EARLIER ESTIMATES ON IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010032-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 18, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010032-8
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18 July 1979
Subject; Earlier Estimates on Iran
Estimates on Iran: 1960 - 1975, The Record
NIE - Outlook for Iran - 16 February 1960
Estimative emphasis is on the stability of the Shah's
regime and chances of an upheaval. The military and security
forces are seen as main support of Shah but also as chief
potential threat to his regime. (A coup attempt might take
place any time.)
While the odds on an upheaval are difficult to assess,
on the whole the chances are estimated to be against a coup;
but a coup might be triggered by civil disturbances threatening
public disorder.
However, the paper notes new internal threats generated
by economic developments and difficulties that are apt to
weaken the Shah's position. The "long-run importance of this
civilian opposition cannot be discounted." "If a dramatic
issue and effective leadership should emerge, the opposition
would probably be able to mobilize popular support for attacks
on the present order."
NIE -- Prospects for Iran - 28 February 1961
Focus primarily domestic. Growing political unrest of
urban middle-class more openly manifested. "While a political
upheaval could take place in Iran at any time, the odds are
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Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
against such a development in the next year or two. However,
profound political and social change in one form or another is
virtually inevitable. The nature of Iranian politics and the
character of the Shah make it unlikely that this change will be
evolutionary"
SNIE - Political Prospects for Iran - /September 1962
Focus internal. "Before long (the Shah) will almost
certainly again become the direct target of political pressures
and general discontent. As long as he retains control of the
army and security forces, the chances are that he will be able
to ride out such crises, but each time a serious crisis rises,
the possibility of his overthrow or even his voluntary abdication
will be present."
SNIE - The Iranian Situation - 10 April 1963
Focus internal. Conclusion similar to above: Forces are
set in motion that it will be difficult to organize and direct.
However, chances of Shah remaining in control are good.
NIE - Iran - 20 May 1964
Focus domestic. It is held to be uncertain whether
modernization will prove relatively peaceful or whether
violence and revolution are in store. Shah's reforms
stimulate and shape forces that must bring eventually
profound changes in Iranian society, one way or another.
However, the Shah, supported by the armed forces, seems
likely to dominate Iranian political life for some time to
come.
NIE - Iran - 24 March 1966
Focus domestic and foreign policy. Shah is aware that
his domestic position depends on US support. He will probably
remain firtniy in control though the bulk of the educated
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Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
middle class will remain estranged from his regime. Religious
conservative opposition is also noted but it is said to be
muzzled and leaderless. The opposition is highly unlikely to
come to power because it is disparate and fragmentary.
Special Memorandum - The Shah's Increasing Assurance - 7 May 1968
Focus mainly external. The Shah is said to have dramatically
strengthened the position of the monarchy during the past decade.
He has undercut the already fragmented opposition by carrying
out economic and social reforms. From a timorous, titular
monarch he has turned into a self-confident potentate. Longer-
range problems remain, but for some time to come the unrest of
earlier days seems under control. Over the long term, the Shah's
policy of rapid industrialization will probably not provide a
satisfactory substitute for greater political participation, but
for some time to come the unrest of earlier days seems under
control.
SNIE - Iran's International Position - 3 September 1970
Focus primarily external. Shah's internal position is
said to be solid. The economy is booming.. There is no
organized opposition. The conservative Muslim clergy is only
mumbling.
NIE - Problems in the Persian Gulf - 7 June 1973
Focus on external problems. The Shah is keeping domestic
frustration and hostility under firm control by means of the
'White Revolution" and repression of dissent.
NIE - Iran - 9 .May 1975
Focus both domestic and external. "We see little prospect
during the next fern years for a serious challenge to the Shah's
authoritarian ddht3'ot over Iran's internal affairs." Nevertheless,
his monopoly of decisiottttiaking is incurring political costs in
terms df gfdWifg alienation and discontent. Strains within
Iranian society seetti destined to grow.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010032-8
Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
Comment
1. Estimates were more frequent during the 1960s
(especially early 1960s) than in the 1970s. Why?
2. The main focus of the first five estimates was on
Iran's internal affairs. In 1966 the emphasis shifts to its
foreign role. The last estimate (1975) dealt with both sides.
3. Relatively speaking, the analytical and estimative
quality of estimates was better during the first part of the
1960s than afterwards. The earlier estimates reflected an
understanding that rapid economic development was bound to be
destabilizing in this autocracy and that a violent upheaval,
though not imminent, was almost certain to occur in the longer
run. (In retrospect, these estimates were very good.)
4. The NIE of March 1966 breaks with the estimative
thrust of the preceding papers. The new tone is strongly
established in the Special Memorandum of May 1968. The Shah's
position is now seen as solid and the opposition, even though
present and perhaps growing, is perceived to be weak and divided.
It appears that this new estimative thrust prevailed through
1978 and the approach (seen in retrospect) of a revolutionary
crisis.
5. The intriguing question is: Why did this change in
basic assumptions occur in 1966 and 1967? I do not know and
can only list some possibilities.
a. Was it induced by a "cry wol$" phenomenon?
(This is not very plausible because the earlier
estimates placed the probability of a serious upheaval
in the fat future.)
b. Was it induced by Iran's rapidly expanding
armed forces and by their perception as an effective
means of suppressing any active opposition?
b. t'as it induced by a deterioration in the flow
of ihf6tftidt1vti7 And if so, why did this happen? Was
it idigeiy that information on Iran's domestic politics
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Subject: Earlier Estimates on Iran
was given a reduced priority because of the new
prevailing assumption that the Shah's hold on power
was firm?
d. Was it induced by a change in US policy
toward Iran? And if so, in what manner?
e. Was it induced by a change in the quality
of the analysts?
f. Was it a consequence of INR's contraction?
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