WILLIAM E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100090005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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S15358
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 1, TXM
Mr. STAFFORD. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives by Mr. Berry, one of its read-
ing clerks, announced that the House in-
sisted upon its amendments to the bill
(S. 426) to regulate interstate commerce
by requiring premarket testing of new
chemical substances and to provide for
screening of the results of such testing
prior to commercial production, to re-
quire testing of certain existing chemical
substances, to authorize the regulation
of the use and distribution of chemical
substances, and-for other purposes, dis-
agreed to by the Senate; agreed to the
conference asked by the Senate on the
disagreeing - votes of the two Houses
thereon, and that Mr. STAGGERS, Mr.
Moss, Mr. STUCKEY, Mr. ECKHARDT, Mr.
BROYHILL of North Carolina, Mr. WARE,
and Mr. MCCOLLISTER were appointed
managers on the part of the House at the
conference.
The message also announced that the
House had agreed to the report of the
committee of conference on the disagree-
ing votes of the two Houses on the
amendments of the Senate to the bill
(H.R. 8825) making appropriations for
the Department of Housing and Urban
Development; for space, science, veter-
ans, and certain other independent ex-
ecutive agencies, boards, commissions,
and corporations for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1974, and for other purposes;
that the House receded from its disagree-
ment to the amendment of the Senate
numbered 3 to the bill and concurred
therein, with an amendment, in which
it requested the concurrence of the Sen-
ate, and that the House insisted on its
disagreement to the amendments of the
Senate numbered 44 and 45 to the bill.
CORRECTION OF A VOTE
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the REC-
ORD of yesterday at page S15190, shows
me as not voting on S. 1560 (vote No.
355 Leg.). I was present and voted "yea."
I ask unanimous consent that the per-
manent RECORD show that I voted "yea"
on that vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the RECORD will be corrected.
FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY
ACT OF 1970
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, 1 ask
the Chair to lay before the Senate a
message from the House of Represent-
atives on S. 2120.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BE:-
NETT) laid before the Senate the amend-
ment of the House of Representatives to
the bill (S. 2120) to amend the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and other
related Acts to authorize additional ap-
propriations, and for other purl%o es,
which was to strike out all after the
enacting clause, and insert:
That this Act may be cited as the "Federal
Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1973".
Sac. 2. Section 212 of the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 441) is amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 212. Authorization for Appropriations.
"There is authorized to be appropriated to
carry out the provisions of this title not to
exceed $19,440,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1974.".
SEC. 3. Section 303 of the Hazardous Ma-
terials Transportation Control Act of 1970
(49 U.S.C. 1762) is amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 303. Authorization for Appropriations.
"There is authorized to be appropriated to
carry out the provisions of this title not to
exceed $1,200,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1974.".
SEc. 4. The Secretary of Transportation
shall, within ninety days after the date of
enactment of this Act, submit a report to the
Congress which contains a complete evalua-
tion of all programs conducted under the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Control
Act of 1970, and on proposed revised han-
dling procedures and feasibility of alter-
native routing in order to avoid population
centers.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate concur in the
amendment of the House.
The motion was agreed to.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will now go into executive session to
consider the nomination of Mr. William
E. Colby to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion of William E. Colby, of Maryland,
to be Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that during the
debate on the nomination of Mr. William
E. Colby to be Director of Central Intel-
ligence, Messrs. T. Edward Braswell, Jr.,
R. James Woolsey, and John A. Gold-
smith, members of the staff of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, be granted
the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I -yield.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Mr. Charles
Stevenson, a member of my staff, be al-
lowed the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that during the con-
sideration of this nomination, Ellen
Frost, Murray Flander, and Roy Green-
way have the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should
just like to detain the Senate floor for
1 minute in behalf of the nomination of
Mr. William E. Colby to he the head of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
First, I commend the acting chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services, the
distinguished senior Senator from Mis-
souri, for the able, the fair, and the im-
partial way in which he conducted the
hearings in connection with the Colby
nomination. A number of statements had
been made regarding Mr. Colby. The
Senator from Missouri saw to it that the
committee probed all these areas very
carefully. The Senator from Missouri
went out of his way to run down all state-
ments including rumors, that might bear
on the qualifications of Mr. Colby. I
commend the Senator, and I say to the
Senate that this nomination has been
thoroughly examined by the committee.
I want to observe that William Colby
is an outstanding and able professional
in the Central Intelligence Agency. I be-
lieve that he stands in the best tradition
of the professionalism which some of us
feel is so essential to the security of the
United States of America. I have con-
fidence in Mr. Colby. There were a num-
ber of situations-one in particular-in
which his integrity was tested. He did
not hesitate to be forthright and
straightforward in his decision as to
what he should do based on his oath and
his obligation as a part of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I merely want to say to the Senate
that I do believe that this is a good ap-
pointment, and I hope and trust that the
Senate will give Mr. Colby the over-
whelming vote of confidence that he so
richly deserves.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank my good friend, the able Senator
from Washington, for his kind remarks.
For many years it has been well known
in this body that he is a true expert in
this field. I respect his opinion, as I am
sure the Senate does also, on matters of
this character. I am grateful for what he
said.
Mr. President, I earnestly hope that
the Senate confirms the nomination of
William E. Colby to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
The Committee on Armed Services
overwhelmingly approved his nomina-
tion. I have known him personally for
many years. He is a dedicated and coin-
petent professional in a difficult and
troublesome field.
Because he is unusually able, Mr. Colby
has been asked to take on some difficult
responsibilities in recent years.
In 1968 President Johnson asked him
to head the pacification program in the
increasingly unpopular Vietnam war.
More recently, as Executive Director of
CIA, he has been assigned certain re-
sponsibilities for correlating and orga-
nizing information in the wake of the
all-infecting Watergate break-in.
I am sure the Senate realize3 that
recent events-including Watergate and
the Indochina war-have caused the
Senate Armed Services Committee to
give unprecedented attention to this
nomination-not only because of the
nominee himself, but also because of the
importance of the assignment as head of
CIA, top intelligence adviser to the Presi-
dent, at this point in history
As far as I can determine, Mr. Presi-
dent, no nominee for this important job
has ever been questioned so intensj.vely
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
by the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee. Three days of testimony were taken
by the full committee. In addition, the
Central Intelligence Subcommittee ques-
tioned Mr. Colby at a fourth meeting.
In addition to these nomination hear-
ings, the committee held 6 days of hear-
ings in May on the CIA relationship to
Watergate. Witnesses included former
- CIA Directors Schlesinger and Helms, the
former Deputy Director, General Cush-
man, and the current Deputy Director,
General Walters, and other CIA officials,
including Mr. Colby. In all, this year the
committee has taken many hours of testi-
mony on this nomination and other CIA
matters.
In addition to testifying in extensive
hearings, Mr. Colby has provided ex-
tensive responses and exhibits in reply
to later questions from Senator KENNEDY,
who was provided the opportunity of
questioning Mr. Colby; and also Senator
PROXMIRE, as well as members of the
committee, submitted questions.
CIA, NSC, AND THE PRESIDENT
Let me say a preliminary word about
the position of CIA with respect to the
White House and other executive bodies.
The Senate should be under no illu-
sions about the position of this Agency
in the national command authority. By
law, CIA is responsible to the National
Security Council. However, the NSC is
advisory to the President who is the NSC
Chairman. As a former NSC member in
two different positions, I know well that
the National Security Council is one of
those bodies where but one vote really
counts-that of the President.
In other words, in point of fact the CIA
Is directly under the President and re-
sponsible to him.
MR. COLBY'S PUBLIC TESTIMONY
The record is available to all Senators.
Mr. Colby, in his public testimony made
some statements which are refreshing,
coming as they do from a career official
of CIA who has now been designated to
be the Director of Central Intelligence.
As example, Mr. Colby stated, in re-
sponse to a question, that he thought the
war in Laos had "undoubtedly gone well
beyond the scope of activities envisioned
by Congress in 1947, when it authorized
CIA to perform certain covert activities,
and he questioned the feasibility of such
large scale covert activities.
Later, I personally asked Mr. Colby
if he would favor a policy of more open
disclosure with respect to activities of
the intelligence community. Here is his
reply:
Mr. COLBY. I think it Is probably essential
In America today, Mr. Chairman, and I would
favor a greater degree of exposure of what
we are doing. We have already had some
matters which we do expose. Some of the
exposure that we have quite frankly gives
us problems abroad in our relationships with
other intelligence services, and even in our
relationships with individuals who secretly
agree to work with us. who are somewhat
frightened at the prospect of their names
coming into the public, and things happen-
ing to them as a result. But I rhink that
there are ways in whl;,h the intelligence com-
munity and the CIA in p:srtlcul.tr can reas-
sure the appropriate Coll :;;,ittees. and aI,o
the Senate as a whole,.m..d elso the people as
a whole, as to the acticltle,; we are en,;;t;ted
In. I think we are going to have to draw that
line. It Is going to be a difficult one in many
situations, but it is obvious that again we
have to run an American Intelligence service.
I also asked Mr. Colby about possible
amendments to the 1947 law which gov-
erns CIA, since our committee is com-
mitted to a broad review of the CIA
charter. He made it clear that he is not
opposed to certain changes. In that con-
nection, he later stated that he has been
authorized to brief the committee on the
basic directives issued to CIA by the Na-
tional Security Council-NSCID's-un-
der the 1947 act. This we plan to have
him do at the earliest opportunity.
Finally, in his discussions of possible
revision of the law, Mr. Colby said he
thought it might be appropriate to limit
CIA intelligence activities by specific ref-
erences to "foreign" intelligence. I asked
Mr. Colby to state the proper scope of
CIA activities within the United States,
and he responded as follows:
Mr. COLBY. We obviously have to run a
headquarters here; we have to recruit people
for our staffs, and so forth; we have to con-
duct investigations on those people; we have
to protect our own intelligence sources and
methods within the Agency; we have to con-
tract with a large number of American firms
for the various kinds of equipment that we
might have need for abroad. We also, I be-
lieve quite properly, can collect foreign in-
telligence in the United States, including the
requesting American citizens to share with
their Government certain Information they
may know about foreign situations. We have
a service that does this, and I am happy to
say, a very large number of American citizens
have given us some very important informa-
tion. We do not pay for that information. We
can protect their proprietary interest and
even protect their names if necessary, if they
would rather not be exposed as the source of
that information.
We also, I believe have certain support ac-
tivities that we must conduct in the United
States in order to conduct foreign intel-
ligence operations abroad. Certain structures
are necessary in this country to give our peo-
ple abroad perhaps a reason for operating
abroad in some respects so that they can ap-
pear not as CIA employees but as representa-
tives of some other entity. Lastly, I think
that there are a number of activities in the
United States where foreign intelligence can
be collected from foreigners, and as long as
this is foreign intelligence, I think it quite
proper that we do so. I can certainly go into
more detail on this in executive session any
time you would like, Mr. Chairman. . .
