FACE THE NATION AS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NETWORK AND THE CBS RADIO NETWORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 5, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
CBS NEWS
2020 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
FACE THE NATION
as broadcast over the
CBS Television Network
and the
CBS Radio Network
Sunday, October 5, 1975 -- 11:30 AM - 12:00 Noon, EDT
Origination: Washington, D. C.
GUEST: WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
REPORTERS :
George Herman, CBS News
David Wise, Author
Daniel Schorr, CBS News
Producer: Mary 0. Yates
Associate Producer: Joan Barone
EDITORS: All copyright and right to copyright in this transcript
and in the broadcast are owned by CBS. Newspapers and periodicals are
permitted to reprint up to 250 words of this transcript for the purpose
of reference, discussion or review. For permission to reprint more
than this, contact Director, CBS News Information Services, 524 W. 57th
Street, New York, N. Y. 10019 [phone].
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2 N,
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
HERMAN: Mr. Colby, you have warned of the dangers to the CIA
from all these congressional investigations. Chairman Pike of the
House committee said on this program last week that he thinks that as
the CIA stands today, if there were to be an attack on this country,
the country wouldn't know it in time. What is your answer?
MR. COLBY: Well, I think Mr. Pike is wrong in that. I indicated
that I disagreed with him. He also said, I believe it was the day
before yesterday, that--challenged us to name one single situation in
which we'd warned the country of a possible attack. He seems to have
forgotten the Cuban missile crisis, on which intelligence did warn
the country of a very direct threat to our country. I think today
we have the best intelligence in the world, and I think that the
American people can be assured that we can warn our government of
potential attack or other kinds of problems that we can face around
the world.
ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and un-
rehearsed news interview on FACE THE NATION, with the Director of
Central Intelligence, William E. Colby. Mr. Colby will be questioned
by CBS News Correspondent Daniel Schorr; David Wise, author; and CBS
News Correspondent George Herman.
HERPZAN: Mr. Colby, in fairness to Chairman Pike, I believe I
should probably point out that the burden of his statement was that
the CIA has millions of very--or thousands of very hard-working good
people at lower levels--that they would find out about a possible
enemy attack or something of that sort, but that it would get lost in
the upper levels and wouldn't get through to the government in time.
MR. COLBY: Well, that's, of course, why CIA was produced--
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
because it was a follow-on of Pearl Harbor, where there were certain
indications to the fact of possible attack but they were not put to-
gether and assembled and given to the senior levels of the government
in a fashion that clearly pointed out the danger. The idea of CIA
was to centralize all the intelligence available to the government;
and as a result, we now have access to all the kinds of material that
our government learns, either from open sources or from technical
sources, or from some of our clandestine sources. In that respect, we
then have to put the different pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together,
and arrange them, and order them, and make a projection as to what
they really mean.
Now the easiest thing after any crisis is to find that single
report that predicted it was going to happen. The question you have
to look at is how many other reports cried wolf earlier, and secondly,
how many other reports predicting exactly the opposite exist. The
process is an intellectual one of analyzing all of these different
reports, putting them together, and hopefully coming out with the
right answer.
On the particular instance Mr. Pike cited--the Arab-Israeli war
in 1973--we did make a wrong prediction. But we really don't run a
crystal ball. What we really try to do is arrange all the things, im-
prove the understanding of our government of the factors and forces at
work, and then, to the extent possible, warn of the dangers, warn of
things, but not give absolute predictions.
WISE: Mr. Colby, perhaps the CIA has gotten away from this warn-
ing function a little bit. For example, why did the CIA open a letter
from Senator Church to his mother-in-law? Did you think that his
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
mother-in-law was a dangerous character, or did you think Senator
Church was a dangerous character?
MR. COLBY: I don't know why that was opened. Since 1973, we
have stopped that kind of activity. It was wrong then. It was wrong
whether we opened the mail of Senator Church or President Nixon or
Mrs. Jones. It was equally wrong for all parties.
SCHORR: Mr. Colby, you've been coping valiantly with the problems
of the CIA in the past year as a series of investigations descend upon
you, and several times you've said that you've been subject to criti-
cism for being too candid. You've never really explained--at least
not publicly--what are the pressures on you within the administration,
where is the criticism of you coming from inside the administration,
and do you think that you'll survive that criticism in your current
job?
