LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-01394R000200110010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE
[Working Paper #2 November 1980
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DRUG TRAF-
FICKING: THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION
(MEXICO & THE UNITED STATES)
by
Peter A. Lupsha & Kip Schlegel
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k' Division
,
4104,
-/
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87131
ILLEGIB
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'7-7117 .
-?
THE POLITICAL- ECONOMY OF DRUG..
? '
TRAFFICKINGI-7THE -HERRERA ORGANIZATION-- -
.(MEXICO 4' THE UNITED STATES)* ?
?
by ?
Peter A. L.u-p-sha tip" Schlegel' --
University of New Mexico
. 4. .
',INTRODUCTION
-Borders Are much more than simple edges. Rather, they encompass
physical, cultural, social, and economic spaces that expand, and contract
along the physical line of. the border. Instead of borders, we must rec-
ognize borderlands, which encompass the geography of border culture and
economy.1 Here we use .borderlands to refer not only to the southwestern
border states of the United States, but also to the states of Baja Calif-
ornia, Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, and the other drug production
areas of the Republic of Mexico, as well as some of the major drug traffick-
ing impact areas within the United States, for these are the economic spaces
affected by our adjacent boundaries and the areas affected by drug traffick-
ing in the borderlafids.
In this paper we examine the effects of this drug trafficking
contrabandista activity, the rise and decline of Mexico's leadership as
an exporter of illicit drugs, and some of the effects of-organized traffick-
ing on the political economy of both Mexico and the United States. Smuggl-
ing and contraband Are endemic_to.borderlands. As one knowledgeable observer
estimated, "anywhere from 26 percent to 30-perCent of all -ecoMomic-activity -
along our Southwestern border is illegal contraband."2 Of this contraband
trade only a small percentage involves the smuggling of illegal drugs.
Most of it involves the illegal rebalancing of border-created supply-and-
demand inefficiencies. Coffee, instant cocoa, parrots, vehicles, appli- ,
ances, human labor; mercury, guns, or drugs make up the traffic, and what
ever is expensive in one nation and cheap in another provide the incentive
to the contrabandista.. .Like many kinds of crime and criminal activity,
smuggling is functional,and'helps satisfy larger, systemic needs.
While the potential for such activity is natural-to borderlands, it
is more likely to occur when economic differences in adjacent cultures are
great? The United greatest greatest per capita
income differences between two adjacent Countries in ifie-WOild;"'thna-it-is.
only.natural_that contraband.,.smuggling, and its attendant crimel corrup-
tion, and human exploitation WOuld be 'cammon-td-this borderland. 3 What is ?
surprising is that this subject'is only rarely mentioned, much less system-
atically studied, by scholars interested in the borderlands. This paper
'.\
7" ?
. - - ?
? . _ ? ...
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As:an.attempt at_?correctingthis situation", and will,: it_is.o.ped,
the,beginning.Of a series-pf,long7term-studies of; contraband and the
_ .
contrabandista,,as well.as_the.ramifications of_this activity.for both
'Mexico and the United States., Much work needs to be done, better statis- -
tics and data bases gathered, and long-term funding support for this type
.of research"developed.- We hope this paper can help point up these issues,
the problems, and the importance of continuing and improving our research
inthis area.
? Here we examine one of the most publicized and' more studied of the
border'contrabandiCiime-mairiCes; the trafficking. in heroin :We focus On
.
this contraband activity ,and its ramifications first because We are famil-
iar with it. We have spent the last Several years researching and studying -
organized drug trafficking in New Mexico." Second, because we believe that
before one sets mit to less known and untidy world-of the- -----
contrabandista, one should first study the more visible and known world;
and much data has been cOlrected,. If ,not analyzed, on heroin traffic.
Third, in keeping with a prudent approach, we believe that before entering
into what could be a,most dangerous, game,' it is wise to study the terrain
from some distance: This we have, done from the sanctuary of secondary
analysis.- We know there are miles to travel; we have, however, sought to
take a first step.
II
UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDERLANDS DRUG TRAFFICKING TRENDS: .
PAST TO PRESENT
The 1,945 mile border between the United States and the Republic of
Mexico has long been an area of drug trafficking and smuggling. In the
nineteenth century, the Chinese communities in Mexico, and the United
States engaged in.the production of opium in Mexico for use in Los Angeles
and San Francisco.5. The Los Angeles-Tijuana link was further developed in
this century-after-the'passage of limiting the open sale. of
drugs and medicines. But for the most part, our Southwestern'.
borderlands before World War II lacked the people, money, leisure, or at-
titude to make it much of a' market. for illicit drugs. While there were
local addicts and indigenous users, these tended to be few in number and/
undeiground in life-style. .The prime market was Los Angeles, and the,I
Tijuana-Sinaloa-connection.appearedto.be only major trafficking axis. . -
The rest of the borderlands had their minor traffickers and user-entre-
preneurs loosely linked-often through "kinship ties--to producer communi-
ties in Mexico, but this border traffic was largelytaniiid-,Ivith:-------
.half-ounce and ounce.shipments constituting the bulk of the trade. Such '
small-Scale enterprise is economically and-risk efficient in the border-
lands.. One important'structural point to remember is that the further one
gets from the-border; the greater 'the :need for organization and:the-traf--
ficking in larger. units of:illicit drugs. This fact changes both the
mature of" the enterprise and-any interdiction strategies or public policy
alternatives.,:
,It was during World War II, With.the:allies-cut.off.:from.Other, legal
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Satircei.-af,drui-SupPlie6%bY:the7fighting:,--that Mexica-beCame a sOurte7-,
of morphine for:the licit market and of heroin for the illicit. Simi=
-.1-1irly?,-thi---iii..f----created:ra need for hemp for rope and Cordage, Which -led
to the large-scale cultivation of marijuana both .in Mexico and the ?
United States.7:: After the war, such cultivation appears to have de-
clined, and.ii.was not'until the "epidemic" of drug use in the 1960s
that border states, and' later the' federal government, began to take
_
cognizance_pf_tbe role and potential of Mexico in the total drug.
trafficking picture.' In_May of .1969 the California legislature iiiii-
noted.the."fire,storm" of drug use in the state.8% In the rest of the.
southwestern barderlands it was Still considered a minor indigenous
problem by, most federal agencies.
