DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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. ?-?
William 0. Walker III
University of New Mexico Press
Albuquerque.
?
-3
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CHAPTER 1
lent of the Harrison ?
diets into criminals
:lion allowed physi-
lical use. This sug-
under his Care, a
maintenance. The
ditional regulations
ether the signatures
3unts of drugs pre- ?
prosecutors for the
t possession of nar-
rded as violation of
with this conten-
241 U.S. 394, the
oader regulation of
until 1919, in two
des (1919) 249 U.S.
J.S. 86?would the
maintenance could
ice. Another ruling
922) 258 U.S. 280,
Ven in good faith."
enforcement and
11 the organizational
sue were contend-
therapy, and custo-
,
vith supervision of
lintenance and ad-
h Service, on the
der therapeutic or
er uniformly held
918-19 may have
The Public Health
Committee of the
of cure and turned
Lawrence Kolb of
t an addict was a
Culture and Bureaucracy
-- 19
psychopath, by choice. Countering this position was the difficult
practical experience of Internal Revenue in accomplishing effective
law enforcement. The bureau came to support a curative solution
for addiction. Under its auspices, forty-four narcotic clinics were
set up for the purpose of assisting gradual withdrawal, or providing
maintenance' for addicts if necessary. Commissioner Daniel C.
Roper praised the work of the clinics in his annual report for fiscal
year 1918-19, but the bureau's next? report, subsequent to the
Supreme Court decisions of 1919, condemned the clinics for "pro-
viding applicants with whatever drugs they required for the satis-
faction of their morbicLappetites" and applauded "the wisdom of
the policy being pursued. "59
The fluctuating support for strict law enforcement, judicial deci-
sions, and the complexity involved in actually reducing narcotic
use help to explain in one sense why the nation's maintenance
clinics never became more than a transitory experiment which had
largely ended by July 1920. The Public Health Service and the
AMA's Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs both lauded the clo-
sure of the clinics.60
In another sense, the bureaucratic differences over narcotic law
enforcement support conclusions in other studies concerned with
the role of bureaucracies and institutions during the Progressive
Era. Whatever its particular characteristics, the Narcotic Division
of the Prohibition Unit of the Treasury Department, established in
December 1919 after the passage of the Volstead Act, can be seen
as representative of the organizational movement for efficient man-
agement. Strict law enforcement therefore need not be seen as
distinct from social reform. In this instance, as institutionalization
in a penal rather than a therapeutic or curative facility for what was
essentially a medical matter (although not universally recognized
as such at the time) became a major organizational objective,
humanitarian social reform lost its remaining importance. At this
juncture, Kolb's depiction of addicts as psychopaths becomes indis-
tinguishable from the reality of government policy.61 Interest-
group administrative liberalism, as Theodore Lowi describes it,
had replaced older, less administratively reliable ways of handling
the socially unacceptable practice of narcotic consumption." - --
To implement antinarcotic policy, the Congress provided the
Narcotic Division, under the direction of Levi G. Nutt, a budget
for fiscal year 1920 amounting to $515,000, almost twice that of the
? ?
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idelaCs=4111%. AlS104111:141klida'
CHAPTER 1
? prior year. Increasing violations of the Harrison law probably led
to larger budgets for its enforcement. From 1916 to 1919, the
number of known violators ranged from a low of 1,100 in 1917 to a
high of 2,400 in 1919. There were 3,900 known violators in 1920,
.an average of 10,300 in 1924-26, and ari average just below P9,000.
for 1927-28. Of the 7,738 persons in federal prison at the end of
the fiscal year 1928, nearly one-third, or 2,529, were imprisoned
for Harrison law offenses. Daniel Roper believed that the drug
ploblem in the United States was out of control by 1920. Terry and
Penens concluded that enforcement practices induced higher lev-
els of addiction, drug peddling, and associated criminal activity. Of
America's addicts, the Special Committee observed, "From infor-
mation in the hands of the Committee, it is concluded that, while
drug addicts may appear to be normal to the casual observer, they
are usually weak in character, and lacking in moral sense."63
In many ways, the law and the evolving organizational structure
through which it was administered had made the addict population
of the United States into a social class not unlike that of Latin
America, associated with extralegal, antisocial behavior. Official
tolerance for drugs and related activity differed greatly. Moreover,
the depiction of addicts in the United States as a coherent social
class, useful for administrative purposes, did not reflect actual
racial or socioeconomic conditions. There existed no distinct drug
culture, no unified group similar to the Andean coqueros, the
participants in rescates, or the rural poor, often Indians, who for
generations had worked the land for the benefit of others.
It was within the context of its emerging federal antinarcotic
activity that the United States encouraged Latin American partici-
pation in the larger, international campaign against narcotics. And
it is from the perspective of the aspirations of officials in Washing-
ton juxtaposed with the vastly different cultural history of Latin
America that the success or failure of the narcotic foreign policy of
the United States should be assessed.
