COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS ILLICIT TRAFFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-01394R000200120002-3
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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 18, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL
Distr.
GENERAL
E/IT/1982/56
18 July 1984
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
ILLICIT TRAFFIC
Mexico
A copy of the relevant chapter of the Annual Report for 1982 is
communicated herewith.
The present document is based on data provided by States both Parties and
non-Parties to the relevant treaties on the control of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, and the-designations employed and the presentation of
material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of
the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any
country, territory, city or area or any authority, or concerning the
delimitation of any frontiers or boundaries.
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E/IT/1982/56
page 2
CHAPTER VIII. ILLICIT TRAFFIC (Form of Annual Reports E/NR. Form/1982)
Paragraphs
A. GENERAL
90. Illicit traffic in drugs: Yes.
Illicit cultivationi harvesting._ manufacture; diversion from licit channels
91a-b. 1 273 hectares of illicit cultivation of opium poppy (10 to 20
poppies per square meter) were discovered in the following States: Sinaloa,
Guerrero, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Durango, Michoacan and Sonora, in that order of
magnitude. The Permanent Campaign of the Mexican Government undertaken by the
Attorney-General with the aid of the Mexican Army to destroy such cultivation
was intensified by aerial spraying and by direct ground action.
92a-b. No.
93a-b. 887 hectares of illicitly cultivated cannabis plants (10 to 20
plants per square meter) were detected in the States of Sinaloa, Oaxaca,
Jalisco, Michoacan, Guerrero, Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Durango and Chihuahua. The
same campaign as in paragraph 91a-b. was undertaken against the illicit
cultivation of cannabis.
94a-b. No.
95a-b. Wild cannabis growth was also discovered and destroyed as part
of the campaign described in para. 91a-b.
96a-b. Mainly heroin, and to a smaller extent, psychotropic
substances were illicitly manufactured in the following regions:
Heroin: in Sinaloa, Chihuahua and the Federal District.
Psychotropic substances: in Tamaulipas.
During the dismantling of clandestine laboratories 350 g of
heroin, 20 it. of opium, and 2 kg 100 g of methaqualone tablets were seized.
Opium, acetic anhydride, solvents and various acids were used for the
manufacture of diacetylmorphine (heroin). Opium is always of illicit origin
whereas the other materials are available in legitimate commerce.
97a-b. Diversion from licit channels of psychotropic substances
(depressants and stimulants) was reported in Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Lower
California and Sonora. No quantities available.
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Smuggling and trafficking
98a-99. Drug offences were mainly related to cultivation, possession,
transport and illegal exportation of opiates and cannabis herb. Cocaine
seized was usually in transit from Central and South America to the United
States of America. Internal concealment (swallowing of capsules containing
cocaine) was a new feature and was frequently used. Traffickers continued to
use the traditional routes.
100a. Drugs seized in 1982:
100b.
Prices
101a-b.
Opium
Morphine
Heroin
Cocaine
Cannabis
Poppy seeds
Cannabis seeds
Amphetamines and other
stimulants
Barbiturates
Methaqualone
LSD
Other hallucinogens
(Peyote-mescaline)
and purity of illicit drugs
Wholesale :
Weight/quantity Number of seizures
65 kg
312 g
8 kg
399 kg
71 174 kg
14 kg
767 kg
1 887 doses
321 201 doses
2 kg 100 g
145 doses
41 kg
50
1
60
67
1 411
30
71
US$*/
11
45
1
5
Opium
1
000
000
6
700
Heroin (purity 70%)
30
000
000
201
000
Cocaine
(purity 70%)
30
000?000
201
000
Cannabis
herb
15
000
000
100
500
per kg
per kg
per kg
per ton
Retail: No details available. However, retail prices
fluctuated in relation to the quantity of drugs sold, to the
degree of purity and to the region of acquisition. The prices
also varied considerably depending on the rate and kind of
exchange of US dollar.
Fluctuations in prices were due, in general, to a decrease in
he availability of drugs, thanks to the results achieved by the National
Permanent Campaign.
, Rate of exchange: mn$ 1 . US$ 0.0067
(United Nations rate as of 15 July 1983)
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Prosecutions
101d. Adulterants: principally lidocaine and novocaine (procaine).
102. 4 032 persons were arrested and 3
connection with drug offences:
arrested
005 were prosecuted in
Number of persons
prosecuted
Opium
57
49
Morphine
8
8
Heroin
96
82
Other opiates
44
40
Cocaine
64
64
Cannabis plants and seeds 1
210
1
100
Cannabis herb 2
428
1
543
Amphetamines and other stimulants
38
34
Depressants
75
73
LSD and other hallucinogens
12
12
103a-b. A high percentage of the persons detained were cultivators of
both opium poppy and cannabis.
104a-b. Foreigners involved with heroin, cocaine and cannabis herb:
71% North Americans, 25% Central and South Americans (from Belize, Colombia,
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, etc.) and 4% from other continents.
B. ORGANIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT
105. Organizations responsible: Office of the Attorney-General of
the Republic and auxiliary units.
106. Specialized units: Office of the Attorney-General of the
Republic, personnel of the Federal Public Ministry and Federal Judicial Police
(provided with modern technical equipment for detection and destruction of
illicit cultivation, and particularly for a selective application of
herbicides) and specially trained technical personnel such as pilots using
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, aircraft mechanics, etc..
107. Co-ordination is maintained through the Public Health Law and
regulations made thereunder, the Federal Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal
Code with its Regional Code covering the Federal District and with the Federal
Code applied to the whole Republic.
108a. The office ensuring liaison on a national basis forms part of
the services responsible for the National Central Bureau of 'CPO/Interpol.
.109a-h. Regional liaison is maintained through Interpol.
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Suggestions
110a-b. Closer contacts with neighbouring or adjacent countries of the
American region, like those that have been built up between Mexico and the
United States, should be established to fight and suppress the illicit traffic
in dangerous drugs. There should be a mechanism to exchange information on
the causes and systems of illicit traffic, on police methods, on means of
co-ordinating action and other topics of concern to countries confronting drug
trafficking problems. Regional meetings should be convened for
representatives of the countries of the area to enable them to exchange
Information, experience and methods of work, so that all could benefit from
the facilities and training for drug enforcement personnel which certain
countries may be able to provide.
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t
B-175425
COMPTROLLER ZOENERAL CF 11-n: U1.4 11M. STATE .
WASHIWZTOti. U.C. zosea
.To the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate
This is our report entitled, "Efforts to Stop Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs Coming From and Through Mexico and
Central America."
We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act
of 1950 (31 U.S.0 67).
?We are sending copies of this report to?the Dire,:tor,
Office .of Management and Budget; the Secretary of State.;. and
the Attorney C..r.eral
AA"
Comptroller General
of the United States
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Contents
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION
Organization of antidrug activities
overseas
Scope of review
Page.
1
SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO 6
Transshipment of drugs 6
Indigenous source of drugs 6
Drug enforcement objectives 13
Mexican Government activities 13
U.S. goals in_Mexico 14
United_States and Mexican- enforcement
accomplishments. 15
Projects for better defining drug
trafficking - 16
3 ENFORCEMENT ACTIN IN MEXICO 18
Mexican Government control nominal in
?some avas 18
? Problems of Mexican Federal police 18
Drug trafficking information often not
available to DEA 20
Limited 'capability hinders Mexican
? efforts - 25
Mexican customs at international ports
of entry need improvement 27 .
Alternatives to extradition 28
Conclusions 29
Recommendations 30
Agency comments 30
4 DRUG TRAFFICKING FROM AND THROUGH CENTRAL
AMERICA
Guatemala
Costa Rica
British Honduras
Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua
Conclusion
34
34
35
36
36
37
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3
APPENDIX
Letter dated August, 5, 1974, from the Acting
Assistant Attorney .General for Admini.istra-
tiOnDepartment of justice
Letter dated August 5, 1974, from the Deputy
Assistant Seeretary for Budget and Fi-
nance, Dep-artment of State
necent ?drug enr.orcement reports issued by
GAO
.Principal officials 'xesponsible for admin-
istering activities discussed in this
? report
ABBREVIATIONS
gNDD ,Bureau of Narcotic's and Dangerous Drugs'
DEA Drug,Enforcement Administration :
GAO ?General Accounting Office
',X111 Offite'of Management and Budget
45
49
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
D:IGEST
WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE
The flow of narcotics and dangerous
drug from and through Mexico to the
United States is increasing.
In 1971 about 20 percent of the
heroin, 90 percent of the marihuana,
80 percent of the dangerous drugs,
and much of the cocaine consumed in
this country came from and throug!-,
Mexico. By.late 1973 heroin flow-
ing from and through Mexico to the
United States had ?increased to about
half the total consumption.
In September and October 1974, Drug
Enforcement Administration officials
eStim,Aed that
?70 percent of all neroin? reaching
the United Statcs comes from
. poppies grown in Mexico;
-. virtually all the marihuana seized
comes from Mexico and the Carib-
bean;
--abort 3 billion tablets of danger-
ous drugs, valued at more than
$1.6 billion on the illicit market,
comes from Mexico in .a year; and
--cocaine, which is becoming a pref-
erred drug of abuse, passes
through Mexico on its way from
South and Central America.
Central America is also a potentially
important transshipment point for
drugs coming to the United States.
:Lent Sheet. Upon iernoval, the report
cover date should be noted hereon.
?- EFFORTS TO STOP NARCOTICS AND ?
DANGEROUS DRUGS COMING FROM AND
THROUGH MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department. of Justice
Department of State
Accordingly, GAO examined U.S.
programs designed to reduce the flow
of drugs coming from and through
Mexico and Central America.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The United States is trying to stop
the flow of drugs from Mexico by:
--Forcibly preventing shipment of
drugs to the United States
(called interdiction).
--Eliminating illicit production
in Mexico.
--Assisting the Mexican Government's?
antidrug efforts.
The U.S. Ambassador, as the
President's representative, is
responsible for seeing that U.S.
objectives are achieved. In the
drug area he is supported by
--the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, the prime U.S. enforcement
agency, maintaining liaison with
Mexican Government narcotics en-
forcement agencies, and
--drug control committees in each
country.. (See pp. 2 and 3.)
PLuress
Since 1969 the United States and
Mexican Goveinments' antidrug ef-
forts have:-
GGD-75-44
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--Increased drug seizures-, opium and
? marihuana eradication, and arrests.
--Provided better information on
drug trafficking.
--Improved Mexican capability
through material assistance grants
. and training.
--Increased cooperation and discus.-
sion at ,high diplomatic levels.
(See pp. 15 and 16.)
FiobleMs
Even with this progress, increasing
amounts of drugs continue to reach
the United States.
Factors which have hindered greater
effectiveness in reducing the flow
o4: drugs to the United States include
--lack of full cooperation betwce.n-
the two Cuvernments regarding drug
information and extradition and ?