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in their 1970-
. . .
budget hearings with Congress, for example, noted: "Heroin from?T -
Mexico is not considered a major problem: New York City is the key .
point of entry for heroin distribution throughout the United States."9
Mexico was considered by BNDD that year, however', to be a major source
of barbiturates and amphetamines as well as the source of large amounts
of marijuana smuggled into the United States. An examination of U.S.
Customs data from the San Ysidro-Tijuana border from the 1960s (Table 1)
Table 1 about here
suggests that BNDD may have been missing some early signs that things
were beginning to change.
While drug statistics and seizure data must always be examined with
. caution, it is the pattern, not the specific numbers, that are of interest
here. By the end of the period, drug trafficking in all common types was
Substantially on the increase. We also would note that in 1967 the
U.S. Customs Service at the San Ysidro station estimated that they were
only seizing some 4% or 5% of the drugs being smuggled across.]-0
? Elsewhere in the southwestern borderlands in 1968-1969,-the BNDD
found only minor drug trafficking from Mexico. In Texas, they noted,
"only gram and ounce traffic by independent smugglers carrying small
amounts.4111 In Arizona and New Mexico, they found, "capsule (gram)
amounts of heroin...(with) none of the traffickers supported by orga-
nized crime."12 In these areas of the border BNDD also found that even
the marijuana was mostly "domestic and homegrown."13
On the other side of the border-there appeared,..throughout this
period, to be greater concern. The so-called "gran campana" against the
cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana was launched by the Mexican
government in 1948.14 But this effort consisted of only occasional raids
on fields in Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Guerrero._ Richard_Craig,?,,
a student of this period, notes that it was not until 1961-1962, after
acquiring some $500,000 in surplus U.S. aircraft, helicopters, jeeps,
wagons, and spare parts, that some 3,890,316-square meters (961 a.crea?
of drug cultigens were destroyed.15 The major effect of these raids
?
141?';'-
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.appears-:-to!have bean--theL:disPlaOement,..O AhaSe.lields anci.thair_relocation?
in iOra:ineUntairious terrain '
. ? , 4
.?Opium and, marijuana cultivators,:aware,of the increased,,,
probability of' aerial detection. began concealing their
crop's amidst legitimate ones and: planting smallercrops. in
even more.remotaregionsJ6
BNDD in Mexico, working with the Mexican government, did not find much
in the way of, major heroin production, or trafficking; they did, however,
begin to'find-mailjUana'forakpOrt'-oli the itiereaSe in 1968-1969
, July 26, 1968. Guadalarjara, Mexico :7 lbs. heroin;
. 2.2 lbs..-.opium gum; 17 lbs.-,:marijuana.seized:. .The
-defendants-are Considered to:be:the biggest ?suppliers-LL
of opiumjn Michoacan State..
? _ _ .
November 13, 1968.
4,000 lbs. bricked
November 19, 1968.
6,000 lbs. bricked
from site of first
Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mexico.
marijuana seized. .
Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mexico.
marijuana seized. (3/4th miles
seizure.)
November 10, 1969. Guamuchil, Sinaloa, Mexico.
6.6 lbs. heroin seized.17
? In a sixteen-month period from 194 to 1969 BNDD seized a total of 13.6,
lbs. (6.8 kilos) of heroin in Mexico.'?
In 1969, however, the United States government in a dramatic policy
shift entitled "Operation Intercept" attempted to halt drug trafficking by
the simple expedient of stopping everyone crossing the border. This op-
eration, better termed "Operation Fiasco," tied up border traffic, angered
the Mexico government, and found little marijuana or heroin in its eight
weeks of operation.I' Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, later argued
that the purpose of Operation Intercept was not to seize drugs, but to con-
vince the Mexican government to pay greater attention to drug production
within its borders. The State Department, at that time, and scholarly
analysis later disputes this reasoning. But with increased aid to Mexico,,,/
greater cooperation, and technical assistance to Mexico's "La Campana '
Permanente" the joint,,U.S.-Mexican effort to eradicate opium poppy and
marijuana was begun." - - -------
?
Not until :1972, however, with 'the breaking :of the "French Connection,"
did the heroin market structures and distribution' patterns radically shift,"
and Mexican drug trafficking and' opium' poppy fields blossom. Mexican "mud,"
brown heroin, was suddenly in great demand. From 1972 through-1976 Mexico
reigned as ."queen" of the heroin trade and the leader in supplying an ever'
increasing_demand_for marijuana.,,, By_1977. and 1978, however, the *pact of"
the cooperative Mexican-United States afforts, t?ocate and: eradicate opium
poppy field and marijuana Pastures, and the TRIZO and jANUS programs that
'
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this cooperation spawned, was beginning to be seen. These programs, as well
as a declining demand for heroin (as purity declined to almost zero because
of improved interdiction and prosecution of major traffickers), preference
and trafficking shifts to Colombian marijuana and cocaine, and the Paraquat
spraying program, all lessened demand for Mexican heroin and marijuana in the
U.S. market."
By summer 19/8 trends could be clearly seen that Colombia had displaced
Mexico as the major supplier of the American drug demand. Cocaine and
Colombian marijuana were the drugs of choice. The penalties for cocaine or
marijuana smuggling are much milder. than those for heroin, thus lowering
risk/penalty ratios for volume trafficking in these drugs. Tremendous pro-
fits and new middle-class demand also helped make this shift attractive.
Today Colombia is first in this illicit drug market. Along with these
changes, the success of the U.S.-Mexican programs has affected Mexico's
leading position as a heroin producer. Now as overdose deaths indicate,
Asian "Golden Triangle," Pakistani, and Iranian white heroin appears to
have taken an increasing share of the market away from Mexican trafficking
organizations. Table 2 provides one illustration of these shifts. Indeed,
impressionistic data suggest that the Colombian traffic is even affecting
Table 2. About here
Mexico's natural dominance in the drug markets of the borderlands.