MR. COLBY: Well, I think there are men of good will on all sides
of various of these questions. There are those who wish that we
didn't have to say anything at all, because that was the old tradition
of intelligence; there are other people, in the government and in
intelligence, who believe that we should expose everything so that we
can get over it and get on with the future. What I've been trying to
do is maintain the morale of both groups, that we are trying to create
a responsible intelligence in America, that we want it to work within
the laws and the Constitution. But at the same time, there are some
secrets of intelligence that we have to keep, and it's those secrets
that somehow--sometimes they leak, but I think we have been able to
keep most of those secret, at the same time being quite open about
some of the other developments of our intelligence business.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
SCHORR: Let me be more specific--
MR. COLBY: There are different people who evaluate the line
between those two extremes differently. We're perfectly straight-
forward in our disagreements, both within our discussions, and you
see indications of these disagreements in the press.
SCHORR: Well, one of the disagreements that I see some indica-
tions of--it appears to be so that last December, you took the respon-
sibility for informing the Deputy Attorney General, Laurence Silberman
at the time, of the possibility that one of your predecessors, Richard
Helms, may have committed perjury, and turned over to the Justice De-
partment for investigation a possible--a possible perjury. I don't
like to--I don't want to prejudge it. One gets indications that you've
been not only criticized, but that maybe Secretary Kissinger and per-
haps Secretary Schlesinger--I'm not quite sure--has gone to President
Ford, saying that you've made an awful mistake there. Why did you feel
it necessary to refer the Helms matter to the Department of Justice,
and how high does your problem in the administration go?
MR. COLBY: Well, I don't,think it's only that. There were a
series of events which later came out, of course--the mail opening and
various things of that nature--that we had investigated. We set out
rules against any repetition of those, but in the course of the
studies there were very strong positions taken as to the rectitude or
non-rectitude of those various activities. There was an old under-
standing between the Department of Justice and the CIA that the CIA
could evaluate whether the revelation of some activity would do so
much damage to our intelligence business that it would not be worth
prosecuting. That seemed a little bit dubious to me, and I did raise
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
that question with the Deputy Attorney General, and he indicated that
that understanding was not proper and could not endure--at which point
I was obliged, under the normal law, to inform him of any potential
activity which would transgress the law. It is my opinion that there
is no one in CIA who could be convicted of any--of any crime. There
were things that were done wrong, but they were either done because
they were believed to be right or within the color of the law there
is a justification for what they did. There are various of these
things, but I do not believe that any of our employees can be found
actually guilty. But that is not for me to decide any more; that is
now a matter for the Justice Department--
SCHORR: But then, what happened after you referred the Helms and
other matters to the Department of Justice? Apparently, the roof came
in at some points around the White House or a couple of departments.
I mean, is it then not true--Secretary Schlesinger admitted on this
broadcast two weeks ago that he had talked about your problem to
President Ford last March, I believe. Secretary Kissinger has admit-
ted nothing, but apparently was also involved. What is your problem
with these cabinet officers?
MR. COLBY: Well, I don't think it's a problem. I think it's
just this question as to what the proper line is between exposure and
secrecy, and there are honest differences of opinion as to how this
should be done. The fact that I'm still in my office is an indication
that the President has not turned his pleasure somewhere else, because
I serve him completely at his pleasure.
HERMAN: One of the things that you've said here, and that you
said before in a newspaper interview, troubles me a good deal--that is,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
your belief that none of the CIA employees can or should be indicted,
because they acted under the belief that what they were doing was
proper, even though it was illegal. I'm a little troubled by the idea
that if the CIA believes something is good or proper, that therefore
it becomes legal and nobody can be indicted for it.
MR. COLBY: No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that the--
an attempt to prosecute an individual--I think that any jury would
give consideration to the circumstances in which he did the act, and
I think that the possibility of a successful conviction would depend
upon the evidence of some wrong intent; and that in the circumstances
of the times, in the 1950's and the 1960's, there were things that
were considered quite appropriate at that time, which are no longer
considered appropriate.
HERMAN: Apparently something as simple as the break-in on Dr.
Ellsberg's psychiatrist--the people who broke in, we know from their
testimony, believed they were doing something right and proper for the
government of the United States.
MR. COLBY: And I think that's a question for a jury to decide.
I don't have any problem--it's not for me to decide--
HERMAN: But don't you have a feeling about it?
