PLAYBOY INTERVIEW: WILLIAM COLBY - A SOMEWHAT CANDID CONVERSATION WITH THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT lddftk~lw
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
,C,O
10
'CIO
4161.0;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
- ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 69
PLAYBOY
July 1978
PLAYBOY INTERVIEW:
a somewhat candid conversation with the former director of the cia
William Colby is cast in the -grand
mold: Princetonian, soldier, lawyer, spy.
-He served as a commando paratrooper in
France and Norway during World War
Two and with the Office of Strategic
Services, the precursor of the Central
Intelligence Agency. For those extremely,
dangerous missions-dropping behind
enemy lines and blowing up railroad'
tracks-Colby won the Bronze Star, the
Croix de guerre, the Silver Star and
Saint Olaf's Medal. Thinking he was go-
ing to pursue a legal career, he returned
to school after the war and practiced
law for three years. Then along came the
fledgling CIA and Colby was recruited.
His first overseas assignment, in 1951, was
as political attache to the Stockholm Em-
bassy, a cover for intelligence work in
Scandinavia. In 1953, he was transferred
to Rome, where Clare Booth Luce was
Ambassador to Italy. One mission there
was to intervene in Italian politics in an
attempt to keep the Communists from
taking over. This much-criticized opera-
tion involved pouring vast sums of
money (officially, several million dollars)
into the Italian political arena.
Colby arrived for his first Vietnam
tour in 1959 to take a position as deputy
chief of station at Saigon. In 1960, he
was moved up to chief of station and in
1962 became head of CIA's Far East
Division. After five years in that job, he
was recruited as deputy head of CORDS,
the over-all structure under which the
infamous Phoenix program was carried
out. Since CORDS was run by-the State
Department, Colby took a "leave without
pay" from CIA. When he returned to
Washington in 1971, due to the serious
(and ultimately fatal) illness of his
daughter, he rejoined CIA and, in 1972,
was given the job -of executive director-
comptroller-a seemingly dull job that,
in fact, gave Colby a rare overview of
the agency and its inner workings.
Under James Schlesinger's short re-
gime as CIA director, Colby was made
deputy director of operations. When
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
had to resign as a result of Watergate,
Schlesinger became-Secretary of Defense.
President Nixon then gave Colby the
nod to head the world's most widely
publicized intelligence service. It was not
destined to be easy at the top.
At the time of the Senate hearings to
confirm his appointment, Colby was re-
lentlessly grilled about The Family
Jewels-a secret 693-page report ordered
by Schlesinger, directed by Colby and
compiled by CIA's own Inspector Gen-
eral's Office. It dealt with what Colby
calls "some mistakes'=specifically CIA
abuses ranging from assassination plans
to dosing people with mind-control
drugs, to domestic spying. During the
hearings, posters went up around Wash.
ington showing Colby as the ace of
spades and accusing him of assassinat-
ing 20,000 people under the Phoenix
program.
. His tenure as director was continuously
plagued with bad publicity. At one press
meeting, he told a group of editors that
CIA did not use American newsmen as
spies. Later, he checked, found that the
agency had used some newsmen and
called back to report this to the press.
The story was immediately reported un-
der banner headlines, and thus began the
furor over CIA use of journalists that
continues to this day. During his final
year in that office, Colby sometimes spent
as much time testifying about CIA's
activities as he did running the agency.
And when The New York Times, re-
vealed some of the details of The Fam-
ily Jewels in a December 1971 story, the
lid blew off. Colby knew that his career
was over. It was just a matter of time-
and of taking the heat for Watergate,
Chile, domestic spying and just about
everything else that could be dragged
into the House and Senate hearings. On
November 2, 1975, President Gerald
Ford fired Colby in the traditional way:
"l- think it is quite possible [that a -' "I don't have a problem with the moral "ICs important that people like myself.
nuclear weapon will be exploded in an justification that if a man is a tyrant, speak out, yet not conceal the fact that
aggressive manner]. A single shot, two thcjs somebody under him has the right there are spies and that there need to be;
shots, are quite possible in the next to shoot him. But that doesn't mean a that in the pail 20 years CIA has made
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 CIA=RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 '$~'.,
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
He offered hire another job, which
Colby turned down.
To find out what a major intelligence
officer would be willing-or be allowed-
to say about America's most mysterious
and notorious branch of service, we sent
Articles Editor Laurenc. Goasal s, who for
years has written on intelligencs.related
matters for PLAYBOY, to talk with him.
Gonzales' report:
"I first determined to interview Colby
about two years ago, when I appeared
on a television show and learned from
the moderator that he had had Colby as
a guest. During the course of their talks,
Colby had said that CIA had never
assassinated anybody. I wanted to look
in his eyes and have him repeat that.
When we finally sat down over p tape
recorder, I learned what a master of
language he was and how well his years
of answering hostile questions had served
him. Questioning Colby was like talking
to a man who has something hidden in
his pocket. You must guess what it is.
You have no clues and your question
must be exactly right-close doesn't
count. If it is a piece of gold and you ask
if it is money, you will learn nothing.
And if you happen on the right answer,
the man is bound by an oath not to tell
you that you have guessed correctly.
"CIA's reality is different from our
reality. Widely publicized all over the
world was the fact that CIA built a
spy ship called the Glomar Explorer to
raise a sunken Russian Golf Class sub-
marine. Yet Colby, under his secrecy
agreement, is not allowed to talk about
what is common knowledge to the rest
of the world. Officially, to him, the story
does not exist. It is very 1984.
"During the interview, Colby often
would pause after hearing a question and
think for a long time-sometimes 90
seconds or more. And when he finally
answered, it would be almost as if he had
been trying to remember the exact word-
ing of an official statement on the sub-
ject, as if he did not want to use his own
mind but wanted to reiterate what the
Government had already said. Under-
standably, he wants to protect many
legitimate secrets. But some of his re-
sponses made me wonder about where he
draws the line in doing so, though he in-
sisted time and again that he does not lie.
"He has a staggering grasp of world
political events-as would be expected-
and has at his finger tips the details of
the most obscure machinations around
the globe. It struck me that this contrasts
sharply with his lapses in memory on
certain subjects.
"The interview was conducted in his
home and office over a period of some
weeks, resulting in almost 20 hours of
taped material. Even the casual reader
will notice the lack of meaningful 'in-
formation regarding certain subjects,
such as Watergate, to use one glaring
example. We put a good deal of material
on tape about Watergate and it was
resoundingly dull. Colby seemed to have
absolutely no recollection of certain as-
pects of the case and absolutely nothing
to say about others. For example, fames
McCord was the man who left the piece
of tape on the door-which led to the
discovery of the burglars in the act. But
McCord was an excellent CIA security
officer, bringing tip the question of how
he could do something that. stupid-or
whether, perhaps, McCord's act was in-
tentional. Colby, in responding to this,
merely shrugged and allowed that Mc-
Cord was probably an all-right security
officer. Period. In general,. there seem to
be whole areas that Colby has made a
personal policy decision not to think
about. He told me that he purposely
didn't read certain controversial CIA-
related books, so that he wouldn't have
to talk about there. On the face of it,
this seems to contrast with the ample
evidence of research in 'Honorable Men,
Colby's recent book published by Simon
Schuster. The careful reader will also
"CIA is the best
intelligence service in the
world. The Soviets did some
brilliant work years ago,
but I don't think they're
doing that well now."
notice certain inconsistencies or even in-
accuracies in some of Colby's statements.
Although many were challenged, I have
no way of knowing what Colby's sources
are or whether future researchers can
prove him right or wrong.
"Generally, preparing for an inter-
view involves simple research in libraries.
When dealing with one of the world's
foremost spies, however, material is not
so' easy to come by, and some rather
specialized sources had to be consulted.
Although most of them did not care to
be identified, the assistance of Asa Baber,
a frequent PLAYBOY contributor and for-
mer Marine officer, was essential to the
preparation of this interview..
"Colby and I began at hisrhome just
outside Washington. His home life sug-
gests another side of this man that does
not match the usual image of the hard,
cold, gray-man spy. It is a relaxed-if
well thought out-atmosphere. Inside,
the lighting is subdued. Beautiful Orien-
tal artifacts are everywhere, some so deli-
rate one is afraid they might break if
looked at too intensely. Colby's wife
with coffee. Occasionally, she would re-
turn with more hot coffee, smiling
brightly. To begin, I asked'a gtseslion'
about something that had always in-1
trigued me."
PLAYBOY: What was it like to be the head
of CIA and really know what's going on?
COLBY: Wonderful! The biggest change
in my life, frankly, was the day I walked
out of CIA Headquarters at Langley
and no longer read "The :Morning
News." I work very hard now to try to
keep up with what's happening in the
rest of the world and I know I'm not in
the same ball park in terms of what I
knew then.
PLAYBOY: What is "The Morning News"?
COLBY. An attempt to encapsulate the
major events of the previous day. It'sI
really very good. I made it into a news.
paper, because I found that a very use.
ful way to present information, with
headlines and all the rest.
PLAYBOY: You're now retired, but people;,
may wonder: Has he. really retired?
Once CIA. always CIA, as they say.'
tOLBY: I have two connections at CIA.
my pension and my secrecy agreement.
PLAYBOY: Do you still consult with CIA?
