A LOOK AT US INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS RE SE ASIA 1965-75

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: August 15, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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15 August 1979
Memorandum for the Record
Subject: A Look at US Intelligence Assessments re SE Asia,
1965-75
1. In the spring of 1979, I took a look at the bulk of
the major US finished intelligence products pertaining to the
Vietnam War and Southeast Asia. These classified documents
numbered over 200, broken out below by year. They arc
predominantly CIA products.
1.965-69 57
1970 50 (incl. one SNIE)
1971 42
1972 36
1973 20 (incl. three NIEs)
5 11 (incl. one NIE and four IIMs)
1974
6 (incl. one NIE and three II11s)
22=
2. In examining these files, I was primarily interested
in those assessments which addressed Hanoi's strategy with
respect to the United States and Vietnam, to include North
Vietnamese perceptions of the US war effort; the effectiveness
of the US air war against North Vietnam; North Vietnamese
capacity to wage a prolonged war and their dependence on the
Soviet Union and China; and prospects for South Vietnam after
the January 1973 cease-fire. A very brief summary of twenty
documents selected from the above files is attached (1965-1;
1966-4; 1967-2; 1968-3; 1970-2; 1971-1; 1972-4; 1973-1; 1974-2).
3. From this brief review of these files, I have come
to the following conclusions:
a. The Agency did an exceptionally fide job in
assessing the situation in SE Asia throughout the war.
25X1
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Subject: A Look at US Intelligence Assessments re SE Asia,
1965-75
b. The Agency's judgments with respect to the
war were sound and their estimates were accurate.
c. The Intelligence Community's estimates with
respect to South Vietnam's prospects after the
January 1973 cease-fire were essentially correct.
4. a. I am not familiar with the Agency's historical
program, but it occurs to me that it would be well
worthwhile, from a national as well as Agency point of
view, to engage a group of professional historians to
write an official history of the Agency's performance
(on the intelligence side, not operational) during the
war. This should be done before memories get too dim
and files become misplaced.
b. Another thought would be to persuade active
and/or retired members of CIA familiar with the story
to get together and write such a history.
Attachment:
As stated
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War
2 March 1965 - 23 December 1974
Preamble Almost all of the documents cited below are
CIA. Two NIEs and one IIM are listed, as well
as one CIA/DIA Intelligence Report.
This list does not comprise all of the intelli-
gence papers produced during the period but only
a few (20 selected from over 200 documents
available). Those selected focus on North
Vietnam's strategy and will to prevail; the
Soviet and Chinese role in the war; the
effectiveness of the US air war against North
Vietnam; North Vietnam's manpower and logistic
capabilities to sustain its war effort; the
enemy strength buildup in South Vietnam; and
net assessments - North vs. South Vietnam; at
various points in time.
Date
of-raper Paper
8 Nov 65 CIA Intel. Report - "Evaluation of Allied (US
and_VN Air Attacks Against North Vietnam"
(Note: A sustained, but restrained air
offensive, called "Rolling Thunder", was
launched on 2 March 1965 against selected
military and economic targets in carefully
delimited areas of North Vietnam.) There
is no evidence to date (November 1965) that
air attacks have been successful in
diminishing the willingness of Hanoi
to support Communist forces in Laos and
South Vietnam.
1 Jun 66 CIA-DIA Intel. Re ort - "Appraisal of Effects
of the First Year O_ Bombing in North Vietnam"
(Note. 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited,
tnodertt economy areas - containing 75 percent of
the population and the most lucrative military
and line of communications (LOC) targets - was
tip bombed.)