No Latin American country attended the Hague conference of
1911-12. At that meeting it became evident that the campaign
against illicit drug traffic needed Latin American support to be
effective. This was especially true in the case of Peru, the world's
Culture and
leading'
charged
presente.
ton Wrig
represen
of the int
there to
out that
Peruvian
their bus ,
vention 1
was to 13(
The g( '
State De
ence. Be
conventi(
industry.
except Pi
if they 1
revenue
volvemei
tion in P
In deli
July 1913
that the
unless Pi
by sever
conferen.
the pron
States.
The d(
third cor.
June 191
support I
tension i
States or
horizon ?i
forty-foth
Hague C
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?
CHAPTER1
law probably led
[916 to 1919, the
1,100 in 1917 to a
violators in 1920,-
e just below 9,000
ion at the end of
, were imprisoned
ved that the drug
1920. Terry and
Iduced higher lev-
riminal activity. Of
Ned, From infor-
eluded that, while
ual observer, they
oral sense."63
izational structure
addict population
dike that of Latin
behavior. Official
greatly. Moreover,
a coherent social
not reflect actual
d no distinct drug
an coqueros, the
Indians, who for
: of others.
-
deral antinarcotic ?
American partici-
lst narcotics. And
icials in Washing-
history of Latin
foreign policy of
;ue conference of
'at the campaign
in support to be
Peru, the world's
?),
Culture and Bureaucracy 21
? ,
leading.coca leaf exporter. The government of the Netherlands,
charged with obtaining signatures to the convention by the nonre-
presented states, asked the United States for assistance." Hamil-
ton Wright composed a detailed memorandum for United States
representatives in Latin America. which. outlined the brief *history
of the international antinarcotic campaign and requested countries
there to sign, the supplementary protocol. Wright's letter pointed ? 4..
out that the conferees at The Hague realized the importance of S.
Peruvian and Bolivian acceptance of the convention and concluded
their business only after agreeing that the signature of the Con-
vention by Latin Ainerican states was essential if the Convention
was to become effective."65
The generally favorable response from Latin America pleased
State Department officials, but Peru and Bolivia withheld adher-
ence. Bolivia objected to the linking of coca with opitun in the
convention and was reluctant to take any action threatening its coca -
industry By the end of 1912, though, all Latin American countries
except Peru indicated a willingness to sign the Hague Convention
if they had not yet done so. Peru was undecided because of
revenue derived from the coca trade and because of limited in-
volvement in opium traffic, primarily within the Chinese popula-
tion in Peru.66
In deliberations during the second conference at The Hague in
July 1913, Great Britain and Germany reiterated an earlier concern
that the 1912 convention would be, worthless regarding cocaine
unless Peru signed. Peruvian reluctance was delaying ratification
by several important narcotic manufacturing states. Before the
conference adjourned, Peru promised to sign the convention, but
the promise was made only after urgent appeals by the United
States.
The delay in depositing ratifications led to the convening of a
third conference. The start was postponed from May until mid-
June 1914 because officials in Washington were seeking Mexico's
support at the meeting and hoped the delay might serve to lessen
tension that arose between the two countries over the United
States occupation of Veracruz earlier that year. With war on the
horizon in Europe, the conference took place. By its final session.
forty-four of forty-six nations had signed or pledged to sign the
Hague Convention. Eleven countries had completed ratification,
?
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including Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras as well as the
United States.67 Although adherence to the convention was grad-
ual, it provide?d a basis for subsequent international antinarcotic
, ? Through 1920 in Peru and Bolivia, adherence to the convention-
tres did not signify its implementation. Both nations refused to jeopard-
., .
ize their lucrative coca leaf operations." Only Mexico, of the Latin -
CHAPTER 1
American countries crucial for control, tried in any way to restrict
. drug-related activity. Early in 1916 the de facto government pro-
:
hibited opium importation. The following year President Venus-
.
? ? ,g tiano Carranza sought to outlaw opium transactions in Baja
?!- California, but his own lack of control and the alleged complicity of
the governor there in the trade (as discussed in chapter 2) nullified
Carranza's efforts."
These episodes presaged future difficulties that would impede
antidrug activity throughout Latin America and cause concern in
the United States. The overriding fear in Washington, then as
later, was that illicit drugs produced in Latin America or shipped
there from Europe or Asia would find their way to the United
States. Compounding the matter, few Latin American states admit-
? ted the existence of a drug problem within their borders. With a
rise in smuggling as a probable consequence of greater actions
against drugs, concern in Washington over inadequate controls in
Latin America was no doubt warranted. The legal-organizational
process leading to the formation of a strict drug control program
seems clear; just as apparent, conversely, is the cultural and eco-
nomic background of Latin American inattention to controls in the
early 1900s. The incongruity between the two would be further
. revealed as the United States continued to press for more effective
international controls on drug traffic.
;
? . . ?
?.? "
. - ??.? P.,'N-** ?