COLBY:. I canceled my clearance the day
I left office. I have not seen one classi-i
fled bit of information since I. left. Oh.
both former director George Bush and
current director Admiral Stansfield
Turner have asked me to speak at.their
training courses. I've seen them for little;
chats; they've picked my brain. And.
every now and again 1 call up over there
and pass along somebody who's inter.
ested in having his name dropped in for
possible employment.
PLAYBOY: What is CIA, as you would
define it?
COLBY. CIA is part of the United States
Government whose responsibility is to
know what's going on abroad, collecting
information openly, using technology,
electronics, photography, as well as era
ditional clandestine methods, to obtain
information that is kept secret from us,
by other countries, when that informs-1
Lion is of importance to the safety and
welfare of our people. That's the main
function of CIA. In addition, intelli-
gence-knowing things--can avoid wars..
If you have intelligence, you know' the;
threats. But I go even further. If you J
know the reasons for the other sides
hostilities, you can then begin to resolve
those things with negotiation instead
of struggle.
,
PLAYBOY: How good is CIA? -
COLBY: It's the best intelligence service
in the world. I
PLAYBOY: What are the other top-ranking
intelligence services, in your opinion?
appears to be his opposite: lively, grin- COLBY: Well, I don't really like to discuss.
ning, -fun-loving and eager to make con- foreign intelligence services very ratwIt.,
' versation. As we sat down, she brought because I don't think that-I don't
out an array of cakes and served them want to talk about them. But. obviously,;
QO TLNUED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
I learned some of,my lessons from the
British. The Israeli is obviously a good
intelligence service. The Soviets did
some brilliant work years ago when they
took advantage of their reputation as
the leading anti-Fascists against Hitler,.
Mussolini and so forth and recruited a
number of high officials in democratic
countries such as Kim Philby, such as
some of the Americans in the atomic
period and so forth. But I don't think
they're doing that well now, because
they don't represent anything positive
anymore. The Soviets during most of
the Fifties conducted a major campaign
to the effect that they represented the
peace-loving forces. And they had peace
conferences and they had a great propa-
ganda mechanism. And yet, when we
had an antiwar movement, it didn't
become a Communist movement. The.
Communists didn't run that movement,
didn't profit by it, because the people
who were in the antiwar movement
here, the Americans, had no sympathy
for the Soviets. They were against their
own Government, yes. But they didn't
translate that into support for the Soviet
situation and I don't think the Soviets
recruited anybody worth a darn out
of that.
PLAYBOY: If you are our protector, who
is going to protect us from you?
COLBY: The separate constitutional struc-
ture, the separation of powers. That's
what's going to protect you from me.
And the press.
PLAYBOY: Has CIA been hurt by the
press?
COLBY: Oh, it's been hurt. It's been hurt
by the sensationalism. I think the only
word you can use is hysteria. Intelli-
gence today is a far cry from the old
spy. It has changed our knowledge of
the world almost totally. Things that
15, 20 years ago we wouldn't have
dreamed of knowing we can now meas-
ure. I think it's important that people
like myself speak out, yet not conceal
the fact that there are spies and that
there need to be; that in the past 20
years CIA has made some mistakes-
sure.
PLAYBOY: By mistakes you apparently
mean such abuses as attempting to assas-
sinate Fidel Castro.
COLBY: I think assassination is as Talley
rand once said to Napoleon: "Sire, it is
not only wrong, it is worse than wrong.
It is stupid." Now, I don't have any
problem with the old moral justification
that if a man. is a total tyrant, then
somebody under him has the right to
shoot him. But that doesn't mean a
separate country has a right to do it. If
I am being oppressed by someone-my
family has been destroyed, I've been
sent to jail and all the rest-then I
,have a right to respond. That's what
the Declaration of Independence says.
It is our right, our duty to overthrow a
tyrant. That's old church doctrine and
old liberal doctrine and all the rest. But
that is different from a state's assassi-
nating somebody in another country.,
Now, I do make one exception. In
time of war, if our young men are shoot-
ing their young men, and vice versa, I
don't think we old men should be im-
mune. Therefore, I would have cheer-
fully helped assassinate Adolf Hitler in
1944. No doubt about that.
PLAYBOY: If we were being oppressed by
Jimmy Carter, should we shoot him?
COLBY: Yeah, if you really were being
oppressed. If you don't have other ve-
hicles-and you have lots of other
vehicles in this country, known as elec-
tions Aand courts and all that sort of
thing.
PLAYBOY: Do you think, then, that the
people of Chile should rise up and shoot
their oppressive leaders?
COLBY: I just couldn't say. But I think
that you are on the point. You're on the
description. As I say, the Declaration of
Independence states that philosophy
very clearly and I'll go with it.
PLAYBOY: How about Uganda? Do the
Ugandan people have an obligation to
kill Idi Amin? .
"I doubt Amin will die a
natural death. That's a pre-
diction.. I'm not saying we're
going to do anything."
COLBY: It would be a moral act if they
did.
PLAYBOY: Do we have many CIA people
in Uganda?.
COLBY: I doubt it, but I don't know. And
I really wouldn't want to say one way
or the other.
PLAYBOY: If CIA has agents in Uganda,
are they encouraging this act?
COLBY: No, that's different. Encouraging
them to kill him? No, I don't think that.
But helping them in what they want to
do? There it would be moral if the
safety and welfare of the people.of the
United States could somehow be related
to it.
PLAYBOY: What do you think will hap-
pen to Amin?
COLBY: Well, I doubt he will die a
natural death. That's a prediction. I'm
not saying that we're going to do any-
thing.
PLAYBOY: Didn't you start your military-
intelligence career as a guerrilla in
World War Two?
COLBY: In Norway, in France. Yeah.
PLAYBOY: How do you distinguish among
good or bad guerrillas, since you obvi-
ously consider yourself one of the for-
mer? Che Guevara was a guerrilla.
Ulrike Meinhof was one. Carlos is one.
COLBY: I don't think there's any differ-
ence. I don't think a guerrilla is either
good or bad. In other words, we get
back to the moral judgment about ends
and means. In Norway, we were hoping,
to have a train crash into the river. But
I put a fellow up the track with a radio,
because if we had a train full of Nor.
wegian women and children, I sure as
hell would not blow that bridge. I've
stuck my neck out, taken a lot of chances
where I'm really a little surprised that
I'm alive today. But I'm not one of the
"my country, right or wrong" types. Our
country can be wrong. I think we've
made mistakes. For instance, I respect
the antiwar people of the Sixties and
early Seventies.
PLAYBOY: If you felt your country were
wrong, would you have resisted if you;
were young and eligible for the draft?
COLBY: That's hard to say. I really have
a hard time answering that. If my coun-
try is doing something I think is morally
wrong-which is what some of the anti-
war people felt, I give them that re-
spect-then I think you have to say?
"Well, no. There s a moral limit here.
This is something I really can't associate
with." I can envisage that as a possibil-
ity. Say, if we tried to seize Panama-the
country, not just the canal: That would
be such a violation of my thoughts
about where our country ought to go
that I would have a tough time decid-
ing. I felt my country made a terrible
mistake in overthrowing Diem [in South
Vietnam in 1963]. But I stayed within,
the structure and tried to recover from
that shock. If President Kennedy had
given the order to have him shot, then I
think I would have....
PLAYBOY: What would you have done?
CotBY: I have no idea at this point.
PLAYBOY: You obviously have very strong
feelings about the Diem overthrow and
we will come back to that. But one more
question on this subject of disagreeing
with your' country: Had you been in
college during the Sixties, on which side
of the student movements do you think'
you would have been? 1
COLBY: That's an interesting question. I
don't think I would have been in the
antiwar movement. I was in Princeton
when the British had the pacifist Oxford
movement in '36 and '37. I thought that
pretty farfetched, pretty absurd. So did
the pacifists, two or three years later. I
think if I had been in college during
the late Sixties, I would have tried to
draw some kind of middle position be-
tween those who were opposed to the
war as immoral and those who were op-
posed to the opposers-the hard-hat
kind of people.
PLAYBOY: Do you think the comparison
between the Thirties movement- in
Great Britain and the Sixties movement
in America is a fair one?
COLBY: I'm just saying that I'm not a
pacifist. I don't. believe that unilateral
oil
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 r?.~ ??~
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
pacifism works. There are some things
one has to fight for.
PLAYBOY: So the war resisters of the Six.
ties were wrong? -
COLBY: Yes. I think die Government was
wrong in the way it did it, but I think
the antiwar movement was wrong in
feeling that we should not assist in
South Vietnam.
PLAYBOY: You fought in World War
Two. Do you-consider yourself a brave
man?
COLEY: I get frightened when things get.
dangerous. If you're not frightened, you
don't really appreciate what the prob-
lem is. I get the heat in the top of my
mouth once in a while when things are
a little dicy. But I don't think you
should single yourself out for laudatory
adjectives. _
PLAYBOY: Still, when you were a com-
mando paratrooper, you were dropped
behind enemy lines. at one point in the
wrong place. How did you react to such
a dangerous situation?
COLBY: I was not very happy about it.
No use sitting around analyzing it. At
that point, you have made the analysis:
You're in the wrong place. It's time
to go.
PLAYBOY: Did you kill anyone?
COLBY: Sure, during World War Two.
PLAYBOY: In what situation?
COLBY. In France, an attack with a
bunch of French Resistance people. We
heard a German plane had been
knocked down and we went out to shoot
it up and got in a fight. I think we had
one wounded and they had a couple
killed.