MR. COLBY: --I'm expressing my belief that the circumstances, as
I know it, we would not have any of our employees actually convicted.
WISE: Mr. Colby, do you think that the CIA should kill the
political leaders in other countries, and have they ever done so or
attempted to do so?
MR. COLBY: I have many times turned down suggestions to that
effect. In 1973 I issued directives that the CIA would have nothing
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
to do with assassinations, would not stimulate them, condone them,
support them or conduct them. Therefore, I think that the answer is
that we should not. Very clearly, I do not think this subject a good
one to go into public discussion of for two reasons. I think we can
sear into our national history a very damaging wound. And I think
secondly, that some of the facts of these things--because of the ways
these matters were discussed at the times there--are very murky as to
who was part of it and who--where the approval and how detailed the
approval was. But it is not a subject for a public discussion--
WISE: Are you saying there was an attempt, an actual--
MR. COLBY: I am saying the situation was very murky, and that I
really don't believe that this subject is an appropriate one for an
official to be talking about.
WISE: (So how are we going to get the facts about it, then?
MR. COLBY: We have reported all the facts to the Senate commit-
tee; they have examined the matter independently as well, and I think
they can come to a conclusionwhich3-on the basis of the evidence
available to them. But I do not believe it appropriate for open public
discussion, because I think we can hurt our country very seriously.
SCHORR: Does that meanthat)when Senator Mondale mentions
as he did in a speech this week--the existence of a group called The
Executive Action Group(in te--for a couple of years in the early 60's,
_
which was charged with responsibility for making plans, hypothetical
or not, for the assassination of various persons--that you'd rather
not talk about that?
MR. COLBY: We have reported everything on this general subject
to the committees, but I don't believe that it's appropriate for pub-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
lic discussion.
SCHORR: You don't dispute the little that Senator Mondale has--
MR. COLBY: I don't say one way or the other. I just don't be-
lieve the subject is appropriate for public discussion. Some others
may disagree with me, but that's my view.
SCHORR: But there will be public discussion when the Senate
report comes out.
MR. COLBY: There has been quite a lot of public discussion, but
SCHORR: There has been Viand there will be.
MR. COLBY: --don't think it appropriate for me to discuss it in
great detail.
HERMAN: Are you satisfied with the prospects for security of
what you have told the two committees?
MR. COLBY: I think our record to date has been quite good in the
Senate--
HERMAN: No, I'm talking about them, Mr. Colby.
MR. COLBY: Yes, yes.
HERMAN: Do you think that they will keep secure the things that
you want kept secure?
MR. COLBY: Well, I think the Senate has kept its matters quite
careful. We had a discussion last week, as you know, with the House
committee, as to the details of how we would do things. I think that
is an arrangement; it's a compromise arrangement, and it affords a
vehicle for reasonable men to come to good conclusions as to what
should be exposed and what should be kept quiet. There may be some
individual leaks; you journalists are very energetic in prosecuting
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
the possible statements of one man and comparing it with another, and
adding up to an overall story. But I would hope that the discipline
of the Senate and the House committees and their staffs would be as
good as the discipline of the executive branch. And neither will be
perfect. Neither are perfect at the moment. But I would hope that
we Americans, as we try to make intelligence responsible, we can be
responsible ourselves in the way we do it.
(MORE)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
WISE: Mr. Colby, you said that assassination is not a good
subject to be discussing publicly, but at a hearing about two weeks
ago you displayed that poison dart gun at the Church committee hearing
in the Senate, and I wondered if that gun or that type of weapon has
been used against any foreign political figures?
MR. COLBY: The gun has not been used. The gun was brought up
there because the Senate committee rather insisted on its being there.
I didn't volunteer it certainly, but it was a part of the evidence that
was submitted to the committee, and there was really no reason to say
that it was so highly classified that it could not be exposed.
SCHORR: Mr. Colby, one of the -- as one gets around this country
one finds that one of the things that will not go away is the popular
misunderstanding about the assassination of President Kennedy. I guess
you've run into that, and time and time again people ask me and I guess
they ask you, did the CIA do it. I've said as far as I know, the CIA
had nothing whatsoever to do with the Kennedy assassination or any
conspiracy in this country against any American public figure, but --
MR. COLBY: Right.