--limited technical resources and
manpower. (See pp. 20 to 25.)
Looperation
One way to reduce the flew Of drugs
to the United States is the exchange
of accurate data about the activities
of known and suspected drug traf-
fickers between the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Mexican Fed-
eral police. The Drug Enforcement
Administration, however, has had
only limited opportunity to inter-
rogate: persons arrested by the Fed-
eral police for drug crimes and
-.sometimes was denied accessto in-
formation the police obtained.
(See p. 20.)
lambilization of drug traffickers
is further hindered because drug
11
la.affickers who flee to Mexico
not prcsecuted and incaceerated.
Mexico readily grants citizenship
to 'persons havino Mexican parents
or background, regardless of the
solicitant's place ef t,irth. Some
of them, before becowin.si Mexican
residents, lived in the United
States unt-L they were conyicted or
suspected of violating U.S. drug
laws.
The Administration estimate that
more than 250 such persons now live
in Mexico. Some still traffick in
ci,-ugs. Because they are Mexican ?
or the Mexican Government
refuses to extradite them to the
United States for prosecution.
In a few cases, Mexican citizens
have been convicted in Mexico for
drug violations in the ?United
States. Greater use of this proce-
dure might deter Mexicans who have
violated-U.S. drug laws from tisiyj
Mexico as a sanctuary from prosecu-
tion. (See p..25.)
Material assistance
lexico is not only a major trans-
Oipment area but also an indigenous
source Of drugs. Its sparcely pop-
ulated and rugged mountains make
location and eradication of clandes-
tine cultivation areas difficult
and time cOnsuming.
Its extended border w.th the ',Initen -
States and two long coastlines
afford- traffickers virt:ally un-
limited locations for smuggling.
1-his, in turn, makes it harder for
its ill-equipped police to ioci,te
trafficking routes. ? (See Pp-6
and 25.)
Since 1970 the United States has
given Mexico SG .8 million in
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equipment, such. as helicopters for
troop transportation. ?Additional
equipmenL has been approved by the--
Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control.. (See p. 26.)
More than 250 of the 350-member
Mexican Federal _police force have.
been trained in drug enforcement
procedures by the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration; this training
is continuing. (See p. 26;)
'The United States is also providing
equipment? and .training to the .Mex-
ican Customs Service. (See p. 27.)
Other maUers
DEA has had some success in locating
and eliminating narcotics laborato-
ries in other countries by publicly
'offering rewards for information
about drug traffickers'.
Though the Administration has had
information for a number of years
that heroin laboratories are operat-
ing in at, least eight areas in Mex-
ico, no significant laboratory had
been seized until February 5, 1974.
Since then six other laboratories
.have been seized.
GAO believes that publicly offering
rewards would increase the. identi-
fication of illicit laboratories,
hut the Mexican Government has not
agreed to offer rewards for informa-
tion, despite. repeated U.S. requests.
Although the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration recognizes that many ocean-
(ming vessels and aircraft are used
in moving .drugs from Mexico illic-
itly, it had not monitored the use
of oceangoing vessels and aircraft
by drug traffickers. (See pp. 18 and
22.)
The Mexican Government recognized
that corruption exists at many of
its levels, including the Mexican
Federal police, and developed plans
to overcome this problem, such as
reorganizing the police: This
reorganization was to begin in
January 1973, but no action had
been taken as of September 1974..
-(See p. 18.)
Central America
Central America is not currently
considered a prime source in trans
shipping drugs to the United State:;;,
however, it does offer trafficker;
many of the same benefits as doe':,
Mexico-.
As enforcement improves in Mexico,
the Drug Enforcement Administraton
expects traffickers to make greater
use Of the Central Ameritan coun-
tries. Plans are being developed,
and the Administration plans to
assign agents to these'countrieS.-
(See p. 34.)
RECOMMENDATIONS.
The Attorney General', in coopera-
tion with the Secretary of State,
-should improve information gather-
ing and cooperation in Mexico by
encouraging the Mexican Government
to ?
--share information obtained durin(.1
interrogation of suspected drug
traffickers and
--prosecute traffickers fleeing
to -Mexico within the Mexican
judicial system if Mexico con-
tinues to refuse extradition.
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AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Department of Justice
The unclassified version of the De-
partment of Justice's comments' are
?included in appendix I. A copy of
the Department's- classified response
will be made available to authorized
persons upon request.
The justice Department
--agrees with GAO's analysis of ex-
tradition problems and the possi-
bility of prosecuting people in
Mexico for violations of U.S.
statutes and .
?--recognizes the merit of some ob-
servations concerning enforce-
ment operations.
However, the Department believes
GAO's findings, conclusions, and rei.-
orme,Iations have serious weakness-
es. The Department believes the
report is a random collection of ob-
servations and includes items of
secondary importance and that it
ignores some significant issues,
such as (1) investigative proce-
dures used by the Mexican Judicial
Police, (2) lack of operating agree-
ments betweer. the Drug Enforcement
Administration and local Mexican
police officers on custody and pro-
secution of arrested carriers, and
(3) problems created for U.S. border
investigations by the policy of the
Government of Mexico which requires
that known narcetics-and dangerous
drugs being smuggled out of Mexico
be seized in Mex!co. ? (This policy
prevents the identification of
U.S. traffickers by keeping .0-1,2
drugs under .surveillance until they
are delivered.)
iv
GAO recognizes that many problems
affect the effoas to stop the
flow of narcutics and dangerous
drugs into the?United States and
that .these problems and .their
s'erious.nesS change from time to
time.
At the completion of GAO's field-
work in late 1973, GAO's findings
were discussed with appropriate
U.S. agency officials in the field
and in Washington. At that time
GAO had not identified, nor had
.agency officials recognized, the
three above areas mentioned by the
Department as causing major prob-
lems .
if the Department ha S sufficient
evidence to identify these areas
as causing real problems to their
efforts to stop the flow of
narcotics and dangerous drIls into
the United States, no additional
work by GAO to develop these probe
lam should be necessary. GAO
-
suggests that the Department con-
tinue to work with the Government
of Mexico to overcome these prob-
lems.
The DeparLment also commented ex-
tensively on hew it believed (1)
the Government of Mexico could im-
prOve its drug enforcement activi-
ties aid (2) U.S. operations on
the border could be improved, It
said that actions had been or were
being taken to imprJve activities
in both areas but that more efforts
were needed.
The Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion's comments on specific actions
planned or being taken on GAO's rece
ommendations are included in the
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body ? of the report.-- (Seep. 22 ,11(1
. 32.)
Department of State ?
The Department ef State (see app:
II) endorsed the recommendations
and said actions are underway and
will he pursued. These actions are
included in the body of the report.
(See p. 32.)
MAITERS FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE CONGRESS
This report is being sent to. the
C(..ngresS td advise it of efforts':
needed and .being taken to reduce
the flow of drugs into the United
States froM Mexicd and Cental
America. The rep-Ott should be use-
ful to these committees having over-
ight in this area.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Sources of illicit drugs in the United States represent
an international problem. Mexico plays an important 1.64.e in
illicit drug trafficking, as an indigenous source and as a
transshipment point for illicit drugs originating from
countries all over the world.
U.S. authorities estimated that in 1971 drugs flowing
from and through Mexico represented 20 percent of the..
heroin, 90 percent of the marihuana, and SO percent of the
illicit dangerous drugs (amphetamines and barbiturates)
consumed in the United States. By late 1973 this flow of
heroin totaled about half the U.S. consumption.
In September and October 1974 Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DIA), Department of Justice, officials estimated
that
--70 percent of all heroin reaching. the United States
comes from poppies grown in Mexico;
--virtually all the marihuana
and the Caribbean;
seized comes from Mexico
--about 3 billion tablets of dangerous drugs, valued
more -than $1.6 billion on the illicit market,
'comes from Mexico in a year; and
at
--cocaine, which is becoming a preferred drug of abuse,
passes through Mexico on its way from South and
Central America.
Large seizures of drugs in the United States have also
been traced directly to' Central America. Some of these
drugs were transshipped through Mexico. As ehforcement
efforts in Mexico become more successful DEA expects drug
trafficking in Central America to increase,
aulassersatiaareausei
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? ORGAN1:ATION OF ANTIDRUG
ACT IV rfJPS. OVERSEAS_ ?
DEA
DEA is ',..he 'prime .Federal agency charged with enforcing
the U.S. narcotic and dangerous drug laws. DEA was established
July 1, 1)73, by Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 2, which
transferred to DEA (1) all the functions. and personnel of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the Office
for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, and the Office of National
Narcotics Intelligence, Department of Justice, and
(2) the functions and personnel-of the U.S. Customs Service
relating to dom...:tic and foreign narcotics intelligence and
investigations. .
DEA employs about 2,200 avnts, of which 132 were
stationed overseas .as of December 31, .1973. DEA 's appropria-
tion for fiscal year 1974 is about $112 million. For fiscal
year 1975 PEA has .requested?an appropri.ation of about
$141 1lion The .1974 apropriation and t1'1975 apdrooriatic'n
request are broken down into the following areas of a.ctivity.
Budget activity
Thw encorcement:
Criminal enforcement
C.--,.1pliance and regulation
Sate and local assistance
1ntelli.gence?-
.esearch and. development
.xecutive direction
Total
1974 :
appropriation
1975
reouesr
.-(000 omitted)
S 80,383 $104,109
9,4.08 10,644
9,891 10,798
8,37:3-
65025,515 6,0.17
215 234
_ .
.S111,)14 5140,775
Six of DEA's 19 regional offices. are located in foreign
:.ountries, including 1 in Mexico City which. is responsible
for administering DEA programs involving Mexico and all
Central America north of Panama.. As of August 31, 1974,
this office was staffed with 21 agents,..one of which was
stationed in Costa Rica, In addition,.157.agents were
2
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stationed on the U.S. border and 54 agents were in special
task forces working Mexican- drug cases...
. In October-1974 DEA. said that it planned to assign 16
more 'agents to the Mexico City -regional office and that they
should he in. Mexico by December 1974.-
U.S. Embassies
In 1971, U.S Embassy involvement in drug law enforce-
ment increased in many countries as a result of the
President's directive establishing drug control committees
in foreign nations important to illicit drug traffiching.
The committees are responsible for coordinating and guiding
U.S. antidrug activities in their respective countries.
The committees'jirst task was to develop plans outlining,
among other topics, the (1) host country's influence on the
U.S. drug problem, (2) U.S. goals and objectives to
counteract, ,this influence, and (3) specific steps to achieve
these goals and objectives. In Mexico, committee membership
includes representatives from DEA, the U.S. Customs Service,-
the Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation: To assist in gathering and analyzing
pertinent data, a Subcommittee on Narcotics Intelligence was
established. Committees in Central America are similarly
organized.
