WHY INTELLIGENCE ON CUBA WAS INADEQUATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180033-9
STAT
AT.. T I CL A'?RA:
ON P - ZL.
tTASH? TGTON STAR (GREE'T LriE)
1 OCTOBER 1979
'Cord Meyer
CUba was made -nate
if President Carter and
his officials are being reti-
cent in their criticism of the
intelligence delay in spot-
ting the Soviet brigade in
Cuba, it is because their
decisions ' ' 'contributed
heavily to the failure.
Carter himself bears the
main responsibility because
he reduced intelligence
coverage of Cuba as one of
his first acts in office, and
signalled that he was more
interested in normalizing
relations with Castro than
in discovering what the
Soviets were doing there.
In January 1977, Carter
cancelled as provocative the
overflights by the SR71, the
successor plane to the U2.
By this act, Carter denied to
the intelligence analysts
photography more detailed
and accurate than any the
orbiting satellitee.can pro-
duce.
More significantly, this
decision flashed a signal to
the intelligence community
that information on Cuba no
longer had high priority, so
the risks of collecting it
were not worth taking.
While Carter pursued de-
tente with Castro. scarce
technical and human intelli-
gence resources `.'were
shifted to more 'urgent
needs.
it was only in the spring
of 1979 that Castro's active
support of the Sandinista
rebels in Nicaragua' re-fo-
cused the eyes of American
intelligence on Cuba: An in-
creased analytic effort
finally paid off in the con-
clusive identification of the
Sviet brigade on Aug. 17. If
this discovery had been
made earlier, there would
have been more time for
quiet negotiations, and
SALT II would not have be-
come entangled in the out-
come. '? '
In retrospect, a second
mistake. by the Carter ad-
ministration on coming to
office was the decision to
abolish the President's For-
eign Intelligence Advisory
Board, (PFIAB), and to i-
nore its final report. First
established by President
Eisenhower, this distin-
guished group of private
citizens and prominent
scientists had been a source
of objective advice to succes-
sive presidents on the work-
ings of the intelligence com-
munity. .
Its swan song was a
warning to President Ford
in December 1976 that the
U.S. had become too heavily
dependent on surveillance
satellites and other techni-
cal means for its intelli.
gence. The board argued
that Soviet technological
progress and increasing
military strength made. it
more -important than ever
before to recruit human
agents Inside potentially
hostile governments to re-
port on their intentions and
on new weapons in the early
stages- of secret develop-
ment
While avoiding the
embarrassment of human
agents who can be arrested
and publicly tried, satellite
surveillance provides mar-
vellously accurate photogra-
phy and is an essential tool
of modern intelligence. But
there are strict limits to
what it can accomplish.
Photography can. only
present a static picture of
what lies beneath the open
sky.
It cannot forecast future
intentions or distinguish
the nationality of soldiers
using similar equipment.
One well-placed human
agent in. Castro's govern-
ment could have provided
early warning of the bri-
gade's presence and de-
scribed what its true pur-
pose was.
Disregarding the PFIAB's
advice, the Carter adminis-
tration has allowed
Admiral Turner to cut
back on the size of the CIA's
Directorate of Operations,
forcing into early retire-
ment. many of its more able
officers. The diminished
espionage capability against
Cuba is a reflection of past
priorities. Until the recent
crisis, the early amount
budgeted for information
collection on. Cuba by
humans,. rather than tech
nology, was a clearly inade-
quate S160,000.
At the start of his adminis-
tration. Carter also made a
serious mistake when he re-
jected George Bush's offer to
stay on for a transitional
year as director of.Central
.Intelligence. Insisting on
his own nominee to replace;
the competent Bush, Carter;
broke with all previous I
precedent by treating the
CIA directorship as a politi-
cal plum- to be distributed
with each change of admin-
istration-When his first choice for
the job, Theodore Sorensen,
ran into trouble in the Sen-
ate, Carter came up with a
quick-fix solution in the per-
son of his Annapolis class-
mate, Stansfield Turner_
There is now a remarkabl
unanimity among Turner'
colleagues on the National
Security Council, in the con-
gressional intelligence com-
mittees and throughout the
intelligence. . community
that Carter's'-.choice of
Turner was unfortunate. He
has somehow managed to of-
fend and antagonize both
colleagues and subordi-
nates.. Cooperative relations
with allied intelligence
services have been dam-
aged..
It may be officially denied
but Carter aides are begin-
ning to look for his replace-
ment. Due to his role as
witness in the SALT debate,
Turner's departure must be
delayed until early next
year so Carter has time to
find a civilian successor of
proven competence who
would be acceptable to both
Democrats and Republicans.
By seeking a replacement
who can win broad, biparti-I
san support, Carter has a'
chance to repairthe damage
of the past 30 months. I
Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100180033-9