And may I add that he did.
But I reiterate that the focus should and
must be foreign intelligence only, and that
all the other activities are only supportive of
that major function.
Finally, I asked Mr. Colby what I be-
lieve is the most important question of
all:
Senator SYMINCTON. If you should receive
an order in the future which appears on its
face to be illegal, what would you do?
Mr. COLBY. I would object to it and, if nec-
essary, I am quite prepared to leave this re-
sponsibility if it came to that.
Senator SYMINGTON. I did not hear you.
Mr. COLBY. And I am quite prepared to
leave this job if it conies to that.
THE OUTSIDE WITNESSES
Five outside witnesses testified in pub-
lic sessions, July 20, on the Colby nomi-
nation. One of them, Paul Sakwa, a CIA
uificer in the 1960's, suggested that we
obtain certain documents from CIA
S 15359
which show that Mr. Colby "slanted in-
telligence" and "submitted misinforma-
tion" as CIA station chief in Saigon from
1959 to 1962.
With the help of the CIA we were able
to get almost all of the classified cables
and reports suggested by Mr. Sakwa. The
committee appreciates his interest, but
it is fair to say that the committee was
not impressed with the thesis which he
advanced as it applied to Mr. Colby.
Another witness, Mr. Samuel A. Adams,
was, until recently, a CIA analyst. He
criticized the Phoenix program-which
I shall discuss later-and he also com-
plained of the treatment given him by
CIA after he pressed his own appraisal
of certain estimates of Communist
strength in Cambodia. Mr. Adams did
not specifically oppose Mr. Colby's nomi-
nation.
The other three witnesses were Rep-
resentative ROBERT F. DIINAN, Democrat
of Massachusetts; K. Barton Osborn, a
sergeant assigned to Military Intelli-
gence, who left Vietnam about a month
after Mr. Colby took over the pacifica-
tion program in 1968, and David S.
Harrington, a former Marine officer who
was assigned to the pacification program,
and once, in early 1969, sat in on an I
Corps briefing for Mr. Colby.
All these witnesses focused on the pe-
riod from November 1968 to June 1971,
when Mr. Colby headed the Vietnam
pacification program as Deputy MACV
for Civil Operations and Regional De-
velopment Support-CORDS. Each of
these witnesses were especially critical
of one CORDS program: Phoenix.
PROJECT PHOENIX
The Phoenix program has been covered
in a number of congressional hearings-
including the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and Senator KENNEDY's Ref-
ugee Subcommittee. The program was
one of Mr. Colby's responsibilities as the
boss of CORDS, the head of the pacifica-
tion program.
It is important to realize that Phoenix
was a Vietnamese program. It had U.S.
support, however, in funds and man-
power. The program was aimed at the
VCI-the Vietcong Infrastructure-
members of the Vietcong apparatus who
were working against the Government
within the cities and hamlets of South
Vietnam.
Unquestionably, there were abuses in
the program. Mr. Colby has conceded
that. He testified, however, that the
great preponderence of Vietcong Infra-
structure killed-some 85 percent-died
in battles and skirmishes, were eventually
identified as VCI, and were added to the
casualty lists as VCI. Others were killed
by police units.
By way of further explanation, Mr.
Colby emphasized that despite this being
a war, killing was to be minimized in
Phoenix especially, because captured VCI
were the best source of intelligence to
help our own military units.
Mr. Colby told us he worked to pro-
vide protection for accused VCI, and
bring a measure of due process into these
paramilitary proceedings. He testified
that Phoenix eventwilly required three
accusers, required that province chiefs
be notified of VCI charges; and finally, in
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S 15360 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
1971, that charges be presented to a sus-
pect in writing.
At our request he has supplied a series
of documents, some of them classified
Vietnamese documents, to support his
claim that reforms were instituted by
Phoenix under his leadership.
Mr. President, my opposition to this
whole Indochina war since 1967 has been
well known to Members of the Senate.
But I do not think we should lose the
ability of an extraordinarily able man
who was only carrying out orders, just
because he was in a paramilitary job at
the same time we were decorating thou-
sands of Americans for carrying out their
military assignments. He accepted a
tough job under orders and did his best;
and the record shows that he tried to
eliminate any abuses he discovered when
he took over the Phoenix program.
CONCLUSION
Mr. President, this has been a sum-
mary of the extensive record the com-
mittee took on this nomination. -Much
in the record is classified, but we have
tried to accommodate Senators who
wanted more information.
I believe the record justifies Mr. Colby's
confirmation.
He is exceptionally well qualified. The
way the world is, surely we need an effec-
tive intelligence agency.
It is for these reasons that again let
me say I do hope the Senate will confirm
him without delay so the intelligence
community can get on with its important
job.
I yield to the able ranking member of
the Senate Armed Services Committee,
the distinguished senior Senator from
-South Carolina (Mr. TIHURMOND).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
in support of the nomination of Mr.
William E. Colby as Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
The case for Mr. Colby has been well
documented by the distinguished acting
chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the senior Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON).
Simply stated this man is a profes-
sional in every sense of the word. For
the most part he has spent his entire
life in- public service.
The son of an Army officer, he joined
the Army himself in 1941 initially serv-
ing in the Parachute Field Artillery.
When the Office of Strategic Services is-
sued it call for French speakers in 1943,
Mr. Colby volunteered and in 1944 para-
chuted behind enemy lines in north-cen-
tral France to work with -a resistence
unit. Shortly before the end of the war
in 1915, he led a teas: dropped in north-
ern Norway to destroy a rail line used
for transporting German reinforcements.
A graduate of Princeton prior to World
War II, Mr. Colby completed his formal
education by obtaining his law degree
from Columbia Law School.
In 1919 he entered Government s_rv-
ice as au attorney for the National Labor
Relations Board in ;;'seliin;ion. In 1951
he joined the staff of tine American lsm-
bassy in Siockholnr and from 1953 to
1953 served in the American Embassy in
Rome, Italy.
Mr. President, the purpose of tracing
this biography is to show the wide ex-
perience of Mr. Colby in foreign assign-
ments. He not only spent time overseas as
a youth when his father held overseas as-
signments but the vast majority of his
life has been in U.S. positions abroad.
After serving as first secretary of the
American Embassy in Saigon beginning
in 1959. Mr. Colby returned to the United
States to become Chief of the Far East
Division of the CIA here in Washington.
In March of 1968 he joined the Agency
for International Development and was
sent to Saigon to assume the post of as-
sistant chief of staff. In November of that
year he became deputy to the com-
mander of the Military Assistance Com-
mand in Vietnam with the rank of an
Ambassador. In this capacity he directed
the civil operation and regional develop-
ment support program. This was better
known as the pacification or Vietnami-
zation program. As director of this pro-
gram, Mr. Colby was the administrator
for all regional and popular defense
forces as well as aid programs in South
Vietnam. The success of this program
had a great deal to do with the safe
withdrawal of American military forces
last year.
In early 1972, Mr. Colby returned to
Washington to assume the duties of Ex-
ecutive Director-Comptroller of the CIA.
In March of 1973, under the directorship
of Dr. James Schlesinger, he was named
to the No. 3 spot at CIA-that of Deputy
Director for Operations.
Mr. President, few men are as well
qualified for the post as Director of the
CIA as Mr. Colby. He knows the agency
well. He has worked for it many years.
He has had experience in managing the
CIA budget.
As we move into a period of negotia-
tion the intelligence gathered by the
CIA will be more important than ever.
We need a professional at the helm.
Further, Congress will he taking a
greater interest in the activities of the
CIA in future years. This is as it should
be. With a, man of Mr. Colby's qualifica-
tions and background in the Director's
office, I believe more congressional over-
sight can be accomplished in an effec-
tive and beneficial way.
Mr. President, in closing, I would like
to stress the point made by our able
chairman that Mr. Colby has had some
tough jobs over the years, because he
was the very man who could handle
them. He has worked under four Presi-
dents. He clearly recognizes the fact that
the CIA never involves itself in policy,
but merely presents the best information
available for policy decisions by the
President. He is a man who I believe will
render our Nation a distinct service in
this unique position and I urge the Sen-
ate to act favorably on his nomination.
I wish to thank the distinguished act-
ing chairman.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
senior Senator from South C rolina,
ranking minority member of Armed
Services, for his constructive contribu-
tion.
I yield now to the distingui h:^d senior
Senator from Wir,consin i Par. P:~osatrrE) .
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distin-
August 1, 1973
guished acting chairman of the commit-
tee.
A BLIND CONFIRMATION VOTE
Mr. President, today the Senate will
cast a blind vote on the confirmation of
William E. Colby to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
It will be a blind vote in many ways.
We do not really know who Mr. Colby
is. We are not allowed to go back into
his personal employment history and
judge his fitness. We do not know what
jobs he has accomplished. We do not
know whether or not he has succeeded or
failed.
And we will be confirming him for a
blind position. In my opinion the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence is one of
the 8 or 10 most powerful positions in
our Government.
So we will vote for or against a man
in an immensely powerful office and we
know very little about him or the job.
Why is this?
Obviously, there are serious questions
of national security involved. Intelligence
operations can be compromised and lives
put in danger. There is the ever-present
possibility of embarrassing the Nation if
caught in the middle of some particularly
sensitive operation. Sources of informa-
tion may dry up.
All these point to the necessity of se-
crecy.
But I would remind the Senate that
failure to find out what is going on could
be just as serious from a security stand-
point. Do we turn a blind eye to the
covert funding of clandestine armies and
attempts to overthrow foreign govern-
ments?
No, we have lived in blindness too long
in this body.
If we do not assert our constitutional
responsibilities, the executive department
will do it for us. That has been the
pattern.
RECENT CHANCES
Today there are promising signs that
we are snapping out of the slumber of
acquiescence that has typified congres-
sional oversight of the intelligence com-
munity.
The Armed Services Committee has
held open hearings for the first time.
Questions have been submitted for the
RECORD and other Senators have been
allowed to pursue individual lines of
questioning in committee hearings.
The distinguished acting chairman of
the committee, Mr. SYBIINGTON, deserves
our commendation for the skill and open-
ness of these meetings. He has begun
the process of reviewing the intelligence
community and he deserves the support
of every Member.
Last week I submitted a series of ques-
tions to the acting; chairman for i>resen-
tation to Mr. Colby durin^ his final con-
flr?mation Bearing. The Director-cicSi, -
nate promptly reified. Most of his an-
swrrs are uncla.ssthcd and I wish to share
those unclassified answers today.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that. my questions and Mr. Colby's
answers be placed in the RrcoRD.
I would like to go over several of theso
questions.
Firs is the issue of the CIA budget.