Cabinet Committee on
International Narcotics Control
The Cabinet Committee was established in September
1971 to formulate and coordinate Federal Government policies.
for eliminating the illegal flow of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into th2eUnited States from other countries. The
Secretary of State servesas chairman and membership in-
cludes the Attorney General; Secretaries of Defense, the
Treasury, and Agriculture; U.S. Representative le the- United
Nations;:and Director of the Central intelligence Agency. A?
working group within the Cabinet Committee is composedof
assistant secretary-level personnel from each member agency.
This group supports the Cabinet Committee and consists of
six functional subcommittees: intelligence, Law Enforcement,
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1
Public Information, Diplomacy and Foreign-Aid, Congressional,
Relations, and Rehabilitation Treatment and Research. A
coordinating subcommittee was also established, to coordinate
narcotics control activities among interested agencies ,and
departments and for other duties:
The Cabinet Committee has specific responsibility for:
--Developing comprehensive plans an programs for inter.-
national drug control.
--Insuring coordination of all diplomatic, intelligence,
and Federal law enforcement programs and?activities of
international scope.
--Evaluating all such programs and activities and their
implementation. ?
--Making recomm,rndations to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) on proposed fundings
--Providing periodic progress reports to the President.
It has directed U:S. int.rnazional drug control efforts t(..ward
interdicting narcotic drugs, particularly heroin. and its prcur-
scrs. To accomplish this interdiction, the Cabinet Committ:e
assignea highest overseas priority to improving the collection,
analysis, and use of drug information and to upgrading the
quality of. foreign drug law enforcement.
The Cabinet Committee requested narcotic concrol plans
from U.S. Embassies in countries considered to be involved in
producing, consuming, or transiting illicit hard drugs. Those
plans include a description of the drug situation, statement
of goals (see P. 14), estimated costs, priorities, and a
general timetable. They are reviewed by the State Department's
regional Interagency Narcotics Control Committees, the Cabinet
Committee's working group,.and finally by the Cabinet Commit-
tee. When the plans are approved, they are returned to the
foreign posts and serve as a basis for ,opening discussions
with host governments for the negotiation of bilateral control
plans,
The Department of State has overall authority for the
control of narcotics funds appropriated under the Foreign
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Assistance Act. For fiscal years 1973 and 1274 approx-
imately $5.97 Million will have been Obligated under this
act to fund the ,aCtivities of the Cabinet Committee in
Mexico, Another $5 million is expected to be expended in
fiscal year 1975 in Mexico..
SCOPE OF REVIEW'
We examined Mexico's and Central America's role in
supplying illicit drugs to the United States and DY,A and
U.S. Embassy efforts to confront the problem.We made our
review at:
--DEA's Washington, D.C., headquarters and Mexico City
regional office.
--U.S. Embassies in Mexico City; San Jose-, Costa Rica-;
Guatemala City, Guatemala; and Managua, Nicaragua.
--Department of State, Washington, D.C.
We examined DEA documents and DEA and other agencies'
flies on drug control_ activities,
Photographs in this report were supplied by DIA.
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CHAPTER -2 ?
SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO
Illicit drug .traffic from and through Mexico to the .
United States is difficult to intercept because traffickers
may use either land, air, .or water, routes for smuggling
illicit_drugs. Also, many sections of Mexico are spaice-ly?
populated anddifficult to police effectively.
TRANSSHIPMENT OF DRUGS ?
Narcotics are transported to Mexico by means of inter-
national air lines, oceangoing freighters, and land. -A 1972
U.S. Government report stated that about 18 percent of the
heroin.consumed in. the United States had .been smuggled
through Mexico. An example of this smuggling is illustrated
by the following case. A retired Mexican army general was
arrested- by French authorities in 1972 as he attempted to
leave France. He had in his possession about 130 pounds of
heroin which .he intended to. pass through Mexican -custOms . ?
for smuggling to the United States. Over. the past. few years
he had made ss-veral trip3 to France, which DEA belicved were
for the purpose of smuggling heroin.
Mexico also serves as a transshipment point iol coca inc
destined for the United States. Almost all of the world's
cocaine is cultivated in South America... Approximately
200 pounds. of cocaine the prOcess of being transshipped to
the United States were seized in Mexico in 1972.
INDIGENOUS SOURCE OF DRUGS
Many illicit drugs used in the United States are
produced in Mexic.o. Sparcely populated mountainous terrain,
climate favorable to growing opium poppies and marihuana,
and limited governmental control in some areas have been
essential elements to the increasing production of ill ict
drugs.
DEA estimated that about. 90 percent of the marihuana
consumed in the United States is produced ? in or transshipped
through Mexico. DEA reports indicate that increasing num-
bers of-dangerous drugs, i.e., amphetamines and barbitu-
rates, are being produced in Mexico. Clandestine lab-.
oratories in Mexico obtain the basic ingredients for
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MAP GF MARIHUANA MD OPIUM GROWING 'AREAS IN MEXICO
UNITED STATES
V**.ihIiuua (Ji
0 oo.
*00 -
13:641-*
\*
Paz
PACIFIC OCEAN
gi =Opium
9 = Marihuanc
GULF OF MEXICO
pia)
4.1,114&, , eXIOVY., 7.3.1r , V,/4,01,0,,,fp? , 41.1,1,`,4101.01,'4194.,
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Most opium grown: Nrexico
IS cultivai.c..d in States bordel.ing
Olt' Pacific Oc.en.. The Sirra
Madrc Mountains provide a
haen foi.many maU farmers v:ito
ili ivplots .:.;f.9pitiin p'oppi(is.
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'
QUJiM POEFY Fl LDS IN
The .averaile size of opium .
poppy field is about 1 acre,. The
Mexican farmer is to plant
his plot or glows I un his own
and sells the opium glIM to the
buyer who visits the area.
9
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_pQpi)y. .N.fE J.P. J.V111.. X ICO ?
..Closcup of opium poppies.
ieady for harvest in the
. Mexican mountains.
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producing dangerous drugs 'frem United States and European
drug supply houses. For example, .a laboratory in Mex.ico.,
which was an affiliate of a U.S. pharmaceutical firm, was
closed down in April 1972 by the Government of Mexico for
. illegal production and sale af amphetamines. the
amphetamines were made with ingredients obtained legally
from the U.S: affiliate. During 1972 the Government of
: Mexico seized three additional laboratories which reportedly
produced and exported to the Uniteol. States at least 6
million doses of:barbiturates and amphetamines.
- Our previous 1974 report to theCongress- 1/. pointed out
that for the first 8-months of fiscal year 1973,. only S per-
cent Of DEA's Mexico City regional office staff time was,
spent- in assisting the Mexican Government to eliminate the
sources of these drugs.
Opium andits derivative, heroin, are also producee. in.
Mexico. DEA- estimated that. in 1971 about ?2 percent of the
U.S. supply of heroin was produced in Mexico.. Since that
time this has risen to about SO percent, -largely as a result
of successful action against heroin entering, the United -
States from Turkey and Western Europe. ? Mexican chemists
follow a less sophisticated opium processing formula than
the European chemists, which gives their heroin a brown
color a. opposed to the white color achieved by their
European counterparts Despite intensive United States and
Mexican drug. enforcement effort, the availability of brown
heroin from Mexico continues to grow. DEA informed us that
information available as of January 1974 indicates that some
brown heroin maybe coming from Southeast Asia and South
America.
Brown heroin seized in the United States represented 37
percent of the :total heroin seized in this country during
fiscal- year 1973 compared with 8 percent in 1972. DEA
reported that, by late 1973, more than SO percent of .the
heroin seized in. the United States was brown heroin from
Mexico. The following maps, prepared by DEA, illustrate
;IOW
the distribution and concentration of brown heroin has
intensified.
1/Identifying and Eliminating Sources of DangerousDrugs:-
_
Efforts Being Made, But Not Enough (B-175425), June 7,
1974..
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C54. .140.
PF.RCENT OF BROWN liEf?WN 10 "TOTAL HERuIN SEIZED
NORTHWEST Aprir. Julie 1::/72
NORTHWEST
During Auly-September 1973
CENTRAL
WEST
12
7,71- ?7`16
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DRUG ENFORCEMENT C3JECTIVES
Drug enforcement priori ieS of Mexico and the United
States have differed in the past in that Mexico, because of
its marihuana abuse problem, was more intereSted in -
eradicating marihuana, whereas the United States was more
interested in stopping the flow of narcotics, particularly
heroin, from Mexico: U.S. officials told us that, because
of increased Embassy and DEA efforts during 1973 to convince
th,:: Mexican officials of the danger ?of narcotics abuse, the
Mexican Government began in January 1974 to change its
priorities.
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES
DEA told us that nearly all opium (to produce heroin)
and marihuana grown in Mexico is shipped to the United
States and very little is used domestically. Mexican
Government officials advised DEA that Mexico had no stzable
narcotics 'abuse problem, but they could not furnish
statistical data suppor-ing their views. Mexico did create
a N: -ional Center for Drug Dependency Research in 1.972 to
conduct studies on all types of drug abuse in Mexico. The
Department of State informed us that the United States is
providing 1 man-year of technical assistance to this center,
to establish and carry out a 2-year epidemiological study of
drug abuse witliin Mexico.
Mexican Jaws prohibit the production and sale of nar-
cotics, cocaine, and marihuana. and they .were revised in
January 1972 to establish control over the sale of dangerous
drugs. Another law passed in 1972 prescribed severe
penalties for landowners whose land is Used for growing
marihuana or opium poppies. Because the overriding Mexican
drug legislation is Federal, the Mexican Attorney General
has overall jurisdiction. Under his auspices, a 350-man
Federal Judicial Police force is charged with enforcing all
Federal statutes. This agency; however, has the authoril.y
to enlist the aid of State or municipal police at any time
to assist in enforcement activities. Mexican army personnel
are assigned to help the Federal police in their efforts,
most notably to destroy opium poppy .and marihuana fields.
At times, up to one-fifth of the 60,000 army personnel have
been involved.
16170."=
,
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? ? ,
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Because of the remoteness of many epimM aa,i marihuana'
fields and the inaccessible terrain, the Mexican
Government's eradication c mpa cannot ct feet sly_t.70 VC 3'
all areas. Even after fields are located Hy Gove;:nment
officials, a portion rif the crop usually can be ,Earvosted -
before enforcement personnel can reach and .deStroy the
plants. Although the campaign has, been con.sidered effective
in decreasing sources, DEA estimates that IS or 20 nei'Cent
of the opium and .60 percent of the marihuana is harvested
before the fields are destroyed. Because of the favorable
climate, the fields are often replanted within a few weeks.
