WHAT DID YOU DO TO MY ITALY, MR. SPY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 7, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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1 6 _ `
all
vs. olb
Y
. Oriana 'Fallaci, t
he Italian journ ali
t
s
" at, spent
one long Friday morning and a long Sunday
? t afternoon" last month interviewing former CIA
Pa-.. Director William Colby at his home here. She de-
+~ scribes the encounter as an "exhausting and
i t nasty fight between. the spy and victim." But
i : . while her voice "trembled with rage," Colby was
unperturbed - cool, controlled, polite - as he
Moftftb. answered her accusations. She thought she saw
anger occasionally in his blue.eyes, but "his lips
did not stop smiling, his hands would not stop
-
I pouring coif ,
e-
nmycup.
:.jA
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Fallacl: The names, Mr. Colby..
The names of those bastards who
took CIA money in my country. Italy
isn't some banana republic of the
United Fruit Company, Mr. Colby,
and it isn't right that the shadow of
suspicion covers a whole political
class. Don't you think that Mr. Perti-
ni, the president of the Italian ParHa-
inent, should have those names?
? Colby: No, because our House has
said by vote that those reports must
remain secret. CIA should protect its
associates and people who work for
than. Of course the decision to give
or not to give those names does not
'depend on CIA; it depends on the
government of the United States'and
I am not speaking for my govern
meat; I'm speaking for CIA. But my
? Judgment is no; my recommendation
would be no. No names. It's the only
thing I can do to maintain my agree-
ment with the people I worked with
Those who feel covered by the
shadow that you talk about only have
to stand up and deny [involvement].
They only have to say. "It isn't true,
we didn't get the money." It's fine
would corrupt. I am saying that it is
against our law for you to come and
do that.
Fallaci: It is also against mine,
Mr. Colby! And I'll tell you more:
A here is only one human type that is
more disgusting than the corrupted
one. It is the corruptor.
Colby: We don't corrupt at CIA.
You may have a problem with corrup-
tion in your society but it was In
existence long before CIA got there.
Saying that we corrupt is like saying
that we give money to do.things for
us. That isn't why we give money. We
give money to help somebody to do
what he wants and cannot do because
he hasn't enough money. We are
basically supporting the democratic
countries and, of all the countries
that should understand this, Italy
should. Because the American assist-
ance in Italy helped it from becoming
an authoritarian communism for 30
years. .
Fallaci: And the result of that
with me. I cannot sacrifice somebody s+sa?.w.~.~+
for this theory that somebody is
under suspicion. I have promised
those men to keep the secret and I
. Excerpted, by permission, from
The New Republic. Copyright o by
The New Republic Inc.
held, Mr. Colby, is that the Commu-
nists are now at the borders of gov-
i ernment. Let's be honest: do you
think all that money was well spent?
Do you think that your intelligence
has been acting intelligently?
Colby: Usually we don't spend
money for fooliness. And you cannot
judge things from one factor alone,
like the last elections in Italy. Maybe
American activities in Italy haven't
.been perfect, since World War II, but
they have been useful. When I was in
Rome, in 1953, people were riding
Vespas. Now they are in cars. You
live better today than you would have
lived if you had had a Communist
government in 1948. Or in 1960. The
average Italian has a better life than
the average Pole. So the American
policies have not been a mistake in
Italy. We did a good job. In Italy you
always see things catastrophically.
In 1955 Italians said that Italy was
going to collapse, that the govern-
ment was no good. hopeless. Now I
must maintain it because, if I break
my promise, when .I go to someone
new he'll say that my promise is no
good. Why don't you ask the Soviet
government for the names of the
Communists who take Moscow's
money in Italy? The Soviets are
doing exactly the same.
Fallaci: Well talk later about the
Russians. Mr. Colby. Now let's talk
about CIA. Tell me, please, if I came
here, as a foreigner, and financed an
American party, and 21 of your pofiti-
'cians. and some of your journalists,
what would you do?
?,~.;Colby: You would be doing an ille-
gal thing and, if I found out, I would
report it to the FBI and have you ar-
rested.
-*-Failaci: Good. So I should report
you and your agents and your ambas-
sadors to the Italian police and have
you all arrested.
Colby: I won't say that.
Fallaei: Why 'not? If it is illegal'
that I come here to corrupt your poli-
ticians. ft is as illegal that you come
there and corrupt my politicians.
Colby: I am not saying that you
hear the same words I heard in 1955.
But you did not collapse then and you
will not collapse now because there
are good Italians.
Fallaci: To what extent did your
work take place within the American
embassy? Does it still?