Since Mr. Colby and his predecessor, Mr.
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Schlesinger, both testified that the re-
lease of the aggregate intelligence budget
would not violate national security, I
asked Mr. Colby just how far down the
line this prudently could go.
He used this question as a platform to
back off from his earlier position. Now
he says that although the "disclosure
of the total figure of the intelligence
community budget would not present a
security problem at this time, it is likely
to stimulate requests for additional de-
tails." He goes on to note that he can-
not positively recommend the publica-
tion of the total or any subdivision
thereof.
Mr. President, I do not think that a
new Director of Central Intelligence
should be confirmed without public
knowledge of the size of his budget.
In view of testimony by Mr. Colby and
his predecessor James R. Schlesinger
that release of the intelligence budget
would not violate national security, there
is no doubt that the Senate and the
American people should be told the truth
about the size of the CIA budget.
Mr. Colby has said that it is up to
Congress to release these facts. Now is
the time to do just that.
Mr. President, I would like to ask the
distinguished manager of the nomina-
tion, the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINGTON), if he could consider re-
leasing those figures in view of the fact
that the testimony froin both Mr. Schles-
inger and Mr. Colby is that it would not
violate national security. Why should not
the Senate and the American people
know as much as we can disclose about
this matter as long as national security
is not endangered and why should we
not have that information?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first
may I say to the able Senator his state-
ment this afternoon is in the interest of
the security and the prosperity of our
country. I commend him for it. It is the
same type and character of interest lie
has displayed in other matters that are
for the welfare of the United States.
When the question of the budget of
the Central Intelligency Agency came up,
inasmuch as I was a member of both
Armed Services and Foreign Relations
I found the latter committee was reach-
ing dicisions not in accordance with the
facts presented by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I then urged that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Subcommittee
include members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, which at that time
included only the top ranking members
of the Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee. For some
reason, the late, great Senator Russell de-
cided later to exclude the members of
the Foreign Relations Committee, this
after they were members by invitation
for several years.
Then it is fair to say that most CIA
interest and the bud,,,et still later carne
before the Appropriations Committee
only, the five or seven senior members
of the Appropriations Committee.
I believe that it was 2 years ago that
our late beloved colleague. Senator
Ellender, was asked on the floor of the
Senate about, this budget, and replied to
the effect that he did not know much
about it, and did not want to know. He
was chairman of the one committee ex-
ercising any review of the status and
functioning of the CIA.
This year the Senate Armed Services
Committee took Mr. Colby and other
members of the Central Intelligence
Agency through the budget in detail.
Questions were asked and explanations
given.
As acting chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, I would welcome the
opportunity of going over that budget
with the distinguished senior Senator
from Wisconsin, who is a member of the
Committee on Appropriations. From
there on, I would rather not commit my-
self further at this time as to just what
can and should be done.
I may say, of interest to other Senators
as well as to the Senator from Wiscon-
sin, that the Central Intelligence Agency
receives a relatively small percentage of
the overall intelligence dollar. That was
a great surprise to me when I first found
it out.
I may say also that several staff mem-
bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions sent around the world by Subcom-
mittee on U.S. Commitments Abroad of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, re-
ported when they returned that proba-
bly the most wasteful, duplicating aspect
of what they saw on their trip was in the
intelligence field. We are trying to re-
lease more intelligence figures. I am
sure the able Senator could obtain them
as a member of the Committee on Ap-
propriations.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I may say to the Sen-
ator from Missouri that I am interested
in obtaining those intelligence figures, as
he knows, but the important step is to
declassify them. We have the word of
Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby that this
would not affect national security if we
knew how much it is. Mr. Colby said it
is up to Congress to release those figures.
Under the circumstances, I see no reason
why we should not be able to get this in-
formation. The Senator said it is a small
part of the total intelligence dollar. Is it a
billion dollars? A half billion? How much
is it? I think the attitude we have to-
ward CIA, to some extent, has to be in-
fluenced by what resources we put into
it. This can best be determined by know-
ing what the dollar spending is on the
CIA.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, on
July 2, in an open hearing, I made this
dbservation and asked Mr. Colby:
Several Members of Congress have called
for the overall budget of the intelligence
community to be made public, so the Amer-
ican people can see at least the general
amount which is spent for intelligence func-
tions. In past years. and despite the increas-
ing desire of the American people to know
what is going on in their Government, the
furnishing of intelligence information has
been further restricted.
Do you see any reason why overall budget
information, or even a breakdown of the in-
telligence budget into its major categories,
would endanger national security if it were
made public?
Mr. Colby replied:
I would propose to leave that question, Mr.
Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to
decide. I think there are considerations pro
S 15361 .
and con on all sides of that question. But I
have found that the Congress is at least as
responsible on this as our friends elsewhere
in Government, and we have, as you know,
shared with the Congress some very sensitive
material which has been successfully pro-
tected by the Congress.
On the other hand, there are situations In
which an American intelligence service will
have to be much more exposed than the in-
telligence services of other countries. We are
not going to run the kind of intelligence
service that other countries run. We are go-
ing to run one in the American society and
the American constitutional structure, and I
can see that there may be a requirement to
expose to the American people a great deal
more than might be convenient from the
narrow intelligence point of view.
That appeared a constructive answer.
Members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and I would hope the Appro-
priations Committee will do their best to
release more information about this
budget. I do not think his answer means,
however, an unqualified endorsement
that everyone in America ought to know
the details of the intelligence business.
That would be against the Nation's in-
terest.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think that is cor-
rect; but I do not understand why we
cannot be told the total amount, so that
we will have some basis for judging it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me say to the
able Senator, we would also give the total
amount for the DIA, for the NSA, and
the amounts for the various other intel-
ligence services, including the Office of
Naval Intelligence and the other services;
and I would be glad to discuss this with
the able Senator, or anyone else. I read
that into the RECORD, because I did not
think Mr. Colby's answer to the question
was quite as broad as I was led to believe
by what the able Senator said.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Can the Senator give
any reason for not disclosing the overall
amount?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes, but I would
rather not discuss this on the floor,
rather some other place at the conven-
ience of the Senator from Wisconsin.
There ought to be more public informa-
tion. How it is given out, from the stand-
point of national security, I would pre-
fer to discuss further with the able Sen-
ator from Wisconsin at his convenience.
Then I would be glad to abide by his
decision, because knowing him, I would
either persuade him I was right, or he
would me that he was right.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Just one further
point on this. My resistance to handling
this on a classified and confidential basis
is that there is then no way in which it
can be used in debate. There is no way in
which it can be used in a report to other
Senators. There is no way in which it
can be made something on which we can
secure outside expert opinion and judg-
ments either as to the adequacy of the
responses or how much should be put in.
Frankly, some of the most thoughtful
and useful comments on spending policy
comes from outside Congress. It comes
from a variety of people;.it conies from
the interested experts in the universities,
the business community, and elsewhere;
and if we cannot discuss this publicly,
so we can secure that Opinion it seems to
me we are very sharply handicapped.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 1, 1973
I think the Senator will agree that the
success of the operations of the CIA, at
least in the covert field, have been
mixed-in fact, mixed on the side of be-
ing a whole series of pretty disastrous
failures, and I think one of the reasons
is because so much of it has been done in
secret.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I fully agree with
the Senator.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I have just alluded to the
fact that CIA operations have often
failed. Let me run through very quickly
some of the CIA operations that have
been made public, and how they have
operated:
1953: Overthrow of Premier Mos-
sadegh and retention of Shah on throne
in Iran. I think we can agree that one
was successful.
Early 1950's: Attempted airdrop of
men into Albania to overthrow Albanian
Government. Ended in disaster-all
caught.
1954: President Arbenz of Guatemala
and his Communist cabinet overthrown
by CIA team. That was a success.
1958: CIA support for invasion forces
against President Sukarno of Indonesia.
U.S. pilot, Allan Pope, captured later
released by intervention of Robert Ken-
nedy.' That was interpreted by most
at that time as a failure.
1960: Reported bribe of Singapore
Premier of $1 million. Another failure.
1960: U.S. U-2 pilot Francis Gary
Powers shot down over U.S.S.R. Collapse
of summit meeting. That was certainly a
failure.
1961: Bay of Pigs. We all know what a
failure that was.
1958-62: Support for Khamba tribes-
men of Tibet against Chinese invasion.
Training camp established at Camp Hale
in Colorado. Tibet operation terminated
with some loss of life among trained
Tibetans. A failure.
1964-66: CIA involvement with emigree
groups exposed in court case over United
States and Canadian Estonian organiza-
tions. A failure.
1964: CIA supported U.S. Congo oper-
ation by assisting Tshombe. Anti-Castro
Cubans used to fly U.S. aircraft. I think
that was considered by most to be a
mistake.
1964-65: CIA attempts to rig Chilean
elections against Allende. Frei wins with
CIA support. A temporary but certainly
a pyrrhic victory, which has resulted
since then in the view of many, as hurt-
ful to American policy.
1966-67: National Student Association
found funded by CIA. Elaborate front
organizations in the United States ex-
posed. That was certainly considered to
be a failure.
Training and support of secret army
in Laos at cost of over $300 million a
year. I think that would be a failure.
Supply of red wig, miniature camera,
credentials, and voice alternative device
to E. Howard Hunt given by CIA. That
would certainly be considered a disaster.
Operation of dummy and front orga-
nizations such as Air America and
Southern Air Transport. Certainly
doubtful.
Phoenix program to neutralize Viet-
cong infrastructure-20,587 people killed
during Phoenix program led by William
E. Colby. That certainly had mixed re-
sult at best, in the view, of most ob-
servers, on the basis of the hindsight we
now have.
So, as I say, this is not an agency that
has a long and distinguished record of
achievement in the covert operations.
They have done many useful things in
intelligence gathering; we would have to
acknowledge that. But the country would
have been better served and the CIA
would have done a better job if we could
have had more congressional knowledge
of these covert operations, and if in fact
some of them, at least, had been made
public at a time when they could have
been discussed, and then influenced the
policies that were formulated later.
I am not contending that all covert
operations can be made public in ad-
vance, of course.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The covert opera-
tions that have failed are the ones made
public. Some covert operations that have
cost many American lives have been out-
standingly successful. Some such opera-
tions have cost the lives of friends in
foreign countries, although outstanding-
ly successful.
I believe it unfortunate and illegal that
the CIA was instructed by the National
Security Council, just another way of
saying the President of the United States,
to carry on a war in Laos. I do not be-
lieve that will happen again. Although
the Director of the CIA does not report
to Congress, he promised me he will do
his best to see it does not happen again.
He knows the damage that war has done
to the good name of the Agency he has
served loyally for many years.