"i;
2
Influences
hemisphere
lems remail
sired by o:
especially
emerged to
nevertheles
participated
United Stat
ence intern
mitment at
chimerical.
ence in Ge
internatiom
domestic p
were at wo
America's fi
would help
number of
The
excellent, d
spective.1
restrictive.
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CHAPTER 2
, and an ou6po-
ipported Blue's
g. "An effective
red by compro7
)sals the United ?
;tipulations that
illegitiinate and
for proper con-
wrote, "that no
e . . . two are
LC session made
nnpromise was
ry departments
e time, nongov-
licy Association
base of support
sured a lengthy
it home, but in
nce antinarcotic
the fifth OAC
H. Brent, Dr.
1 of the Foreign
;hes defined the
rter to initiate a
session opened
ted, Porter told
y's proposals as
rther debate."
rdained condu-
le international
;: "If when I get
o me, he ought
ast have been,
heir efforts and
; in Septembef,
o convene two
Led to a consid-
Bed in the Far
The Road to Geneva
35
East, while the second would deal with the limitation of manufac-
tured narcotics and their derivatives, and the restriction to legiti-
mate .needs of raw materials produced for export. In formulating a _
program of that nature, the League virtually assured United States
participation in the latter conference, as NILT shall presently see:"
Latin American participation in the international movement fol-
lowed an uncertain course as well in the early 1920s. Explanation -
of this uncertainty can be found in the nature of the directives
issuing from Geneva andin the unsettled domestic conditions then
prevalent. In the first place the Opium Advisory Committee had
unintentionally erred in transmitting questionnaires regarding cul-
tivation, production, and manufacture only in French and English,
the two official languages of the League. Replies reached Geneva
belatedly, if at all. The use of Spanish, a goodwill gesture to
countries largely unconcerned about drug control, might have
improved the situation. The lack of substantive data in responses
further underlined the differences in attitudes. Annual reports for
1921 came only from Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, and Venezuela;
Bolivia sent a partial report." The import-export certificate system
received even less attention. By the fifth session of the OAC only
Mexico, not a member of the League, and Panama were experi-
menting with the system; several other countries were considering
doing so. As late as August 1925 only Cuba, Guatemala, and Haiti
joined Mexico and Panama in using the certificates. Peru once
contemplated adoption, but decided against doing so." In short,
the administrative directives .of the League had little impact in
Latin America. .
Even more important, domestic conditions worked against the
adoption of controls. Mexico, for example, was burdened with
border difficulties and an increase in drug use by its own populace.
Border conditions in the 1920s had not changed appreciably since
the end of the revolutionary decade.47 Chihuahua, Sonora (one of
the states most dramatically affected by the Revolution), and Baja
California Norte continued to meet American demands for narcot-
ics and oilier illicit pleasures. The situation in Baja stood as a.
dubious legacy of the governorship of Esteban Cantu, 1915-20."
While in office Cantti virtually set up an autonomous regime de-
spite Carranza's efforts to the contrary. He cemented his hold on
.:.-
Q.
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CHAPTER 2
? ? ? .
power, Ontil.forCed'ot;i of office, by licensing gambling, ? prostitu-
tion, and other vices illegal across the border. Narcotics, too, were
readily available. Not surprisingly, numerous Americans, including
some business interests in the West, preferred Canttl's control of
Baja and the enjoyments found in Tijuana to the more restrictive,
anti-American leadership of Venustiano Carranza in Mexico City.49
As in Tijuana, so, too, in Ciudad Juarez. To some observers the
notoriety achieved there was truly appalling. -United States Consul
John W. Dye remarked that "Juarez is the most immoral, degen-
erate, and utterly wicked platre I have ever seen or heard of in my
travels. Murder and robbery are everyday occurrences and gam-
bling, dope selling and using, drinking to excess and sexual vices
are continuous. It is a Mecca for criminals and degenerates from
both sides of the border." Said an American evangelist: "I would
rather shoot my son and throw his body in the river than have him
spend an hour in the raging inferno of Juarez."5? Conditions in
Juarez, exacerbated by continuing economic dependency upon El
Paso and by the imposition in Texas of prohibition in 1918, sparked
the inflammatory comments.
The sentiments of Dye and the evangelist should not be viewed
in isolation, but need to be seen in the context of the border's
history since the Mexican War. In brief, a predisposition to illegal
activity, including smuggling, emerged along the border soon after
the war. Border areas are often regions of great opportunity. This
potential took concrete form from the 1850s to the 1890s with the
establishment on the Mexican side of a free zone for trade. Within
the Zona Libre, whether through legal or illegal activity, standards
of living were generally higher than in the interior, a result of
considerable trade with the United States. Both this American
orientation and discrimination in favor of the Zona ultimately
aroused such strong domestic opposition that the Diaz government
abolished the free zone. The resultant economic dislocation at Paso
del Norte, the area encompassing Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, was
particularly felt in the agricultural sector of the economy. To com-
pensate for the socioeconomic travail of recession, Juarez turned to
the tourist trade?a way of life even More dependent on the United
States than existed with the Zona Libre."