PLAYBOY: Did you see the person you
killed?
COLBY: No. I aimed at him, but I didn't
see him after that.
PLAYBOY: Did you have an emotional
reaction to killing the first time?
COLBY: I didn't like it. I really think we
ought to be able to solve our problems
in this world in a better way than that.
PLAYBOY: But did it disturb you emo-
tionally?
COLBY: No, I don't think so.
PLAYBOY. What we've been driving at is
that some critics have called you cold-
blooded. We just asked you how it felt
to kill and you said you had no reaction
other than an intellectual one.
COLBY: I tried to keep it on that level. I
tried to do my duty.
PLAYBOY: When you became a spy, did
you consciously try to make your ap-
pearance bland?
COLBY. Nondescript.
PLAYBOY: And did that represent a
change from what you were like before?
COLEY: No, I don't think so. I was never
a flamboyant leader. During World War
Two, I got into a little trouble with
the :LIPS in London because a friend of
mine and I decided we would make our
uniforms a little more colorful and we
bought a couple of British green berets.
We were picked up in London for being
out of uniform. I think that's probably
the first of. the American Green Berets,
PLAYBOY: What can you tell us of the
real CIA, as opposed to the image in
popular folklore? For instance, have you
seen any movies that deal with spies
accurately?
COLBY. There were a couple made after
World War Two about the British that
I thought were pretty good. I can't give
you the titles. Some written accounts of
the Cuban Missile Crisis give a pretty
good flavor of how intelligence con-
tributes to decision making. Theodore
Sorenson's book and the one by-what's
his name? With the bow tie? Arthur
Schlesinger.
PLAYBOY: Did you see Three Days of
the Condor?
COLBY: I saw it on an airplane. It's
baloney. It's just plain baloney. The
baloney part is the theory that there's
some interior plot or group in CIA
that determines its policies and elimi-
nates those who disagree.
PLAYBOY: What about the TV series
Washington: Behind Closed Doors?
COLBY. I saw about two of the episodes
and I thought they were outrageous.
First, the concept that the director of
CIA is some independent power in
Washington, spending all of his time
keeping up with and manipulating
American political decisions. Second,
the outrage of saying-and it was a
veiled ; reference to Helms-that Helms
had blackmailed the President-Nix-
on-into making him Ambassador [to
Iran] by threatening to reveal something
about the Watergate affair. - Well, of
course, the fact is that Helms is the fel-
low who said no to Watergate, said no
to the cover-up, s;id he wouldn't be in- j
volved in it-- and it's just outrageous to
have that image of the director of CIA
and of Helms put on the tube in every
home in America. It's just false, false
history. It's not even fiction.
PLAYBOY: Many people do not think
Helms was as heroic as you say. Some
think he perjured himself for Nixon's
sake and thus had a hold over Nixon.
COLBY: I don't think Helms perjured
himself. And that had nothing to do
with Watergate. That was the Chilean
thing. d
PLAYBOY: We were referring to the Sen-
ate hearings in which he apparently lied
about CIA involvement.
COLBY: Frankly, I don't think what lie
said met the legal standards of perjury.
With respect to having power, the fact
was, he was fired. The fact is, I was
fired. So there's no question about
whether or not the President has power I
over the head of CIA.
PLAYBOY: What is your view of the
Chilean matter? Helms did lie to the
Senate, did he not?
COLBY, The main issue was whether or
., CON'TIMUND
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 --+----
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
not CIA or the United States gave aid
to the opponents of Allende in the 1970
election in Chile. Helms's answer was
no. Now, a decision was made that we
would do some little, minor propaganda
activity against Allende, against the
prospect of Communist victory there.
During the hearing, the question was,
Did we give aid to the opponents?
There were two opponents of Allende.
And I Think it's a reasonable construc-
tion; when you say, "Did you give aid
to the opponents?" you're talking about
the opposing candidates. The Supreme'
Court has set a very high standard for
perjury, and the Court heard a case a
couple of years ago and basically said
that if there is a reasonable construction
and you don't tell everything, that's not
the problem. The problem is whether
you answer the exact language. It's up
to the prosecution to ask the right ques-
tions to force you to give them flatly
false answers. I think there's enough
ambiguity there that Helms wouldn't,
have been convicted by a fair jury.
PLAYBOY: Mr. Colby, he was clearly mis-
leading the committee, was he not?
COLBY. He was trying to protect the
secret. Nixon had ordered him to tell
nobody that we had been involved in
any way in that whole operation in
Chile. He was trying to protect the!,
secret his President had told him to
keep. And so he did. But I say he did !
not commit perjury. Not that he wasn't.
you know, less than totally responsive.
PLAYBOY: That certainly puts a.
fine
point on it. But let's go on. One of the,
most sensational recent charges against)
CIA was made by Edward Jay Epstein'
in his recent book, Legend. In it, he saysl
the Soviets recruited Lee Harvey Oswald
to tell them about the U-2 spy plane.
Oswald was a radar operator at Atsugi
Air Base in Japan, a base used by the
U-2. Afterward, he was sent back to the
U. S. The Soviets had nothing to do with
the assassination of President Kennedy,
according to Epstein, but when Oswald
shot him, they had to cover his connec-
tiori with Russia. To accomplish this,
Yuri Nosenko posed as a defector to
assure CIA, among other things, that
Oswald had not been recruited by the
K.G.B. In addition, another Soviet agent
was sent to corroborate Nosenko, thereby
allowing the FBI to assure the Warren',
Commission that Oswald was a lone,
crazed assassin.
COLBY: Whew! [Laughs] First, I don't
think there is any credible evidence that
Oswald was a Soviet agent while lie Was
in Japan. Oswald was a Marine essen-
tially on guard duty at an air base. A
lot of aircraft took off and landed there
all the time, including, I guess. the U-2.
I can't confirm that the U-2 used the
base, but I've heard that it did. But to
jump from that to the fact that he Was
telling the Soviets something unique is COLBY: I don't remember that-at all. I
too strong. don't really know what that refers to. j
PLAYBOY.- According to Epstein and I don't remember talking to Angleton
in Moscow to his brother, in which
Oswald said he had seen Francis' Gary Powers. Is that so? I
COLBY: It triggers in me somewhere that
that has been denied. I'm not sure, but I
can't flatly deny it now. But it tickles
my brain that somehow we denied it.
PLAYBOY: But wasn't Nosenko trying to
cover for a Soviet double agent-known
as a mole-who was working his way i
PLAYBOY: Why did you fire Angleton and.
reorganize his counterintelligence ? .de-
partment?
COLBY: Well, Angleton's and my differ-
ences were professional differences: He
believed in a high degree of compart-
mentation, all counterintelligence cen-
tralized in a -single staff-a very large
single staff. I believe it much more
important to get all of the agency con-
scious of its responsibilities in counter-
intelligence. I found it very difficult to
There are two teams who have a view get any results out. of the former system.
about Nosenko. One says that he was a I felt that the job of CIA is not to-fight
fake. The other says that he was legiti- , the K.G.B. but to find out the secret in-
mate. It Was the formal finding of the ! formation in another country that is
a legitimate defector. That was the final
decision. Not every individual in CIA
accepted that.
PLAYBOY: And the alleged mole in CIA? .
important. Angleton was too secretive
in his way of doing business. And I
finally came to the decision that either
he was going to run that part of the
agency or I was. And I was charged by
COLBY: I do not know of any mole in I the President and the Congress with If
CIA. None has surfaced in the past running it. I didn't fire him. I offered
30 years. I don't say it is impossible, but him a different job. He had had the job
I don't believe it has happened. for about 20 years and I thought it was
PLAYBOY: Epstein says it's impossible for
us to establish moles inside Russia.
COLBY. That is wrong. I won't tell you
what's Wrong, but the basic "it's impos-
time for some new blood.
PLAYBOY: What about the specific
charge-the" Epstein thesis again-that
Angleton and his people were challeng
Bible" is wrong. in- your Soviet sources, so you had to
PLAYBOY: New York magazine published get rid of him?
an article about the Epstein thesis. Did ! COLBY: It wasn't my sources. It was the'
COLBY: Yes. [Pause] The best line in that ton felt that some of the sources we had
article, incidentally, is were doubles-and some undoubtedly
[Here, Colby points out a paragraph were, and I don't object to that. Bur I
in the magazine in which an ex-staff; think his people were hypercritical.
member who had worked with former Most of our approach is in a defensive,
rather than an offensive mode. And this
head of CIA counterintelligence. James
Angleton-whom Colby fired-was hypersuspicion and hypersecrecy result-
i ed in a disincentive to developing the
asked who the alleged CIA mole might kind of positive sources we needed. I
be. The answer: "You might find out was not a believer that a Soviet double I
who Colby was seeing in Rome in the agent could badly lead the United States
early Fifties."] astray.'That was the theory of the coun-
PLAYBOY: PLAYBOY: How do you interpret that? terintelligence people: that the Soviets
COLBY: Well, I didn't understand what could give us some totally false informa-
it meant when I first read it, frankly. ! tion and cause us to have a perfect
But somebody said to me, "That means disaster.
th
t
i
h
h
a
you m
g
t
ave been the mole. And ! PLAYBOY: The answer to the specific!
that you might have been in touch with charge is still not clear, so let's put it
the Russians back then." But, of course,
I just deny. I mean, that's nonsense.