I agree with the Senator from Wiscon-
sin that many problems we are talking
about today came about, because of lack
of review on the part of the committees
of Congress that should have been more
interested in CIA operations.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think we also ought
to recognize that it is very possible that
this whole notion of our playing God, of
our determining that the head of a gov-
ernment in a foreign country is not the
right one, that we should challenge
whether to act by assassination or by
military coup or in some other way to put
our own national preferences in author-
ity and power. The President for whom
both of us have such reverence, Harry
Truman, who was the man during whose
administration the CIA was founded, said
in 1963 that he had no idea, at the time
the CIA was established, that it would
get into covert operations. He was ap-
palled at the so-called "dirty tricks" rec-
ord.
So here is one area that, whatever we
are spending-and we have no idea-
considerable question could be raised,
first, as to whether the should continue,
in view of the fact that we can chal-
lenge whether it is serving our interests
under any circumstances; second, wheth-
er covert operations represent a moral
attitude and posture that we should take;
and third, whether this kind of activity
should be continued without the con-
gressional oversight, congressional
knowledge, and congressional decision
that should be required.
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say the great
President the able Senator just men-
tioned brought me into Government; and
The first Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency was from my home town,
and a close friend. I agree the agency
began doing extraordinary things in lat-
er years, actions not justified under its
charter. Let us hope that can be cor-
rected. I would hope to see legislation,
plan to suggest some myself, to correct
this development. On the other hand, of
all Senators who might be interested in
it, I would say would be the distinguished
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE)
because I have never seen, with one ex-
ception, a CIA estimate of the Army,
Navy, or Air Force capabilities of the
possible enemy that was not less than
the estimate of our own Armed Services.
Without the CIA, we would be turning
over decision as to what the enemy has
to the Pentagon.
If we do that, I am sure it would In-
crease even more our already very large
military budget, because we build our
own defenses against the best estimate of
what the possible enemy has.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I would agree whole-
heartedly, from what I have heard-and
I know very little about it, as all of us
know very little about it, unfortunately-
the CIA may well have done a very good
job in bringing quality to the intelli-
gence community in the noncovert in-
telligence gathering area.
Mr. SYMINGTON. And separated from
the military.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Missouri yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able
friend from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I want to express my
appreciation for the great work the
Senator from Wisconsin has been doing
in seeking to bring to public light-for
the information of the Senate, the Con-
gress, and the country-the total budget
figure for the CIA. It is very important
that that figure be made public. I think
that the response the Senator got to his
question submitted to Mr. Colby during
the confirmation hearings indicates
clearly that there is no security reason
for keeping the figure secret. All that Mr.
Colby said, according to the Senator's
speech today, was that to disclose the
total figure of the intelligence budget
would not present a security problem at
this time, but that disclosure was likely
to stimulate requests for additional de-
tails. What he was saying there is that
there are no security reasons, but they
want to keep the figure secret because
they want to keep some other things
secret. To me, that makes no sense. If
there are figures that should be kept
secret, those figures need not be 're-
vealed. I agree that there are facts about
the CIA's opera tion that are not properly
available for public consumption, but
making public the overall figure has
nothing to do with concealing those facts.
But the chairman of the committee
mentioned that if this figure was made
public, then certain overall figures would
have to be made public.
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. SYMINGTON. I find myself in a
rather extraordinary position this after-
noon. Perhaps more than any other Mem-
ber of the Senate, over a period of years,
I have been pleading, arguing, working
for further information about the CIA
to be released at least to the Congress
if not the American people.
So I do not want to be in any box
about what is or is not released.
What I said to the able Senator from
Wisconsin was based on his being a mem-
ber of the Appropriations Committee.
So far as I am concerned, it has been
most unfortunate the way intelligence
information has been so extensively
masked in the overall budget.
Mr. CRANSTON. I am delighted that
the Senator has made that statement,
because that is what the Senator from
Wisconsin and I have been looking for.
The DIA figure is already in the public
domain.
I would like to add to the point the Sen-
ator from Missouri made about the fig-
ures in the defense budget. Since we do
not know what the overall figure for the
CIA is, every other figure in the Defense
budget is open to suspicion as to its
accuracy. In order to conceal within the
Defense budget the overall CIA figure,
every other figure is susceptible to being
padded, and certain figures are padded.
As a result, we have no idea what the
figures really are, whether for the C-5A,
the B-1 bomber, the Trident, or for mili-
tary housing. We do not know whether
those figures are accurate or inaccurate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
California mentioned the DIA figure as
published. I am not sure all the DIA fig-
ures are published, or NSA, or ONI, or
Army Intelligence, or Air Force Intelli-
gence. We are getting into something
that should be checked from the stand-
point of national security. I am sure the
Senator would agree.
Mr. CRANSTON. Absolutely. I am de-
lighted that we seem to have come to a
point of agreement among the three Sen-
ators in talking about this matter.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, apro-
pos of what the Senator from Missouri
has been quoting, indicating in his judg-
ment that the total size of the intelli-
gence budget is in the neighborhood of
-something like $5 billion or $6 billion, it
has been said by some that this is high,
and by others that it is low. Does the
Senator feel, or could he discuss the total
amount of the intelligence budget, in
view of the fact that the Senator from
Missouri just said that this is one area
where there is more waste and extrava-
gance than in almost any?
Mr. Symington. May I say to the able
Senator from Wisconsin that I came in
here to recommend the confirmation of
Mr. Colby-
Mr. PROXMIRE. All right.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I know the Sena-
tor's tremendous capacity for figures-
therefore do not want to commit myself
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator
very much.
Mr. CRANSTON. If the Senator will
yield for just one brief question, I
should like to ask him if I could also
be advised of that figure. The Senator
said the Senator from Wisconsin is a
member of the Appropriations Commit-
tee. I am not contesting my right to the
figure-
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would certainly
desire to give the Senator from Cali-
fornia any information he wants. He has
me in a bit of a "crack"-
Mr. CRANSTON. That was deliberate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Unusual for him,
too. Let us see. In any case, one or two
members of a committee should not be
told about things other members of the
committee are not told about. When that
happens-and it has happened-I see
the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) in
the Chamber, and he knows what I am
talking about-then we do not have a
majority of the committee voting money
on the basis of the facts. It was easy for
me to say to the Senator from Wiscon-
sin that I would be glad to discuss it
with him, because he is a member of the
Appropriations Committee.
Would the Senator be good enough to
give me 24 hours, then I will answer his
question.
Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. The diffi-
culty I have in voting on matters like
this, not only in relation to the CIA, is
that the concealment of the CIA figure
distorts every other figure.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
California is right. I am sympathetic.
But we do not want to be attacked for
violating any rules on national security.
I would hope we can do what the Sen-
ator from California desires and I ap-
preciate his understanding.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
from Missouri very much. I will be de-
lighted to wait until tomorrow.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Jerry Tinker
and Dale deHaan be given the privilege of
the floor during the course of this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DorcaNIcI). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The time of the Senator from Wis-
consin has expired.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield 15
minutes of time under my control to the
distinguished Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE) to finish his statement.
He has obviously been in discussion here
and has been unable to finish it. So I will
be more than happy to yield him that
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Wisconsin is recognized for 15
minutes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President. I want
to thank the distinguished Senator from
Iowa for giving me this 15 minutes. I do
not think I will use it all.
because I am not sure. I am quite con- Mr. SYMINGTON. I participated in
fident in my own mind, however that the this colloquy, but did not start it. If the
figure of $6 billion is high. As to what the Senator needs more time I will be glad
exact figure is, let me check it, and I will to yield him from my time.
tell the Senator before the end of the Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
week as well as the relatively low per- On the issue of the National Security
centage of that figure that goes to the Council Intelligence Directives, which I
CIA. first raised here on April 10 and again
5,15363
on June 4, I am pleased to note that for
the first time the oversight committees
will be briefed on their contents. It is
simply unbelievable that the oversight
committees were unaware of these-the
primary operating directions to the in-
telligence community-for all these
years. How could there be any oversight
if Congress had no idea about what the
executive department had directed the
CIA to do? That is why the oversight
committees did not know about the secret
army in Laos or the tampering with the
election in Chile. They did not even know
where to look.
I urge the oversight committees to re-
tain copies of these directives and require
frequent briefings along the lines of the
programs undertaken under each direc-
tive.
I ask the distinguished Senator from
Missouri, the acting chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, if it would
be possible to sanitize the NSCID's and
release them publicly or have the Na-
tional Security Council do so-that is,
take out the classified information in-
cluded in them, but release what can
be released:
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not sure, but
have obtained approval to look at them
myself. We have been so busy trying to
get the procurement bill out under pres-
sure from the leadership that I just have
not yet had time. I would be glad to as-
certain whether or not that would be
possible. Those directives from the Na-
tional Security Council, at least in the
minds of some people, in effect go against
the legislation which created the agency
itself.
Mr. PROXMIRE. It is the kind of
information we ought to have. Much of
it is historical and dated and therefore
could be disclosed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree. The only
person who could decide that would be
the President or his agent, through the
National Security Council. I will be glad
to write them a.letter about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. When I get classified
information and I ask that it be sani-
tized, 90 or 95 percent of the information
is usually intact.
I might also add at this point that the
CIA's reply to my question about the
interpretation and extension of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 was com-
pletely inadequate. The NSCID's flow
from one clause in the 1947 act. The act
also provides, as Mr. Colby states, that
the National Security Council shall issue
directives pursuant to the act.
But this does not give the National
Security Council the right to change the
intent or substance of the original act.
It merely enables the National Security
Council to carry out the expressed wishes
of Congress as stated in the act. And
nowhere in the act does Congress give
the CIA authority to operate overseas
with covert techniques.
In 1963, President Truman stated em-
phatically that he did not have this in
mind when the CIA was formed during
his administration.
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Finally, I wish to talk about the issue
of domestic operations. Although Con-
gress clearly did not want the CIA to
become involved in domestic matters and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 1, 1973
placed specific language in the act to
that effect, still the CIA maintains cer-
tain.domestic operations. Some of these
may be harmless, like the Domestic Con-
tact Service, but others pose more serious
problems.
Mr. President, the strictest kind of
restraint must be placed on domestic
activities of the intelligence community.
The CIA has no place training police
forces under the omnibus crime bill. It
should not be forming dummy domestic
corporations or active corporations, for
that matter. CIA ties with the academic
community, research institutes, aero-
space companies, and Federal bureauc-
racies should be carefully controlled.
I am particularly disturbed that the
Domestic Contact Service has been
placed under the operational control of
the clandestine services. Mr. Colby says
that this is to improve the coordination
of its collection activities with those of
the Agency abroad. I find this disturbing
because of the possibility that the DCS,
which has a good reputation, may now
become `tainted" by the covert side of
the Agency. If the DCS is an open and
aboveboard operation, then it s hould
operate in an open and aboveboard
manner. It should operate under the au-
thority of the analytical side of the CIA.