SCHORR: -- one of the reasons people don't understand the role
or lack of role of the CIA is that there are things that the CIA did
know about tangentially connected, and which apparently didn't come
out. I'm talking about, for example, the series of conspiracies to
try to kill Castro, which was never communicated to the Warren Com-
mission, as far as I know. John McCone as director, Helms as deputy
director, testified and didn't tell the Warren Commission anything
about that. Would you care, if you feel that way, to say that covering
up things that didn't matter, like that, didn't matter that much, was
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
11
a mistake and gets the CIA blamed for a lot of things it didn't do?
MR. COLBY: Well, the CIA is somewhat accustomed to being blamed
for a lot of things. In that case, CIA did provide to the Warren
Commission everything it knew about the assassination, about Oswald
and so forth. It did not apparently display this matter, but you must
remember that Mr. Allen Dulles was a member of the Warren Commission,
and he certainly knew something about this general subject, and he
could have brought that question in very easily.
SCHORR: Can you say now that other than its involvement with
Castro who -- and that which may or may not have been involved with
what was going on in Oswald's mind, that the CIA had no connection
with Oswald, no connection, is not hiding anything in the way that
we're finding out that the FBI destroyed certain documents, that the
CIA has nothing further to reveal about the Kennedy assassination?
MR. COLBY: Certainly not, not about Mr. Oswald or about the
assassination. We have provided all the material we had that was in
any way relevant to the matter to the Warren Commission, with the
single exception of the possible stories about Mr. Castro, which I
think were considered as not relevant at the time.
WISE: Wouldn't the CIA have wanted to brief Oswald, debrief him
when he came back from the Soviet Union, ask him about his travels
in the Soviet Union? I've always wondered about that.
MR. COLBY: Well, there was some consideration of that, but
he had other connections, other contacts, in the context where any
debriefing could have been handled through that.
WISE: I don't understand.
MR. COLBY: He had some other contacts, as I think has come out
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
in the record, with the United States government, other aspects of our
government, and that any debriefing that was appropriate could have
been handled through that manner.
WISE: Are you suggesting the FBI might have interviewed him?
MR. COLBY: I think there is in the record the fact that there
was some contact early on with the FBI.
HERMAN: When you say could have been handled, are you actually
saying was handled by the FBI?
MR. COLBY: I don't know the answer to that. I'm not aware of the
details of the FBI's experience.
HERMAN: Do you consider that the CIA is now bound by law, like
laws passed by the Congress and signed by the President, to the point
where it cannot conduct overseas operations?
MR. COLBY: No, I don't think so at all. We're --
HERMAN: I mean operations, not in the sense of gathering in-
telligence but of operating against a government or for a government
or for a political party?
MR. COLBY: No, I think not. The question of whether we should
be allowed to conduct these things, these kinds of operations, was
raised last year in both the House and the Senate, and both the House
and the Senate voted that we should continue to do so. At the same
time --
HERMAN: But in a very --
MR. COLBY: But at the same time a regulation was put in that we
could only do other than intelligence gathering if the President found
it important to the national security, and it was reported to the
appropriate six committees of the Congress. We are in compliance with
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
13
that law, and we are able to do things in compliance with that law.
There is obviously a risk in exposing secrets beyond a very limited
group, but at the moment we are following the law and I have every
intention to continue to follow the law.
HERMAN: How do you inform the committee? Do you inform just one
member of the committee, the chairman?
MR. COLBY: It's up to the committee, the way we -- to set up
the arrangements. In some cases we inform a small group; in some
cases a larger group.
WISE: On that point, you've said that the CIA gets its authority
to conduct so-called covert political operations from the rather broad
language of the law that set up CIA. Now, if Congress gave CIA that
power, do you believe that Congress could take it away? Could Congress
prohibit covert operations altogether, and if they did, would you obey
that law?
MR. COLBY: Oh, certainly they could. That was the question of
the bills put in Congress last year, and both the House and the Senate
turned them down. If they had barred it, of course we would obey the
law.
WISE: But, you see, that leads into the question of suppose the
President ordered a covert operation to be conducted despite this act
of Congress. Would you --
MR. COLBY: Well, this came up in my confirmation hearing. They
asked me what I'd do if I were directed to do something that was wrong.
I said this very easy, I'd leave the job.
SCHORR: Mr. Colby, the White House indicates that plans for the
reorganization of the intelligence community are being considered,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
14
probably will not reach definite shape until the current wave of in-
vestigations is over. Are you a part of the planning of this re-
organization, and do you expect to play any part in administering the
new shape of things?