Tourism, of course, serves many masters; and tourism flourished
during reform times in the _United States, notably during the era of
_
,
45,1
' ? ?
- The Road to Geneva--
prohibition. The
suited largely fro
side of the borde
Mexican side by
reciprocal..Durin
ing? its AissOlute I
arms trade with
though Mexican
revolutionary via
cess to narcotics-
Compounding
tic drug problem!
officials could no
the governor of
prohibiting trade
thereafter, the M.
the domestic use
alleged drug-inch
ported growing
Excelsior chargeC
their habit while
paper's campaign
when in July Cob
narcotics except
smuggling and re:
decree at the mo
The geographi(
the Mexican Rev
dent.56 -Moreove:
effective drug cor
intoxicating prom
expressed in expE
While such goal!
aspirations of pec
dismayingly more
of drug-related b.
Although Mex
quently chronicle
them briefly, as ir
ent interpretatior
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CHA1FTER 2
;?' ?
)1ing, prostitu-
tics, too, were
:tans, including
itei's control of
)re restrictive,
Mexico, City."
? %.
observers the
[ States Consul-
degen-
heard of in my
nces and gam-
id sexual vices
;enerates from
'elist: "I would
than have him
Conditions in
iency upon El
1918, sparked
not be viewed
if the border's
;ition to illegal
rder soon after
mrtunity. This
1890s with the
trade. Within
vity, standards
or, a result of
this American
ma ultimately
a government
)cation at Paso
I El Paso, was
mmy. To com-
arez turned to _
on the United
ism flourished
ring the era of
prohibition. The rampant 'vice that Dye and Others decried re-
.
suited largely from .a demand being treated on the United States
side of the border, the fulfillment of which had been forced to the
Mexican side by social and legal Proscription. Illegal activity was
-
reciprocal. During the revolutionary decade, as Juarez wasacquir-
ing its dissolute reputation; Americans were carrying on an illicit
arms trade with various revolutionary factions in Mexico.52 Al-
though Mexican needs from the contraband trade subsided as
revolutionary violence abated, American demands?including
_
ao-
cess to narcotics?on the illegal border economy continued.
Compdunding difficulties at the border for Mexico were domes-
tic drug problems that President Alvaro Obregon and other federal
officials could not readily bring under control. In February 1923
the governor of Yucatan, Felipe Carillo Puerto, issued a decree
prohibiting trade in opiates, cocaine, and marijuana.53 Shortly
thereafter, the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior called attention to
the domestic use of narcotics. Demanding corrective action against
alleged drug-induced violence by young Mexicans, the paper re-
ported growing national concern about the spread of addiction.
Excelsior charged that perhaps 90 percent of the addicts acquired
their habit while in the nation's hospitals and sanitariums." The
paper's campaign against narcotics elicited government response
when in July Obregon prohibited by decree the importation of
narcotics except for legitimate needs.55 The high incidence of
smuggling and residual corruption of officials probably nullified the
decree at the moment of its promulgation.
The geographical and ideological configuration of forces during
the Mexican Revolution restricted Obregem's authority as presi- _
dent.56 More-over, intern- al conditions reduced the likelihood of
effective drug controls. That is to say, the Revolution put forth the
intoxicating promise of democracy and socioeconomic change, as
expressed in expanded political participation and agrarian reform.
While such goals necessarily raise the level of expectation and
aspirations of people in a revolutionary situation, fulfillment is a
dismayingly more gradual process. As a result, established patterns
of drug-related behavior persist even as changes occur. - ? -
Although--Mexico's revolutionary? tribulations have been fre--
quently chronicled and analyzed, it seems worthwhile to recount
them briefly, as indirect, though substantial, support for the pres-
ent interpretation. The Mexican Revolution did not appreciably
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pr.
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,
CHAPTER 2
. _ The .Roact.to_
. alter at once the life-stylsof many Mexicans. At length, an enlarged.. I The e:
middle class :took shape, but only as . part of a larger political
which ag
structure wherein persisted from times past patterns of marginality, 4
depicted
internal colonialism, and a distinctly plural society. Access to effec.. ? . ? , - the Revc
tive political participation was therefore not easy, and many groups, . ? ::, culture (
? especially rural -ones, 'whether- native or' mestizo, remained for a .. ??. Change 'I
long time in virtual isolation from national political activity." Few ' charted.
previously marginal groups became organized well enough to de- ''''.' block of i
mand effective participation or to insure that the nation responded ...? income (
? to their political concerns."--------- _
statistics
In the place of democracy, then, Mexico has experienced a ,-.;? ment; ar
modern continuatioriof essentially caudillo-dominated rule, even , :;, be apprt
if a particular president's hold on power was brief or uncertain?as , : f persister
,
was the case until the time of 1?47.aro Cardenas." In effect, one ,, If the:
.,.
ruling elite replaced another. However diminished actual demo- ::' factional
cratic opportunity and practice have been, there has simultane- .?