I should like to ask the Senator from
Missouri one other question: Does the
chairman think the oversight committees
should be told about the foreign and
domestic operations?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would put it this
way: The oversight committees should
be told everything that does not direct-
ly affect an operation.
During the years I spent in the Pen-
tagon at the Secretary level, there was
one subject I did not want to know about;
namely, the details of war plans.
If we have agents in a foreign coun-
try, under cover, I do not want to know
who they are, nor do I want to know the
details of their actions.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand that. I
think everyone would agree with that.
What I have in mind is that when these
operations have taken place, and with-
out disclosing identities of individuals
involved, does the Senator feel that the
oversight committees should be in-
formed, so that there could be a prompt
evaluation and a policy determined on
the basis of that experience?
Mr. SYMINGTON. One of the most
unfortunate developments in the history
of this country was the secret war in
Laos run by the CIA out of the Embassy
in Vientiane under instructions from the
Embassy. It was run without knowledge
on the part of members of the Armed
Services Committee or the CIA Over-
sight Committee or the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
It was only found out about when staff
members of Foreign Relations went into
Laos and found a war being run out of
the Embassy in Vientiane.
That kind of secret operation is wrong.
It all should have been reported to the
proper committees. I believe the main
reison it wea not reported was because
they knew if it, was found out, it would
have been stopped.
Mr.. PROXMIRE. Are these foreign
operations ever reported to the over-
sight committees?
Mr. SYMINGTON. They have not for
some years.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Why should they not
be reported to the oversight committees?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I think they
should.
Mr. PROXMIRE. And they should ex-
ercise their authority.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. So far as the Sena-
tor is concerned, that is his position?
Mr. SYMINGTON. And to the best of
my ability, I will see that such reporting
of a war, a secret CIA war, is put into
effect.
THE COLEY CONFIRMATION
Mr. PROXMIRE. In considering how
to vote on the Colby confirmation I have
weighed the available facts, as inade-
quate as they may be. On the negative
side are his associations with the Phoenix
program, his lifelong career in the co-
vert side of intelligence, and the whole
question of executive department use of
the CIA. On the positive side is his
willingness to answer all questions, his
reputation as a good administrator, and
some awareness of the propriety of close
congressional oversight.
On balance, I have decided to support
Mr. Colby. But I am giving notice that I
will closely monitor his leadership of the
intelligence community. And I will not
hesitate to object to any questionable use
of the intelligence community in do-
mestic affairs. Furthermore, I may offer
certain amendments to the military pro-
curement bill dealing with the CIA.
A NEW OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
Mr. President, within the next few
days I will introduce a resolution to
create a standing committee of the Sen-
ate on the Central Intelligence Agency.
There are many sound reasons for creat-
ing a full standing committee. Not the
least of these is the need for continuing
oversight of the multibillion-dollar in-
telligence community. This can only be
done with a full-time staff unencum-
bered by other responsibilities.
I will recommend that this new com-
mittee be composed of members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, the
Foreign Relations Committee, and others
selected from the remaining Senators.
Mr. President, I welcome the statement
by the distinguished chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee (Mr.
STENNIS) that the committee will under-
take a reassessment of its oversight re-
sponsibilities. I hope that my bill S. 1935
will be considered at that time.
I thank the distinguished Senator from
Iowa and the distinguished Senator from
Missouri for yielding me time.
Mr. President, I yield back the re-
mainder of my time to the Senator from
Iowa, and I thank the Senator once
again.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if
the distinguished Senator from Iowa will
yield, I am very glad to hear the able
Senator from Wisconsin say he has de-
cided to vote for Mr. Colby. Knowing hint
as I do, I know also that he would so
do unless he felt It was right and in the
interest of the country.
His speech today on the Senate floor is
constructive. This situation has been
wrong; it has been wrong over a period
of years; it should be corrected; and as
a member of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and a member of the Military
Subcommittee on Appropriations, I will
be glad to work with him to that end.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield
myself 15 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator from Iowa (Mr.
HUGHES) and the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY)
have at least 20 minutes apiece of the
remaining time and that the vote occur
on the pending nomination at the hour
of 4 p.m.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I do wish
to speak on the nomination and I am not
certain as to the time I will need. I am
waiting to hear the statements of the
two Senators.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We are trying to
accommodate several Senators who
would like to vote at 4 o'clock.
Mr. CRANSTON. I do not want to ob-
ject, but I would like to have 12 or 14
minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well. I with-
draw the request.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I have
requested time to speak to clarify my
opposition to this nomination. As I stated
at the time of the vote by the Armed
Services Committee, I wanted to review
the evidence which had been presented
before making a final judgment.
That review has reinforced my original
inclination to oppose Mr. Colby's nom-
ination.
At the outset, let me say that I do not
question Mr. Colby's ability. He has an
impressive background of Government
service in intelligence and other areas
as well as good academic and professional
credentials.
Moreover, I am pleased with many of
the statements and pledges made by Mr.
Colby in his confirmation hearings.
He has offered to accede to Congress
will in making public some information
about the CIA budget.
He has promised to continue reducing
unnecessary intelligence activities in
order to hold down costs.
He has stated that he would respect
the prohibitions on CIA activities within
the United States and calls the Agency's
assistance to E. Howard Hunt a mistake
that will not be made again.
He has agreed to consider providing
written materials as well as oral brief-
ings to the appropriate congressional
committees.
And he has declared his intention to
resign if he is ever given an order to
involve the Agency in an illegal act.
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
These are no small assurances and he American rather than Laotian policies.
is to be commended for them. As the years passed, Americans became
Despite those statements, Mr. Presi- so deeply involved with this army-
dent, I remain troubled about Mr. Col- through advisers, pay, and air support-
by's suitability for this particular im- that the CIA was in effect running its
portant and sensitive position. After all, own war in Laos rather than simply
we are deciding who shall control what gathering intelligence.
our intelligence agency does overseas Mr. Colby never told the committee
and who should be the President's chief that he would not engage in another
analyst of political and military develop- secret, CIA-run war. Rather, he said:
ments in other countries that affect our I will try to keep it out of the kind of ex-
national interest and security. posure that some of these larger activities
The decision as to who should have got us into.
these far-reaching powers gets to basic
consideration of a public official's loyalty
to the Constitution of the United States
when that loyalty seems contravened by
other loyalties and disciplines. This, in
turn, gets at the fundamental qualifica-
tion for a CIA Director of an overriding
commitment to civilian control of the
Agency.
At a time when startling disclosures
are being made of secret warfare being
waged at the behest of a few individuals
in command positions and of large scale
falsification of official reports on such
activities to the Congress and the Ameri-
can people, it seems imperative to me
that we take a thorough, objective look
at the temperament and background of
the individual we select for this power-
ful, sensitive post.
In this context, I have serious doubts
about the way in which Mr. Colby
handled his previous assignments.
His optimistic assessments of the pop-
ularity and strength of President Diem
in South Vietnam a dozen years ago may
well have helped to cement American
policy in support of a dictator who had
lost touch with his own people. Better
judgments in those years may well have
avoided or mitigated the tragedy of
Vietnam.
Mr. Colby's activities as head of the
Far East Division of the Directorate of
Plans may well have undermined the
1962 Laos accords and led to the start
of the secret but deadly war in that
troubled country.
Mr. Colby's direction of the Phoenix
program, however well intentioned it
may have been, clearly did not prevent
abuses and excesses in that program
which are now a matter of public record.
I will leave to some of my colleagues a
more detailed analysis of Mr. Colby's rec-
ord as director of Phoenix which I believe
requires the most careful scrutiny.
I am also frankly troubled about some
of the attitudes Mr. Colby has shown
toward the proper role of the CIA in the
future.
Take, for example, his statements with
regard to U.S. activities in Laos.
Mr. Colby told the distinguished act-
ing chairman of the Aimed
aerviCes
Committee (1%ir. SYMINGTON) that,--
The initiation of C'IA':; ac,trit in Laos was
a matter which did require the use of Intelli-
geht::c, te,,iiques because It isa- t ,t ihn-
portant at that tine that the UiaiI'll state,;
not br off..ciaily ylcoi:ed in that a 'iritc.
His concern was with exposure rather
than with impropriety or outright il-
legality of an intelligence-gathering
agency's running _a war.
In a written question for Mr. Colby, I
tried to pin down this crucial difference.
I asked him: Where should the line be
drawn between CIA and Defense Depart-
ment activities involving the use of
armed force?
His answer was:
In general, the line should be drawn be-
tween CIA and the Defense Department with
respect to armed force at the point in which
the United States acknowledges involvement
in such activities. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the scale of the activity will, in many
cases, also affect whether the United States
is revealed as engaged in the activity.
Again, the point to be made is that
Mr. Colby believes that CIA-run military
operations are perfectly acceptable so
long as they can be concealed. This is
unacceptable to me.
When Americans are involved ill com-
bat, the Congress should be iniormed
and congressional approval should be
obtained.
Yet Mr. Colby stopped short of prom-
ising the openness which our system de-
mands. When I asked him: Do you be-
lieve that it is proper under our Consti-
tution for such military operations-as
in Laos-to be conducted without the
knowledge or approval of Congress, he
replied :
The appropriate committees of the Con-
gress and a number of individual senators
and con;ressmcn were briefed on CiA's ac-
tivities in Laos during the period cove.ed. In
addition, CIA's programs were described to
the Appropriations COir.niittees in our an-
nual budget hearings.
Mr. President, in my judgment, the
lines drawn by Mr. Colby in responding
to these questions are too blurry to be
acceptable.
Given the recent evidence of the fail-
ure of more than a handful of Members
of Congress-if that many-to be in-
formed of the secret B-52 raids in Cam-
bodia, 1 am sllspit'tmis of such asser-
tions. And I ...cn sure that thy:
guished Senator from
SY:\IINGTON), tlseif;}I t' e oilier i:11 Tiati
particular nocninaation. would ag;'ce that
suilicient aid ti) neic in' eri >.tion on L,ios
Was not proridect to t;:e eonrrc
Now we fac F i tlc ihl o!,Ii I) of C:irr 1 { L.
Pi c': s reports sw.:dt,5t t !',!t tile 01,'A
tie
aIeao iii c, j'.i`,cl
ke::areleis of ~.thatise ntcl'
tfe}IlliriUC., .l'L t't' )'h': 11'ril? the Let was 1'irltt to L.Lmboc...i 11 l.: Ihil ,..'.O
that t is (IA Gc. :t' od m milt lac- .a, _ ., v- ro ? rt: sc . -
tam trhiclh overt)iree, ) he i ,:ultimate Gov'- ate: A'.t 1Lh t , u.r.r of tl ese i- epll' we: led
ernnlent of L:ws in ljcf,, and later spon- on operations in Cans tit
sored a secret army responsive to all earlier time.