PLAYBOY: Is that a Helms-type denial, in
which you don't tell everything?
COLBY: [Laughs] I officially, flatly, super-
deny it, and I notice it's rather carefully
written in the article. But I'm not going
to sue anybody. Don't worry about it. I
can just deny it.
PLAYBOY: Whatever the Rome incident
was, 'Epstein says that you did have con-
tact with a Frenchman in Vietnam who
was a Soviet agent. Further, that when
Angleton later brought that to your
attention, you blew your stack.
into CIA?
COLBY: Well, that's the interpretation.
this way: In Epstein's words, "The for
mer CIA officers who were involved in;
the hunt [for the mole] tell me that the,
"new" CIA has now made a policy deci
sion to believe moles do not exist. All'
speculation on this subject has been
officially designated 'sick think."' Now,
clearly, Epstein is drawing on the Angle-;
ton camp, but do you consider that an
accurate interpretation?
COLBY: It didn't happen under my watch.
Quite the contrary: I say it's possible
that there may be_moles, but I do not,
believe there have been.
PLAYBOY: Could you, then summarize
rb Tl'NUED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
your view of the Nosenko story for us?
CIA's Soviet Russian Division prepared
an internal report that said Nosenko
was a fake.
COLBY: There was a report written, I
gather. I never read it. But the responsi-
ble people who reviewed it came to the
conclusion that the report did not es-
tablish what it set out to establish, that
Nosenko was a fake. The senior levels
of the agency, which reviewed the mat-
ter at that time, came to the opposite
conclusion. I've checked this recently
with one of the senior officers involved
and he said absolutely, we went through
every little bit of the thing and we came
to the conclusion that Nosenko was
what he said he was.
PLAYBOY. So Epstein was wrong.
COLBY: Yeah; oh, yeah.
PLAYBOY: Let's talk about your credibil-
ity. There are many critics of CIA
who wouldn't believe you if you gave
them the time of day, isn't that true?
COLBY: Oh, yes, sure. Somebody asked
me one time, "How can I believe you
when you say these things?" My answer
is, don't. Your job is to review the alter-
nate statements, come to your own con-
clusions. Don't just accept what I say.
PLAYBOY: Does being regarded with so
much suspicion bother you personally?
COLBY. No. That's part of the job of
representing an organization. I think
it's quite appropriate.
PLAYBOY: When you say review the al-
ternate statements, we assume that in-
cludes the various committee reports on
investigations. into CIA. But many jour-
nalists contradict your statements in
those reports. How do you respond to
that?
COLEY: I don't think the journalists con-
tradict me. There are some extremists
who certainly do contradict me, yes.
But if you'll read carefully even what
the journalists say, you'll find basically
they're agreeing with what I say.
PLAYBOY: Are you saying that journalists
who don't agree with you are extremists?
COLBY: No, I'm not saying that at all.
PLAYBOY: Still, the official reports aren't
exactly accepted as the final words on
CIA abuse.
COLEY: The Rockefeller report is subject
to the accusation that it was a little
more discreet than it might have been.
But the Senate (Church) report I really
don't think is. I think that comes out
pretty straight. The Pike report I
thought was outrageous. It just picked
up our own old, internal post-mortems
and published them as its findings.
That's pretty easy stuff.
PLAYBOY: Many reporters have written
about the practice of CIA's using jour-
nalists. Should our spies be able to use
journalistic cover?
COLEY: Not now, no. Sure, I would like
it, but I recognize as a political fact that
that is not going to happen.
PLAYBOY: Could other governments use
our journalists, then?
COLBY: Other countries are using jour-
nalists to any degree they can. We know
that. That's obvious. And, therefore, I
do not think that we should bar our-
selves from being able to get at the press
of other countries.
PLAYBOY: That doesn't answer the ques-
tion.
COLBY. There are journalists here who
have been used by foreign governments;
I believe, either consciously or uncon-
~sciously.
PLAYBOY: Which ones?
'COLBY. I'm not going to name them. But
I know a number of countries that have
used their nationals as journalists re-
porting as intelligence agents.
PLAYBOY: Yes, but are they recruiting
Americans?
COLBY: I'm trying to see whether I can
remember any cases of American jour-
nalists and I can't, offhand.
"Somebody asked me one
time, `How can I believe
you when you say these
things?' My answer is,
don't. Come to your
own conclusions."
PLAYBOY: Are there times when you in-
tentionally forget things it would be
inconvenient to remember?
COLBY: Oh, I think a psychiatrist will say
that you unconsciously forget things
you don't want to remember. But I don't
use that'gimmick of saying I don't re-
member.- Now, sometimes your question
may put a very fuzzy tingle in the back
of my mind and I may not be sure. At
that point, I won't say no, but I won't
say yes, either. I will probably say I
don't really remember, even though
there may be a little sort of funny
tingle-there may be something there,
but I don't know what it is.
PLAYBOY: We were discussing Americans
who might have been recruited by ene-
my governments. What about former
CIA officer Philip Agee, author of In-
side the Company, who published a list
of the names and locations of active
CIA personnel? [Agee was the subject of
the August 1975 Playboy Interview.]
COLBY: I think Philip Agee can be con-
sidered our first defector from CIA. In
his book, he thanks the Communist
Party of Cuba for its assistance in his
research. He decided to resign from
CIA. He wrote us a very warm, grateful.
letter of resignation. Agee then went off
on his own and eventually produced
that book. I don't have a problem with
its being critical of CIA. That part
would have been cleared. The part that
would not have been cleared was the
list of names of everybody he could re-
member who had. worked with CIA,
thereby exposing them to all sorts of
potential problems. I find that totally
reprehensible. And I would cite his visits
to Cuba, the assistance he s had from the
Cubans, the fact that he is sufficiently
in touch with hostile intelligence groups
to be persona non grata to the British.
I gather now the French and tie Dutch
have put him out of their countries. Ap-
parently, he has continued connections
with some hostile intelligence services
that are unsatisfactory to those coun-
tries. Those countries didn't do it be-
cause we asked them to, that I assure
you.
PLAYBOY: Agee wrote a book against the
agency's interests. Are there propagan-
dists who write books or make movies
and documentary films at the behest of
the agency?
COLBY: I don't know whether it's all that
broad. When you have a cultural con-I
test between the Soviets and the Amer-
icans, if the Soviets are putting out their
word, then I think we ought to be able;
to put out ours.
PLAYBOY: That's a pretty evasive answer.
COLBY: If the other side can use ideas i
that are camouflaged as being local rath-
er than Soviet supported or stimulated,
then we ought to be able to use ideas
camouflaged as local ideas.
PLAYBOY: So, have we-or has CIA?
COLBY: I think CIA did help produce
books abroad, yes. In a few cases, it
helped produce a book in America for
distribution abroad-had it published
here. In some cases, it provided material
to people who then wrote their _own
books. '. . .
PLAYBOY: This is all very vague. Let's get
down to specifics. Praeger and Fodor-
two well-known publishing houses-
have been mentioned as having been
used by CIA.
COLBY: I'm not sure I could say. This is
one of those things where I really don't
like to name names. Because I really
don't think CIA ought to go around
making secret arrangements with people
and later give out the names.
PLAYBOY: You once mentioned in a com-
mittee hearing that CIA used Reuters,
the British equivalent of A.P. or U.P.I.
Later, you retracted that. Tell us about
Reuters.
COLBY. Oh, there's nothing. Unfortur-
nately, that was a pure throw-off phrase,
"like Reuters." It wasn't a reference to
QNTt tJED _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
anything in particular. It was just some-
thing everybody would identify as a for-
eign news service. I should have said Tass.
PLAYBOY: Are you saying CIA has never
worked with?Reuters?
COLBY: Now, you get into these kinds of
questions and 1--have to be very careful.
I'm not quite sure of the answer to that
particular question. Whether a CIA
story ever appeared in Reuters, I really
couldn't say. But Reuters was not con-
trolled, run, managed by CIA. That's
certainly true.
PLAYBOY: Somewhere-anywhere-has
CIA been involved in. the production
of a movie?
COLBY: Yes. I think so, yes.
PLAYBOY: How about specifics? Do you
remember?
COLBY: Yeah, but I don't know'enough
about it that I want to name it. I mean,
I might be off base on the specific ar-
rangement. I always resisted movie proj-
ects; they're terribly expensive. There's
no use making a movie unless you know
how you're going to distribute it. And
the usual enthusiasm will get the movie
made and then you end up looking
around to see how to distribute it-
and you can't. So you end up with lots
of cans of film in the back room. CIA.
didn't support Three Days of the Con-
dor, that's for sure.
PLAYBOY: What about John Wayne's The
Green Berets? -
COLBY: [Laughs] No. Not the James
Bond movies, either.
PLAYBOY: Are there any editors on any
newspapers or magazines or in any pub-
lishing houses here in the U. S. who are
on contract to CIA? ' '
COLBY: I would say the answer is no, ac
cording to Turner's directive.
PLAYBOY: When did that stop?
COLBY: I haven't the faintest idea.
PLAYBOY: In any event, you can see what
we're getting at. CIA can say it is
no longer going -to use American jour-
nalists and then go ahead and use who-
ever is excluded by the strictest sense
of the definition, thereby producing the
same result as if there were no restric-
tions at all.
COLBY: Olt, yes. It's a terrible problem.