Colby: Very much. Sure. I used to
work a lot with the embassy. I was
political attache. We always work
with the embassies. Most, information
we get through our embassies, of
course.
Fallaci: But it isn't only through
embassies that CIA works. abroad.
We all know that SID (Italian Secret
Service] is the pied-a-terre of CIA in
Italy. Now tell me, Mr. Colby, what
right do you have to spy on me at
home and use the secret service of
my country? What right do you have,
for instance, to control my telephone
there?
Colby: I get news from around the
world. There is nothing wrong with
trying to understand what is happen-
ing in the world, what people are
doing or thinking. It isn't a matter of
invading others' privacy. It's a mat-
ter of looking to see if you have a pis-
tol to shoot me or another weapon to
hurt me, and prevent it. You ask if a
nation has the right to conduct
clandestine intelligence activities in
other nations? Well, there is a law in
every country that says no. and al-
most every country does it. So do I-
have the right to try to find out what
happens in order to protect my coun-
try? Yes, I morally have it Though it
is illegal.
Fallaci: . Mr. Colby, I am
trying to make you admit that Italy is.
an independent state, not a banana
republic, not a colony of yours. And
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TheV&shhigecn Star
Fallaci: If all your information. is
like that, Mr. Colby, I understand
why CIA makes itself ridiculous so
often. But here is what I want to
know from you who claim to fight in
the name of democracy: Having won
the elections democratically, did Al-
lende have the right to govern his
country? Yes or no?. . Don't be si-
lent, Mr. Colby. Do answer, Mr.
Colby.
Colby: Didn't Mussolini win elec.
tions? Didn't Hitler become the chan-
cellor of Germany in an election?
Fafeci: This is what I call bad
faith. You know very well that those
were not. free elections, Mr. Colby.
And you cannot, just cannot, com-
pare Allende with Mussolini and with
Hitler. This is pure fanaticism, Mr.
Colby!
Colby: I am not fanatic. I believe
h a Western liberal democracy.
Fallaci: Mr. Colby, you portray
the CIA as an association of Boy
Scouts mainly occupied reading
books and speeches in some library.
Let's be serious. To begin with, you
are spies.
Colby: One moment. Yes, in the old
mage, intelligence used to be spying.
data Hari and so on. Today intelli-
tence is an intellectual process of
assembling information from the
press, radio, books, speeches. Which
s why we're called Central Intelli-
rence Agency. All this information is
:entralized and studied by people
vho are specialists in various fields.
.nd then there 'are electronics, com-
Puters, technology. In the last 15
rears technology has so changed
atelligence that we don't need to spy
o get secrets to give to generals to
in battles. Intelligence is far be-
,and that. It is a technological phe-
vmenon. We used to wonder how
many missiles the Soviets might
gave. Today we don't wonder; we
ount them...
Fallaci:Mr. Colby, CIA may be
at partly. But it also is something
rorse, something dirtier. I mean a
olitical force that secretly organizes
oups and plots and assassinations. A
econd government that punishes
'hoever is against the interests of
Se United States in the world.
ovine is much nobler than that.
Colby: What you are talking about
is S per cent of our budget. Only S per
cent goes for any kind of political or
paramilitary activity. And this is an
activity that is necessary in the
wcrld we live in because.a little help
in some countries to some friends can
.-avoid a serious crisis later. In the
'S0s this was 30 per cent of our bud-
get. In the '80s, if the world goes on
facing totalitarian developments, we
might go back to that 30 per cent
again or more. But now it is S per
cent, and all this excitement is about
that 5 per cent. Which is legitimate
because isn't it easier than to defend
ourselves with bombs and-soldiers?
Isn't it easier to help some political
group?
Fallaci: Yes, but the point isn't fi-
nancing here and there, or corrupt-
Fallaci: Caesar was not killed by
an American. He was killed by some
Romans. The Medici, in the Renais-
sance. were killed by the Florentines,
not by Americans. And Pericles
erected monuments to the Greek who
killed the tyrant, not to the Ameri.
cans who killed a Cuban in Cuba.
Colby: I tell you that this has
always happened and I say that it is
difficult for any country to give
moral lessons to another.
Fallaci: By God, Mr. Colby! It is
you who claim to be more moral than
others. It is you who introduce your.
selves as the Angel Gabriel sacrific-
ing for democracy and freedom..
Colby: Maybe our morals are not
perfect but they are better. than
others. American policy is regarded
all through the world as a
ill
p
ar of
freedom. There are a few things,
lug here and there to protect your
interests that are not always noble
interests. The point is the assassina-
tion of foreign leaders, Mr. Colby!