MR. COLBY: Well, I certainly am participating in the different
discussions, as to how this ought to be arranged, different kinds of
thoughts as to how it ought to be structured in the future. I have
submitted my comments on both the Murphy Commission report and on the
Rockefeller Commission report, and I have discussed these to some ex-
tent with the various other people in the intelligence community, and
with the policy levels of our government. Certainly I expect to play
a part in any changes which are developed.
SCHORR: No, what I really mean is -- this was the original
question which you bypassed much earlier in this broadcast -- do you is your role about coming to an end? Have you been expended in
saving the agency,ancl having been expended; do you expect to be
leaving at some proper point in the next year or so, or do you still
think you'll be in office a year from now?
MR. COLBY: I really don't decide that question myself. That's
a question for the President. I serve at his pleasure --
SCHORR: You work on forecasts --
MR. COLBY: I serve at the President's pleasure. It would depend,
I think, on the restructuring that is finally decided, the develop-
ments from now on, as to how things happen. At any time that either
the President or I thought that the intelligence business would be
better off with someone else, why I would clearly withdraw, or I would
be asked to.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
15
SCHORR: My question is really one where your talents as an in-
telligence analyst come into play. You know how much trouble you've
made for yourself by what you've had to do. You know how many
people disapprove of your candor, and every time you've gone to
Congress and told about some new little thing that went wrong, the
people involved might have been angry at you. Do you think that you
can preside over a united agency with what you've had to do?
MR. COLBY: Well, it's been, I think, very united in these past
weeks and months. I think it testifies to the toughness of spirit of
the people in the intelligence business. They have had a terrible
buffeting, and I think that they have stood together and stood very
well. There have been some unease and some concerns and all the rest
of it, but they have held their morale and discipline very well.
Whether I'm an essential element of that, I really don't think that
I'm an essential element to it. It might be that some day a new face
would be a mark of a new start and the investigation period is over
and we can get back to the important work of our country.
SCHORR: When do you suggest that?
MR. COLBY: As I said, if either the President or I felt that the
intelligence operations of our government would be better served by
having a new face, why I would leave.
HERMAN: You said a moment ago that if you were asked to do
something wrong, you would resign. That speaks well of you, but how
about the organization -- supposed to be equal justice under laws --
equal application of the laws -- is the law and the government so set
up that if somebody else were in your place, he could not disobey the
will of Congress?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
16
MR. COLBY: Well, I think the clear evidence today is that the
people in CIA and in the intelligence business are as conscious of
the American attitudes, feeling about wrongful acts, as any other
Americans -
HERMAN: Are they in agreement with it?
MR. COLBY: They are in agreement, they do want to conduct an
intelligence business in our society which does follow our laws, and
I think that if any effort were made to do anything wrongful to get
them to do things that are wrongful, there would be objection and
they would not do it.
WISE: Mr. Colby, the CIA, according to- what we've been hearing
and reading, has broken the law in some cases and done some, as you
yourself have said, some terrible things. It's opened mail, it's
engaged in domestic surveillance, there have been break-ins and iwire-
taps, failure to destroy poison, and what not. Now, do you agree with
the recent testimony of James Angleton, who was your chief of counter-
intelligence, that we must sacrifice some of our liberties in order
to preserve our freedom?
MR. COLBY: No, I don't think so. I think America has had
secrets, it has lots of secrets in the ballot box, in the grand jury
proceedings, even the Congress has secret sessions. If secrecy is
necessary to the operation of part of our democratic government, I
think we Americans can respect the secrets. I think we have to really
decide between sensation and safety, between publicity and protection,
and I think we have to draw a line there so that we Americans, as we
look into our intelligence business, are really responsible as we try
to make it responsible.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2
HERMAN: Is that where we are now?
MR. COLBY: I think it is. We are at the question of whether we
can conduct a responsible investigation, make the improvements in our
system so that we can conduct a responsible intelligence business
under the Constitution and laws of our country.
HERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Colby, for being with us on
Face the Nation.
MR. COLBY: Thank you.
ANNOUNCER: Today on FACE THE NATION, the Director of Central
Intelligence, William E. Colby, was interviewed by CBS News Corres-
pondent Daniel Schorr, David Wise, author, and CBS News Correspondent
George Herman. Next week another prominent figure in the news will
FACE THE NATION.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100110017-2