The vast profits to be made from trafficking during the heyday of
Mexico/s leadership in poppy and marijuana production led to the develop-
ment of a number of sophisticated organized criminal groups and trafficking
structures. Major crime families operated in Ciudad Culiacan in Sinaloa
State, and in Durango State. The Durango or Herrera Organization was con-
sidered by the Drug Enforcement Administration to represent the single most
important group. Other families among the six major trafficking organizations
are of almost equal importance, wealth and influence, but the Herrera "Family"
is typical of them and illustrates the structure and operation of Mexican
drug trafficking groups and their impact on both sides of the border.
THE STRUCTURE AND ECONOMICS
OF THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION:
THE DURANGO-CHICAGO CONNECTION
The Herrera "family" is said to have been in the heroin trafficking
business since 1957.23 While their home base is Los Herreras in Durango,
Mexico, members of the Herrera group have been living in the Chicago area
since the 1950s. It was not until May 1972, however, that the Herreras
were specifically mentioned as being large-scale traffickers. In that
month the "Noche y Dia" Club, owned by Asuncion Herrera-Chavez, and "El
Alacran" Club, run by Reyes Herrera-Herrera and his three sons, were cited
by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement as being major trafficking
headquarters.24 It is likely that the Herreras were well-established by that
date, although at the time the Chicago Police were not yet knowledgeable
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f r e* ft% 1^ . t
about-Mexican "brown" heroin.? Indeed - year later, two officers stopped
and released 'a young Mexican national in the 'vicinity of these two clubs
af ter -accepting:--his - story -that tha-br own sOi17-1-ika sub statt 6-filling a
suitcase in his car was Mexican "fertilizer."2.) By 1978, however, both
local and federal law enforcement were well acquainted with the Herrera
organization and what the Illinois legislative Investigating Commission
called the "Heroin Highway" stretching from Durango to Chicago.
_
Tii-gtudenti-of illiEit organizations and 'their operations, as well
as, to borderlands pcholqrs,.the.Herreras' heroin trafficking operations
provide fascinating material for study. The Herreras are in all likeli-
hood the premier ."contrabandistas" of the United States-Mexico border-
lands. The DEA considers them the largest single heroin supplier Rrgani-
zation in Mexico, estimating their profits at $100,000,000 a year.46 Such
net profityould-place.the Herrera-group about 116th in the Fortune magazine
listing of America's most profitable' corporations, and ninth, 'just behind
Safeway Stores, in'profit earnea-by U.S. retailers.27 To students of
border ?issues perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Herrera organiza-
tion is that the vast majority of this_proat is_returned to the Republic
of Mexico.
The base of the Herrera organization's operations is Durango State,
Mexico: in the capital, Durango, where Jaime Herrera-Nevarez lived for '
many years, and where his associate Enrique Diaz-Garcia owns an illicit
heroin processing laboratory; up the secondary highway, Durango 89, past
Los Herreras, the family stronghold where Arnoldo Herrera-Herrera owns a
heroin laboratory; and on to Tepehuanes, some two hundred kilometers
Northwest'of the capital city, where Manuel Herrera-Herrera controls a
seasonal heroin laboratory; Durango State is Herrera country. In the
summer of 1978 Jaime Herrera-Nevarez moved south to the Zacatecas-Guadalajara
area, where his long-time friend and partner, Manuel Villareal-Valdez, re-
sides.28 A Herrera cousin, Carlos Herrera-Araluce is Mayor of Gomez Palacio
in East-cenKal Durango State and said to run a heroin-processing labora-
tory there.' Another cousin of the Herreras is a police official in
Hidalgo del Parra' in southern-Chihuahua State and is said to facilitate-
Herrera interests from there. The Herreras' influence and investments
are felt across all North Central and Western Mexico, but as one DEA agent
noted, Durango is their corporate headquarters.
The Herreras control the City of Durango in the same
manner that American 'corporations have controlled company ,
towns in the, United States.3?
------In"organizational:structure-and-styla;-the-:Herrera-group is rather
similar to Italian-AmeriCan'organized crime groups operating in the United
States during Prohibition. The approximately 2,000 members of the "family"
are all of the same ethnic-group.and come from a particular geographic area
-of their 'country of 'origin."- They are related either 'directly 'by blood ties"
and kinship, or through the cross-ties of marriage. As did the old Italian-
American .organize&crime leadership, .they tend to live-relatively modestly:.
in both Mexico and in the United States. As did the old Italian groups
they tend to send theirmoney, or some portion of it, home, and they seek
. _ . ?
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-respite:there, As'well-as sanctuary framAmerican-law-enforcement=
? .???????7.,,,.;-.: ? ; ; 4, .'r ; ? ' ? ? ,
. .
-
. Strudturalln-the-Herrera-organization consists-of-six-interrelated
families.. -The senior members of these families (JaiMe:Herrera-Nevarez,
. Manuel and Arnoldo Herrera-Herrera, Heliodora Herrera-Medina,.and Luis
Herrera-Vengas) are- responsible for overseeing the organizational tasks of
' production and processing as well as the management and investment of capital.
These organizational tasks include the hiring of campesino farmers, the dis-
tribution of poppy seed; the deVelopient- of -new productiOn*areas, the over7 ?
sight of habitadOtes? who.collect the opium .gum, the.superviSion,and manage-.
ient of the laboratories; and the."Stepping on"- (1.e., cutting and diluting),
packaging, and shipment of the heroin to Chicago.'1 While the life-style
of the family members in Mexico is more -visible and somewhat more opulent
than that of those In the United States, it is for the Most part unpreten-
tious : Theigtrniajolitf-cif -the -cirganization's wealth is-invested in ranches,
-land, dairies, apartments,'and the financial institutions Of Durango and
Mexico's western region. ?
The younger members of the family- (Reyes Heriera-Nevarez, Adalberto
Herrera-Medina, Jose Herrera-Manquero, and their relatives 1 run the dis-
tribution and wholesaling end of the business in Chicago.3 Their neigh-
borhood bases are in the Roseland, Pilsen, Blue Island, and Aurora sections
of the-city. They are also responsible for transshipment to retailing''
groups in Louisville, Detroit, Boston, Springfield (Massachusetts), Hart-
ford, New York City, Philadelphia, and Puerto Rico.
Efficient organizational management is maintained .by some 26 executive
level directors, and a vast array of "field representatives" in a number
of American citie.33 This network is held together through the Herrera
organization's Chicago "offices" and through constant communications and
trips back to the organization's headquarters in Durango.
