-security adviser Zbigniew Brze-
Senator Church and CIA chief Turner: The Soviet troops may spell defeat for SALT
until the latest Cuban controversy is "sat-
isfactorily resolved."
Caught between. the imperatives of
diplomacy and the realities of domestic poli-
tics, the Administration took a determined-
ly moderate approach but couched it in stern
language. At a bare-bones news briefing,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance added little
to what was already known about the Rus-
sian unit-a force of 2,000 to 3,000 men,
tanks and artillery. And he sought to play
down the danger by disclosing that they had
been in place for years-perhaps since the
1960s-although U.S. intelligence just late-
ly confirmed their presence (page 30). "We
regard this as a serious matter affecting our
relations with the Soviet Union," Vance
said. "I will not be satisfied with the mainte-
zinski agreed that Carter should move
cautiously.
Some Administration officials talked
about stepping up economic and diplomatic
pressure on Moscow, and making it clear
that SALT II was at stake. But they firmly
denied any plan for U.S. military action.
"It's just like Iran; people are going to be
asking why he doesn't do something about
it," grumbled one of the President's senior
advisers. "He is doing something about it,
but in a restrained way. That doesn't sound
very sexy, but we can't afford to back the
Russians into a corner."
TRADE-OFF? Vance prepared to meet early
this week with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin in an effort to worla out a com-
promise designed to get both sides off the
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Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180043-8