Thermid
,:.
ously existed a high degree of aspirational politics?at least until ,:, obscure?
recently. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the Revolution .,,, the richr
redistributed and broadened the base of power, gradually enlarging ?.;" Mexico E
the size and enhancing the power of the middle sector. To argue for mode
additionally that this process guaranteed a cohesive nationalism, as
4 concentr
has been done," seems to claim too much in view of our knowl-;; to 1910.
,,,
edge of those who do not share in the process. ?. economil
A look at early attempts at agrarian reform further brings into class, su
question the extent of the benefits of the Revolution. As with ?4 length N.%
democracy, it has been difficult to transform the promise of change i-, - regime."
into reality. It is possible, in fact, to question the putative nationaland econ
commitment to reform.61 Specifically, the revolutionizing effect of :, ety long
'.:-?
the ejido on land reform is less than its proponents have claimed. ? ?.4 - - On -th.
Practical limitations of the ejido were evident even with the inclu- ?-..., tradition;
sion of Article 27 in the Queretaro Constitution of 1917.62 The :, ? zation th;
need for change was great, however. Around 1920 perhaps 70 :, oppresse
.,,
percent of the labor force was engaged in agriculture, and an ceeded i
-?
equally high percentage of the population lived in rural communi- did to sc
.
ties. (It is probable that 90 percent of the rural families owned no t.: during ti
land on the eve of the Revolution.) In ten years the rural population , lives?so
of Sonora had increased by nearly 45 percent,6_3_ While _Mexico's _ _. .f: society, _
total population had declined?as had agricultural production. Sig- ?...' The er
nificant change in the form of actual agrarian reform would not ,? and acco:
alter these conditions- until after 1930." . Wages, ir
-74
?
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CHAPTER 2 -
:h, an enlarged
arger politiaal"
of marginality,
ccess to effee-. - -
I many groups,'
-emained..ftir a
activity.57 Few
enough to de-
ion responded
experienced a
ted rule, even
uncertain?as
In effect, one
I actual demo-
has simultane-
-at least until
the Revolution
ually enlarging
ctor. To argue
nationalism, as
? of our know!-
ler brings into
ition. As with
mise of change
tative national
nizing effect of
have claimed.
kith the inclu-
4' 191732 The
perhaps 70
lture, and an
iral communi-
lies owned no
tral population
.vhile Mexico's
oduction: Sig-
rm would not
"?:x`
The Road to Geneva
The extent of social and economic deprivation. in Mexico, for,
which agr- a`rian reform was intended to be a major fanacea, can be
depicted with some precision: There Was much to be done after
the. Revolution; life meant little more for many Mexicans than.
culture of poverty. Drawn even in the broadest strokes, gradual? ?
change is evident when differences between 1910 and. 1930 are....
charted. Education at the primary level chipped away at the solid
block of illiteracy So, too, were slight improvements noticeable in
income distribution and the general level of poverty.65 Although
statistics on unemployment,.: -or more accurately underemploy- -
ment, ire meaningless in the modern sense, its pervasiveness can
be appreciated when seal" in the context of Mexico's traditional,
persistent agricultural-village economy." ? ?
If the foregoing suggests that the Mexican Revolution, however
factional and regional it may have been, experienced an early
Thermidorean or reactionary phase, that conclusion should not
obscure the essential complexity of the revolutionary process and
the richness of its ultimate achievements. The Revolution brought
Mexico economic growth, industrialization, and prepared the way
for modernity. There continued at the same time, nevertheless, a
concentration of wealth, but with a broader social base than prior
to 1910. Instead of having a leveling effect, however, subsequent
economic growth and urbanization, while expanding the middle
class, sustained discernible class distinctions. There emerged at
length what Peter H. Smith has termed "a stable, authoritarian
regime.?67 Limited political participation, social differentiation,
and economic privilege for the few still characterize Mexican soci-
ety long after the Revolution.
On the surface the preceding analysis does little to alter the -
traditional view of the rural Mexican, or campesino, a characteri-
zation that finds the campesino to be scarcely more than a helpless,
oppressed peon.68 At issue is not whether the Revolution suc-
ceeded in changing the status of the campesino, for it inevitably
did to some degree, but rather how campesinos may have acted
during the Porfiriato to gain a measure of control over their own
lives?so that we may revise our understanding of their role within _
society._ _
The emerging picture s-uggesis-a life-style of mutual adjustment
and accommodation, especially in terms of service and the level of
wages, in contrast to one of unbridled exploitation. Not that land-
*'
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Co,
1;
-
??? ?
' CHAPTER 2
-
owner control suddenly became undesirable; rather, labor short-
ages,: particularly in the center and north of Mexico; changed the
forms of control latifundistas endeavored to employ. Before the
Revolution the transition of the campesino out of peonage re-
mained sadly incomplete. It was not unusual therefore to find him
out of Work, dispossed,pf the land he shad.worked for another's- advantage. In the course of modernization of the work of the
agricultural laborer to a form over which he exerted some control,
a clash of values resulted?the impact of which ironically threat-
ened the survival of his cultural heritage. The, demands of. an
, increasingly market-oriented economy no doubt disrupted natural
agricultural rhythms, often alienating the campesino from wage
labor even when it was available.69 ?