S 15365
We have to be sure that these people
are not the entering wedge of another
clandestine cadre of American military
advisers-which would be contrary to ex-
isting law and against the clear desire
of the American people and the Congress
to withdraw from military operations in
Cambodia.
Mr. Colby's prior association with such
operations and his testimony make me
fear that he might acquiesce in another
secret war, at least so long as it can be
kept secret.
I have no objection to an intelligence
man as director of the CIA. In some
cases, it might be positively beneficial,
since he would be better able to control
the vast bureaucracy beneath him be-
cause he knows the ins and outs of the
process.
But the intelligence apparatus should
be under command and control of proper
constitutional authority; its operation
must not be permitted to become an
end In itself.
I am fearful of a man whose experi-
ence has been so largely devoted to
clandestine operations involving the use
of force and the manipulation of fac-
tions in foreign governments. Such a
man may become so enamored with these
techniques that he loses sight of the
higher purposes and moral constraints
which should guide our country's activ-
ities abroad.
We need as Director of the CIA a man
who will unflinchingly act on those pur-
poses and subject to those constraints,
a man who will unfailingly show the
independence necessary to resist pres-
sures from his operatives below and from
his superiors above to try some dirty
trick which promises some clever suc-
cess at the expense of our principles.
Take the example of CIA involvement
in domestic activities in the United
States. We know that the CIA provided
assistance to Howard Hunt's burglary of
Daniel Ells-berg's psychiatrist's office;
that it prepared a personality study of
Dr. Ellsberg, an American citizen: that
it provided probably illegal training to
local police forces in our country.
When questioned about taking firm
steps to prevent recurrences, Mr. Colby
answered me that---
With respect to the training of local police
personnel--any further such action will be
taken or-' in the most exceptional circum-
stances and with the Director's personal ap-
proval.
Instead of outright repudiation of such
practices, Mr. Colby left open the door
for his own personal decision.
Bluntly, there v. ere too many qualifica-
tions, too many hedges in such :tnsci,eis
to convince ale of Mr. Co!'1y';? suitability
for this particular command post.
We c.c.not accept suc?il loopholes un-
le+N V:e are 1C lines to t(ilc.tt?e :hoses and,
tti~'tn^.teiy, rise loss of cou+t,?oi.
Mr. Pre ident. in eo;liictiut.: a director
of the i:t.r-iw) CIA, th~tc s'.ot,ld be no
(j,W"11 ns t'.'i151 t'I' In Our Iii lids a,c to
t..s rc:spu.:,.v ti( .~e u) c,cil:un imi,aol anti.
his rc'nn1ut for rite bu_ir' h.'ilical proc-
i_~ c" e t tit?:; rc'p,)biie,
The ui.clpline of the seeret Opera-
tive is ntc,:::,:uy, otter ac:)u;rabic, but it
il: not ncci'ssurily condurive of the kind
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S 15366
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 1, 1973
of perspective and judgment required for
the-head of a vast governmental agency
which has the capability of either pro-
tecting or compromising our national in-
terest and our moral purpose as a people.
Mr. President, we must recognize today
more clearly than ever before that the
Congress has awesome responsibilities in
voting on this immensely important ap-
pointment. The selection of head of the
CIA is too crucial to our future to be
made with a routine stamp of approval.
This brings us to the larger context of
congressional responsibility for oversight
of the CIA. In the last 20 years more
than 200 bills designed to make the CIA
more accountable to Congress have been
introduced and have gone absolutely
nowhere. The least we can at this time
do is to review and live up to our re-
sponsibilities under the existing im-
precise laws governing that agency.
Mr. President, my opposition to Mr.
Colby has no personal overtones. Nor do
I have cause to question either his loyalty
or ability. The question is whether or not
this man in the light of his background
and attitudes is qualified for the CIA
directorship with all of its sensitive bear-
ing on national security, national pur-
pose, and constitutional liberties.
For me the answer is No.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to repeat my request: Twenty
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) , and
10 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from California (Mr. CRANSTON), and
then a vote on the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object and I shall not ob-
ject-I simply did not hear the request..
Mr. MANSFIELD. Twenty minutes
and 10 minutes and then the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Montana? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I, first
of all, want to express my very sincere
appreciation to the acting chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, and the
person that is bringing the nomination to
the floor of the U.S. Senate (Mr. SYmIINC-
TON). I want to express my very deep
sense of appreciation for all the courte-
sies he has extended to a Member of the
Senate, which in this case is myself, and
for cooperating in every possible way to
assist this Member to gain information
from the nominee and also from the
committee itself on a number of differ-
ent matters which I was deeply troubled
by and very much concerned about.
After listening to the colloquy of the
Senator from Wisconsin, the Senator
from California, and the Senator from
Missouri, and hearing the Senator from
Missouri indicate that he was going to
respond in every po-itive way he could
to work with Member, of the Senate, I
would like to say publicly that, as a per-
son who has worked with him closely on
this particular matter, as well as other
matters, I think my colleagues can be
very much assured of his cooperation
and willingness to extend every degree
of information that he possibly can to
the Members of the Senate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
cannot let those very kind remarks go
without expressing my gratitude. Hav-
ing served for many years with the able
Senator from Massachusetts, and hav-
ing had increasing respect for his ability
and his intelligence on these and other
matters, it was a privilege to cooperate
with him in this case. It will always be
a privilege to cooperate with him.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, although I respect Mr.
William Colby's proven ability and the
high regard in which he is held by the
intelligence community of the United
States, I intend to cast my vote against
his confirmation as Director of Central
Intelligence.
In part, the reservations I have about
his nomination are matters of personal
conscience, arising out of Mr. Colby's
close relationship with the Phoenix pro-
gram in South Vietnam and my own
longstanding humanitarian concern
about the effects of the war-on Vietnam-
ese civilians.
In part, my reservations also involve
larger questions about the changing role
of the CIA in American policy and the
philosophy of the person the country
should have to guide the Agency in the
years ahead.
As chairman of the Senate Refugee
Subcommittee, as a Senator concerned
about civilians in Vietnam, as one who
has been to Vietnam and seen their
plight firsthand. I have long been trou-
bled by the continuing serious allegations
surrounding the Phoenix program.
From the fall of 1968 through the
spring of 1971, Mr. Colby was in charge
of the U.S. pacification program in South
Vietnam. As such, he was one of the
principal architects and masterminds of
Phoenix, a program designed to "neu-
tralize"-in one of the more notorious
euphemisms of the Vietnam war-the
so-called Vietcong infrastructure, that
is, South Vietnamese civilians providing
assistance to the Vietcong.
The following statistics on Phoenix,
furnished by Mr. Colby in House hear-
ings in 1971, represent one of the few
accepted measures of the program:
PHOENIX-NEUTRALIZATION OF VIETCONG INFR.ASTRUC-
TURE
Most of the developments of the Phoenix
program were my own.
Yet, the record of Phoenix and related
public safety programs under Mr. Colby
is marked not only by a shocking dearth
of information on the operations and
results of the programs-but it is also
riddled with unanswered charges and al-
legations of assassinations, of indiscrim-
inate killing of civilians, of targeting
suspects without adequate intelligence,
of false arrests and unknown persons
"neutralized," of torture and brutality
in the interrogation centers and prisons,
of jailing non-Communist political op-
ponents of President Thieu, of reclassify-
ing political prisoners as common crimi-
nals, and of inexcusably poor training
and field control of a program of such
lethal scope. And we see the results of
this program continuing today in the
prisons of South Vietnam.
In addition to a private conversation
with Mr. Colby earlier this month, I had
the opportunity, at the invitation of the
Armed Services Committee to question
Mr. Colby last week in executive ses-
sion, and to submit a series of written
questions on Phoenix and related pro-
grams. Mr. Colby's replies still leave
many questions unanswered-and, in
-fact, raise some troubling new ones.
In terms of the past record, Mr. Colby
has provided no additional information
on the Phoenix and related programs,
and declined to submit documentation
in support of his views.
In terms of the present, it is clear
from Mr. Colby's replies that the United
States has not fully disengaged from
Phoenix and related functions, and that
Mr. Colby supports our present posture.
One of the questions I submitted read
as follows:
What is the current status of the Phoenix
(Phung Hoang) Program? Assuming it con-
tinues, does the United States have a sup-
portive, advisory or any other kind of role?
Are any American or American sponsored
personnel, from the CIA or elsewhere, in-
volved in any way? Are any American com-
modities or funds, directly or indirectly,
from the CIA or elsewhere, supporting any
aspect of the Phoenix Program?
This is Mr. Colby's response:
Aside from a GVN national level coordi-
nating committee, the Phung Hoang pro-
gram has been incorporated within the na-
tional police of Vietnam and is no longer a
separate program. The United States does
not have a support, advisory or other role
with respect to the Phung Hoang program,
although CIA maintains liaison and assists
the Special Police Branch of the National Po-
lice in its intelligence functions. The United
Total
Per- neu-
Cap- cent tral-
tured Rallied Killed killed ized
--------------- 11,289
19.;9--------------- 8,515
Sentenced:
2,229 2,559 16
4,832 6,187 31
15,766
19,534
1970 -------- 6,405 7,745 8,191 36 2:,341
1Sll (tray)------- 2,710 2,911 3,650 39 9,331
Toal----------- 28,978 17,717 20,537 30 66,972
As Ambassador Colby stated in his
public confirmation hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on
July 2, during his tenure as head of
pacification:
program was terminated in December 1972,
and U S. assistance to the Phung Hoang pro-
gram through the Department of Defense
ended at the some time. Aside from this re-
lationship with CIA, I am not informed about
the uses made of other assistance which
might be supplied by the United States.
This comment is distressing. Clearly a
continuing American involvement along
the lines suggested by Mr. Colby is not
only unconscionable-hut, I feel, it is also
in violation of the spirit, if not the letter,
of than ceasefire agreement for Vietnam.
Finally, in terms of the future and his
potential direction of the CIA, Mr. Colby
clearly feels that Phoenix-type functions,
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-August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
organizations and programs-what he
calls "internal counter-subversive or
counter-terrorist activities"-are a prop-
er function of the CIA, and serve a use-
ful purpose in U.S. foreign policy.
Again, one of the questions I submitted
read as follows:
Are there plans, anticipations, or personal
convictions on your part, that Phoenix pro-
grams should be supported by the United
States in the Philippines or Thailand or else-
where?
This was Mr. Colby's response:
Under the Nixon doctrine I do not envisage
a large-scale U.S. Involvement In internal
counter-subversive or counter-terrorist ac-
tivities on the scale of experience in Vietnam.
Frankly, this is a surprising reply-
for the Nixon doctrine has been in force
for the greater share of Phoenix history.
As a matter of fact, this morning, in
our Refugee Subcommittee, we inquired
into the matter with AID and Depart-
ment of Defense officials. I asked Mr.