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War (continued)
Hanoi has been forced to cope with
disruption, but has been very successful
in overcoming interdiction efforts. The
cost to Hanoi - diversion of labor; intro-
duction of Chinese logistic troops into
North Vietnam; and the economic and military
damage has simply been passed on to the USSR
and China. (USSR provided 70 to 95 percent
of military aid in 1965 - SAMs, AA guns,
aircraft, trucks, radar, jet fuel; China
provided infantry weapons and ammunition,
a few aircraft, and some trucks.)
rear bb CIA Intel. Memorandum - "The Role of Air Strikes
in Attaining US Objectives in North Vietnam"
Under the ground rules of employment and
force levels of 1965, bombing of North
Vietnam has obviously not achieved its
major objectives of reducing the flow of
supplies and men into South Vietnam and
of forcing Hanoi to negotiate. To the
contrary, the enemy has increased its flow
of personnel and material south and Hanoi's
determination is as firm as ever. Air
attacks could contribute more with a greater
weight of attack, but the most important
change could come from drastically revised
rules of engagement.
- North Vietnam's own industry makes only
the most marginal contribution to their
military strength; Practically their entire
support comes from external sources.
Despite US air attacks, their logistic
and.transportation system is working better
than it did 18 months ago before the bombing
began. North Vietnam is taking punishment
Aug 66 CIA Intel. Memorandum -
Wil to Persist "The Vietnamese Communists'
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War (continued)
on its own territory, but can afford the
price. In available maneuver battalions,
the Allied to Communist ratio is close to
one to one. If Hanoi can maintain this
ratio, the regime almost certainly
believes it can wear down US will.
International opinion is favorable to
North Vietnam, the USSR and China will
support Hanoi, and North Vietnamese
morale is good.
Nov 66 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "The Effectiveness of
the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam"
Effectiveness of Rolling Thunder diminished
in 1966 (January through September). US
bombing diverted manpower and increased
physical damage, but despite heavier US air
attacks, North Vietnam increased its efforts
in South Vietnam and their war capabilities
improved. The North Vietnamese manpower
drain peaked in 1965-66, and barring a great
increase in casualties, requirements will go
down in 1967. Bombing has not visibl
red
d
y
uce
Hanoi's will, nor has the air campaign changed
third
country attitudes (generally negative)
towards the war.
23 May 67 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "The Vietnam Situation:
Air Evaluation and Estimate"
The strategic balance has not been altered;
Hanoi's will has not been shaken. Hanoi
seems confident of a prolonged stalemate
which eventually will force the US to scale
down its objectives. Hanoi will continue
to base its strategy on a war of attrition
and will not negotiate from weakness. US
air attacks have reinforced their deter-
mination. Although not committed to success
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War (continued)
at any cost, China is not willing to yield
at this point. China will intervene if US
air attacks are made against Chinese bases,
or it the US makes a major invasion of
North Vietnam, or if the Hanoi government
disintegrates. The Soviet Union probably
believes that it has no alternative but to
help Hanoi until a political solution
becomes possible. A prolonged war hurts
the world image and position of the US.
North Vietnam has the manpower base to
continue such a grinding war, keep pace
with the US buildup (now 1/2 million men),
and improve its logistic position. The
future will depend on which side is more
determined.
Jan 68
CIA Intel. Memorandum - "Rolling Thunder: The
1967 Campaign Against LOCs"
- Rolling Thunder changed significantly in
scope and intensity in 1967. Industrial
targets in North Vietnam were neutralized;
new targets in heretofore restricted areas
around Hanoi and Haiphong, and in the
Chinese border area were hit for the first
time; and there was renewed emphasis on LOC
interdiction. However, North Vietnam's
logistic capabilities were not reduced, and
military and economic goods continue to move.
CIA Intel. Memorandum - "The Manpower Situation in
Nort Vietnam
North Vietnamese manpower reserves are
adequate to meet current demands. Hanoi
could support a considerably higher
mobilization effort than present levels.
(South Vietnam effectively controls only
11 to 12 million population, while North
Vietnam exceeds 18 million. Yet South
Vietnam has sustained a military force
1 1/2 times larger than North Vietnam's.
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War (continued)
If North Vietnam mobilized the same
share of population as has South Vietnam,
North Vietnam could double its present
force.)
Mar 68 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "An Assessment of
Rolling Thun er Program Through December
1967"
During a sustained and intensive inter-
diction campaign against almost every
significant military and economic target
in North Vietnam during 1967, there was
no significant weakening of North Vietnam's
military capabilities, resolution to carry
on the war, or popular support of the regime.