The scarcity of work, alienation, the threat of cultural change,
and the promises of revolutionary caudillos combined to bring
peones actively to the Revolution. In the south this meant joining
with Zapata in a radical quest for land reform, consecrated, as it
were, in the Plan de Ayala. For the Zapatistas, the Revolution was
agrarian-based and political in nature, advancing a more coherent
ideological position than evident elsewhere. The northern support-
ers of the revolt against Victoriano Huerta, led by Carranza and
Pancho Villa, were far less unified. Villa's revolt, described by John
Womack, Jr., as "more a force of nature than of politics," com-
manded the allegiance of a diverse group of followers: dispossessed
campesinos, cowboys, railroad workers, bandits, Yaqui Indians,
and others. This congeries of social misfits and the downtrodden
gave little organized support to the nationwide uprising. An effort
to join with Zapata in opposition to Carranza and the Sonorans
failed markedly.7?
What the Villistas brought about, "howeve-r, was their own brand
of chaos in Chihuahua and parts of Sonora (for which they con-
tended and lost)?a social anarchy whose impact was felt even after
the revolutionary decade ended. Yet the Villistas could not ordain
chaos in the north on their own. Social upheaval was generously
abetted by economic dislocation, the result jointly of internal civil
\strife and international conflict. Nor were the actions of the Villistas
as directionless as has been generally assumed, despite their being
declared "outside the ,law,"-One of the principal examples of their
alleged anarchy, the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9,
1916, may actually have been a rational if erroneous response by
_
e Vi
tween
of that
ficially
Villa's
raid c
troubh,
and ec,
clear al
had to
Nun
thoritiel
ent, on;
Yuma,.
tian Tei;
a dry z,
petitioi
ics, thel
alent a
situatic
cernibl
barely.
preseno
Atti
tively
the Qui
stand ti
PeruviE
use cot
largely
succeec
ites, it
This
Peru d
lasting
"dictate
of demo
an expE
class di
nationa
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? CHAPTER 9
[er, labor short-
2o, changed the
by. Before the
of peonage re- _
fore to find him?
ed for another's
ie ? Work of the
d some control,
onicallY threat-.
demands of an
,srupted natural- --
sino from wage
,ultural change,
bined to bring
s meant joining
nsecrated, as it
Revolution was
more coherent
rthern support-
y. Carranza and
scribed by John
politics," corn-
rs: dispossessed
Yaqui Indians,
e downtrodden
ising. An effort
I the Sonorans
heir own brand
hich they con-
felt even after
>uld not ordain
was generously
)f internal civil
; of the Villistas
)ite their being
imples of their
0, on March 9,
is response by
_
The Road to Geneva
41
the Villistas to the relationship their leader believed existed be-
? tween Carranza and the Wilson administration:" A minor aspecim
of that episode, but important for, our purposes, and which super-
ficially lends credence to the charges of anarchy, discloses that L._
Villa's men probably smoked marijuana to steel themselves for the
? ,raid on Columbus." Marginal men and, marijuana,, border:!:
?? : troubles and drugs: whether in the context of revolution, social ?
and economic dislocation, or simply vice, the association was
clear and the message direct. Domestic and international controls
had to be made more effective.
Numerous incidents occurred in the early 1920s providing au-
thorities ample opportunity-to reiterate these sentiments. At pres-
ent, one example will serve to make the larger point. Citizens from
Yuma, Arizona, acting in conjunction with the local Women's Chris-
tian Temperance Union, petitioned the State Department to set up
a dry zone along the' border with Mexico. The practical effect, the
petitioners argued, would be to halt the flow of liquor and narcot-
ics, thereby containing the "unbridled vice and debauchery" prev-
alent along the border." Attempts at control of this and similar
situations met with scant success. Drugs continued to play a dis-
cernible if veiled role in Mexican society. The Revolution had
barely touched the foreign and domestic preconditions for their
presence.
At the same time, the situation in Peru presented a compara-
tively clear picture, bound as it was to the observable culture of
the Quechua and Aymara Indians. It is simpler therefore to under-
stand the context in which drugs helped to shape the contours of
Peruvian society. Primary, of course, was the presence of coca. Its
use could not be eliminated, and scarcely reduced. Army officers,
largely from the middle class, considered it an achievement if they
succeeded in denying Indian conscripts their quid of coca. Urban-
ites, it seems, smoked tobacco."