The eradication campaign is also hindered because many of
the poor in Mexico's hinterlands depend on marihuana
crop, the most profi.table crop that can be grown. Few farmers
realize the ultimate havoc their crops cause. Since opium
poppy production in Mexico is illegal (unlike in Turkey
where it is lawful), it would be difficult for the Mexican
Government to develop a crop substitute pregram. Under
these circumstances farmers will continue Lo resIst
government efforts to destroy their main livelihood.
U.S. GOALS IN MEXICO
in February 1973 the drug control committee nrc).1c.ej j
plan outlining actions to be taken in Mexico.
1. Interdict the flow of all narcotics transiting
from third countries into the United States.
. Cooperate with the Mexican Government in oHam poppy
eradication efforts and interdiction of Mexican heroin
destined for the Inited States.
3. Provide assistance to increase the effectiveness of
the Mexican Government's border, air, and sea anti-
narcotics law enforcement.
4. Work cooperatively with the Mexican Govei.nment to
combat the processing and to affiaing of dangerous
drugs, especially amphetamines and barbiturates.
5. Convince the Goverament of Mexico to reorder its p1 1.
or! ties to give top and predominant attention to
"hard- drugs rather than marihuana.
1 4
.WIJOIXXIMICOM=WV02.1Mmidimpamm.
. AriataMbilimilaMmuce.immaanceenyme?
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6. Identify, penetrate, and collect intelligence on
trafficking organizations.
7. Concentrate on major violators (as opposed to small
traffickers).
8. Help train Mexican Government Jay enforcement offi.-
cials in antidrug operations in order to carry out
the objectives of goals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
above.
? 9. Cooperate with Mexico in marihuana eradication pro-
grams.
In addition, the U.S. Government plans to:
--Encourage the Mexican government to devote. greater
resources to drug enforcement;
--Collect and analyze .information on illicit-drug pro-
? duction and trafficking.
--Provide technical. and material assistance to the
Mexican Government.
--Provide information on illicit drug trafficking to
Mexican personnel which will assist them in making
drug arrests and seizures.
UNITED STATES .AND MEXICAN
ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Enforcement efforts have increased since 1969, when
agents began a program of detaining and searching all
vehicles leaving Mexico. For example, with the Mexican
Government's approval, DEA 's manpower in Mexico more than
doubled with district offices being established in three -
areas outside Mexico City. (See p. 3 for DEA's current
staffing plans.) Statistics on Mexican Government drug
activities before 1969 were not available, but DEA stated
that drug seizures and arrests were minimal compared with
current activity.
Although reliable statistics are difficult to obtain,
the Mexican Government reported the following seizures
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during the 12 months ended in February 1974: opium, 227
pounds; heroin, 293 pounds; cocaine., 405 pounds; mar-ihnana,
513 tons; and dangerous drugs, 8,674,0.00 dosage units plus 110
pounds amphetamine powder. Though there were irregularities
in reporting, the MeXiCall Government reported that, in its
1973 eradication program, 10,045 opium fields covering over
10,000 acres and 8,569 marihuana plantations covering over
6,000 acres were destroyed. In .the first 4 months of 1974,
over 7,500 poppy fields were reported destroyed, covering an
area of over 4,000 acres; in the same period some 2,300
marihuana plantations were destroyed with a total area of
about 1,000 acres.
The loexican Government also reported that,.during the
same 12 months from February 1973 to February 1974, 3,073
persons had been detained, in connection with drug
-trafficking. In addition, it was reported that 467 farmers
had been arrested for growing opium and marihuana and 2
launches, 41 airplanes, and 735 cars had been s07ed.,
PROJECTS FOR BETTER DEFINING
DRUG TRAFFICKING
DEA initiated several information-gathering project .to
better define .the illicit drug trafficking within Mexico.
Two examples Of such. projects follow.
OTeration.Jadpol
This project was initiated in April 1972 with the ob-
jective of interdicting heroin, cocaine, and other narcotics
before they reach the United States. From specially
selected informants, DEA tries to get. inform4tion. OH
trafficking routes and sources of supply. During these ?
investigations DEA determined that (1) buses and cars were
used in smuggling drugs into the United States, (2) addicts
were used to cultivate and harvest the opium crops and .to
transport the drugs, (3) addicts were not afraid of?
enforcement officials because they believed the officHls
were corrupt, and had been paid off, and (4) roadbloci,
inspections were not effective because carriers knew how to
avoid them. The. gathering of this information was completed
in December 19-2 and this concluded Phase I of the project.
Phase II involves making arrests based on this information.
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SlDecial enforcement actiyity,
In August : 1973 the Mexican attorney genera' e)Tressed
interest in conducting studi-es into the narcotics .traffic in
Mexico. This project consists of studies of the
eradication., interdiction, and information analysis
capabilities of the Mexican Government.. The DEA
Administrator has Met with the attorney general to discuss
U.S. cooperation: This projett ?,.:as begun in .February 1974,
and will enable the Mexica.u. Government to identify areas
where equipment; manpower, or procedural changes aro
necessary. .
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CHAPTER 3
ENFORC1AENT ACTION IN MEXTCO
Although tons of narcotics and dangerous drags have been
stopped from reaching illicit U.S. markets, this represents
only a fraction of the total drugs which illegally cross the
border from Mexico to the United States.
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL
- NOMINAL IN SOME AREAS
In some isolated regions noted for opium and marihuana
production, especially in the mountains, Mex can Government
drug enforcement has been intermittent. One reason Federal
control is often hampered is because State or local govern-
ments resent Federal actions in their :jurisdictions. : Thus
the Mexican Federal police have not mounted sustained opera-
tions in these regions:
A BNDD report dated November' 29, 1972, identified this
situation as the chief obstacle in investigating and immobiliz-
ing heroin laboratories. It also pointed out that the relation-
ship between one State government and the Federal Government.
was so delicate that s-r..,ct enforcement of Federal narcotic.
laws was handled with extreme diplomacy. DEA told us thatoi-,
some areas the traffi:kers have more authority than the local
police or army troops and are often better armed. Therefore,
narcotic activities are carried on virtually unopposed.
PP0.1:.LEMS OF MEXICAN FEDERAL POLICE
The Mexican Government recognizes that corruption exists
at many levels, including the Mexican Federal police, which
sometimes restricts law enforcement efforts.
DEA believes there is corruption in the Mexican Federal
police because the police are not provided good working bene-
fits. For example, job security, hospitalization, and retire-
ment are not provided for by a civil service system. Therefore,
the police have need for additional funds_, which must be ob-
tained from other sources. The potential effect ? of this situa-
tion on the intensity of enforcement may be demonstrated by the
following comments made to us by agents.
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--When Mexican police agents are sent out of town they
' must 'pay'for lodging from their own salaries.
--If an agent is wounded while on duty he must sol.oi..imes
pay for his own medical care, including hospitaliza-
tion.
Poor pay is also an important factor which may influence
the quality of Mexican investigations. According to DEA analy-
sis, some Mexican police:
u* * * sustain themselves on illicit monies ac-
quired from various avenues which include prostitu-
tion, contraband smuggling, and in some ?cases,
narcotic trafficking. Each agent, regardless of
rank, sustains hiMself with these monies. It is
the opinion of the sources of informatior that
most of these agents are involved with minor
narcotic traffickers.. Most agents will not deal
with major traffickers for fear of being identified
or dismissed."
The Mexican Government has recognizedthese problems'
tand has used extreme care in designating agents to whom confi-
dential information may be entrusted) and. is developing programs
to eliminate them. For example, Mexico's attorney general plans
to restructure the police force. One element of the plan calls
for establishing a career police service, a step which could
be significant in improving enforcement efforts. Although
the reorganization was to begin in January 1973, no action had
been taken as of September 1974.
The Attorney General sees the widespread use of heli-
copters as extremely important in bringing the Federal law
to hitherto lawless areas..
One very useful device employed by the Attorney General
is the task force approach, in which flying squads .of out- -
of-area Federal police are sent to localities where local of-
ficials or police may. be suspected of corruption or ineffec-
tiveness. These task forces can hit traffickers who might
otherwise be protected by local officials.
With regard to the Mexican Government's reorganization
plan, DEA officials told us in September 1-974 that although
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no action had as vet been taken, ;.iA will continue to en-
courage and provide managerial and technical Assistance to
the Government of Mexico for implementing. the Federal Judie.
ciale Police 'reorganization an
DRUG TRAFFICKING INFORMATION
OFT7N NOT AVAILABLE TO PEA
One of the major gaals proposed by the Drug Conrol
Committee is to obtain information on trafficking
organizations. Accurate information is one of the major
drug enforcement weapons. Because DEA restricted in
gathering information in m.any foreign countries, it relies
on the host country to supply information on narcotics
traffickers. DEA's attempts to obtain information were
often hampered by limited cooperation from the Mexican
Government, although it readily cooperates by making many
arrests.
- During the past year, both DEA and the Mexican
?Government have increased their efforts to control illicit
narcotics and dangerous drug traffic In November 1973, top '-
DEA and Mexican Government officials met and agreed to
establish procedures for exchanging information.
Specialized training programs have been offered to and
accepted by Mexican officials. In January 1974 DEA was in
the process of finalizing arrangements to install a Mexico
City terminal to its Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs computer
information system. A number of extensive enforcement-
oriented operations were jointly irstituted commencing in
December 1973.
These efforts, with supporting DEA Headquarters activi-
ties, have already resulted in conspiracy indictments.
interrol_Illip_n of apprehended violators
Interrogating arrested' suspects may provide vital in-
formation or leads about other drug traffickers. DEA has
had limited opportunity to use this source information. In
Mexico, a suspect must be interrogated Within 48 hours
following his arrest. In Most instances this time is used
by the Mexican Federal police. DEA told us it does not have
the opportunity to question suspects, and in some cases, has
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been denied access to data obta!hed by the Mexican Federal
police.
Gather ma information
Although considerable information had been developed on
certain major, drug traffickers, DEA did not use all
available means of obtaining additional information. For '
example, greater use of rewards to informants and policemen
for information about traffickers and increased efforts to
develop information on ocean and air smuggling would assist
in identifying and immobilizing major drug traffickers.
Use of reward payments
In some foreign countries, excluding Mexico,?DEA's
policy had been publicly to offer monetary rewards to
Persons. volunteering information leading to seizures of
narcotics or heroin laboratories ' (This policyis not
followed in the United States.) The reward for information
leading to the seizure of .a ..laboratory, for example, can be
$200,000 or more depending on the amount of opium and heroin
seized. This pf)liy has resited in the seizures of eight,
laboratories and 605 kilograms of heroin in other countries
which might not have been seized otherwise..