Colby: In 1973, long before this ex-
citement started, I issued a directive
against assassinations. I have turned
down suggestions of assassinations
on several occasions ... saying that
assassination is wrong. But there are
people who will say to you that if Hi-
tler had been assassinated in 1938,
the world would be better.
Fallaci: Lumumba was not Hitler,
Mr. Colby. Castro is not Hitler.
Colby: Well, Castro allowed the
Soviet Union to place nuclear mis-
siles in Cuba, which put American
cities under nuclear threat.
Fallaci: And because of this you
kill Castro.
Colby: In Italy, at the time of the
Renaissance, there were many peo-
ple inside and outside the church who
discussed the rights and wrongs of
tyrannicide. And. discussion had
started long before the Renaissance;
it isn't new. Yes, this assassination
business did not occur in America
yesterday, it's been a political tool
for centuries. How did the princes die
in the various states of Italy? How
did Caesar die? Don't, as an Italian,
stand on moral lessons on this. I don't
accept moral lessons from you.
over 28 years, that we shouldn't have
done. Like opening the mail. Yes,
there was a period in the 'SOs when
we opened the mail to and from the
Soviet Union. And we shouldn't have
done it, though one caix understand
why. There were Soviet spies running
all over America. However, we
shouldn't have done it and .. .
Fallaci: Come on, Mr. Colby, r am
not talking about opening letters! I
talk about murdering people!
Colby: CIA has never assassinated
anybody. Including Diem. Saying
that CIA does assassinations all the
time is unfair. There were a few
occasions in which we wanted to try,
and none of them worked.
Fallaci: Even if you spoke the
truth, Mr. Colby, which I doubt, isn't
it shameful enough for CIA to plan
such projects like Al Capone?
Colby: People do it all over the
world. Lots of different countries,
whether it's wise or not. Personally I
was always against it. People came
to me with such proposals and I said:
"You will not do it." But I recall that
Jefferson said: "The tree of freedom
has to be watered every 20 years by
the blood of tyrants."
Fallaci: In other words, once in a
while is all right. Are you religious,
Mr. Colby?
Colby: Sure I am. I'm a Catholic
and a rigid one.
Fallaci: One of those who go to
church every Sunday?
Colby: Yes, sure.
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Fallaci: One of those who believe
in Hell and in Paradise?
Colby: Yes, sure. I believe in
everything the Church teaches.
Fallad: One of those who love peo-
ple as Jesus Christ wanted?
Colby: Yes, sure. I love people.
0 * 0 *
Fallad: Let's talk a while of the
Pike report, Mr. Colby. Because, U in
the Church report CIA sounds so bad,
in the- Pike report It looks rather
ridiculous. Is it true, as Pike remark-
ed, that, if America were to be at-
tacked by another country, CIA`
would not know of it in advance?
Colby: The House Committee re-
port is totally partial, totally biased.
and done to give a false impression of
CIA. The Church report. that is the
assassination report and the Chile re-
port, well ... I think they were
reasonably fair. Yes, fair reports.
Also the Rockefeller commission's
report is a fair report. Pike's report
is iota fair report. And that Pike re-
mark ... it's nonsense. He did not
publish things we did right. He chose
what we had done wrong. For in-
stance, in the spring of 1973 we told
our government that, unless there is
movement on a political level, there
probably will be war in the Middle
East. AnUwe helped onr government
follow everything that was happen-
ing. On October Sth in the evening we
made an assessment: "There are
certain signs that indicate that there
shouldn't be a war. In balance we
think that there will not be a war."
Well, this was a mistake. Why did we
make that mistake after having given
good advice? Well, we don't have a
crystal ball, we don't know 100 per
cent what is going to happen. .
Fallad: Let's face it, Mr. Colby.
Saying that war is not going to hap-
pen when it's about to happen doesn't
reflect very well on what you portray
as the "best intelligence in the
world." Nor was it the only case.
Take Portugal, for instance. You
hadn't the vaguest idea that the army
would overthrow Caetano.
Colby: We did know something, &a.
spite Pike's report. We knew that
there was unrest and dissent in the
army. We reported it. But, as with
the Arab-Israeli war, one may know
the general background, and then
make a mistake on little things. The
fact is that Mr. Pike takes the little
things. The fact is that Mr. Pike
takes the little thing and applies it to
the whole. It isn't true, as he says,
that we had a total ignorance of the
Portuguese situation . People see
CIA under every sofa. People see
CIA all the time, even in a contest for
the best sheepdog. We really haven't
the time to be in every village. It is
reasonable to think that, later, in
Portugal, we had to work harder on
what was happening.