It's a difficult problem. Obviously, if
something is in one category, you don't
do it. If it's in another, you do do it.
If it says don't use journalists, then you
don't use journalists. If it says don't use
authors, you don't use authors. But
authors aren't journalists. It's a different
business. I mean, use the words for
what they say.
PLAYBOY: And when you were
tor-
COLBY: When I was there, I testified sev-
eral times that I didn't have anybody
in America. There's no reason -for it
here. And I mean that literally. There's
no reason for CIA; even 20 years ago.
there was no particular reason.
PLAYBOY. What about other attempts to
mold American opinion?
COLBY: Well, take, for instance, the Na-
tional Students Association relationship
we had. We went to the N.S.A., saying
the Soviets were supporting a very large-
scale international student effort and we
had to match that. And if you American
students here can get active in this in-
ternational field--go to the meetings,
stand up and say what you think about
America-why, we'll help you in that
respect. That is what the CIA funds
were used for in support of N.S.A. With
one exception, I believe. I think we
helped guarantee the mortgage on their
headquarters.
PLAYBOY: Under CIA's program to help
that organization, didn't it send Gloria
Steinern to a foreign political confer-
ence at one point?
COLBY: I think she is not very happy
about this story these days, because she's
been accused-and I think wrongly--of
being linked with CIA. She was quoted
as having said she was supported by CIA
in going to one of those conferences but
that CIA-had not told her what to say
and do; that CIA was providing the
means for them to get there but wasn't
manipulating or running them.
PLAYBOY: Yet the agency certainly
wouldn't have chosen a young Abbie
Hoffman to go to those conferences.
COLBY: I guess that if some particularly
vocal pro-Soviet figure had been included
in the group, we would have asked, "Do
we really need to pay for this airline
ticket?" But I don't think he had to be
a good Eisenhower supporter, either.
PLAYBOY: So you're claiming CIA has
not been involved in any domestic prop-
aganda efforts?
COLBY: Essentially not. As I say, you have
the fallout problem that has come from
CIA efforts abroad. That when you do
some covert propaganda work abroad,
there's a chance that an American will
pick it up and bring it home, or send
it home. That's a fallout problem. It.
think Turner's rule says that if there's
any substantial fallout here, you're not
director of Central Intelligence." Thatf
doesn't sound like much of a restriction.
COLBY: Well, there s a very simple answer
to that. I told the Congress all it has to
do is tell the director that it wants to,
know of any exceptions. And CIA can't
get -away with not telling them what it
has to tell them.
PLAYBOY: Why not?
COLBY: That is very clear. If the Congress
wants to supervise, which it does now,
then it is very easy for it to supervise. It
has the job of writing the appropriation
every year.
PLAYBOY: Traditionally, Congress has re-'
garded CIA as a hot potato and has!
not supervised its activities. Can Con-!
gress really supervise it?
COLBY: I think Congressmen know it has,
to be done. And if the responsibility is
firmly on them to do it, they'll do it. No
matter what their attitude is, they're go-1
ing to have to do it. They can't afford to
be caught off base. ' .
PLAYBOY: Still, the new directive would
appear to have. a large loophole. It
doesn't, for example, cover free-lance
COLBY. It covers anyone who is accred-
ited.
PLAYBOY: So PLAYBOY could give this in-
terviewer leave without pay and he'
would be clear to work with CIA,
correct?
COLBY- If lie were a free citizen abroad
with no connection to PLAYBOY, yes, he could pose as a journalist under that
role.
PLAYBOY: Yet you categorically deny that
CIA has any media-manipulation pro-
COLBY: Absolutely yes, I'll deny that flat-
ly. Again, in America. I hope we won't
be barred from the use of Tass.
PLAYBOY: One journalist who charged
CIA with massive domestic manipulation
was Seymour Hersh of The New York
Times. But you called him a good
American and a good journalist in
your recent book. What do you mean
by that?
COLBY: He's certainly not disloyal to his
country. I think lie's loyal to his pro-
fession.
PLAYBOY: When is a reporter not a good
American?
COLBY: When lie sits by for the other side.
I think Kim Philby wasn't a good Brit-
to do it. Fundamentally, CIA'was.inter----_isher.-
ested in affecting foreign opinion. Fun- PLAYBOY: Wait a minute; that's a ridicu.
damentally, CIA was not interested in lous analogy. Philby was not a journalist.
affecting American opinion. COLBY: Yes, lie was a journalist.
PLAYBOY: Let us ask you one more ques- PLAYBOY: He used journalistic
tion about the use of journalists by CIA. there's a big difference.
The new directive prohibits it, but COLBY: He was a journalist.
there's a disclaimer that reads: "Excep- PLAYBOY: Professionally, Philby was a spy.
tions: No exceptions to the policies and cOLBY: well, he was lots of things... .
prohibitions stated above may be made PLAYBOY: You know as well as we do that
except with the specific approval of the Philby was not a journalist recruited by
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
an intelligence agency. He was an intel-
ligence agent posing as a journalist.
COLBY: You're right. You're right. I ac-
cept that. You know, that business about
answering questions narrowly-it's a ter-
rible problem and I really haven't figured
out. how to get around it. Because if you
answer the questions broadly, you're
proved wrong. And, therefore, my only
solution has been to answer them nar-
rowly. I
PLAYBOY: Some members of the press have
kept secrets at. your request. Hersh,
among others, kept the Glomar Explorer
story secret when you asked him to. And
didn't Jack Anderson keep some project
secret at your request?
COLBY. I asked him to make a change and
he did.
PLAYBOY: What was it?
COLBY: Oh, he had run across an opera-
tion he felt was over. He had written it
up. If it had been over, I wouldn't have
said a word to him, but it was still going
on. He didn'tknow it. I called him and
asked him if he could stop it. I said,, "I
think you think it's over, right?" He said,
"Yeah." I said, "If it were over, I
wouldn't be calling you." Well, then lie
was interested. I said, "Could you make
one change in it?" He did, yes.
PLAYBOY: Yet Anderson gets on television
and lakes shots at the Government-and
with particular glee at CIA.
COLBY: 'He's a newspaperman. He's sup-
posed to be critical of the Government.
It keeps the Government on its toes. It's
all right with me. He has brought up a
lot of things. So it's all right. He's doing
the job that he's supposed to do. under
the Constitution. He makes me very un-
comfortable. I disagree with him rather
violently on some things. I think lie's
wrong on some things. But that's the way
the system works. I like the system, even
though I don't like all the people we
have engaged in it-
PLAYBOY: There are still some newsmen
who may go to jail for not revealing
their sources. What do you think of that
legal question?
COLBY: I think the Supreme Court is
wrong. Doing the'job of journalism in
America requires the ability to protect
your sources. I think there ought to be
a shield law by which a reporter can
refuse to testify about his sources.
[During a pause in one of the many
conversations that make up this inter-
view, Colby,. without encouragement,
brought up the subject of the infamous
Phoenix program, part of the Govern-
ment's "pacification" program that re-
sulted in 20,000 enemy deaths, which
some charged were assassinations.]
COLBY: Have we. talked about the pacifi-
cation program or not?
PLAYBOY: Phoenix?
COLBY: Yes.
PLAYBOY: You haven't yet. Do you want
to?
COLBY- Oh, yes.
PLAYBOY: You've made your position fair-
ly clear in testimony in the past.
COLBY: Well, I want to make sure that if
you have any questions about Phoenix,
my explanation is there.
PLAYBOY: We do have questions about
Phoenix. You have answered them many
times, and yet there remains a very sim-
ple one: There were 20,000 people
killed
COLBY And 28,000 captured and 17,000
took the amnesty. And the 20,000 dead
for the most part were killed in military
combat and identified after they were
dead. And that is not 20,000 assassinated.
PLAYBOY: How do you distinguish be-
tween ,20,000 people dead and 20,000
people assassinated?
COLBY- The accusation is that they were
assassinated, wrongly killed. They were
killed."in the course of military combat,
in the course of a war. In other words,
the Phoenix program Has designed to
and did move into a very bitter and
bloody battle that was going on in Viet-
nam between the secret Communist ap-
paratus and the government. Phoenix
was designed to improve the govern-
ment's side, if not the Communists' side,
by making it both more decent and more
effective. It did that through setting up
rules to identify people properly rather
than just calling them Communist in a
McCarthyist' way; defining what their
jobs were; dividing the leaders from the
followers and'saying we weren't interest-
ed in learning who the followers were;
training people in the 'proper methods
of interrogation instead of improper
ones; issuing a directive that prohibited
any involvement with assassination-not
merely that an American not assassinate
but that if an American heard of any
such activity on the Vietnamese side, lie
was to report it to me: I believe the pur-
pose and effect of Phoenix was to reduce
that to an absolute minimum. Prior to
the time Phoenix was set up, i.e., in
roughly 1967, there was that kind of
activity. And that kind of activity was
exactly why we set up Phoenix-to stop
it. Now, to put billboards around town
emblazoned with headlines stating my
admission of 20,000 people being assassi-
nated is just misusing the word, misstat-
ing the facts.
PLAYBOY: How do you think Phoenix got
its reputation?
COLBY: It got the reputation from the
antiwar people who brought up charges
against the military from an earlier peri-
od and applied them to Phoenix. And
from my testimony before a House com-
mittee in 1971. That wasn't anything fer-
reted out or unveiled. My testimony in
1971 described what Phoenix was about.