Dennis Doolin about the Department of
Defense's contribution of nearly $12 mil-
lion, under fiscal year 1974, for police
support activities. Under Mr. Colby's
earlier response, he recognizes that the
Phoenix program continues in Vietnam
and recognizes that the program is now
incorporated into the national police.
However, he was unable to give us any
Information. We know that we are con-
tributing in excess of $12 million to the
police forces of South Vietnam, out of
AID and DOD funds. But the Defense
Department personnel whom we had be-
fore our committee were unable to give
any assurance to us this morning that
no part of these funds are being used for
Phoenix functions.
Also, Mr. Colby indicated when I
asked if such a program could start in
the Philippines, Thailand, or elsewhere:
"Under the Nixon doctrine, I do not en-
vision a large-scale U.S. involvement in
internal countersubversive or counter-
terrorist activities on the scale of ex-
experience in Vietnam."
The Vietnam experience is the one
that gave us Phoenix. I cannot say that
I was assured by his answers to those
questions.
Finally, during his tenure in Phoenix,
Mr. Colby found it necesary to issue a
directive to all U.S. military personnel
participating in the program. One pas-
sage in the directive states that:
U.S. personnel . are specifically unau-
thorized to engage in assassinatiton.
Another passage states:
If an individual finds the police type ac-
tivities of the Phoenix program repugnant to
him ... he can be reassigned from the pro-
gram without prejudice.
In sum, the essence of Mr. Colby's de-
fense against the charges that Phoenix
was a program of indiscriminate murder,
assassination, and torture is that war is
dirty business, that the program was an
essential part of the American war ef-
fort in South Vietnam. that he was aware
of the abuses, that, as the military direc-
tive indicates, lie made efforts to reduce
them, that the abuses were isolated
events, and that, in any event, he was
simply carrying out a program ordered
by the U.S. high command.
But no rationalization of Phoenix, no
minimization of its abuses, no antiseptic
label can conceal the fact that although
Phoenix is the mythical bird of life and
resurrection, Phoenix under Mr. Colby's
tenue was a bird of death for 20,587
civilians of South Vietnam.
This Nation should never have been
involved in Phoenix. Never again should
a program like that be part of America's
role in world affairs.
The other reservation I have about
Mr. Colby involves the sort of leadership
America wants for its CIA in the years
ahead.
In recent years, the activities of the
CIA, especially its secret operations,
have come under increasing challenge
at home and overseas. The gulf between
the Agency's intelligence arm and its
clandestine arm is well known. Espe-
cially in recent months, as highlighted
by the unfolding disclosures of CIA in-
volvement in the Watergate affair, the
reputation of the Agency has been fur-
ther diminished, because of its apparent
involvement in domestic activities in vio-
lation of its charter.
I share the serious and growing doubts
of many other Senators about the role
of the CIA as it is presently constituted.
Already, under the leadership of Senator
STENNIS and Senator SYMINGTON, the
Armed Services Committee has begun an
extensive review of the CIA Act. There
are many other signs as well that both
the Senate and the House intend to ex-
ercise a far greater degree of oversight
over the CIA in the future than has ex-
isted in the past.
But Congress cannot do the job alone.
If the CIA is to fulfill its proper role in
the decade of the seventies, it must have
a director who is responsive and sym-
pathetic to the need. As a man who has
risen through the ranks of the Agency
on its clandestine side, Mr. Colby sym-
bolizes the side of the CIA that has be-
come deeply embroiled in the present
controversy over the Agency's foreign
and domestic activities.
Perhaps the CIA continues to need
this covert side to its operations-un-
questionably, Mr. Colby is an outstand-
ing choice to lead such a role as the CIA's
Deputy Director for Operations, the posi-
tion he now holds.
But, looking to the future of the coun-
try and the future of the CIA, I believe
the United States has had enough se-
crecy and covert ideas and covert men.
At the very least, the CIA needs a greater
balance between its clandestine and its
intelligence functions.
But William Colby is the epitome of
the covert man. And so, although my
opposition to liini on this ground is in
no sense a personal refiection on him, I
do not believe that he should be the
choice to strike that balance or to shape
the Agency in the transitions that lie
ahead.
One other point should be mentioned.
In recent weeks, I have been troubled by
a number of questions arising out of Mr.
Colby's role as Executive Director of the
CIA in certain aspects of the Water-;ate
affair in 147 ar,d early 1973.
Although this aspect is not yet entire-
ly free from doubt, the Issue continues
S 15367
to be investigated by the Senate Select
Committee and the special prosecutor.
I do, however, want to make clear that
my vote against Mr. Colby's confirma-
tion is not based on his relationship to
Watergate.
In closing, let me say again that I re-
spect the very high regard in which Mr.
Colby is held by those who have known
and worked with him. In many respects,
he symbolizes the finest qualities of in-
tellectual ability and personal sacrifice
demonstrated by legions of able and un-
heralded American officials who have un-
selfishly dedicated their careers to the
Nation's public service.
But, for the reasons stated, I am un-
able to approve his nomination.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays on the nomina-
tion.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. CRA,NSTON. Mr. President, to me
there, is one basic problem looming be-
hind the vote on the nomination of Mr.
William Colby to be the new Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. That
problem is the vast power wielded by the
Central Intelligence Agency itself.
When I reviewed the National Security
Act of 1947, I was reminded once again
that the CIA's power has largely devel-
oped within the statutory authority laid
down by that act.
The bulk of the CIA's duties as de-
fined by the National Security Act are
related to advising the National Security
Council and correlating and evaluating
intelligence. The authority for the "dirty
tricks" is contained in one short clause
stating that it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the Na-
tional Security Council-
to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct. (50
USC 403(d) (5).)
This means that the law gives the
CIA, subject only to the approval of the
National Security Council, a virtually
free hand in conducting clandestine op-
erations overseas, overthrowing foreign
governments, training mercenaries, and
even sponsoring assassination programs
such as Phoenix-all in the name of na-
tional security.
Today it seems strange that Congress
should have signed away such power.
Knowing what we know now, we would
probably have placed far more restric-
tions on the CIA's mandate. Perhaps a
brief look at the cold war setting in which
the National Security Act was drafted
will help to show how badly change is
needed.
The cold war spawned an increasing
tendency to see overseas political devel-
opments in military terms and hence to
let defense policy determine foreign pol-
icy, rather than the other way around.
Prior to World War II, military officers
had not been prominent cler_isionmak-
ers in matters of foreign polies', but the
cold war saw a dramatic reversal. Diplo-
irats yielded their influence to profes-
,ional soldiers and to civilians whose
concern for military might surpassed
even that of the generals.
In this framework, the political sys-
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S 15368
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 1-, 1973
tern adopted by another country was au-
tomatically part of a worldwide contest
between capitalism and communism, and
thus either a threat or a boost to our na-
tional security. As President Truman said
before a joint session of Congress on
March 12, 1947:
... totalitarian tegimes imposed upon free
people, by direct or indirect aggression, un-
dermine the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of the United
States.
National security had become a na-
tional mania. Accordingly, the powers
of oversight and review were given to
the two Armed Services Committees of
House and Senate and to the Appropria-
tions Committees, but not to the Foreign
Relations Committees.
Today we know that what the CIA
does has explosive foreign policy im-
plication. In many countries of the
world, American foreign policy has be-
come closely associated with the CIA.
Today we know, too, that a radical
movement somewhere in the world is not
automatically a threat to our security.
We know that economic strength and
political leadership are as important, in
their own way, as our arsenal of bombs
and missiles.
Today the mood and atmosphere have
changed, but the law has not.
And I think that is the most funda-
mental challenge facing the Congress on
the question of the CIA-to bring the law
into line with a democratic society and
to place further restrictions on the CIA,
its Director, and its activities.
Accordingly, I am introducing today
a measure to set up a 1-year, ad hoc
Select Committee on Foreign Intelli-
gence, whose duties shall include recom-
mendations on revising the National
Security Act and taking other appro-
priate steps to bring the CIA under
firmer supervision. This committee
should address the basic questions of the
CIA's mandate and the degree of power
that is appropriate to that mandate. It
should consider that power in the context
of a democratic society. It should seek
to lay down guidelines for the CIA's
activities.
More broadly, however. the ad hoc
committee that I am proposing should
take a broad look at all our overseas in-
telligence activities, not just those of
the CIA. It would be directed to study
the implications of these activities for
U.S. foreign policy, foreign economic
policy, and defense policy, and to report
its general findings to the full Senate.
Mr. President. I think we need a. study
committee of this kind even if an au-
thorizing conhniittee is set up relating
to the CIA. I ani delighted that the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisccnsin (idr.
PROxMTas), who has provided such crea-
tive and constructive leadership in this
field, plans to introduce a resolution to
create a statidinia cornniittee of the Sen-
ate on the CIA. I am cieligthted, too. that
our wise and cffec?tive majority leader,
Senator Maasriot.D, is particularly in-
terested in this move, and is devoting a
conic enable ni a:)ure of leis talents to the
effort to biint; the CIA under proper con-
trol.
I believe we also need a study commit-
tee because-too often-this country does
one thing with the right hand and
another with the left. There should be
some group in the Senate that can
stand back and look at the whole, briefly,
without a permanent assignment, and
thus without developing a domain of its
own-in other words, without developing
a constituent interest.
I also have some modest suggestions
relating to curbing the power of the CIA
short of a fundamental review and over-
haul. I am offering these suggestions in
the form of amendments to the National
Security Act, and I will explain them in a
moment. But first I want to make clear
that I would prefer to have these sugges-
tions acted upon by some sort of over-
sight committee or authorizing commit-
tee. But if the Senate does not establish
either of these committees, I will push
ahead with these amendments on my
own.
My first proposal is to place a time
limitation on the terms of the Director
and Deputy Director of the CIA. As the
law stands (50 U.S.C. 403(a) ), the Di-
rector and Deputy Director shall be ap-
pointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
But there is no time limitation to that
appointment. I propose a term of not to
exceed 8 years. I do not feel that 8
years is a magic number. But I do think it
important to place a time limitation on
these positions so as to prevent the per-
petuation of an "independent kingdom."
I understand that the distinguished Sen-
ator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) has
introduced similar legislation to place a
time limitation on the term of the Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.
My second proposal would prevent the
posts of Director and Deputy Director
from being occupied by two "insiders" at
the same time. According to existing law,
at no time shall the two positions be oc-
cupied simultaneously by commissioned
officers of the armed services. I suggest
extending that restriction to individuals
employed by the CIA within the last 5,
years prior to their appointment.
By requiring that the posts of Di-
rector and Deputy Director shall not both
be filled by "insiders" at the same time,
my intention is to prevent the Agency
from being run by "professionals' profes-
sionals" and subject it to some form of
supervision from the cutside. Just as a
general should not be appointed Secre-
tary of Defense, so the leadership of the
CIA should not be drawn solely from
within.