Two aspects of the Herreras' operations are of interest to us in
this paper: first, their transportation and transshipment of heroin
throUgh the-I5OaifIandiT"leaaTINET-Wilirn-thipment-to the Mexican econ-
87fOrTrarrlinilir-Untaked. United?States currency. This second aspect of
die-Herrera-it .opeiaficin'fs particularly significant as it has been ignored
for so long by students of the.borderlands. The traditional wisdom is that
drug trafficking crime matrices, particularly those from less developed /
nations, such as Mexico, are unimportant from the perspective of political
economy because the bulk of the profits occur in the recipient nation, and ?
only small sums return to the producing nation. Indeed, it has been argued
that even_the.money_that_does_return_to_the less deyel4ed_illiclit_druk.L____
producing country is of little concern for it will be spent on expensive
luxuries and advanced technology products, which are produced in the high-
technology drug-consuming nations.34 We oballenge_thionventional view,
for the data from the Herrera organization indicate,--i-s
-
that under certain organizAtion41:_c_onditionsS_____?,large,pircentage oft4 Ern-
f-117117121371117e?ae illicit drugonsuming contry:apsl_returITig-he-7pro-
duping nation Second, we finds little comfort In the view that these "drug-
dollars" will quickly-find their way back into the U.S, economy. We note
that there are _other advanced technology nations (for example, Japan and
West Germany) producing goods that compete for these narcodollars. - And more
_
_
-
?
I.
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-thafTthaTproduditiag
investment possibilities;.5 Wes?little _
reason why a group-like.the Herreras
should:return'their drug -d011ars-;to:the United States through-the.purchase of
New York City' office buildingaYor'BeverlyHills estates,.`When?the ranches,
dairies, and resort deelOpmenta-of Mexico offer attractive returns. From
this point of view, we see drug trafficking as. having an importanteffect-on
North/South relatiOns.--And,-It 'May well be that the argument we are present- ?
.for .Mexico could be.,%made_regardi:ng.. the _Colombian . drug-dollars as
? The DEA estimates-that-the Herrera organization imports-.O.37-tons (746 r
? lbs.) of pure 'fieroin'f into the 'United ? States each year. This amount's tO some
8.14 tons of."steppecl'on" .fiiie'lieicent'hei-oin for retail According to the
Drug Enforcement kuiic3i.,.,thig'.4mOUnta:"tO one-third of the total Chicago .Mar-
ket for this
L.:V.3,431c r?. .
- 'There are a number of-Ways-to mOve illicit contraband .across a border.
In the heroidtraffieking Matrix,:the.most common way is foraHhalfounce.or-
Ounce of heroin to be carried in:A-rubber condom and held insidethe mouth' .
or other orifices by.hUMan "burroa? or.'"mules." ?This is perhaps the most
common means of transport in theborderlands themselves, One New Mexico
trafficking group had seventy-six-such human "mules' crossing. the border '
every month. After.delivery_of the heroin; they would return to Mexico iia
the Immigration and Naturalization Service:bus, courtesy of our. undocumented
,
workers program.37...
?
The Herrerasl. operations are too large and too far from the border to
permit the use of this method; Their preferred method Of transshipment is .
the "Durango drive-shaft," and the compartmentalized gas' tank, although they/
have used door panels and other hiding places as wel1.38 The "Durango
drive-shaft" is a sleevelike device, of the Herreras' invention, which sur-
rounds the vehicle drive-shaft and can contain up to' several kilos of her-
oin. The compartmentalized gasoline tank is simply that, a subdivided ve-
hicle gasoline tank, one part holding thefuel, the other several kilos of
heroin.. _Once theae;devices,are..traveldirty,_they are_hard_to_distinguish
or detect:
-:-;; ?
To bring their .heroin across the border, the Herrera' organization uses
driver-"mules" who take aloaded 'Vehicle from Durango to Chicago in 49 hours/ .
of.straight-through driving. V At the border crossing?the Herrera group,-
according to one,DEAMaP,,prefers the El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass,- and ..,
Laredo check points?the mule will 1RR observed by a Herrera representative
to make sure he crosses undetected.," .The U.S. Customs estimates, they. are -
-only able to interdict some two-'percent f the -heroin-crossing--the Southwes?
border, so this phase of 'the Herreras "operations usually proceeds Smoothly.40
On arriving in Chicago the mule will be paid $800 to $1;000 for' his work. In
this manner the senioraerieras traffic their heroin' across the borderlands.
." : . ? ' ? .
The second part of the Herreras' operations that is of interest involves
the movement of United States (untaxed). currency back to Mexico.- Much of
. .. . . _ ... _
this cash is returned by southbound."mules"nr by'higher -level members ofl
the 'Organization who'are'ieturning hoMe. One such Herrera family'member was
. -
?Arrested just as he was-about tOJeaveThicago carrying $94,000; 'another was
,'stopped at the border arid.$217,7970'found-in' a 'compartmentalized gii-tank.41
. 4, -,:,-,...? ?:rf .,,,--,,..--,?',.? 4:-.as ..------e--.....4 - - ? . ,,.. : - - .
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Because of these problems, and other problems of "slippage'.' sending cash.:.'.;.:...,.
reras back to Durango, the Herreras have turned to a different and unique method. .
7ii7C51 They the local poverty neighborhood currency exchanges (check
i
ea;', , 1 cashing outlets) to send money orders back to Durango. A. recent Congres-
om? ,.- sional study .found that between June 1976 and July 1977, the Herreras sent
-
t on $625,906 from one South Halsted Street exchange to a.bank.in.Durango. Be-
sent- '' tweet.' January1975 and June 1977 they had sent $1,253,076 south of the bord-
1-...______
-::.-- er from another exchange. Indeed, in a Single day they moved $/25,000 in-
. - .
money42
orders one poverty neighborhood exchange 42 -- ? ? - ---
.
146.
sote
the A
Mar-
?