I said that the results of Phoenix over
the three years were 28,000 captured,
17,000 amnesty and 20,000 killed. But I
could not say that no improper deaths
had ever occurred. Well, my admission
that some of the deaths occurred was
translated into 20,000 assassinated. And
it's just false.
PLAYBOY: What is assassination?
COLBY: A conscious effort to kill some-
body.
PLAYBOY: So, if an agency were to pick
someone out by name and say, "We are
going to go out and kill this one person,"
would that be assassination?
COLBY: That would be an assassination,
yes. And I think that id some situations,
you can pick someone by name and say
we're going to go out and try to capture
this person, and if we can't capture him,
we're going to end up shooting him-at
him.
PLAYBOY: Was there a CIA'?jargon word
for killing?
COLBY: For killing? There was a CIA jar-
gon. Also, the upper levels of the United
States Government used it: executive
action.
PLAYBOY: Let's continue on the subject
of Vietnam, since you were the. CIA sta-
tion chief in Saigon for a time during
the war. Why were the enemy actions in
Vietnam worse than our own?
COLBY: I think there was an indiscrimi- ,
nate quality to the Communist rocketing
of the towns. We didn't have a right to.
just go and say, "Well, I think that town
needs to. be bombed." That's different
from sitting outside Saigon, launching
one. of those 122 rockefs' and just ]etting
it slide into the middle of town, no mat-
ter where.
In terms of behavior of troops, I think
we tried to control it. Now, the conscious
use of terror on the part of the Commu- `
nists, the. assassination of the village
chiefs-did we have a comparable thing?
Not after Phoenix, no. Mortaring of they
refugee camps in order to drive people
back into the countryside: Did we do
that? No.
PLAYBOY: You say we didn't have the
right to go in and just.bomb some place
we felt like bombing; we may not have
had the right, but we did so, anyway.
COLBY. In the populated areas, it re-
quired the concurrence of the local au-
thorities. And there'is some criticism of
whether or not that would be too easilyf
granted. On the other hand, you did
]lave the right,- if you were in a ]helicop-
ter and were shot at from the ground, to
return the fire.
PLAYBOY: What about the free-fire zones?
COLBY: Free-fire zones were primarily jun-
gle areas with essentially no inhabitants'
except the enemy forces and, in those
areas, you did not need the province
chief's approval.
PLAYBOY: We moved entire populations
in order to create those free-fire zones,
didn't we?
COLBY: Whole populations moved out of
areas. I think you'd come out about
even Stephen. Half of them moved out!
because they didn't want to be under]
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 "'~" ""
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
the Communists and half of them moved
otit because they didn't want to be
under the American bombs. So, in that
sense, many areas were depopulated.
PLAYBOY: One of the most controversial
and widely reported battles of the Viet-
nam war was at a place called Khe Sanh
in 1968. Do you see an analogy between
Kite Sanh and Dien Bien Plitt 14 years
earlier?
eoLBY: I see a big difference. I think we
won in Khe Sanh and the French lost
in Dien Bien Phu. It was a pretty big
difference. We never surrendered in
Khe Sanli.
[Finding Colby's characterization of
Klee Sanh at variance with other reports,
we approached this question again at a
subsequent session. It resulted in the fol-
lowing-the most heated discussion of
the interview and the only time Colby
became openly agitated and angry.]
PLAYBOY: You said we won at Khe. Sanh.
Allow us to summarize what appears to
us to have happened there. By Novem-
ber 1967, the 26th Marines were a rein-
forced regiment. They were surrounded
and outnumbered something like eight
to one. They were barraged by the
enemy continually. The Russian and
Chinese howitzers and rockets and mor-
tars sat up on CoRoc Ridge and pasted
them day and night. Khe Sanh was only
about two square miles inside the perim-
eter and weather conditions made air
support very difficult. Route 9 was con-
trolled by the North Vietnamese Army.
Then, suddenly, the 304th N.V.A. and
the 325C N.V.A. left the area. They
evaporated.' And in one month, Khe
Sank went from being our symbol of
defense to an unoccupied piece of
ground. We rolled up the airstrip and
went away and then Tet began. Khe
Sanh was at best a stalemate for a time,
and then it was nothing. And then
we lost the entire country. Now you say
we won at Khe Sanh?
COLBY: Oh, dear!
PLAYBOY: Americans who were in Khe
Sanh when we finally pulled out could
see the North Vietnamese walking in to
take the position.
COLBY: Wait a minute! The French
forces surrendered at Dien Bien Plitt.
Formally surrendered to the enemy! The
American forces never surrendered at
Khe Sanh.
[At the next session, Colby launched
into this subject,again before the ques-
tioning could begin.)
COLBY: Khe Sanh. I think there's one
other thing I would say about it. Our
discussion reflects the problem of under-
standing that war. Dien Bien Phu was
the classic military-versus-military force,
which ended with the North Vietnamese
victory and the French surrender. Khe
Sank was a military-versus-military force,
which ended in kind of a draw. I guess
I would have to correct my statement
that we won. I say we didn't lose, but
it was kind of a draw on the ground. So
I would withdraw that we won. I think
you caught me well, and I'm sorry if I
was a little testy there. I got a little lost
in the ... excuse me, I had a chance
to think about it.
PLAYBOY: Thank you, sir. May we return
to the question of assassinations? Former
CIA officer Frank Snepp, in his book
Decent Interval, says the following about
Nguyen Van Tai, a Communist spy
Snepp was sent to interrogate in 1972,
just before the U. S. evacuated the area:
"A senior CIA official suggested to South
Vietnamese authorities that it would be
useful if he 'disappeared.' ... Tai was
loaded onto an airplane and thrown out
at 10,000 feet over the South China
Sea."
COLBY: I never heard a word about that.
I frankly have trouble as to whether it
"As for President Kennedy's
having any intention to'
kill Diem, absolutely not.
I know that he was
shocked and horrified
when it happened."
really happened. I think that the Sen-
ate and House intelligence committees
should investigate a charge that serious:
PLAYBOY: You never heard of it?
COLBY: I haven't read the book, but I
heard about the occasion with the Spe-
cial Forces in '69, was it? There the
Special Forces apparently did take. a
man out and throw him into the sea.
PLAYBOY: CIA was widely charged with
assassinations, but the Senate commit-
tees came to the conclusion that the
agency did not commit them. Yet assas-
sinations have been attempted and the
assassins were supported by CIA money;
they were given weapons by CIA. Then,
of course, the agency could say, "We
didn't kill."
eoLBY: Well, I think there's a distinc-
tion between your own idea of going out
and conducting an assassination, which
you can find in the case of Castro, and
giving people the means to carry on
their fight. Obviously, when we give
military assistance or CIA weapons to
groups, we're giving the weapons so they
can use them. That's what weapons are
for. The Diem thing was an assassina-
tion and the evidence is very clear that
CIA had nothing to do with it. In fact,
I think General Big Minh made that
decision on his own. I know some of the
too. Can you say that the United States f
Government knew that a revolt was
going to take place? Can you say that
the United States Government was en-
couraging that coup? Sure. Not CIA.
That decision to encourage the coup
was made in the White House, there is
no question about it. Should the United
States Government have estimated the
likelihood that Diem would be killed in
the course of the coup? I think the as.
sessment at the time was that the coup
wasn't aimed at assassinating him. It
merely wanted to take power from him.
PLAYBOY: But that's always the case.
COLBY: Yeah, I know it. I know it. And
I -say, therefore, the lack of facing that'
question is a subject of fair criticism.
It's different from CIA's being involved
in an assassination. It's a different thing,
Certainly, in a revolt, the fighting takes
place and people get killed. I mean,
there's no question about that. .
PLAYBOY: Henry Cabot Lodge was Am-,
bassador to South Vietnam at the time
you were chief of CIA's Far East Divi-
sion. What did you think of him?
COLBY: He's a brilliant fellow, a brilliant
political analyst. He was very wise. His
political judgments-he was not a man-
ager, not an administrator by a long
shot, and I don't think he ever pretend-
ed to be. And I disagreed with him rath-
er violently on the assessment of Diem.
I didn't think' he had sufficient time to
appreciate the nature of the problem
and Diem's role in it.
PLAYBOY: Our understanding is that Am-
bassadors are a joke to CIA.
COLBY: What kind of joke?
PLAYBOY: A bad joke: They don't run
things.
COLBY: They do, they do. Lodge ap-
proved every step.
PLAYBOY: There are two versions of that.
COLBY: Lodge himself said many times
that CIA was meticulous in following
his instructions on the last days of the
Diem thing. Lodge knew that people
like me did not agree with the policy;
but, at the same time, I told the station
they were to do exactly what the Am-
bassador told them to do. That they
PLAYBOY: Then what you seem to be
saying is that Kennedy and Lodge are
ultimately responsible for the Diem
overthrow and execution.
COLBY: Fundamentally, yes. The Presi-
dent's responsible, obviously. There was
no encouragement of the death of Diem.