DEA officials have had information for a number of
years that heroin laboratories are active in at least eight
areas in Mexico: however, no significant laboratory had been.
seized until February 5, 1974. Since 'then six other
laboratories have been seized. Notwithstanding the recent
successes, we believe that publicly offering rewards would
increase the seizures of laboratories. DEA Would like to
offer rewards to Mexican informants for information about
the location of heroin laboratories, but the Mexican
Government has refused to allow such action. State
'Department officials told us that the Embassy ? had several
times requested he Mexican Government to. publicize the
paying.. of rewards.
U.S. officials in Mexico pointed out that some persons
may falsely accuse others solely to collect a reward.
Mexican officials state that it is the duty of citizens and
policemen to provide any known information on drug
traffickers and that no rewards should be necessary.
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DEA ? officials informed us on September 10, 1974, that
DEA recognizes the sensitivity of the Government of MeYien
regarding a program for rewarding individuals, and that there
are differences in the interprettion of. the involved laws
in the United States and Mexico.. However, they said that
DEA will continue to seek a change by the Government of
Mexico to allow implementation of the award program, which
has proven most effective for DEA elsewhere.
State Department of informed us on August 5,
1974, that the technique of offering rewards to obtain drug
trafficking information has been employed successfully in
many places, and the result:; of experience elsewhere have
been brought to. the attention? of Mexican authorities. They
have not adopted this technique, however,.and-thcir, decision
must be respected.
Because both State and DEA officials are taking action
on this matter, we are not making any recommendations.
SmugOing by air and sea
According to DEA, Mexico is a natural conduit for
smuggling by air and sea to the United States. The joint
border stretches many miles and accords smuggler numerous
crossing points -where risk of discovery is minimal.
Isolated landing strips on each side of the border and
.e'asive air maneuvers ?makr aircraft a 'highly undetectable
smuggling vehicle, particularly since there is an average of
500 private aircraft crossings a month. Mexico's two long
coastlines offer illicit traffickers a multitude of
embarkation points for sea voyages to U.S. coasts.
According to DEA reports, every conceivable type of
oceangoing vessel has been used in the illicit movement of
drugs. In response to this problem, DEA in late 1972
-established as one of its major cnforcement objectives the
improvement of the Mexican Government's capability in
surveillance of ships. However, DLA had not initiated
action to accomplish this objective, until early 1974.
DEA officials informed us on August 26, 1974, that dur-
ing late January and early February 1974, representatives of
the Office of Intelligence and the Office of Enforcement
surveyed the air_ narcotics Smuggling problem in the south-
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western United States. Til:';,SUY YeSUltS, coupled with
previous Federal experience which indicated that inter-'
diction. without an intelligence base was unsuccesful, led
to the development of. the DEA f\ir Intelligence. Progiam,
which was started on .June 27, l'.)74. ?
This program _institutes. an aggressive eifort for,collect-
ing air intelligence by providing a formatted report form which
is compatible with the Nart:otics and Dangerous Drugs Intel ii-.
.gence System. It emphasizes collection and reporting Of data
on pilots, aircraft owners, aircraft, airports, and airport
operators knomi or suspected to be involved in moving illicit
substances by air. DEA officials stated that, since June
1974, numerous-reference documents have been obtained or de-
veloped in conjunction with this program.
DEA officials also stated that they recognized the use?:
of aircraft in the illicit traffic is not limited to the
border areas alone. Accordingly, the Air Intelligence Pro-
gram is designed to be national and international in scope
with special emphasis on the borders. Since January 1974,
? DEA has initiated various programs and efforts to interdict
the trafficking of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs
by air. Tangible results are beginning to be seen and are
expected to increase la the near future..
DEA. officials also pointed out that, in regard to the
air interdiction program, (Df1B performed a study in the
Southwest horder area and recommended that the U.S. Customs
Service 'hethe primary U.S. Government agency for air inter.-
diction along our southern border. Since. the Mexican phase
of this program is predicated upon the final resolution of
OMB's conclusions and since DEA has planned significant
expenditures for support of the program, before DEA
accelerates its progjam the status of OMB's recommendation
should be determined.
The-Department informed us in August 1.974 Csee app. I)
that DEA has recognized this problem and plans to establish
new offices in Merida, Acapulco, and Vera Cru: in fiscal
year 1975. Also, additional positions .are being established
in Mazatlan to plate increased emphasis on ocean vessel
monitoring,
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DEA officials told us on September 10, 1974, that DEA
and its predecessor agencies. had recognized the need to
monitor sea and air trafficking and that this has received
major attention since the reorganization of national nar-
cotics enforcement efforts.
DFA officials also said they are substantially increas
ing intelligence collection and evaluation efforts, estab-
lishing a border intelligence center at El Paso,- increasing
the use of airscaft, and installing new computerized assis-
tance programs.
State Department officials told us on August 5, 1974
(see app. 1), that ways and means are bcing explored to in-
crease the effectiveness of surveillance over oceangoing
vessels '.nd aircraft engaged in dig trafficking. Among
various -steps under consideration to accomplish this is the
possible stationing of Dp liaison personnel at seaports to
work with their Mexican counterparts in such control
activity'. The problem of air trafficking is of continuing
great concern to both Governments and has been discussed at
high levels as well as t the operational level in recent .
months.
In vies% of actions being taken, we are making ne rec-
ommendations on this matter.
Limited cooperation
In several instances the Mexican GoVernment has failed
to respond or has refused to take certain actions requested
by DEA involving important drug activities. For example,
DEA has been trying to obtain information on and samples of
drugs produced by. Mexican firms for more than 3 years with .
only limited success. The Mexican Government .repeatedly re-
fused to let DEA agents visit the Mexican. firms. Finally,
the agents were permitted to visit a few firms. ?However, of
the hundreds of different pills made by legitimate firms in
Mexico the agents were able to obtain only a few samples.
Although agency officials indicated that efforts would be
continued to obtain additional samples from Mexico, as of.
September 1973 they had not been obtained. Also, after ex-
tensive enforcement work by DEA in- the United States and.
Eu rope to identify drug shipments to Mexico, the Mexican
Government's cooperation was requested in November 1972 to
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determine .the legitimacy of the recipients. No action was
taken by the Mexican Government to? comply with the request
.until June 1973.
LIMITED .CAPABILITY HINDERS
MEXICAN EFFORTS
Well-trained manpower and modern equipment are
important factors in antidrug activities. In Mexido both
these factors are limited, contributing to Mexico's
difficulty in .suppressing illegal drug activities. Grants
of material by the United States have been a problem,
because the Mexican Government was -sensitive to any actions--
connoting aid and reluctant to accept needed equipment.
This has now been largely overcome.
DEA said that.-Mexico's most important material need was
transportation equipment. Although the highly inaccessible
opium and Marihuana. plots in Mexico's mountains may be
reached in A few hours by airplane or helicopter, it takes
several days to reach them by ground transportation. Thus
without adequate air transportation theFederal police
cannot destroy the crops before a-large part is harvested.
Also, DEA said that, in some cases, the Mexican Government
is reluctant to. commit troops to destroy crops because the
fields may be too small to warrant the manpower and money
involved if troops ?must spend considerable time just to
reach the areas. .
Once the fields have been located, extensive effort is
necessary to destroy.the crops. DEA estimated that the num-
ber of opium or marihuanafields that could be spotted from -
a plane in 1 day would require as much as 6 to 8.months of
daily effort to destroy. The Mexican army 'reports that to
destroy a 20-acre field would require over 30 men for 7
days. The plants have to be pulled out of the ground or cut
by hand, stacked, dried, ? and burned. Destruction ? is of the
crops only. Most fields are used year after year, despite
intermittent crop destruction.
Helicopters are also needed for moving troops to and
from roadblocks in areas where information indicates ongoing
trafficking. They would be especially useful in the
-southern areas of Mexico which, according to a DEA official
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in Mexico City, are where narcotics ,.are smuggled lhto
MexiCo.
Material assistance
Io heln. the Mexican GoNernment improve its oporations,-.
the United States gave Mexico's Office of ?the Attorney::
General grants of equipment Naluedjit.$6.8 miiljon.? -.Under
.-the initial grant of $1 million? three light fixed-wing?
aircraft and five 5-seat helicopters were delivered between.
March 1970 and August 1971._ In August 1971,.. $200,000 was
used to match $200,000 furnished by the Mexican Government
to .purchase three additional helicopters. A September 1972
grant. of $1.3 million provided for transferring two .12... to ?
IS helicopters, portable radios, and Mobile radio base
?stations.
Following a September 1973 hi.gh'level diplomatic
meeting, both Governments entered into an agreement
involving a material assistance program of $.3.8 million.
This grant is the third such agreement between the countries
and .involves four Bell 212 (troop carrying) helicoptens,
maintenance and snare part packages, and pilot and mechanic
training, The helicopters were turned over to the Mexican
Government in February 1974.
On February 1,? 1224, an additional-agreement was con-
cluded, providing the Mexican Government with four now Bell
200 helicopters and spare parts, the cost not to exceed
$733,000. These aircraft were delivered and the Government
began using them in March.
-
The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics
Control has also approved the acquisition of additional
equipment to ,enable the Mexican Government to improve its -
eradication capabilities. The proposed project,. discussed
under Special Enforcement Aetiv,ity in chapter 2 (see p. 17),
will provide- the U.S. Government with needed ilr'ormation for
submitting recommendations to the Cabinet Commitnee for the
possible acquisition of additional equipment.
Training_
DEA has provided training seminars for Mexican
personnel on drug enforcemer-. procedures. These seminars
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included such topics as addition, firearms, history of
narcotics, and Use and identification of drugs-. Participants
included Mexican psychiatrists,- sociologists, criminal
lawyers, police, and military personnel. Also, DEA has
provided narcotics enforcement training to more than 2S0
members of the 350-man Mexican Federal polite and plans to
train Others. In the United States, selected Mexican
Federal training officers have been given extensive training
in management and administration.
Trilateral conferences
In responding to Mexico's request, the Canadian Govern-
ment agreed to join Mexico and the United States in periodic
meetings to discuss antinarcotics programs. The first
session was at the Deputy Attorney General level in
Washington in October 1971; the second session Was held in
Mexico City in March 1972; the U.S. Attorney General,
Solicitor General of Canada, and Attorney General of Mexico
attended_ The Deputy Attorney General from each country and
their staffs met again in Canada in January 1973.
MEXICAN CV-',TOMS AT INTERNATIONAL PORTS -OF
ENTRY NEED iMPROVEMENT
One objective included in the Narcotics ControlPlan ?
for Mexico was theinterdiction of illicit drugs from third-
country sources. Such interdiction would entail intensified
scrutiny at international entry points, most importantly at
harbors, airports, and the southern land border. The.
Mexican Customs Service is assigned to monitor incoming
traffic at these locations.