IIy third proposal is directed at the
broad power granted to the CIA by the
National Security Act to perform func-
tions other than those related to the col-
lection and analysis of information-the
so-called "dirty tricl;a I have already
quoted that part of the National Security
Act that conveys the authority for these
operations.
a nlendment would change that
power in a very modest way by r'cquirin_t
not only the ipproval of the National
Security Council, but die ~:peelfir, writ-
ten approval of the President as well.
This is a small but important first step
toward curbing the misuse of power.
Let me emphasize again that these are
not final solutions but only modest first
steps. And again, they should ideally be
debated by an authorizing committee or
by , a committee specifically set up to
study foreign intelligence activities in
general and the CIA in particular.
I also want to make it clear that my
motive in introducing this legislation is
not punitive. I have considerable respect
for the CIA. Nor is it directed at Mr.
Colby personally. I recognize that he is
a capable man who has won the respect
of his colleagues and of many people out-
side of the Agency as well.
I have endeavored to find out all I
could about Mr. Colby but, like Senator
PROXMIRE, I have found that a difficult
task. I concur with him that today the
Senate will cast a blind vote on the
Colby nomination.
I came on the floor today not knowing
how I would vote. I have listened care-
fully to the debate. Primarily for some of
the reasons advanced by two distin-
guished Senators, Senator HUGHES and
Senator KENNEDY, I shall vote against
him.
I shall vote against him also because
William Colby is a symbol of the abuse
of power.
We do not need to break the law to
have effective intelligence operations. I
believe in order, justice, and law.
My aim in the legislation I am propos-
ing is simply to place limitations on the
extraordinary power wielded by the Di-
rector of the CIA in the belief that such
power is incompatible with our demo-
cratic system.
The legislation that I am introducing
today is only a partial check on the vir-
tually unfettered power enjoyed by the
CIA. A crucial step not covered by my
proposals, for example, is making public
the budgets of the various intelligence
agencies, including the CIA. I have al-
ready pursued this suggestion through
letters to other Senators and through
discussion in the Democratic Caucus, and
I want to reiterate this concern today.
I have noted two encouraging develop-
ments in particular. First, during his con-
firmation hearing for his appointment as
Secretary of Defense, Dr. James Schles-
inger stated that publishing a gross fig-
ure for national intelligence programs
would have a "minimal" effect on secur-
ity concerns. In answer to determined
questioning on a public budget figure by
the distinguished Senator from Vir-
ginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), he added:
... for the gross national lutelllgence pro-
gram figures, I think the could live with that
on a security ba'is, yes.
And William Colby, the- Director-
desii;nate of the CIA, stated that while
budget totals have traditionally been
classified, lie would "defer to the aln)ro-
pri;tte con. sessional authorities" for any
chance. I read that as a messa~:c for us
to sso ahead with chaii ping this unneces-
sarily stlpcrsecret tradition.
Mr. President, General Marshall used
co say that political p:ob;cnis, if thou.?ht
abOllt 111 t)ilitcu'y telins, become ndlitarv
problems. Now the word rnili-
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August 1, 1973
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 15369
Lary"-from "para," meaning "along-
side of" or "related to"-has come into
common use even though most standard
dictionaries do not list it. I am afraid
that without legislation to curb the CIA,
political problems-already woefully
militarized-will increasingly become
paramilitary ones.
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the proposed legislation be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion and bill were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
S. 2321
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a)
section 102(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended by
striking out the proviso at the end of such
section and inserting in lieu thereof the fol-
lowing: "Provided, however, That at no time
shall the two positions of the Director and
Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously
(1) by commissioned officers of the armed
services, whether in an active or retired
status, or (2) by individuals who have been
in the employ of the Agency for any period
of time during the five year period immedi-
ately preceding the time they are considered
for appointment. No person may serve as Di-
rector for more than a total of eight years."
(b) The eight year limitation prescribed
for the Director of the Ceneral Intelligence
Agency by the amendment made by subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall begin to run
on the date of enactment of this Act in the
case of any person holding such office on
such date of enactment.
Sec. 2. Paragraph (5) of section 102(d) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403(d) (5)) is amended by striking out the
period at the end of such paragraph and in-
serting in lieu thereof a comma and the fol-
lowing: "but only if the President specifically
authorizes any such function or duty and
notifies the Director In writing of his ap-
proval and includes in his notice a descrip-
tion of the function or duty authorized to be
performed by the Agency."
S. RES. 152
A resolution to create a Select Committee
of the Senate on Foreign Intelligence
Resolved, That Rule XXV, paragraph 1, of
the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended
by inserting a new subparagraph (f) and
relettering the subsequent paragraphs ac-
cordingly. The new subparagraph (f) reads:
"(f) Select Committee on Foreign intelli-
gence, which shall be charged with
(1) conducing oversight and review of all
foreign Intelligence activities carried out by
(a) the Central Intelligence Agency
(b) the Defense Intelligence Agency
(c) the National Security Agency
(d) the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S.
Marine Corps, and the U.S. Air Force
(e) the Department of State
(f) the Atomic Energy Commission
(g) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(h) any other U.S. Government depart-
ment or agency which the Ciiairmau of the
Select Committee determines is carrying out
foreign intelligence activities;
(2) to study the implications of such ac-
tivities for United States foreign policy,
foreign economic policy, and defense policy;
(3) to review the pro. i,ions of the lsa-
tional Security Act of 194'7 with a view to-
ward recommending further restrictions on
the duties, functions, and powers of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Ao,ency; aid
(4) to report to tiro toll hmate at the end
of one year followiio t the passage of this
Resolution concerning, its 1 eneral (ti:dings.
Sec. 2. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of
the Senate is amended by inserting a new
paragraph (4) and renumbering the sub-
sequent paragraphs accordingly. The new
paragraph reads:
"4. Without regard to paragraph 7 of this
rule, the Select Committee on Foreign Intel-
ligence shall have a term of one year and
shall consist of seven members of the Senate,
four from the majority party and three from
the minority party. Two members shall be
Senators who are concurrently serving on
the Committee on Armed Services, and two
shall be Senators who are concurrently serv-
ing on the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The remaining three members shall be ap-
pointed by the President of the Senate upon
the recommendation of the policy commit-
tees of the majority and the minority. The
Select Committee shall select a Cnairrhan
and a Vice Chairman from among its mem-
bers."
SEC. 3. The Select Committee is hereby au-
thorized, for a period of one year following
the passage of this Resolution,
(a) to adopt rules concerning its proce-
dure,
(b) to hold hearings,
(c) to procure printing and binding,
(d) to make expenditures,
(e) to employ personnel, and
(f) to receive and deposit such written in-
formation as It may request from the various
Departments and Agencies listed in Section
1, and to take all appropriate steps to safe-
guard, where necessary, the confidentiality
of such information.
SEC. 4. For purposes of this Resolution-
"foreign intelligence activities" means all
activities conducted in, or directed toward,
areas other than the United States and its
territories and possessions, and relating to,
(a) the gathering of information, and
(b) the planning, conduct, and execution
of political, economic, or military activities
whose existence is not generally or publicly
acknowledged by the United States Govern-
ment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Illinois may be yielded 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Senator from Illinois is
recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, at an ex-
ecutive session of the Committee on For-
eign Relations on February 7, 1973, I
expressed to Mr. Richard Helms my feel-
ing that the CIA should have no direct
relationship with the briefing or training
of domestic police, law enforcement, or
internal security personnel. I said that
I believed those functions should be car-
ried out by the FBI.
I was aghast to learn that the CIA
had engaged in a training program or
in training sessions at the request of
the Chicago Police Department, among
other police departments of the United
States, with techniques that were de-
scribed to us in executive session. I said
that I felt this action simply had no place
in the CIA and contravened the author-
ity granted by Congress to the CIA,
which was supposed to engage ill activ-
ities outside the United States. I said
that the F11I had adequate resources to
carry on this assistance, but that if the
CIA had information that could be used,
it should be transmitted to the FBI, be-
cause the FBI had direct rr'zponsibilit.y
for domestic activities, and that the CIA
should stay totally and completely away
from that :area.
I described also my concern because
I had just I _cently visited South Korea,
where there is an agency known as the
CIA, which then engaged in interna-
tional activities besides also engaging in
domestic activities. That is a most dis-
trusted agency, and I wanted no impli-
cation that our CIA could ever become
involved in domestic affairs right here
in the United States.
Mr. Helms responded that he would
convey this information to the new Di-
rector and said he was sure that he
would abide by it.
On May 21, 1973, at an open session
with Mr. Helms, I asked him if he had
in fact conveyed this position to his suc-
cessor as Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. James Schlesinger. He responded:
I did not talk to Dr. Schlesinger directly
about this. I conveyed the sense of the Com-
mittee's statement and the Senator's state-
ment of the General Counsel of the Agency,
which was conveyed to Dr. Schlesinger. And
a few days before I left to go to my post
in Iran, I was informed that Senator Ful-
bright had written a letter to the Director
embodying in his letter these strictures. So
I assume that, therefore, the messages had
not only gotten through but the new Director
would abide by it.
The letter from Senator FULBRIGHT to
Mr. Schlesinger was dated February 8,
1973, and said that members of the com-
mittee present at the executive session
the day before had reached a consensus
"that the FBI was the proper agency to
carry on such activities-involving as-
sistance to local police departments-
and that they should be discontinued by
the CIA." Senator FULBRIGHT said he
wanted to underscore the point and to
request Mr. Schlesinger's comments
after he had familiarized himself with
the matter.
Mr. Schlesinger responded by letter to
Senator FULBRIGHT on March 1, 1973,
stating:
I have given this matter careful attention,
and am satisfied that the Agency's activities
in this connection have been consistent with
the letter and spirit of existing legislation.
Howeter, in keeping with the sensitivity of
this natter I have directed that such activi-
ties be undertaken in the future only in the
most compelling circumstances and with my
personal approval. We will, of course, comply
with applicable laws and regulations regard-
ing coordination with other Federal agencies.
Before voting on Mr. Colby's nomina-
tion, I wanted to assure myself that he
was acquainted with the discussion and
correspondence between members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and
Messrs. Helms and Schlesinger on this
matter.
I was particularly concerned to have
Mr. Colby's own views, since Mr. Schles-
inger-in his letter to Senator Fur.-
RRIGHT-had left the door ajar on this
question by indicating that such activi-
ties would be undertaken in the future
"only in the most Compelling Circum-
stances and with my personal approval.,,
Therefore. I have raised this issue with
Mr. Colby, V.-ho has responded that lie
would undertake such act.i:itics only in
the most extraordinary circumstances
and that-if the circunhstauccs appeared
to hint to be that e tr.:orrc
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