This type of incident reveals much of the place of the Indian in
Peru during el oncenio, the dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguia
lasting from 1919 to 1930. Leguia, who disingenuously held that
"dictatorship is more popular than anarchy," imperiled the fortunes
of democracy in Peru until his ouster. The fortunate coincidence of
an expanding, supportive middle class and the impetus given that
class during the First World War to participate more actively in
national political life assisted. Leguia's rise to power in 1919. The
-rre-
SAP
r
_ASV_
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a
CHATTER 3 7
.---
.._
. approach to drug control. In 1923 the government issued a numbeJ.
of decrees establishing a partial state monopoly over the commerce
6
in drugs.. By placing restrictions on imports of opium and cocaine,
the government intended to limit usage to legitimate medical
purposes.23 Concern, however, about drugs as a serious social .
problem only arose five years later. The case of Uruguay raises an -
important question with broad implications, If within a short pe-
riod of time the nation changed from giving casual attention to
drugs (the 1923 laws) to acute concern over their prevalence and ?
misuse (the warnings of the National Health Council), how serious
must the situation have been when drugs first received legislative _
response? As one official later Piit it, drug usage in 1923 had
"acquired the proportions of an actual plague."24 If this were true
in Uruguay, what were actual conditions elsewhere in Latin Amer-
ica? -
Insufficient information leaves that question largely unanswered.
Such is not quite the case with Mexico, however. The government
there had equated increased drug usage with social problems since
the early years of the decade, as the executive decrees of 192.3 and
1925 attest. Their promulgation had no discernible effect on a
worsening situation. Marijuana continued to grow wild throughout
the country and opium poppy cultivation flourished especially in
northern states. The poppies were frequently processed into mor-
phine and heroin. This indigenous crop, along with opiates smug-
gled into Mexico from abroad, served both domestic addicts and
1
innumerable others in the United States. In a further attempt to
control the situation, President Calles signed a decree late in 1927 94_
banning the export of heroin and marijuana.25 Two years later a
revised penal code enumerated strict penalties for those persons
found guilty of illegally growing or manufacturing drugs.26
? Success in the Mexican effort depended, of course, upon effec-
tive enforcement of the decrees. As before, congruence between
intent and actual procedure seemed coincidental. For instance,
Henry Damm, the United States consul at Nogales, reported the
growing of large quantities of opium poppies in the region, yet
Damm had no indication that local authorities were trying to halt
cultivation. Similar reports reached the State Department from
other consular districts in northern Mexico." ?
Revelations similar to Damm's came also from Mexicali where
Consul Frank Bohr learned of the existence of a lucrative, wide-
?
., ?
,
Rebuilding if'
spread co
opium de
Mexicans
United S
available
was set a
Chinese ,
Bohr's co)
The cons
drug.28 TI
enforcem,
In addi
had to cor
Nuevo LE
centage o
Condition
sular reqt
there." 1
Mexico's I
also from
the Unite
De spit?
Mexico se
held in th
could achi
effort had
not s tried
evolved fr,
of citizens
Recognizii
Departme
in a confe
change on
to attend t
a backdroi
depicted :
[considera
reached ar
tion on kn
in March
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CkAPTER 3
Rebuilding the Politics f Drug Control
sped a number
the commerce
m and cocaine,
imate medical
serious social. _
iguay raises an ?
bin a short pe-
al 'attention to
)revalence and ,
[1), how serious
ived legislative ..
e in 1923 had
this were true
in Latin Amer-
ly unanswered.
he government
problems since
Bes of 1923 and
)1e effect on a
throughout
d especially in
!ssed into mor-
opiates smug-
tic addicts and
her attempt to
-ee late in 1927
o years later a
those persons
drugs,26 _
se, upon effec-
ience between
For instance,
reported the
he region, yet
trying to halt
partment from
dexicali where
icrative, wide-
59
spread commerce in opium. Bohr managed to arrange a visit to an
opium den run by Chinese nationals. There the consul found
Mexicans and *Chinese as well as black and white citizens of the
United States. Inside the den many varieties of narcotics were
available for sale and consumption on the premises; a special room
was set aside for the smoking of opium. Upon Bohr's arrival the
Chinese operators expressed suspicion. about his presence, -but
Bofir's contact secured entry by buying a small amount of cocaine.
The consul's report does not reveal whether he partook of the
drug." This incident underlines the difficulty inherent in drug law
enforcement for Mexican officials. _ _
In addition to internal narcotic problems, Mexican authoritig-'
had to cope with the ubiquitous matter of smuggling. At Juarez and
Nuevo Laredo, officials rarely confiscated more than a small per-
centage of the quantifi of-drugs adiiinfedly_crossing_the b?order.
Conditions in the Matamoros-Brownsville area resulted in a con-
sular request for a special agent to investigate the illicit traffic
there." The poor record of interception stemmed not_only_frona-
Mexico's lie-tfifiger?Trs,and funds to patrol the border properly, but
als-o-EC?n the absence of any cOo-peiative antismuggling effort with
the-Mired ,States."