Of enforcetent4nterest'in thiS'meehOd Of funds*.trenifer.". , ?
the Herreras appear to have turned to Western Union to send their excess cash
to Mexico. In 1976 they.sent $270,680 to Durango through Western Union. In
. the first five months of 1977, ai the government studied the currency ex-- '
----change -tiansfers, this-jumPed to $351,65043 - -
.. ? 1' !-rt
t.
e or In total, the DEA ancfnfer federal, state., and local law enforcement
.-
agencies could trace just under $2 million ($1,878,323.23): from the exchanges
and Western Union during the period they studied. They estiMate that this
is probably about one percent of the total ($100 -$200 million) cash trans-
ferred to Mexico by the Herrera organization annually. 44 We believe that the
via
$200 million figure is too high. Our analysis of the economics of the
?
nted ? Herreras' operation indicates that $100 million is more nearly correct.
The DEA estimates that it 'cost the Herrera organization between $5,500
and $6,500 to get a kilo of heroln from the opium poppy fields of the Sierra
to
is Madre to the streets of Chicago." The difference in these figures depends
they on whether they are bringing in ten percent heroin ($5,500)or five percent
heroin ($6,500). As the Herrera group are primarily wholesalers, they are
content to sell a kilo for $27,500, even though they could work for higher
prices.46 Given their costs, they net $21,000 or $22,000, depending on the
level of purity of the kilo. Chicago Police Department intelligence indi-
cates that the Herreras have an organizational norm which states that a
minimuT of $17,000 is to be returned home to Mexico out of every kilo whole-
- - saled.'7 By working through these numbers, we can better estimate how
the Herrera group is likely to send across the border back to Mexico. This
analysis is presented in Table 3.
?
Table _3 about here.
The government's investigation of the Chicago currency exchanges, -amh
DEA and U.S. Customs border stops over six months in 1976-1977, only account
for'about'$2.1. million moving south-. If we accept the notion ? that as-border
--r-streent-are-designed.tokeep things out, rand not to -frath-leav -
ing,-and the fact the Customs only stops ten percent of total contraband coming
into the United States, it is possible that much larger shipments Of untaxed .
- cash are moving out.48 Certainly our analysis would suggest that then.move-
ment of over $100 million to Mexico by-the Herrera organization-is
How many of the other major heroin trafficking groups that operate in the
- borderlands return Similar proportions of their profits to Mexico is unknown.
To examine further the impact of drug trafficking on North/South relations,
we now turn to the political economy of drugs south of the border.'0"'
i :5;7 ?
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4
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
? OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO.
THE HERRERA ORGANIZATION; PART II
In,Mexic6 a federal policeman is paid between $150 and $200 a month' in
salary. Given the contraband on' the border., it is not, surprising that mordidas
tha,payments.of. gratuities or bribes for the nonenforcement.of law, are common-
. place. The Herreras'. organization obviously can make use of this, so perhaps -
we should not .be surprised when Marshall Cartevin her.'study.,of El?PasO informs,'
Us of -one relatively'neW'MeXiCan border off ice who has over $150;000 in U.S. '
bank accounts.49 Obviously., if one is in the right place whether it is on
the United siaies;or,the Mexican side of thel)order, one Can earn significant
sums by looking:the.otherway._ Thus. the first' impacts that the.Herreras.have
south of the border, as probably theydo on the U.S. side of the line, is in
bribery and corruption of the guardians of that border.- Unfortunately, due
to the lack of systematic data, we cannot analyze this and can only note the
need for regularized study:. -
Farther south, the canapesinos of the Sierra Madre can, with luck, earn
$100 a year from the beans and corn they raise.. If, one adds to this the:
value of their labor, and the fruit of their livestock and family's efforts,
this figure can be increased to $400 per year. The poor, often landless
campesino, by planting an illicit 2.5 acres on government mountain wilder-
ness, can aid his family. The sowing and cultivation of opium with his corn,
or on some rugged mountainside, can also greatly increase the campesino's
income. At the same time, the caRResino has little understanding of the
serious implications that his efforts to improve his lot have on some other,
distant society.50- By planting opium poppies on 21/4 acres, a campesino can
earn from $2,000 to $4,000 or more annually, depending on the number of crops
he can harvest.51
. Table 4 about here
In Table 4 we present several scenarios that estimate the Herrera organization's
contribution in terms of local acreage planted in the Durango area. This table
is based on a number of premises, which we will do our best to explain. As
this is a secondary analysis, lacking access to either the Herrera account /
books or DEA intelligence files, we have used the best common-sense intell,i=
gence possible.
- -. The different yield figures and alternative scenarios in Table 4 provide
us with the range of acreage the Herrera organization must have in cultivation
to produce their supply for the Chicago market. The varying yield formulas.
could
could reflect the varying soil or climatological conditions of the Sierra
Madre region, or mew learning on the part of DEA. ? Since it is impossible, us-
ing secondary source materials to know the answer to this, or to know the..-
exact number of Herrera acres affected by the TRIZO eradication program, we
simply present all the alternative likely yield and eradication scenarios.'
Obviously,
Obviously, if all the Herrera acreage had been eradicated by the TRIZO pro-
gram, they would be out of business. ? We assume, therefore, that they have
the capacity to achieve at least one harvest. It may be that they had other
acreage planted that was completely eradicated: The largest figure in the table
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ILLEGIB
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h in- '
mordidas
common-
erhapa:
:infOria
.-\
ficant
shaVe-
ia in
-due
e, the
earn
e _
ort s,
er-
corn,
1s labor and thus this income will be more widely dispersed in the Sierra Madre
communities.
ther
can This analysis reflects the impact that the Herrera organization would have
crops on the income of the campesino population of the Sierra Madre region. We sus-
pect, however, that the TRIZO program has probably displaced much of this
cultivation to other areas and states east and south of the TRIZO program
boundaries.54 Whatever the case, it is evident from Table 5 that the cultiva-
tion of opium can greatly increase campesino income,_and_that any program to
ization's limit the cultivation of opium poppies must seek to provide alternative income
istable possibilities and incentives for the campesinos. Indeed, because campesino
As earnings are so low, any extra income is likely to be quickly consumed with
mat attendant multiplier effects on the merchandising and retailing sectors of the
regional and local economy.
- t-4" -.AJ
035 _acres) Indicates_what-the Herrera group must cultivate to meet their
_tonnage under the poorest yield conditions. .The smallest figure (185 acres)
ndicat-es--the_least_emount_of 'itc.ies_they need cultivated under the best
dr .,..conditions: It ,is likely that the Herrera organization receives their opium
guni from some amount of acreage within this. extreme range.
