'DEAR JOHN' LETTERS AT THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100120041-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: November 26, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/08/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100120041-6 STAT]
OX P.?: G: " A!
ohn' Letters at.the
Roland Evans and Robert Novak
Tear
Top-flight covert operatives being
fired by CIA director Stansfield Turner
are convinced that their "Dear John"
letters were carefully composed so as
to shield the agency-and the admiral
-from possible legal action, a protec-
tive device that further depresses mo-
rale at the Central Intelligence Agency.
The "eyes only" mimeographed dis-
missal letters, untainted by any word of
praise for long service rendered, do not
fire anybody. They simply inform the
recipient that William W. Wells, chief of
covert operations, has an "intent to rec-
ommend" dismissal. Further, the word
has been passed that those who volun-
tarily quit after reading their "Dear
John" notes will be treated as having
made a normal retirement decision,
with no damaging words in their files.
This bloodless, ,self-protective bu-
reaucratic method of rewarding years
of loyal service only contributes to the
gloom at Langley, where the an-
nounced 800 officers (out of 4,500) in
clandestine operations to be fired ac-
tually will climb to over 1,000.
The clandestine service may indeed
have been overstaffed since the end of
WASHINGTON POST
26 November 1977
the war in Vietnam. Old-time station
chiefs fired after 20- and 30-year stints
admit it. But the pruning of some of the
most experienced clandestine agents in
the spy business carries implications-
denied by Turner's men at the CIA-
that Turner is de-emphasizing human
intelligence in favor of electronic intel-
ligence.
"The Russians can now blunt our spy-
in-the-sky capability," one worried in-
telligence official told us. "Downgrad-
ing the human element in intelligence
could lead to one of the great intelli-
gence failures in our history."
Two things infuriate and humiliate
the old hands: first, the particularly
"brutal" way (to quote one top-level
CIA officer) Turner is engineering the
separations; second, the danger implicit
in stripping top foreign posts (including
the highly sensitive post in Bonn) of the
best, most experienced operatives in
the CIA.
Footnote: Adding a new Byzantine di-
mension to Turner's undoubted ability
to alienate his CIA subordinates is his
double-edged use of Wells as chief
hatehetman. The word is out inside the
CIA that Turner is now looking for the
"right" replacement for Wells to run
the once-essential clandestine service.
The problem posed by Marshal Tito
for U.S. foreign policy was pointed up
this year when Yugoslavia secretly sent
American tanks to revolutionary Marx-
ist Ethiopia in violation of U.S. law.
In contrast, Yugoslavia refused to
break a Soviet agreement last year
when non-revolutionary, non-Marxist
Egypt requested desperately needed
Soviet military equipment Such con-
tradictory handling of identical re-
quests by Third World countries under-
lines this. problem: How closely should
the United States cooperate with Tito-
cooperation based on mutual distrust
of the Soviet Union-when Tito invari-
ably aids new revolutionary move-
ments abroad no matter how detrimen-
tal to U.S. interests?
Both Washington and Moscow ban
the transshipment of military equip-
meat they sell or give away. Yet Tito.
approved the dispatch of M47 tanks-
believed between 50 and 100-to help
the Soviet-allied regime in Ethiopia.
This was discovered, almost acciden-
tally, by U.S. intelligence agents in
Africa.
When Moscow denied Egypt vitally
needed spare parts for its Soviet-built
tanks and aircraft, President Anwar
Sadat appealed to Tito during his April
1976 state visit. Tito was deeply re-
morseful: Sorry, Anwar, I want to do it
but I simply cannot break my. agree-
ment with the Russians.
Yugoslavia has now quietly apolo-
gized to the United States for breaking
the transshipment ban. When Secre-
tary of Defense Harold Brown visited
Belgrade last month, Yugoslav military
officials promised him it would never
happen again.
Nevertheless, the record shows that
Tito has an irresistible urge to give all
aid possible whenever asked by a
revolutionary regime. He ignores the
fact that the United States happens. to
be a victim in almost every case, espe?
cially so in Ethiopia, where the.Soviet
takeover threatens Communist domina-
tion of vital sea lanes bringing oil from
the Persian Gulf. .
f1 . s? i
Approved For Release 2007/08/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100120041-6