Air defense targets received the most damage,
but USSR/China aid resulted in a more
effective air defense system at the end of
1967. US aircraft losses went up - 366 in
North Vietnam in 1967 (16 percent increase
over 1966 losses). The ratio of US air-
craft losses to sorties went up in 1967;
in fact, the loss rate against tough
industralized targets was nine times
higher in 1967 than in 1966.
Oct 68 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "An Assessment of the
Rolling Thunder Program Through June 1968"
(Covers 1 January - 30 June 1968)
The US bombing halt north of the 19th
Parallel on 31 March 1968 resulted in
Rolling Thunder becoming almost exclusively
an interdiction campaign against logistic
targets in the Panhandle and in freeing
almost all of North Vietnam's population
and industry, as well as many key trans-
portation targets from attack. North
Vietnam continued to move large quantities
of men and supplies throughout North Vietnam
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam War (continued)
and into South Vietnam, and North Vietnam
LOCs were fully operational after the
bombing halt. During the period, a record
level of seaborne imports arrived in North
Vietnam through Haiphong and air defenses
were strengthened in the North. (107 US
aircraft were lost over North Vietnam
during the period bringing the total to 984.
1,300 US personnel have been shot down over
North Vietnam since the beginning of the US
air offensive.) The bombing halt noticeably
raised the morale of the North Vietnamese
people, supporting their leaders' contention
that North Vietnam will ultimately win.
10 Oct 70 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "Hanoi's Short-Term
Intentions
- Hanoi's fundamental views have not changed;
namely, that their struggle will be long
and painful, but they have more staying
power than their opponents (the United
States and South Vietnam).
Nov 70 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "NVA/VC Forces in South
Vietnam Estimates include both combat and
administrative/logistic forces.)
- 31 Dec 1967 Estimate - 270,000 to 315,000
(T is was the high just before Tet 1968.
Totals include 125,000 to 135,000 NVA; and
? 50,000 to 60,000 VC - Combat)
- 31 Dec 1968 Estimate - 250,000 to 290,000
Inclu es 120,000-130,000 NVA; and 50,000-
60,000 VC - Combat)
- 31 Mar 1970 Estimate - 210,000 to 250,000
Inc u es 95, 0 -105,000 NVA; and 35,000-
45,000 VC - Combat)
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Notes from Intelligence Documents on Vietnam (continued)
(Note: CIA was not in the Order of Battle (0; B) business
until late 1967 just before Tet 1968. After the enemy
offensive of Tet 1968, 0/B matters became the focus of much
greater attention on the part of the Intelligence Community.
By late 1968, CIA and DIA reached agreement on NVA units and
strengths, but not on Viet Cong s renctl-i and attrition r_at,os.
MACV in May 1969 completed i_ts first al-1-source 0/B, an
improvement over previous estimates, but generally too low in
numbers of personnel in CIA's view. By mid--1970, CiA and DIA
were able to agree generally on all. (NVA and VC) main force,
administration and logistic units and str.eugths, but were
never able to agree completely on guerrilla and political
cadre strengths. The capture of numerous enemy documents in
Cambodia show COSVN HQ, the high command in South Vietnam,
was overrun, was a major factor in solidifying agreement
between CIA and DIA, and confirmed the correctness of the
generally higher numbers held by CIA.)
May 71 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "North Vietnam's
Capa i ities to Continue to Wage War"
Hanoi's military supplies and war-
supporting goods come almost exclusively
from the Soviet Union and China. The
manpower and material burdens on North
Vietnam over the past six years have been
manageable and acceptable. Manpower and
material resources available for continuing
the war are clearly adequate to support any
of the strategic options (from protracted
warfare to all-out countrywide offensive)
Hanoi might choose to follow in l`5i2.
10 Apr 7 CIA Intel. Memorandum - "Net Assessment of
North Vietnc:mesa' aria ;,uth Vietn