? ?
If the typical campesino family in the Sierra Madre' cultivates 2.5 acres
. of opium poppies asDEA reports, then the Herrera organization provides employ-
ment for anywhere :from 68 to 756 campesino families._ This work, however, is
. highly labor intensive and, at harvest time, many more farm laborers would be
'employed: Indee8L:DEA estimates that it takes 20 laborers to harvest the gum
from one acre of.opium-poppies.53- If this is so (and because of serial Plant-
? ing, all acreage does not mature at the same time, so that the average field
crew can only harvest two acres), then anywhere from 680 to 7,460 farm labor-
- ers-could-receive-seasonal.employment from the_Herrera's illicit. entrepreneur-
...
This is,admittedly a crude "guestimate," but .it indicates the range of
'basic employment opportunities provided by the Herrera group in the Sierra
? Madre region.
Using the various scenarios presented in Table 4, it is possible to
derive some income estimates for the campesino families who engage in the
cultivation of this illicit crop. Table 5 presents these income estimates.
We assume in this effort that some of their income will go.to pay harvest
Table 5 about here
? f
rovide
hration-
'las
7a -
Le,' us-
le - --
we
Is
rro-
ive
Ither
.he table
The Herrera organization, through their illicit entrepreneurship in the
borderlands, is putting, we estimate, nearly $1.5 million -into the campesino
economy, whicb is -likely to have a "spending" multiplier effect several times_
that amount-55 Such economic "Pump-priming" is likely to have strong effects
on the campesino economy. Through poppy cultivation a campesino can, for .
better or worse, Move from a subsistence income and barter to participation in
the cash economy._ -From dependence on. the burro, be can achieve dependence. on
the pickup or four-wheel-drive vehicle. Indeed, the booming borderlands
business in stolen, trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles moving south across
the border underscores this transportation change. C.C. Benson of the National
Auto Theft Bureau estimates that some 10,000 vehicles stolen in the United
tStates each year end up in Mexico-56 The majority of those vehicles stay in
the Mexican borderlands, 'particularly the drug-producing regions. .
,
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While the Herrerali contribution to the campesinO.eacnomy is large cotpar
,.? ?.
-With eatningsjiong-traditional:ptoduCtiOn,and labor, it-represents only 1,5-pe
cent of the total Untaxed U.S. Clittenincome they'bilng'int6 the Republic of'''
Mexico,- Their annual-..inveStmentaduring-Tthe--19705;Lof-over--$1-00-million-a
year in land, tenches, dairies;. apartments, resortfdeVelokents, and financial:
institutions is a tremendous, if-illicit,' boon to the Mexican'economy. In
light of the consequences of addition, and its multiplier effects of crime and
'human misery on the United States side of the border, this is not a'pleasant
conclusion to come to: But from the point of viewfota less developed nation.
and its-ecOnoity--,--ad-lbreS7the(1-111C0--dtVg-ptOduonld trafficking is for
? ? ?
the expoit.marefl. thftteare.feW incentives to eliminate.totilly this pOducti9
'It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that'thaMexiCan government has-been as
,cooperative as it has in assisting the United States to eliminate opium and
marijuana fields and bring major traffickers to justice. In 1978 Mexico spent
some $40 million in these efforts,57'.1This is far more than a token gesture
and'indicativeof.the-strong-desires-the-Mexican-government-has for amicable
.and 'close relations with the United,States..-58 'Given the shifting trafficking
.patterns to other less develbpri'd countries, however, -this analysis of. profits
and incentives is something that out.policy makers must recognize and ponder.
' V '
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF:
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN.MEXICO: PART III
ESTIMATES OF HEROIN PRODUCTION
AND DRUG-DOLLAR RETURNS
TO THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
DEA authoritiesestimate that there are six separate organizations
that control production and smuggling of an estimated 10 tons of pure
heroin into the United States each year.59
Governor James Thompson of Illinois made the above statement in February
1978 at the opening of congressional hearings into drug trafficking in the
Chicago area. While we agree that there probably are six major organizations
engaged. in this drug trafficking-across the-southwestern borderlands; we
believe that .the "10 tons of pure heroin" is either exaggerated or out of date.
In .order to get a better estimate of the total amount of heroin that
could be produced in Mexico, and, in turn, Imported into the United States,/
we must turn to the eradication and yield estimates of the U.S. government<
In mid-October 1976, the DEA reported that it had destroyed some 38,500 fields
,of opium poppies', which it estimated made up between 85 percent and 90 percent
of the total acreage in'Mexico.60,--In-1978, DEA'Oregented-summaty figures,
which showedathifiii-1977-iiiii-e-21:769-iiiei-IYai-COUld'haiii3iieIded-some 8,567
kilos of pure heroin were eradicated.61 ,This conversion'is based on a DEA
formula, which estimates that 2,471 acres yields 10 kilos of opium gum, '
equivalent to one kilogram of pure heroin (2.2 lbs.). Either DEA's- math is
--in-error or they haveadditiOnal'Unsfated--assumptions regarding yields, for
using their formula and numbers we find a yield (see Table 6) of 8,809 kilos.
1
Table 6 about here ?
?
If the 21;160'Scres eradicated' were the total acreage in Mexico and if
, ;":7"" '
?