If you wanted to make a reasonable i
criticism, you could say if you go into a
situation like that, you have to antici-
pate that that might happen. As for
President Kennedy's having any inten-
tion to kill Diem, absolutely not. I know
that he was shocked and horrified when
it happened. - _
PLAYBOY: Because you're characterizing
GTIXUBD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 ', 10
CIA so benevolently, doesn't it lead COLBY: Well, I think there were some the dogs wake up. You aon:t nave tue
again to the question of whether or not uses of some kind of device like that dogs hooting at you.
sags.
a CIA director could ever tell the public against dogs. PLAYBOY: All right. Whatever, ou
the exact truth? PLAYBOY: Dogs? Let's try another subject. On th~`?ttilii 'ct
COLEY: My own view is that you can't COLBY: Dogs. It was to knock them out of nuclear weapons--
-lie. You don't have to tell the whole in order to get into a foreign installa-. COLBY: They're not my favorite subject,
truth, because that would reveal a se- tion abroad and plant a bug; to make but, go ahead. CIA has none, I know
act. But you can't tell a positive lie. I the watchdogs go to sleep for an.hour that for sure, I know that.
keep silent sometimes about something or so. They were shot with that device- PLAYBOY: What sort of concern is there
that would. be a further step of informa- I don't think that particular device. but at the CIA that someone will -just throw
Lion; but what'I say'is true. something like it. The dogs went to one together?
PLAYBOY: When you go before a court of sleep. The people went in and did the COLBY: Great concern, great concern. I
law, you agree to tell the truth, the job, came out and the dogs woke up don't think it's a concern about three
whole truth and nothing butSthe truth. later. And it was all done. Now, that fellows in.a garage doing it. The real
Shouldn't the American public expect wasn't assassinating them, it wasn't kill- problem is proliferation to smaller na-
the same from its Government agencies, ing them.. tions.
with the obvious exceptions that relate [The` question was asked again at a PLAYBOY: Such as Libya? ?
to military security? subsequent session.] ? COLBY: Such as India.
COLBY: Well, I think the American PLAYBOY: If CIA wasn't going to use PLAYBOY: That's not a smaller nation;
people are conditioned well enough the dart gun and the toxins associated it has already tested a nuclear bomb.
through modern advertising, through with it, why did it make them? What about those we don't know abo_th?
modern political rhetoric, through mod- COLBY: There's a thing called bureau- COLBY: I don't believe Libya is on the
ern headlines, to be willing to.: look cratic momentum. You set upa little list. The problem is if you.give the
through a certain. overstatement and group that's responsible for developing bomb to somebody who. would' be irre-
? understatement and work the truth out weapons, it'll develop lots of weapons. sponsible and use it, you have a serious
? of it. I think they don't expect that the You set up a little group that's respon- problem on your hands.
words appearing in either the advertis- sible for collecting information about PLAYBOY: Such as whom?
ing or news or columns of our papers foreign involvement in the antiwar COLBY: Any wild, half-mad dictator. I'm
be in in stone. _ movement, it'll keep on collecting. not going to name names.
PLAYBOY. Buh were discussing our Gov- PLAYBOY: You should. name names. Why
ernment. should it be an intelligence secret? Why
COLBY: I don't think they expect either. "There's shouldn't the people know which. na-
more or less from their Government a thing called Lions are capable of unleashing nuclear
than they do from the others. And I warfare?
don't think they get either more or less. bureaucratic momentum. COLBY: I tfiink it would be a little irre.
I think they're about the same. You set up a. little group to sponsible to say. If they haven't' been
PLAYBOY: That seems to be a pretty shod. made public, then that's a conscious de-!
dy picture of our Government... develop weapons, it'll cision not to make. them public. And I
COLBY: That's life. ' think I'm required not to make them
PLAYBOY: So as far as this interview is develop lots of weapons." public.
concerned; shall we then advise the . PLAYBOY: Requirements aside, what do
ptAYBoy reader to beware of misleading you think about our right to know?
[We decided to try the question one COLBY. It's a very delicate business. If
statements?
COLBY: I would say it's going to be very more time at yet another interview ses- the Government knew of a certain
obvious to the PLAYBOY reader that I'm sion.] country that had a weapon and we were
putting a favorable picture of American PLAYBOY: Let us try to get this straight working on that country to join in some
intelligence into your pages. once and for all. Tell us again why nonproliferation agreement or even to
PLAYBOY: Then the reader is duly cau- CIA made those weapons if it says it get rid of.the weapon, I can see a circum-
tioned. Let's move' on to the subject of wasn't going to use them. stance where we should not publicize
CIA weaponry. There was the Black COLEY: Because there was a section of the fact. You can hurt the negotiation
Pistol-the famous electric dart gun that CIA that was responsible for providing process by making it public. You can
was shown to the Senate committee and technical support to clandestine opera- ram the other fellow into a corner and
pictured on the front page of every tions. And weapons, obviously, were he lashes out at you, like a cat will in
major paper in the country.-It was called potentially useful, an experiment with a corner.
a Nondiscernible Nicrobioinoculator PLAYBOY: Do you think that in the next
meaning you could shoot a tiny poisoned a weapon using a device that would put some poison in you but then melt, so 16 or 15 years a nuclear ar weapon will-be
dart at someone without its being there would be no visible indication of exploded in a g g r e s s i v e . manner?
detectable. COLBY. I think it is quite possible. Quite
an actual wound. I think this was a dart
COLEY: Yeah. Possible. A single shot, two shots, are
but one that would melt: quite possible in the next ten ears.
PLAYBOY: And we had the toxins --shell- quP Y
fish toxin and cobra venom-to put into PLAYBOY: For the purpose of killing? PLAYBOY: Where do you think it might
the dart gun. Why did we make- those COLBY: Yes. sure. It's a. weapon. happen?
gadgets if we were not going to use PLAYBOY: So it was conceived with the COLBY: Who knows?
them? idea of assassinating someone? PLAYBOY: We would assume you'd know:
COLBY: Well, wed id use the toxin on one COLBY: To kill him, yes. Now, the thing CIA has scenarios, educated estimates of
occasion for Gary Powers' flight. He had was used, as I said, against dogs with a where this might happen.
a silver dollar with a little pin in the sleep inducer, not a killer. It's the same COLBY: These are estimates. There's no
side of it, impregnated with the toxin, kind of weapon. firm knowledge there. I'm giving you
and it would have killed him if he had PLAYBOY: That seems hard to believe. the outlines of how you would decide
scratched himself with it. COLBY: Well, it was used. And it put which country would be involved. There
PLAYBOY: That doesn't say anything the dogs to sleep, so that we could go are several countries that, if they were
about the Black Pistol. in and put the bug in. Withdraw and overrun and faced complete destruction,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
PLAYBOY: Let's take a recent example. A
Russian satellite containing 100 pounds
of enriched uranium fell out of the *sky
in Canada. To begin with, the public
hadn't even a clue that nations were
putting nuclear materials into space,
much less that they could fall back to
earth.
COLBY: I really couldn't say whether the
public knew about it or not.
PLAYBOY: You mean because something
like the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists may have carried an item?
COLBY: If the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists covered it, then the question
is whether or not the journalists took
the technical information and made it
into general knowledge.
PLAYBOY: No, the point is that the pub-
lic had nothing to say about it.
awesome new weapons systems. Isn't the
public kept in the dark about that sort
of work?
COLBY: No, I don't think it is, really.
I think our knowledge of what our
weapons systems are is pretty public-
tcouki be quite prepared to possibly use
therm But without naming names, be-
cause I think the name itself might
create troubles.
PLAYBOY: What about other technologi-
cal weaponry that may be being devel-
oped in secrecy and to which CIA is
privy? Our sources at places such as
M.I.T.'s Lincoln Labs have hinted at
What are we, cattle?
COLBY: No, no, no. You're dealing with
a volatile subject. You're being careful
of it and you don't, sort of, Chicken-
Little-the-sky-is-falling over every little
thing that might happen. Because soon-
er or later, the public will turn you off
and not listen to you at all. The old
crying wolf story.
PLAYBOY: Well, first of all, in the case of
the Soviet satellite, the sky was falling.
Secondly, we're not talking about crying
wolf, we're discussing 100 pounds of en-
riched uranium, which could have come
down in Washington or Chicago or New
York. Only it happened to come down in
the wilderness near Yellowknife, Canada.
PLAYBOY: You're missing the point: Why
weren't we told when that thing went
up that it was out of stable orbit and
that it was going to come down?
COLBY: That I don't know. I mean, there
you're talking about something in the
current Administration--I just don't
know.
PLAYBOY: Knowing what you know,
though, about the way things work, what
would the logic be?
COLBY: Well, I think they've said they
were iafraid to frighten everybody.
PLAYBOY: That's the point: Aren't ' we
being kept from truths we should know?
COLBY: Congressmen have a lot to
about it.
COLBY: I'm not going to defend the Ad
ministration's handling of it. I don't!
know anything about it. I don't knowi
why they did what they did, I don ti
know what their considerations were.!
I'm just repeating what I read in the
open press. I have had no discussions]
with anybody in authority on this sub-
ject.
PLAYBOY: Do we
in space?
COLBY: I have no idea.
PLAYBOY: You were running things at
CIA. You should know. This has been
going on for years.
COLBY: No, I don't think it has. I think
that .. . the point is, I don't know of
any such thing. The director of Central
Intelligence worries about what's going
on in a foreign country, not what our
weapons systems are. That's not his
chore.
PLAYBOY: So he could be fairly ignorant
of our own capability? '
COLBY: Of some new weapons systems.
It's not necessary that he know about
that.
PLAYBOY: What about our own capabil-
ity to use such things as lasers and so-
called death rays in space?