A 1972 survey by the U.S. Customs Service found,
however, that the Mexican Customs Service needed
communication and transportation equipment. Since previous
U.S. grants were made to improVe Mexico's opium and
marihuana eradication program, they did not benefit its
customs efforts. US. Embassy officials said a grant
package for customs equipment and training was being
provided. The equipment consists of $50,000 worth of
aircraft radios to improve customs communications along the
border. The training consisted of two customs international
narcotics control courses conducted in Mexico in November
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1973. Each class; of 2 weeks' duration, was presented to a
group .of 30 Mexican customs officers by a 4-man U.S. Customs
mobile training team. In addition, slots for 1.0 Mexican
customs officers were reserved for the Customs midmanagement
class offered in Washington, D.C., in March 1974:
To achieve the Narcotics Control Plan's objective of
interdicting he and cocaine transshipped through Mexico
to the United States, it is essential that Mexico have ef-
fective customs operations, not only at "theU.S.?bbrder but
at other borders and at international ports of entry. The
plan recognized this need, but provided for increasing
Mexican capabilities at the U.S. border only and did not
specifically consider the need to improve Me'xican customs
operations at its international ports of entry. Embassy
officials stated that Mexican customs agents could have an
impact on drugs being smuggled on incoming international
planes; ships, and vehicles by more closely working their
own ports of entry and indicated that this was their long-
term plan.
Although the United States is doing much to encourage
Mexico to improve its customs capabilities along the U.S.
horder, we believe Mexico should be encouraged to improve
its customs capabilities at other borders and at 'portsof
. entry. This might be accomplished by providing additional
grants of equipment and 1-raining to the Mexican Customs
_
Service.
ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRADITION
One of the most important U.S. goals is to immobilize
traffickers, either in
countries. To achieve
retrieve violators who
prosecute:them in U.S.
they lied. 1/
the United States or in. the other
this goal, DEA needs to either
have fled from the United States and
Courts or in the .country to which
Extradition agreements
permit the transfer of alleged
criminals from one nation to another. Although the la99
1/See our report entitled "Difficulties in Immobilizing Ma-
jor Narcotics Traffickers," Dec. 21, 1.973 (B-17542S), for
? a more detailed discussion on this matter.
28
PIZENEZZaailiffiggrailiffEERMONNLUMMIRIEFECEMSPROMMIESERMENNossamizmaci
WMOW.9.1a0MMAIMIWMIMM=MiCEMINEWtommwelmmusamwins
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extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico pro-
vided for mutual extraditiOn, Mexican authorities have con-
sistently rejected the surrender of any of its citizens to
U.S. custody. However, Mexico does allow the deportation
(or theoretically, extradition) of non-Mexican residents,
including American citizens. The problem posed by Mexico's
extradition policy arises from its practice of granting
Mexican citizenship to solicitants. who have Mexican parents,
regardless of their place of birth, making them immune to
deportation or extradition procedures. DEA believes that at
least 250 fugitives from drug Charges are living in Mexico
and that many have continued to participate in illicit drug
,activities.
In view of the importance of prosecuting traffickers,
especially those, who use other countries to circumvent pros-
ecution, we believe that viable alternatives to extradition
must be found. In Mexico one such alternative may involve
prosecuting in Mexico its citizens accused of committing. -
drug crimes in the United States. A May 1970 U.S. review of
Mexican drug laws stated that:
"In January of 1969 the Supreme Court of Justice for
Mexico affirmed a conviction obtained pursuant
to such a procedure in a case invelving a 'Mexican
citizen who was trafficking heroin into, theUnited'
States. _Several similar cases are now being_pros-
ecuted in Mexico." (Underscoring supplied.)
In 'a 1969 meeting between the U.S. Deputy Attorney
General and .his Mexican counterpart, the problem of
prosecuting Mexican nationals for crimes committed in the
United States was discussed. In 1971 legal experts from the
Departments of State and Juftice went to Mexico and
discussed the extradition problem with their Mexican
counterparts, including evidentiary requirements ?for
prosecution in Mexico.- A seeond such meeting was held in
August 1972. As a result, the two Departments have
considerable information on how to submit evidence for a
successful prosecution in Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS
Mexico is a major .source for drugs abused in the United
States. DEA and the Mexican Government have intensified en-
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forceMent efforts in recent years, but the amount of drugs
originating from or transshipped through Mexico to the
'United States continues to increase. Although_the.U.S.
Government can take certain 'steps to improve the planning
and management of its operations and help to train and equip
Mexican enforcement personnel, the Mexican Government is the
key to any real success. The effectiveness of drug .
enforcement will be determined by the priority the Mexican
Government gives such enforcement and acts to resolve
situations hindering progress.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
We recommend that the Attorney General, in cooperation
with the Secretary of State, act to improve information
gathering and cooperation in Mexico by encouraging the
Mexican Government to
--share information obtained during the interrogation
of suspected drug traffickers and
--prosecute traffickers fleeing to Mexico within the
Mexican judicial system if Mexico continuos to
refuse the extradition of important_ drug
traffickers holding Mexican citizenship.
AGENCY COMMENTS
Department of justice
The Department of Justice told us. (see app. I) that:
--In general this report makes some important specific
observations.
--it agreed with our analysis ?of the extradition prob-
lems and the possibility of prosecuting people in
MexiCo for violations of U.S. statutes. .
--It also agreed with some observations concerning en-
forcement operations. ?
--It believes the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations have serious weaknesses;. namely, that the
report is a random collection of observations and
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includes some items of secondary importance, such
as Mexican Customs and planning actions in Central
America, and ignores a few significant issues,
such as, (1) the investigative procedures used by
the Mexican Judicial Police, (2) the lack of
operating agreements between DEA and the police
with respect to custody and prosecution of
arrested carriers, and (3,) the problems created
for DEA border investigations by the policy of the
GovernMent of Mexico, which requires that known
narcotics and dangerous drugs being smuggled out
of Mexico be Seized in Mexico. (This policy pre-
vents the identification of U.S. traffickers by
keeping the drugs under surveillance until they
are delivered.)
We recognize that many problems affect the efforts to
stop the flow Of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the
United States and that these problems and their seriousness
change from time to time. At the completion of our
fieldwork in late 1973, our findings were discussed with
appropriate U.S.. officials in the field and in Washington.
At that time we had not identified, nor had agency officials
recognized, the three above areas mentioned by the Depart-
ment as causing major problems.
We believe that, if the Department has sufficient evi-
dence to identify these areas as causing real problems to
their efforts to stop the flow of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into the United States, there is no need for addi-
tional work by us to develop these problems. The Department
should, however, continue to work with the Government. of
Mexico to overcome these problems.
The Department also commented extensively on how it be-
lieved (1) the Government of Mexico could improve its drug
enforcement activities .and (2) U.S. operations on the border
could be improved. It said that actions had been or were
.being taken to improve activities in both areas but that
more efforts are needed.
With regard to information exchange, the Department of
Justice informed us in August 1974 that:
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"This is a complex subject. While it is true that
there are occasions when information is not
passed, much data is obtained from Mexican
Officers. Often it is undesirable or impossible
to have U.S, Agents present during interrogations
and Mexican Officers lack the training and ex.-
pertise to properly interrogate arrested persons
concerning matters in which we have an interest."
DEA officials agreed with our recommendations and in-
formed US on September 10 1974, of the following actions
planned or being taken.
--Sharing. information:
DEA believes that much informatiOn is now being ex-
changed between the Government of Mexico and DEA,
although further improvement is possible.
In this regard, the Government of Mexico has re-
cently established a new narcotics intelligence ca-
pability, and the involved unit is coordinating its
activities with those of DEA enforcement units.
--Prosecution of fugitive traffickers:
DEA.. agrees that the prosecution in. Mexico or extra-
dition to the United States. for prosecution of nar-
cotics.violators is highly desirable ?
Substantia) efforts are now underway to implement
this recommendation. For example, during the e.econd
week of September 1974, information was provided to
the Attorney General of Mexico concerning the names
and ? locations, of dozens Of violators wanted in the
United States. Most of them were promptly arrested,
and it is anticipated that many will be prosecuted
in Mexico. ,Extradition proceedings against severalY ?
of these individuals were being discuSsed at the
time of the writing of this report..
Department of State
The Department endorsed our recommendations regarding
actions that should be taken in. conjunction with the Attor-
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ney General to improve information :gatherin and cooperation
in Mexico. to stop theiillegal flow of .narcotics and danger-
ous drugs to the United. States. The Department also-in-.
-formed us that actions consistent with these recommndations
are underway and will be. pursued. These actions are:
--Sharing information based ? on interrogation of-sus-
:pects:
The desirability of a fuller and more _systematic
exchange of information on drug traffickers is rec-
ognized by both the Mexican and the United States
Governments. Practical ways and means of doing this
are being developed at the operational level between
the two Governments; this subject was also discussed
at a high-level meeting in May 1974 between the
Mexican Attorney General, the Executive Director
of the U.S. Cabinet Committee on International Nar-
cotics Control, and the Administrator of DEA.
--Prosecution of fugitive traffickers in Mexico when ex-
tradition ? is not feasible:
Most bilateral extradition treaties between the
United States and Latin American countries (includ-
ing Mexico) provide that there is no obligation for
the requested State to extradite its own nationals.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Valentine v. U.S:_ex_rel
Neidetker, 299 U.S. S (1935) held that the United
States cannot extradite its own nationals unless a
treaty imposes the obligation to do so, but did not
rule out extradition under a treaty which authorized
extradition.
Recognizing these mutual difficulties in the extra-
dition process, the alternative is open in some
. cases of supplying information .to support prosecu-
tion within the other country, and the Department
of State concurred in the recommendation that this
alternative be pursued more extensively than it has
in the past. Differences in proeedural requirements
are an important complication in some cases, how-
ever.
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. CHAPTER 4.-
. ? . . .
DRUG TRA7FICKING'FROM AND
THROUGH CENTRAL AMERICA
Central America is not cuvrently considered a...prime
source for the production and transshipment of drugs; however,
because of its geographic location and growing world:commeree, ?
it may become a major source of illicit drugs abused in the
United States. DEA hos developed some information on drugs,
provided some training to local enforcement agencies, as-
signed temporary agents, and proposed plansto.open offices
in Guatemala and Costa Rica.
DEA's Mexico City regional office has responsibility in
six Central American countries.: Guatemala, Honduras, British
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
DEA considers Guatemala, British Honduras, and Costa
nica to be the most potential major sourcesof illicit drugs.
GUATEMALA
Guatemala tends to be a funncl for commercial air traffic
coming from Europe- and South America. It also has seaports
capable of accommodating oceangoing vessel's -both on. the Pa-
cific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, and it has a long land
border with Mexico. Information indicates that heroin and
cocaine have been transshipped through Guatemala. .For example,
two defendants were arrested in ?Mexico City after transport--
ing 18 pounds of cocaine through Guatemala, and DEA learned
that the Ecuadorian source had been transporting 100 pounds of
cocaine'a.month for a yar via commercial aircraft to Guatemala
and overland te Mexico. .