Fallaci: ... There Is another
Inutg [fiat pu:.z1es u,e WI/eU )'UIY a.,y
that CIA is the best intelligence in the
world. Is it really? Hasn't KGB been
more successful than you ? .
Colby: Oh, no. Besides. it's so dif-
ferent, you can't compare. Most of
the work of KGB, for instance, takes
place inside the Soviet Union: they
are the FBI, the CIA. the state police,
the Carabinieri, everything. And
most of its effort is there. Well, when
they used to spy here they had some
good operations, some very impres-
sive ones. I mean the atom spies.
When they recruited a young lady
from the counterespionage section of
our Department of Justice, for in-
stance. She told them everything we
knew about their spies, and this was
a good operation indeed. And when
they put a bug inside the shoe of one
of our diplomats. That was very im-
pressive too. Very. You know, those
people are serving their government
and I disagree with their philosophy,
but about their professional side I
must say that they can do a good job.
Fallad: Mr. Colby, who wanted
you out of CIA? Was it Kissinger?
Colby: No. Kissinger has always
been a great supporter of intelligence
and, though sometimes I agree with
Kissinger and sometimes I disagree,
we are not enemies ... I alp out of
CIA because the President indicated
that be wanted to offer me another
job and ... The President may have
many reasons why he wants some-
body else as head of CIA. It is his
privilege. He is the President, not
me. Make a change? Fine ... Then
the President offered me many jobs,
good jobs, but I said that I could help
more if I write a book about what
intelligence really is. As I am doing.
One on CIA and one on Vietnam.
tar
Fallad: And you do not feel bitter.
Colby: Not at all. I do not feel like
a scapegoat.
Fallaci: Sure. What could shake
your icy imperturbability? You never
show youremotions, do you?
Colby: I am not emotional. I admit
it. Just a few things bother me. For
instance, what happened when I was
nominated and some people put post-
ers around Washington -- posters
illustrated with a very poor picture of
me, by the way. They called me a
murderer. And my children had to
live with that. But it didn't really
bother me. Not much. Oh, don't
watch me like that. You're looking
for something underneath which isn't
there. It's all here on the surface. be-
lieve me. There is nothing behind or
underneath.. There are not two or
three layers. I told you:. I'm reli-
gious, I'm conservative ..
Fallaci: Do your children ever call
you "reactionary" or worse?
Colby: No. We have different
views. They were against the war in
Vietnam. We discuss things at the
dinner table. And I admit that.
.
Fallaci:... you like Nixon?
Colby: I voted for him. He appoint-
ed me. And I think that, in interna-
tional politics, he did a splendid job.
Splendid. Just think of China, of the
SALT agreement.
Fallaci: Just think of Chile, of Cy-
prus. Mr. Colby, I'm exhausted. Only
when I interviewed (Portuguese
Communist party chief Alvaro) Cun-
hal did I suffer as much as I did
today with you.
Colby: Tell me, tell me:.what kind
of fellow is he?
Fallaci: I told you. In the end, a
type like you.
Colby: What?
Fallad.; Yes, a priest like you. 0h..
Mr. Colby! You'll never know how,
much you two resemble each other.
Had you been born on the other side
of the barricade, you would have
been a perfect Stalinist.
Colby: I'reject such a statement.
But . well ... it might be. No, no.
It might not. And I am not a priest.
At the most. I'm a puritan.
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you don't admit it. I am also trying to
explain to you that you cannot be the
'Policemen of the world.
Colby: After World War I we said
that the war had been wrong and
badly fought, and we had a period of
innocence. We reduced our army to
something smaller than the Ruma-
nian army, ISO,000, and we decided to
have an open diplomacy, and the
secretary of state dissolved'the intel
ligence service, saying that gentle
men don't read others' mail. And we
thought that we were going to live in
a world of gentlemen, and that we
wouldn't involve ourselves any more
in foreign affairs. Then we had prob-
lems rising in Europe. But we did not
intervene. And we had problems in
Manchuria, it was too far away. But
we did not intervene Then Spain.
And we were neutral.
But it did not work very well, no,
and we had economic problems, au-
thoritarian leaders who believed they
could dominate their neighbors. And
then came World War II, and after
World War II we did as we had done.
