DIRECTOR COLBY ON THE RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100049-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: September 30, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ii ILIRIU 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/21 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100049-8
4
20 SEP 1974
Director Colby on the Record
:' ,?.
In a rare on-the-record interview vert activities reflects the kind of world i CIA be separated from intelligence
with TIME Correspondent Strobe Tal- we live in. If it's a world where two su- i gathering?
bott, Director William Colby defended perpowers are peering over the fence at '
the CIA against its critics, ranged over each other, then it's a matter of con- That proposal stems from the Bay
the current functions of the agency, and cern when a hostile political group is I of Pigs. The problem there was that we
discussed future prospects. Highlights:
--- about to take over a country. But if it's didn't let the analysts in on the act. Now
a world in which we've worked out a re- senior levels of the analyst community
Why does the CIA intervene in oth- lationship of reasonable restraint, Or are aware of covert activities and have
er nations' internal affairs? detente, with the other superpowers, a chance to comment. In the early years.
then it won't matter to us who runs One of the agency, we tried conducting in-
I'm not saying we're engaged in a of these countries in a far-flung area telligence and action operations through
campaign to bring democracy to the of course, something very close to us two separate units, but they kept get-
world. That's not what the U.S. Gov-
might still be imPortant for political or 'ting in each other's way.
eminent expects from this agency. security reasons. There may still be cer-
We're expected to carry out U.S. pol- I
tam situations where U.S. interests; What alternatives to covert opera-.
icy. Over the years, we've helped dem- ?and I don't mean corporate interests, tions are possible for the CIA? 1
ocratic forces rather broadly. In those1
but fundamental political interests?can
cases where we have got involved with be adversely affected. In some of those, - We could not?and did not?con-
military regrnes, we did so because there
was a greater danger from some place ca it would 1.3e. appropriate to take 'duct the SALT negotiations and reach al
some modest action such as establishing SALT agreement until after our intelli-1
else. I don't think we've toppled dem-
a relationship with somebody who needs gence techniques had improved to the i
ocratic regimes, and I don't thin.<
' we the help. But I stress: it's not now our 'degree that we could tell whether the So- !
did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring Government's policy to engage in these yiets were going to abide by the agree-
about the soup, and second,the Allen- ?c.tiitiniic around the world ments. On a number of occasions, wel
The degree ?four involvement in co- 'Should the operational side of the
de regime was not democratic, Granted ? -
the military regime is not democratic, How is a covert operation. Tiarted?
I don't ? think a Communist regime is
democratic. We follow the traffic with the em-
Our program in Chit
n
'e was to sus- bassy. We follow the political attitudes
tai the democratic forces against the
that we have toward that country. We
Allende political forces, which were sup-
in generate a specific suggestion in the light
- pressing various democratic elements
. , a -variety of ways?harassing radio sta- of what we think would be national
policy. We don't do anything without
tions harassing some parts of the press
and some political groups. We looked approval.
Sometimes we get the specific sug-
forward to the democratic forces corn-
ir.g to power in the elections o11976. gestion from the outside?from an am-
bassador, from the State Department or
from the National Security Council staff.
They'll say: "Why don't you guys do so
and so?" We have the technicians here sponsibility of the CIA to give our lead-
who decide what is possible and what is ems the knowledge necessary to move
not. it's the same sort of thing you get into a dire situation and defuse it.
To what extent had Communist
forces intervened in Chile?
Castro spent about a month down
there in the late spring of 1973. There
were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile
from other countries .in Latin America_
There was a lot of assistance going into
Chile from Cuba and other Cornmunist
sources. There are indications that there
have identified a situation that was get-
ting very sour in some country or be-:
twee.n two countries. By reporting the ;
facts and our assessment, we generated
diplomatic action so that the trouble we
predicted did not happen. For instance,
peace arrangements might, have broken
dowa, but because of our intelligence,.
negotiations saved the situation.
In the future this sort of intelligence
will help our country in negotiations and
diplomatic relationships. As a result, we
will be less likely to get into screaming
crises, and there will be less need for co-
vert action. It will be the increasing re-
with military activity. How you land
troops on a hostile shore is not devel-
oped in the White House. The Joint
Chiefs develop a proposal. Thea if the
NVhite House approves it, you go ahead.
'But I want to emphasize that we're
was some Soviet activity. They were put-.
talking about a-very small number of co-
tins some money in. as well as hard- ".
vert actions. Policy is generated at the
ware of various sorts. This was a pro-
NSC, not here.
gram to support an eventual takeover
in what I would call a nondemocratic
fashion?suppressing the opposition and
extending Communist -influence ,e!se-
where in the hemisphere.
Laos. It was considered important
Will the CIA continue?to mount co- to the U.S. that a country remain friend-
vert operations? ? ,
? ly and not be taken over by hostile fore-
! es. Rather than use our military force
or an enormous political effort, you try
to influence some key people and key po-
litical groups. The Laos operation cost
substantial amounts but was cheap com-
pared with other ways of doing buiirtess.
We were not involved in the 1967 coup
in Greece or in the coup in Chile last
Yea r?
oved For Release 2012/11/21 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100049-8
_
What would you regard as a suc-
cessful covert action?
?
The CIA has three major functions:
science and technological work, analy-
sis, and the clandestine collection of in-
telligence. Now there's been a fourth re-
sponsil:?ility, and That is positively
inEuencing, a situation ?through political
or pa:arnilii2ry means. That's the one
that sces up and down depending on r.a-
tional ;,'- --- A ""
Declassified and Appr
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