DEA proposes to open a new office in Guatemala City, from
which it will also cover the other Central American countries.
The opening of. this office will depend upon a .supplemental
budget request and permission from the Government of Guatemala.
Diplomatic interest
Department of State reports indicate that drug enforce-
ment in Guatemala was assigned a low priority for fiscal years
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1973 and 1974. A drug control committee had been 'formed but
no plan developed.
The U.S. Embassy security officer works with the Guate-
mala narcotic enforcement group, which consists of about 14 .
men in the national police. We were told that lack of ve-
hicles and radios limits their drug activities. For example,
in 'a recent investigation of a narcotics trafficker in Antigua'
a local agent had to use public bus transportation.
DEA has acted to improve drug enforcement in Guatemala,
including prepaying and updating important data, sponsoring
a 3-day police drug training seminar, and sending DEA agents
to Guatemala to assist on important cases.
The U.S. Embassy reque3ted a training team from Washing-
ton to train Guatemalan customs officials,' 'The officials
agreed that a drug control plan should be established. Al-
though Guatemala dces not seem to have a serious drug problem,
the Embassy believes it would be helpful to have full-time DEA
agents there to improve information gathering and to assist
local authorities with investigations.
COSTA RICA
Costa Rica could become a major transshipping point for
drugs. There have been no known seizures Of heroin within
Costa Rica but cocaine transshipped through there has been
seized in the United States. In July 1971 about 7 pounds of
high-grade cocaine was discovered in a routine search of an
aircraft from Costa Rica at New Orleans international Airport
:-ince then, other seizures of Cocaine destined for the United
States have been made in Costa Rica.
Di.plomatic interest
State Department reports indicate that drug enforcement
in Costa Rica was assigned a low priority for fiscal years
1973 and 1974. However, a drug Control committee had been
established.
The U.S. public safety officer has worked closely with
the main Costa Rican drug enforcement group, which consists
of about 10 police officers under the minister of public se-
curity. Except for the chief, drug personnel have had no
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training and are poorly paid political appointees who are re-
placed with each new. administration. DEA told us that the
Government lacks sufficient equipment for efficient narcotics
investigations.
To help improve data on Costa Rica, DEA has periodically
sent agents there. In June 1972 a 3-day narcotics seminar
was held for 40 law enforcement officers. Embassy officials _
told us it would be helpful if DEA stationed agents in Central
America who could devote some time to Costa Rica. An agent
was assigned to Costa Rica temnorarily during November and
December 1973.
BRITISH HONDURAS
British Honduras has only recently surfaced as a country
significantly involved in the transshipment of drugs from
Europe and the Far East to the United States. DEA said that
the geographic features of the country and problems with the
local policemake it difficult to develop and work drug en-
forcement cases there. Also, the Mexico City regional office
has limited informaton about the level and complexity of drug
traffic. The DEA agent responsible for 'Central AMerica has
'requested that a temporary agent be assigned. to British Hon-
duras to establish coordination with local authorities.
HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, AND NICARAGUA
These countries could be used as transshipment points
for drugs Moving toward the United States, but at the present
time there is no information indicating any important involve-
ments or major local drug problems. The Embassies in these
countries assigned drug enforcement low priorities for fiscal
years 1973 and 1974. DEA told us that drug control committees
have been established and that a plan has been developed for
Li Salvador.
DEA said that, as in the other Central America'.1 coun-
tries, local authorities lack the equipment and expeitise to
effectively work narcotic investigations. DEA maintains con-
tact with these countries and has held a 3-day training semi-
nar in Nicaragua and has been requested to hold one in El
Salvador. Data on drug trafficking is limited because DEA
has not spent much time in these countries cooperating with
enforcement agencies and other persons familiar with drug
actikities.
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CONCLUSION
According to DEA, Central America currently is not con-
sidered 'a prime source for the production and transshipment
of drugs to the UnitedStates; however, because of its geo-
graphic location and growing world. commerce, it may becomeia
major source of drugs abused in the United States. In re-7
viewing?DEA's files,.we found that necessary 'information,. -
such as the country-by-country drug laws and police. organi-
zation, were not availablefor each country. DEA ,has initiated
efforts to obtain information and to help prepare local au-
thorities to deal with the growing drug problem. Also, drug
control. committees have 11)en formed in each country to keep .
abreast of the situation and to help prepare local officials.
Because plans have been made to assign agents to Central
America and because it is expected that plans and priorities
will be established, we are not making any recommendations in
these areas.
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COPY
APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST/CI;
WASHINGTON, L.C. 20530
AddiwAlteplytothe
DirWoufmliel?ed
? d to Inkirl. Prui Ntumb,
Mr. Victor L. Lowe
'Director
General Government Division
U. S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 ?
Dear Mr. Lowe:
AUG S 1974
This letter comments on the draft report entitled, "Greater Efforts
Needed to Stop the Illegal Flow of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to the
United States From and Through Mexico and Central America:' ?
In general, we believe some important specific observations are made
in this report. The analysis of extradition problems and the possibility
of prosecuting people in Mexico for violations of U. S. statutes is
excellent. The prosecution of drug violators who have fled from the
United States has been a matter of great concern to the Department's
Criminal Division for several years.
Beginning about 1965, then Assistant Attorney General Fred M.
Vinson, Jr., met with Mexican authorities and established .procedures for
prosecuting certain violators by the Government of Mexico.- As the. draft
report reflects, existing treaties between the United States and Mexico.
provide for'extraditing violators of laws relating to narcotics and
dangerous drugs. In addition, those treaties gave the chief executive
officer of each country the choice of not delivering a national of his
country even though he was extraditable in all other respects. On several
occasions United States citizens have been extradited to Mexico, but our
information shows that no Mexican national has ever been extradited to the
United States for any crime. Because of this, 'representatives of the Gov-
ernment of Mexico gave assurances that, where appropriate, Mexico would pros-
ecute the Mexican national on the ? basis of evidence furnished by United
States authorities.
Negotiations between Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vinson, jr.,
and Mexican authorities produced a semi-formal procedure whereby the De-
partment of Justice transmitted the request for prosecution directly to
the Attorney General of Mexico and the particular Mexican Federal Prosecu-
tor in whose district the defendant resided. One case presented to the
Mexican authorities was that of Mario Aauilera Suith. This defendant was
successfullly prosecuted and, following an appeal to the Supreme Judicial
Tribunal of Mexico, his conviction for the exportation of heroin from Mexico
was upheld in 1969.
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APPENDIX 1
After Supreme Judicial Tribunal action in the Suith Case, several
meetings were held between United States and Mexican authorities to discus
the general problem of narcotics and dangerous drugs. These discussions
included the. particular problem of prosecuting fugitives fro M justice. At
or about this time, the United States, following prevous arrangements,
furnished evidence to the Mexicans for the prosecution of Robert and
Helen Hernandez.- The presentation of this evidence ultimately resulted in
the conviction of both defendants and the imposition of heavy senter.'-ese
During the prosecution of the Hernandez ease, United States authori-
ties were asked by the Mexicans to. [utilize standing extradition procedures].
(See GAO note 2.) The reason for this request was to permit Mexican au-
thorities to place violators under arrest and to hold them until a determi-
nation was made to either extradite or prosecute them After this request,
our presentations tothe GoVernment ef Mexico for the prosecution of viola-
tors have followed the formal extradition route.
[See GAO note 2 )
We.believe it is important that fugitives from justice in the United
States not use Mexico as a haven, (See GAO note 2,) It appears advisable
to try to negotiate a simpler procedure similar to the one negotiated in
1965 for presenting evidence to the Government of Mexico for prosecuting,
nationals of that country.
We recognize the merit of some obseivations concerning enforcement
operations. The identification of intelligence, as an area where improve-
ments can be made and would have an iwpoiLant effect on enfoecemese opera-
tions, is correct. However, 'sharing intelligence' Is less important than
some other aspects. We also. belie-,re that thefindings, conclusions, and
recommendations in. the draft report have two serioUs..weaknesseS.
[Sce GAO note 1 1
The Attorney General of Mexico has shown a strong commitment to effec-
tive enforcement [GAO note 2] and Operation. SEA/M has demonstrated that the
Goverrimeht of Mexico can [exert its complete control under difficult condi-
tions even in the'remotest corners of its territory.] [See GAO note 2).
- Second, the report is nearly a random collection of observations about
the problem. For example, it presents an extended discussion of issues
that are currently only of secondary importance, such as [GAO note 2]
Mexican Customs and planning actions in Central America; it provides only
a superficial analysis of some [areas] [GAO note 2] of major importance
like the role of intelligence activities in [GAO note 2]..Mexican enforce-
ment procedures; and it ignores a few issues of significant importance,
such as the [GAO note 2] current investigative procedures used by the
Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), the lack of operating agreements
between DEA border officers and local MFJP officers with respect to custody
e.ni prosecution of [GAO note 21 "mules" on the S.W. border, and the problems
40
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APPENDIX I
tot DEA border. investigations by the. policy [of the Gevernment of
nezicoi [GAO note 2] -prohibiting the Convoy of loads out of Mexico. 'the,
rnport dues not provide a properly focussed discription of the pronIL.:na
.nnl opportunities in controlling the production. and transshipment of ?ftugn
Mexico.
egc,est that the report be divided into two sections. The first
:inn ?2..1d deal with factors which influence [GAO note 2) effective
against transshipment or production of drugs in Mexico. The
.iecticn.could deal with factors which influence our ability to !ieei:'
produced or transshipped through. Mexico from reaching the United
ates.
The first section on enforcement in Mexico should emphasize the
nilooing points:
EfLeCtive enforcement in Mexico is 90. percent of the battle
against drugs produced in or transshipped through Mexico. If
enforcement fails in Mexico, even the most lavish commitment
of resources to the S.W. Border will not he able to signifi-
cantly improve the situation. If.enforcement gets letter in
Mexico, even small commitments to the Border will show a
dramatic improvement. Thus,. factors which limit the effective-
ness of enforcement. in Mexico are by far the Most important
Ia ?OIS
!Anu nua non of effective enforcement in Mexico is :1 strong
commitm,nit from the Government of MeXico (GOM). [GAO note 2]
The GOM has declared its intent to do an effective job in the
areas of eradication, internal dnvev,igations, and developin6
intelligence systems, and has [been very cooperative with DEA.)
