DETECTING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 1, 2012
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 2, 1979
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3.pdf135.13 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 -EGIB' 2 May 1979 ie Requirements and Evaluation Staff/NFAC SUBJECT Detecting Political and Social Changes 1. our suggestion, I have consulted with Professor at Princeton about suitable academics to assemble or a discussion of methods for detecting political and social change of consequence for estimative efforts. - Princeton (Africa) - Chicago (Middle East) - Univ. of Washington (India) - Pennsylvania (India) - Harvard (Brazil) - UC Berkeley (Far East) - UCLA (Africa) - SAIS (Urban Violence) - Yale (Southeast Asia) - Yale (Latin America) - Wisconsin (Zaire) - Princeton (Egypt) - Chicago (Africa) 2. All of these people are experts on general problems of political development as well as area specialists. 3. I do not know whether or not they would want to make themselves available. I happen to know that once turned down the CIA on consultation. I a so know definitely that there would be no problem on this ground Senior Review Panel STAT STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01_ CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 ? . -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 S T cc 5Ri II' 441 18 April 1979 Senior view Panel Evaluation Staff/NFAC ie Requirements and 1. The Intelligence Community recently has suffered con- siderable criticism about its ability to detect significant social and political changes in several countries. The most recent examples have been the PDRY, Afghanistan, and Iran. The unsophisticated critics of the craft of intelligence probably ex- pect too much from us in this regard but, at the same time, there is a wide-spread feeding in the Intelligence community that we could do better than our recent track record. 2. The D/DCI/NFA recently requested that I look into this problem with emphasis upon: defining popular movements, political instability, social movements portending change and instability formulating specific collection requirements for use by field collectors determining feasibility of collecting useful infor- mation on social/political change developing a model for such a collection program selecting a country where we could test the model either by simulation or with a pilot collection program. I 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 SLTBJEC T : Detecting Political and Social Changes Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 3. Please review the attached draft work plan with your colleagues and then we could exchange some ideas. After reviewing the work plan, I contemplate discussing it with Bob Bowie before involving other people. 4. This memorandum and its attachment are classified Secret. Attachment: As stated -2- S E C R E T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01: CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3 I. Establish core group to follow project from beginning to end: -- Representatives from OPA, DDO, OCR, FBIS, State, and Senior Review Panel. -- Discuss information potentially available, Sources, applicability of available information to intelligence problems, timeliness of potential information. -- Assemble list of academics who have done pertinent research in methodologies related to determining social/ political change and those who have done country/regional analysis of social and political change. II. Reports from academics specializing in social/political change: -- Group meetings on this subject should be sponsored by State to avoid public CIA involvement. -- Selected academics, those of special interest and appro- priately cleared, could meet under CIA auspices if we need to hold in-depth discussions. III. Core group reviews results of consultations with academics: {ov -- Sift academic experience frdn common themes and methodologies. -- Identify academic successes and failures. -- Relate academic techniques to operational environment and collection opportunities. -- Relate potential information to production requirements. IV. Core group selects one or two countries for testing its findings. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010019-3