COLBY: That is a lot of science fiction at
11
didn't know about that." This is a kind
of feckless discussion between von and
me. I mean, if you. basically start from
the position that there's a great conspira-
cy running the world, then you can
bring in all the evidence that supports
it. My experience, however, is that there
isn't a great conspiracy running the
world. We run over all those old hob-
goblin stories and we're really not get-
ting anywhere. On the question: Isn't j
there something horrendous going on
behind the scenes? the answer is basical
ly no.
PLAYBOY: All right. Let's talk for a mo-
ment about computer technology as it!
relates to privacy. A grand-jury witness]
in Iowa told one reporter of the exist-
ence of a device called the Silver Box or
REMOB, meaning remote observation,
that allows an intelligence agency to)
listten in on any phone conversation by'
means of computer codes input through'
touch-tone phones. We've also heard of
another system that can activate the
microphones on all telephones, so that
conversations in rooms where phones are
located can be overheard even when the
phone is on the hook. Would you care
to comment on that?
COLBY: Most telephones have micro-
phones in them.
PLAYBOY: We know that, Mr. Colby.
COLBY: Well, I never heard of such a
thing. Sure, technology can do an} thing.
I guess, of that nature. But you can have
PLAYBOY: So, in other words, we do not
have any such capability at the moment?
COLBY: You know, I really am not going
to talk one way or another about these
kinds of far-forward weapons systems,
intelligence systems. It would be irre-
sponsible of me to do so, because I don't
know what's there now and what I do
know may well be covered under my
secrecy agreement with the agency.;
Therefore, I really think I'd better
leave this topic. ,
PLAYBOY: Under our treaties with the;
Russians, we can still conduct biologi-;
cal-warfare research. If we were doing
that sort of work, we certainly would j
not make it public, would we?
COLBY: I beg your pardon, we do makei
most of it public. The public has a
right to know most of this. Actually, it!
has the means to know most of. it. If the
public says it doesn't know anything, it
means that the press hasn't one they
job of translating for public interest the!
facts that are available, the materials
known to the cognoscenti, the experts.
PLAYBOY: Isn't it a little illogical to
blame the press if the public is ignorant
of biological-warfare experiments?
COLBY: No, I'm not saying it in those
terms. Yin saying that there's a lot of
information available to experts. A great
deal of it. If it doesn't become an issue,
then the press normally doesn't cover it.
It looks for the issues. If there's no par-
ticular issue, then it gets circulation
among the experts, but it doesn't get
circulation as a broad public issue. In
that case the public can say, "Olt, I
CONTINUED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9
laws and rules and you can enforce scions of exactly that kind of problem.
them. You cannot tap a phone without Now, there is a certain benefit if he's an
a judge's warrant. expert on the politics of a local coun-
PLAYBOY: Are you saying that such capa- try; the company's going to benefit from
bility does not exist? it. It's inevitable to some extent. I don't
COLEY: I'm saying it could be, technical- think it allows them to make a killing,
ly, but it isn't. Because we have the but it may help theta do business gen-
rules and requirements for a warrant. erally in that area. And that's the re-
PLAYBOY: So .you're saying we can do it, ward they get for taking the risk of
but we don't do it? - having a CIA guy use their name.
COLBY: That's the way you handle all PLAYBOY: In speaking of cover arrange-
technology. A gun can shoot you. But ments, another problem comes to mind.
you don't let it be used for that. And that is that if CIA wants to con-
PLAYBOY: If a satellite can photograph duct domestic spying and wishes to deny
something as small as the inscription on it, it can work out a temporary arrange-
a golf ball, couldn't it be targeted ment with some other agency. In other
against individuals, perhaps even into, words, CIA can lend an agent to the
their homes? FBI and'"ihen say, "We don't do domes-
COLBY: I will speak hypothetically on tic spying."
this question. Hypothetically,?yes, these COLBY: Not to the FBI; I don't think I
devices could be used for a bad purpose. remember any case of that. We've as-
The way you control them is by rules.- signed them to a lot of different places.
PLAYBOY:. How good is our ability to But if they go and work for that agency;
know where enemy. submarines are at they don't work for CIA anymore.
all times? PLAYBOY: These labels begin to lose their
COLBY: Pretty good. That's all I'll say meaning. A lot of people shuttle back
about it. I'm not going to talk about and forth among various intelligence
that. agencies.
PLAYBOY: Is that classified? ' COLBY: So do a lot of people go back
COLBY: Yeah. and forth between IBM and \1'esting-
PLAYBOY: Do they know that we know? house, Chase Manhattan and Ford Mo-
COLBY: I'm not going to talk about that. tor Company and all the rest. But I don't
PLAYBOY: If they know that we know find any great conspiracy in it.
where they are at all times, and we know PLAYBOY: Let's go on to something else.
that they know, then 'why can't you talk Do you have any heroes?
about it? COLBY: Saint Francis is one.
COLBY: Because I can't talk about PLAYBOY; Why Saint Francis?
how good we are. Maybe they don't COLBY: To be very, very honest with you,
know how good we are. I'm not going he was a humble man. If you've ever
to risk the lives of a lot of our subma- been to Assisi, I think you know what
riners by blabbing something that could I mean. That place- is permeated with
put them in danger. his spirit. Saint Francis was a young,
PLAYBOY: Some critics have said that fairly flamboyant, rich, spoiled brat.
through the use of satellite information He was wounded in one of the innumer-
and the ability thereby to predict crop able struggles then and he began to
yields in Russia and other countries, think about what lie really should do.
CIA can use and has used that informa. He went home and decided he wasn't
tion in. commodities, investment and per- going to be a rich spoiled brat anymore.
Raps in manipulating the market, either He was going to live a simple life, to
by itself or through some of the large follow the law of love. And he did. He
grain companies by allowing them access formed a whole congregation at a very
to that information. Is there any truth difficult time for the Church.
to that? PLAYBOY: Do you mind talking about
COLBY: No. In terms of playing the fast religion?
game to make quick bucks, you couldn't COLBY: I'm a practicing Catholic. Cer-
do anything with the money, anyway. ? tainly, I"believe in God. I certainly be-
The Government employees who run it lieve that Jesus was God and that Jesus
aren't Doing to get anything out of it. carne to this earth to launch a new mes-
And we don't give favored treatment to sage, which I think is one of the most
individual companies. CIA has no sweet- inspiring messages in the world. It's
heart arrangements with individual corn. called love. And it's a pretty exciting
panics to give them a leg up. message.
PLAYBOY: People who are asked to pro- PLAYBOY: Would Saint Francis have
vide cover for CIA, using their cony joined CIA?
panics, have an incentive, don'r they? COLBY: No. Saint Francis was a pacifist.
If a company, for example, is involved . I'm not a pacifist, but I can still say that
in commodities, an employee in that I admire some people who take a posi-
Third World. Three quarters of &he'
world is in the Third World. The most
obvious threat is the fact that there are
60,000,000 Mexicans today and there
are going to be 120,000,000 of them by
the end of the century. A goodly portion
of those are hungry and live in a cer-
tain degree of misery. They are fairly
easy to equip with advanced technology.
They're becoming increasingly dis-
pleased at the gap between our affluence
and their poverty: -
There are 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 Mex-
icans who live in the United States today'
and of the extra 60,000,000 who will be
around by the end of the century, there
is no way we can keep a good 20,000,000
of them from living in this country. We
can reinforce the Border Patrol and
they don't have enough bullets to stop
them all. Or we can get a positive rela-
tionship with those people and help
them develop their own country. We
have the most productive agricultural
establishment in the world and this year
we are doing what is to me the obscene
step of cutting back production when
millions of people haven't enough to eat.
PLAYBOY: In thinking back over the ses-
sions we've had, have we gotten uncom-,
fortably close to anything you can't
talk about?
COLBY: I don't think so. We haven't
gotten into the area of some things I
know but we still want to keep secret.
There are some operations, systems, that
sort of thing. You haven't asked about
those and don't want to ask, either.
PLAYBOY: What do you mean?
COLBY: Things I don't want you to ask
.and I'm not going to talk about. There
are some things that obviously I know
I wouldn't get near. And I'm not going
to suggest what areas they are, either.
PLAYBOY: Why did you agree to give,,
company will have specialized know]- tion farther out than mine in certain
edge, privileged information that could ideal directions.
yield that company greater profits. PLAYBOY: What do you see as the greatest
COLBY: I think if they made a killing, threat to America today?
we'd cut off the relationship. We're con- COLBY: The over-all relationship with the
PLAYBOY this interview?
COLBY: Because I think it important that!
our people as a whole have an accurate
view of what American intelligence is
today, what it was in the past and how,
important it is to our future. I think it I
has been grossly sensationalized, and
that a wrong impression of American
intelligence is dangerous to the country.
And here's a chance to get a word to
PLAYBOY readers, which I hope will be
persuasive, that CIA is different from
what they're familiar with from TV
and the more sensational press. I felt
that the Playboy Interviews I've read-
Walter Cronkite, Admiral Zumwalt and
others-were very straight. I'm not ask-
ing fora sympathetic presentation, I'm
merely asking for an honest presenta-
tion of what I'm trying to say about
intelligence. I think Ptavisoy will give
it to me. If it doesn't, I'll object after I
see it. [Laughs] A fair picture, that's all
I ask-with the warts. I don't mind the
warts' showing. They're real.
-., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100002-9 :~,,;