[GAG note 2]
We do not believe the general commitment and specific responsive-
ness of the GOM is sufficient [of and by itself] [GAO note 21 tu
sustain an effective enforcement program. The MEM' must
[_';AO note 2] launch a well-designed attack on Mexican production
arm distribution Systems. The basic building blocks of a swi-
tnined Mexican enforcement program [as now envisaged by the k-l0Mr
[GAO note 2] include at least the following elements:
a. An effective, 'centralized operational intelligence unit whi(A)
can identify specific targets and monitor Progress on. investi-
gations.
b. [Gs? note 2] personnel systems [which encourage efficiencyl.
;GAO note 2]
c. increased use of investigative procedures developed during
Operation SEA/M (e.g., roadblocks between 'opium growing -areas
and heroin labs, [GAO note 2] etc.)
e
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Ati'EDIN. I
d. Expanded -and imp roved erareic;icion programs sastained through
the development of. 'Co-I:Ward better?aerfal reconnais-
sance, etc.
To help the COM translate their general commitment into [even
more] [GAO .e:)te 21 effective operating programs, the U.S. Govern-
ment can do several things:
DEA and the [State Department can offer their expertise as a
resource for COM planning].
[GAO note 2]
-b. For those enforcement progrms that require large amounts of
equipment or money, the Stat , Department can le,Efer) U.S.
funds to support the neeessaey [GAO note 2] peugrams.
[GAO note 2)
e. [GAO note 2]
In summary, what is required at this stage is not general discussions
epocific planning of operat ons. 'DEA now has both the expertise and
liaison with the MFJP to [contribute to] [GAO note 2] this detailed
[GAO note 2]
heiwever, DEA needs some help from the State Department to continue
.;:eerol.coordination with the GOM; to release funds for equipment and
other resources,'
inc second section of the report dealing with enforcement in the
Thrt,d States should recognize that trying to [secure] tne Southwest
against a large flow of Mexican drugs is a second-best solution.
eete 2] However, there are some actions which could improve U.S.
cc Lens on the Border.
1. [GAO note 2] [An agreement with the MFJP providing for Mexican law
enforcement authorities to take custody of and prosecute Mexican
nationals who transport drugs aerosL:: the borders (i.e. "mules")
would reduce the amount of DEA agent time devoted to processing
. these defendants:and may result in the police obtaining more
information from the defendants.;
2. The Mexican Government should be encouraged to conduct joint in-
vestigations with DEA so drugs originating in Mexico are allowed
out .of Mexico for delivery in the U.S.
3. [GAO note. 2]
[CAO note 2]
42
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APPENDIX I
4 The U.S. Border Patrol, Customs Patrol Officers, and -Customs
Inspectors opera ing on the .Southwest Border must be -coordiw2ted
more effectively with DEA investigations. They should preser%;e
the potential of leads they develop from violations .discovered
on patrol, and they should avoid compromising DEA investi7
gations by. "disCovering". covert operations in progress. Moreover,?
the. size of the patrol forces needs to be kept in balance with::the?
size of the. DEA investigative forces so the patrol forces cio.hnt
encroach on investigative functions, and overwhelm the investiga-
tive forces with patrol cases. If these- policies are not adhered
to, the effectiveness of both operations will suffer.
5. DEA has already taken three steps to ?Increase the number and im-
prove the quality of investigations ort.the-Southwest Border. .They
have transferred 100 agents to this area; they are establishing an
intelligence center. at El Paso to identify major traffickers in
Mexico; and they have begun the installation of a communication
system that will link all border offices. ?
. In summary, much of what is possible to [secure] [GAO note 21 the
Border by unilateral action of the United States Government has. begun.
What is still needed for a more effective enforcement program is somewhat
better coordination between the patrol forces and ?DEA. in addition, i. is
im:_ortant to encourage the GOM to take greater responsibility for viol. ors
identified an _narged by U.S. authorities.
Given our general view that this report_ does not properly emphasize' .
the important factors influencing enforcement operations in Mexico and at
the Border, some errors, of a factual nature, should be clarified.. .Since
factual errors are only a small part of the problems with the report.,
simply responding to the following items will not make the report accept-
'able;
[GAO note 1]
We do not believe that the GAO report 'adequately describes DEA proillcms
and opportunities of enforcement in Mexico. The report does not point out
DEA's accomplishments in strengthening the commitment of the GOM throuel
personal negotiations, developing effective investigation procedures during
Operation SEAM, shifting agent resources to the Southwest Border, and ini-
tiating unilaterally a large intelligence program for the area. The report
dues not indicate the vital role the State Department and [our Embassy in ?
Mexico] [GAO note 2] must play in improving enforcement in Mexico. We be-
lieve that without State Department efforts- (GAO note 21 virtually all of
DEA's initiatives might be wasted.
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APPLND1X I
Thank you for giving us the oppdrtunity to comment OR your draft
report. Please contact us if you ha7e any additional questions.
GAO notes: 1. Deleted. Suggested changes made in body of report.
2. Deleted or changed [] to permit letter being de-
classified. The revised version of this letter has been
approved by 'officials of. the Department of State for
classification and by officials of the Department cf.
Justite for content,
Sincerely,-
Glen E. Pommerening
ting Assistant Attorney General
for Administration
4
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A 111)1:D 1 1 1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
' D.0 2'3520 ?
August 5, 1974
Mr. 3, K. Fasick?
Director
International Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Dear Mr. Fasick:
I am replying to your letter of June 10 in which. you
requested- the Department's comments on the draf?. report.
"Greater Efforts Needed to Stop the Illegal Flow of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to the United States From
and Through Mexico and Central. America". EncioF:ed are
the Department's comments and a listing of .suggested
textual changes.
[See GAO not-e.g.;
The Department endorses the recommendations ma :Th in
the report regarding action that should be undertaken
in conjunction with the Attorney-General and appreciates
the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Enclosures .
Sincerely yours,
I /
aclar
Deputy Assistant Secretar)
for Budget and Finance
1111,(AiliVZ
W. Murray ./
45
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.APPENDIX II
DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMETS ON GAO DRAFT
REPORT: "Greater Effort Wooded to Stop
the Illegal Flow of Narcotics -and Dangerous
Drugs to the United States. from and Through
Mexico and Central America"
The Department of State endorses the recommendations
made in this report regarding actions that should .be
taken in conjunctiOn with the 'Attorney General to
improve information gathering and cooperation in -
Mexico. to stop the illegal flow of narcotics and-dan-
gerous drugs to the United Stat.. Actions- consistent
with these recommendations have been underway for sometime
as outlined below, and will be pur!;ned in the future.
Sharing information bci interrogation of
suspects
The desirability of a fuller and more system-
atic exchange of information on drug traffickers
is recognized by both the Mexican and the U.S.
Governments. Practical ways and means of doing
this are being developed at the operational level
between our two govcrnments; this subject was
also discussed at a high-level meeting in May,
1974 between.the Mexican Attorney General, the
Executive Director of the U.S. Cabinet Committee
on International Narcotics Control, and the
Administrator .of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration.
-- Prosecution of fugitive traffickers in Mexico
when extradition is not feasible
Most bilateral extradition treaties between
the United States and Latin American countries
(including Mexico) contain a provision that there
is no obligation for the requested State to ex-
tradite its own nationals. The United States
Supreme Court in Valentine v U.S.. ex rel Neidecker,
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,
APPENDIX II
249 U.S. 5 (1936) held it the United States
cannot extradite its own nationals unless
a. treaty imposes the oblivaton to do so, but
did not rule out extradition under a treaty
which authorized extradition.
Recognizing these mutual difficulties in
the extradition i'rocess, the Alternative is
open in some cases of supplying information
to support prosecution within the other
country, and the Department of State concurs
in the recommendation that this alternative
be pursued more extensively than it has in
the past. Differences in procedural require-
ments'are an important complication in some
?cases, however.
Encouraging a program of rewards for information
This technique of obtaining drug trafficking
information has been employed successfully in
many places, and the results of experience ?
elsewhere have been brought to the attention of
Mexican authorities. The latter have not
adopted this technique however, and their de-
cision must be respected.
Monitoring sea and air trafficking
Ways and means are being explored to increase
the effectiveness of surveillance over ocean-
going vessels and aircraft engaged in drug
trafficking. Among various steps under consi-
deration to accomplish this is the possible
stationing of DEA liaison personnel at seaports
to work with their Mexican counterparts in such
control activity. The problem of air trafficking
is of continuing great concern to both governments
and has been discussed at high levels as well as
at the operational level in recent months.
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APPENDIX II
Textual Changes
Attached to this memorandum is a list of changes that
should be made in the draft GAO report in the interest
of accuracy. [See GAO note 2.}
Sheldon B Vance.
Senior Adviser for
International Narcotics Matter::
Attachment:
Listing of textual changes
[See GAO note 1.]
GAO notes: i. Deleted. Suggested changes made in body
of report.
2. Deleted. Included in body of report.
48
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?? , ? ? ??-fP,,,.,.-4,?,?*--10. 4';?' ? s '?
Pr ?,,r? ? ?? - - ? t ,? ? ?a. ? ?
,g 261 16, r ?i?-? ?att4i
ilk ? -A,
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APPENDIX III
RECENT DRUG ENFORCEMENT REPORTS
ISSUED BY GAO
Title
B-number
Oct.
Date
20,
1972
Efforts to Prevent Heroin from
Illicitly Reaching the
?
'United States
B-164031(2)
Heroin Being Smuggled Into.
New York City Successfully
B-164031(2)
Dec.
7,
1972
Difficulties in Immobilizing
Major Narcotics Traffickers
B-175425
Dec.
21,
1973
Identifying and Eliminating
Sources of Dangerous Drugs:
Efforts Being Made, But
Not Enough
13-175425
June
7,
1974
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APPENDIX JV
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Tenure of office
From
To
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES:
William B. Saxbe
Jan.
1974
Present
Robert H. Bork, Jr. (acting)
Oct.
1973
Jan.
1974
'Elliot L. Richardson
. May
_1973
Oct.
1973
Richard G. Kleindienst
June
1972
Apr.
1973
Richard G. Kleindienst
(acting)
Feb.
-1972
June
1.972
John N. Mitchell
Jan.
1969
Feb.
1972
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION:
John R. Bartels, Jr.
Oct.
1973
.Present
John R. Bartels, Jr. (acting)
July
.1973
Oct.
1973
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS (note a):
John E. Ingersoll
Aug.
1968
July
1973
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Sept.
1973
Present
William P. Rogers
Jan.
1969
Sept. 1973
SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY
AND COORDINATOR FOR INTER-
NATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS:
Aliibassador Sheldon B. Vance
Apr.
1974
Present
Ambassador William J. Hadley
May
1973
Mar.
1974
Harvey R. Wellman (acting)
Feb.
1973
May
1973
Nelson G. Gross
Aug.
1971
Jan.*
1973
a
Effective July 1, 1973, BNDD and other Federal agencies
involved with drug enforcement merged to form the new DEA.
Al). BNDD functions were transferred to DEA.
SO
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