In 1945 we dissolved our intelligence
service, the 055, and we said: Peace
See SPY, E-4
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again. But the cold war started and it
was obvious that Stalin was ...
becoming a threat in Greece, in Tur-
key, in Iran. And we learned the les-
son. And we applied the lesson. We
collected our security again, and we
attempted to contain the expansionist
Soviet Union through NATO and
through the Marshall plan and
through CIA. Liberals and conserv-
atives together, both of us convinced
that. we had to -help. I. was one of
those liberals. I had been a radical
when I was a boy and ...
Fallaei: For Christ's sake! How
could you change that much?
Colby: Clemenceau said that he
who is not a radical when he is young
has no heart; he who is not conserv-
ative when he's old has no brain. But
let me go on. NATO worked. The con-.
tainment of Soviet expansionism
worked. The subversive plans of the
Communists were frustrated. It was-
n't the right against the left. It was a
democratic solution. We decided that
we would go any distance to fight for
freedom. And in the course of this
J -L
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there were some situations in which
local leaders were somewhat authori-
tarian or more authoritarian than
people liked.
Fallaci: From Gen. Franco to
Caetano, from Diem to Thieu, from
?Papadopoulos to Pinochet, without
counting all the facist dictators in
Latin America, the Brazilian tortur-
ers for instance. And so, in the name
of freedom, you became the support-
ers of all those who killed freedom on
the other side.
Colby: Like in World War II when
we supported Stalin's Russia against
a greater threat. We work now in the
same way we worked with him then.
In the 'S0s wasn't communism the
biggest threat? If you support some
authoritarian leader against a
Communist threat, you leave the op-
tion that the authoritarian state could
become democratic in the future.
With the Communists, the future
offers no hope. I mean, I don't see
any scandal in certain alliances. One
makes an alliance in order to face a
bigger threat. My government recog-
nizes Pinochet's Chile as the legiti-
mate government. True. But don't I
accept that 200 million Russians live
under Soviet communism? Pinochet
is not going to conquer the world. No-
body is worried about Pinochet.
- Fallaci: I'll tell you who's worried
about Pinochet, Mr. Colby. The Chi-
leans, first, who are imprisoned and
persecuted and tortured and killed by
Pinochet. Secondly, those who really
care about freedom. Thirdly, the
Countries that are afraid to become a
second Chile. Like mine.
' Colby: You're so wrong in choos-
frig Chile. If you read carefully the
Senate report on Chile ... you'll find
that from 1964 we helped the demo-
Fallaci: . . Had you an-
swered with a fie . ?
Colby: I don't lie! And I suf-
fer when they accuse me of
lying... Sometimes I refuse to
give information, sometimes I
keep a secret; but never lie. My
Congress won't let me. my
press either. The head of intelli.
gence in America cannot say
that it is not true when it's true.
Our intelligence is under the
law, not outside the law ...
cratic center parties against a man
who said that he was associated with
Castro and the Communists. CIA had
no part in overthrowing Allende in
1973. Read my denial in the Senate
report when I say: "with the excep-
tion (of) about six weeks in 1970."
Fallaci: Sure. November 1970
when Nixon called Richard Helms
and ordered him to organize a coup
to overthrow Allende, who had just
won the elections.
Colby: It only lasted six weeks
And we did not succeed ... We had
no part, later.
Fallaci: Really? Tell me about the
financing of the strikes that ruined
Allende's government, Mr. Colby.
Tell me about the interventions
through ITT.
Colby: Well, we gave a little bit of
money, yes. A tiny amount that. I
remember, was about $10,000. We
gave it through other people. I mean
we gave it to a group that passed it to
another ... The rest of our program
in Chile was to support the central
democratic forces from the threat of
the left. The Senate committee has
found no evidence against us, except
in 1970. It wasn't our policy to over-.
throw Allende in 1973. We were look-
ing to the elections of 1976 where we
hoped the democratic forces would
win. Certainly we did not help Al-
lende but we are innocent of that'
coup The coup came from the fact
that Allende was destroying the soci-
ety and the economy in Chile, from
the fact that he was not acting demo.
craticalld y as the Supreme Court of
Chile an the Congress of Chile and
the controller general said when issu-
ing statements that Allende was out-
side the constitution. Even the free
press had been suppressed by Al-
lende .. .
Fallaci: What, Mr. Colby, are you
out of your mind? But you cannot
falsify history like that. The opposi-
tion press tormented Allende till the
end.
Colby: The opposition papers had
lots of difficulties under him. And
Allende was democratic
saying that it is your opinion. There
are his own words when he said that
he wanted to suppress opposition. He
was an extremist. And an oppressor.
I have good information.
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