?:.t.e?!7P 7 -7.7
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tr they had been unmolested for one or both harvests, anywhere from-8.-5 to 34.6
metric tons of 'pure heroin would have beenavailableIdr"exliort fo'te'United
States:: Instead,' the TRIZO:eradication-program removed much_of_this_tonnage_____
from the market:: The acreage eradicated, however,- is not likely to be the
total acreage planted in opium poppies, only some percentage of it. It we
assume that in 1977 they were able to destroy the same percentage as in 1976
(ie., 85'percent to 90 percent) then, using the lower percentage figure,'
DEA and the Mexican government destroyed 21,769 acres out of a total acreage
of 25,610 1n poppy cultivation : This were some 3,341 acres
missed by the. TRIM. program:. If this acreage produced,ohe.harvest it could
yield, using the 2.471?apres.yields One kilo.formula, some:1;336- kilos:of
pureheroin., or 1.3 tons. If totally unmolested, this acreage could yield
2.6 tons for export. ,This estimate of between 1.3 and 2.6 metric tons avail-
able to the United States market appears more reasonable than Governor -
Thompson'S "10 tons :r It also'appears-.to be more in-line with the 0.37 met-
ric? tons that DEA estimatesis the Herrera organization's share of the U.S.
market. The large:drop in'the purity of heroin available on the streets of
this nation, from 5.1 percent in the 'beginning of 1978 to 3 5 percent in
March of 1979, also corroborates that the qmoune of pure heroin available
for the market has declined considerably.64
If the range of from 1.3 to 2.6 metric tons of pure heroin available
for export can be considered to be "ballpark," then we can estimate what -
the likely drug-dollar flow back to Mexico might be if every trafficking'
group behaved like the Herrera organization. Table 7 presents this analysis.
Table 7 about here
From this analysis we can see that if every Mexican heroin trafficking
group behaved like the Herrera organization is said to behave, then anywhere
from $420 million to $1.5 billion dollars in U.S. currency could flow into
the Mexican economy from the heroin trade. It is unlikely that other traf-
ficking organizations behave like the Herrera group, although we would note
that Alberto Sicilia Falcon, who headed a large Culiacan-Tijuana to Los
Angeles trafficking? network,- is said-to have returned-some $3.6 million-a--
week to Mexico when his organization.was operating at peak efficiency."
_
Given the large amount of drug-dollar flows back into the Mexican
economy as well as the extremely large dollar amount of the estimated pos-
sible drug-dollar flows, it is surprising that the Mexican government has
Ls been as cooperative in eradicating the opium poppy crop as they have been
t in the past several' years. Even with government cooperation, however, one
must not .forget the persistence and tenacity of human beings to improve -
i7 their lot in life.: For the poor campesino the growing-of opium poppies---
will remain an extremely attractive proposition given his limited alter-
, .
natives.
-ih the fall of l977,7-the-DEA- conducted .s.!,21ell.u.p.tsLey of Zone 06
north of Culiacan in Sinaloa State. Here the fields of opium 5FFTWEI7.177g
been the targets of eradication programs since the "gran campana".of.1945,
Yet the survey found that of 1,055 fields flown over, some 608 had been
destroyed, 270 had Oium poppies growing, and 177 were in preparation for
poppy Cultivation.6q_ The survey noted:.-"the large fields that had been
destroyed were abandoned.' The fields are smaller, dispersed . . . hidden
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among traditional crops . . under 146 foliage ,65 For more than thirty=
4.
two'y'ars-thi,s-,arei:Of Sinaloa State has been under surveillance and sub=-
jected to. Poppy eradication efforts. . Tet, 'the poppies are still being. .
grown, close, we wouldnbter that if-Suet-the 177 fields in prepaiatiiin-
Were each only'one:acre and left unmolested, they would more than supply
the Herrera organization's share of the United States market.
_
VI
_ .
CONCLUSIONS
. . ? " ' ? ? t
. . ? '. . ? ?
-
In summary, We have in this paper eXamined one amall aspect of the
-?
political And economic relationships that make up the complexity of the
borderlands, the.heroin trafficking crime matrix and its effects on .the
ppited_States. and Mexico.. We 'have found.that.some forms of borderlands_
drug trafficking organization'appear to provide an illicit and untaxed
form of foreign aid for 'a less developed economy, aid that, we noted,
reaches into very different sectors and. levels within an economy as does
the formal foreign aid program. Law enforcement, whether 'federal or lo-
cal, Cannot be expected ever fully.to-accomplish its mission so long as
such political and economic incentives to trafficking continue to exist.
4,
Finally, in terms of future research, much needs to be done. First,
we--academics and scholars--need to work more closely with the State
Department and law enforcement intelligence working in this field. We
need access to data, and they need an outside, objective research and
analysis of their formulas, data collection, and verification techniques
if they are to serve the Congress and the nation. There is a need for on-
site research in Mexico, and other nations, and the development of coop- ;
erattve projects and ties with our counterparts in the academy and drug
law enforcement of those nations. There is also a need for comparative
research studying the structure and function of trafficking organizations
and cash flows and their effects on a nation's economy." Comparative
studies between Mexico and other Latin American drug-producing nations
and the Caribbean area would be a good place to start. Most of all we
need to recognize the multifaceted nature of this policy problem and its
effects. We hope this research can provide one example of a beginning,
and that we and others can progress, learn, and develop a more sophisti-
cated understanding of all the aspects of drug trafficking as both a domes-
tic and international policy problem.
-
ILLEGIB-
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-NOTES ?
?
i. See Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "The
Substance and the Study of Borders in International Relations
Research," International Studies Quarterly 20:4 (Dec. 1976);
_John A. Price, "Borders and Border Screens," Border-State
University. Consortium for Latin America, Occasional Papers
No. 2. . . ? .
-
- ' ?2; *Robert*Tobermin, U.S. Border States`Commission,
Tucson, Arizona, personal communication, January 17, 1979.
3. Raul Fernandez,- The United States-Mexico Border:
A Politico-Economic Profile (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1922); John A. Price, Tijuana:
Urbanization in a Border Culture (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press,, 1973).
4. See Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in New
Mexico, A Report for The Governor's Organized Crime Prevention
Commission (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1978).
?
5. Report of the Subcommittee to investigate Juvenile
Delinquency; Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 95th
Congress; The Mexican Connection Hearings Feb. 10th and
April 19th 1978, p. 19; Richard Craig, "La Campana Permenente:
Mexico's Anti-drug Campaign," Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 20: No. 2 (May 1978), pp.
107-133.
6. John A. Price, Tijuana: Urbanization in a Border
Culture, op...cit., p. 53.
- 7. Ibid.,-p.-99.
8. State of California, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
"Drug Traffic in California," Report (Mimeo), May 26, 1976.
9. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
Appropriations Hearings, Subcommittee on Appropriations, U.
House of Representatives, 91st Congress, p. 931.
-
Michael Logan, ,"Smuggling Drugs and Narcotics
Through the San Ysidro Station," in John A. Price, ed.,
Tijuana '68 (San Diego: San Diego State College, August,
1968) (Mimeo).
11. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs k)prOpria-
tion Hearings, op. cit,, 11?
12. Ibid., p. 981.
13. Ibid., p. 32.
,r
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15. -Ibid., p. 109.
16.'
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous. Drugs, Appropria-
tions CoMmittee Hearings, U.S. House of Representatives,
91st Congress, op tit. p:'968:
18. r.Ibid., p.
19. See Richard Craig, op. cit., pp. 107-133; also
- Lawrence A. Gooberman,-Operetion Intercept: The Multiple --
Consequences of Public Policy (New York: Pergamon Press,
1974),..
20. See Richard Craig; op. cit., pp. 107-133; Washington
Post, June 15, 1971, P. 1; and Edward Jay Epstein, Agency of
Fear (New York: G. Putnam Sons, 1977), pp. 86-92.
21. See Hearings of the House Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, Cocaine and Marijuana Traffick-
ing in the Southeastern United States, 95th Congress, June
9th and 10th, 1978.
22. Data for 1972, 1975, 1977, from Hearings of the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Committee;
of the Judiciary. U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, The Mexican
Connection, February 10th and April 19th, 1978, pp. 47, 296;
1973,1974, Hearings of the Subcommittee to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, The Global
Connection: The Heroin Entrepreneurs, pp. 89-90; 1976,
House Appropriations Committee .Hearings, 94th.Congres_s,_DEA
Budget Analysis, p. 1123.
23. Investigation of Narcotics
Laundering in Chicago, Report of the
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, U.S.
95th Congress, February, 1978, P. 4.
?
Trafficking and Money
House Select. Committee,
House of Representatives,
. 24. Lynn Emmerman, "Mexican Mud and the Herrera Family,"
Chicago Magazine, September, 1978,..p.
25. Ibid., p.157.
?
Report of the House Select Committee on Narcoticsr
Control, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th -
Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds
Illinois), September 30th-October 1st, 1977, p. 14.
26.
Abuse and
Congress,.
(Chicago,
27. Ibid., p. 267.
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? -
^
Ibid'p 127571.-,,
. .!
-. . ._ 4 : . ? ?. ? ? ? . ? 1, ? t.?;?,T. a . ? ._.. . .
_
-,29. 'Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission,
The Heroin Highway (Springfield, Illinois: State of Illinois,
June, 1976), P. T- . . .
- _
30:- House Select Committee on Narcotics- Abuse and -
Control, Investi-gation-of-Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds,
??-f ?
260.
?
, ? ,
". ? ?
31.? ? .1 L., ? L.-- .3 ? ?-?-?
?
. ?.? ; 7. 7 f I Sr". C .7. 7 . , ?
?
32; -Ibid , :2 4 4 p ; 2 6 0 Also Illinois .Legislative'
---Invstiga.ting-Itommissioh`LThe-aeroin-Highway,2--opT-cit-.--,------- --
,
, ,
Chapters .3 -through 5.-r,--:.-1.-. : ? - - ?
, - --, L.
----,E-.. .
-
I -
, 33. ,Ibid.*?p-260:1---' , ='-
--?
34.- 'For various perspeCtives see R. Dan Walleri, "The
Political Economy Literature on-North South Relations,"
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, Dec. 1978,
pp. 587-624. - -
35. ?The Heroin Highway, op. cit.,- p.279.
36. The Mexican Connection, op. cit., presents several
interesting charts, unfortunately based on very small numbers,
which suggest that heroin inside Mexico frequently moves by ,"
private aircraft', but that it crosses the border primarily
by private automobile. If this information is correct and
patterns hold, then the implications of this pattern differ-,
encedes-erv-e serious 'research and study.
17-___Testimony;_Governoes_Organized.Crime Prevention _
Commission hearings September 11, 1976; see Drug Abuse and
Organized Crime in New Mexico: A Report, pp. 13-15.
-
38. Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission,
The Heroin Highway, op. cit., pp. 14-15. (Text and photographs.)
;
39. ; DEA Budget- Hearings, House Appropriations Sub-
committee; -U.S. House .of Representatives, 94th_ Congress,
p.'--1133.
. ? ?
- .40.',The Mexican',ConneCtion, op. cit., p..47:
?
Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds,
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, op.
cit., pp.%277-81.
p. .288., .
-17- -
_..
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4 L.-
44. Ibid., p. 63.,
45. Ibid., p. 62.
46. 'bid;
47. Ibid., p..44. .
:5
- 48. - John A. Price-, "International Border Screens
and Smuggling," op.'cit., p. 25. -.Also- see. dkcellent summary
in Appendix to The Mexican Connection, op. cit.
49., Marshall Carter, "The Political Economy of Crime
in the U.S Borderlands,"_unpublished paper, North
American Economic Studies Association Meetings, Washington,
D.C., November, 1972,/ p. 18.
50. House Committee on International Relations, U.S.
House of Representatives, 94th Congress, Report, Shifting
Patterns of Narcotics Trafficking: Latin America, January
6th-May 18th, 1976, pp. 25-48.
51. Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds,
op. cit., p. 274.
52. Yield formula one comes from DEA in Investigation
of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds, op. cit, p. 274; yield
formula two comes from Drug Enforcement, the DEA house organ,
February,. 1977, p. 7; yield formula three comes from DEA in
The Mexican Connection, op. cit., p. 14.
53. DEA, Drug Enforcement, op. cit.,: p. 7.
54. The Mexican Connection, op. cit., pp. 141-143.
? 55. As opium gum and heroin could be considered basic
export industries of the Sierra Madre, a multiplier effect
of 3 or 4 would be typical of the consumption of this income
by campesinos on the local retail and service sectors of/
the regional economy. See Charles Tiebout, The Community
Economic Base Study (New York: Committee for Economic
Development, Supplementary paper Number 16, December, 1962),
pp. 54-76p- - -
56. Report of the Southwest Conference on Crime on
the Border II, meetings held in El Paso, TeXas, October 2nd- -
5th, 1977, p. 42.
57. The Mexican Connection, op. cit., pp. 19-22 and
Appendices.,--- - --
58. There appear to be some clouds on this horizon for
The Mexican Connection reports that in spring of 1978 the
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