Despite the difficulties they faced, upper echelon leaders in
Mexico seemingly possessed antidrug sentiments similar to those
held in the United States. Neither side working alone, however,
could achieve the results each desired. Yet the idea of a common
effort had been considered earlier and abandoned, but for reasons
not strictly pers,aining to drug control. The plan for cooperation
evolved from tlie previously mentioned request in 1924 by a group
of citizens in Yuma, Arizona for a dry zone along the border.31
Recognizing the unilateral nature of the dry zone proposal, State
Department officials instead issued an invitation to Mexico to join
in a conference to create channels for improving information ex-
change on illegal drug activity. All border consuls were instructed
to attend the meeting in El Paso scheduled for May 1925.32 Against
a backdrop that portended further smuggling at Ciudad Juarez and
depicted Ensenada in Baja California as "an entrepot of some
[considerable] quantity of narcotics,"33 the two sides quickly
reached an agreement. Both pledged regular exchange of informa-
tion on known smugglers and their activities. The pact took effect
in March 1926.34
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ILLEGIB
?
- ? ?
60 CHAPTER 3
The treaty was not an open-ended one, so as the conclusion of
the initial year of its operation approached; the United States?
notified Mexico of its intention to terminate the agreement. The
decision resulted from an assessment by State Department officials
of political and economic contitions within Mexico. Secretary of
State Frank Kellogg e?cplained.theAlecision in a conversation, with.
the British 'Ambassador Sir Esme Howard. Painting a picture of
chaos and imminent disintegration of Mexican society, the secre-
tary described a situation in which business activity was slowing
-down and revenues decreasing. Kellogg feared that opposition to,,,
Calles by "radical Communists" would prevent any corrective ac-
tion. "Mexico,''',, he-told Howard, "[is] evidently on the brink of
ancial collapse."35
In a postscript to the termination of the treaty, Consul Jon Dye
in Juarez reacted to its lapse indifferently. He felt that the Mexican
government had not seriously endeavored to enforce the accord.36
True, the task of transforming commitment into effective action
often failed, producing understandable exasperation on the part of
officials who were reminded daily of the large quantity of drugs
moving northward. In April 1931, when a special Mexican agent
arrived in the Juarez-El Paso area to assist the consul there,
William Blocker remarked that "the arrival of the narcotic
agent. . . would indicate that the Mexican Government has at last
decided to clean up the drug traffic on this section of the border."37
The vicissitudes associated with drug control activity throughout
Latin America in the latter half of the 1920s prevented the United
States from discrediting the work of the League of Nations at the
1928 Havana Conference.The___r_eneiging. -definition_of drug usage
as a social problem was demonstrated more, by thmle.L.v goyem-
IVIileh acted, ttirough acceptance...of the,..1925_Geneva
?
vention than by sole adherence to the.1912 agieeas
ate- United States desire& By the start of the meeting in Havana,
Latin American nations including Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Uru-
guay, and Bolivia with reservations, had signed the Final Act of the
1925 convention; others were reportedly about to sign. These
ratifications, plus those from outside the Western -Hemisphere,
guaranteed adoption of the convention. The-action-of-the-United
States at Havana only_added-to-its-isolation-from- international-
antinarcotic activity. That is, the refusal of the United ,States. to
_ _ _ _
Rebuilclini
disavov
willingi
States i
Desr
Mrs. Al
product
her frec
some w
accepta
that oth
convent
told M
Affairs
done. 39
calling
skeptick.
toward
again. 1
policy I
moveml
Calch
idea. IL
for 192i
been th
merit."
other if
That as
progran
discoun
cluding
scured
countrie
Renel
drug coi
in whicl
producil
have hac
channel:
cially tn
_
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r
CHAPTER 3 ?
rclusion of
Led States
nent. The
nt officials - --
;cret4ry. of.
;ation with ?
picture o
the secre-
as slowing._
position to
rective ac-
e brink of
11 Jon Dye
le Mexican
accord.36
tive action
the part of
y of drugs
ican agent
ksul there,
e narcotic
t has at last
border. "37
throughout
the United
ions at the
drug -make
ew govern-
!neva Con-
eement, as
in Havana,
agua, Uru-
il Act of the
ign. These
emisphere,
the United
iternational
d States to
Reblditiethe-Tolitic &Drug Uoliti-ol
61
disavow fully the .ri
c_.
wit ngness o Latin Americans to follow the_lead of the United
S tat-eri ii--o-theTin-atteii:in?clu-d in g arcotics 38 -
Despite -he-r Support for the position of-the State Department,
Mrs: Wright knew thit Americari policy was. inherently counter-
. .
. . -
productive to 'effective drug control;In Jan. u'arj, 1928 during orie
her frequent discussions with Nelson Johnson, she suggested that
some way should be found to have the 1925 convention made more
acceptable. She offered few specific proposals except the vain hope
that other nations' might be wiling to accept an amendment to the
convention so it would not be,adopted in its present form. Johnson
told Mrs. Wright that Porter and the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs were studying the situation to determine what could be
done." Caldwell and other officials realized that she was right in
calling for a reassessment of policy. Johnson, though, remained
skeptical; he saw no feasible way to revise Washington's policy
toward the League. But Mrs. Wright interposed her ideas once
again. In March she urged the secretary of state to formulate a
policy reasserting United States leadership in the antinarcotic
movement. This meant convening a new conference.4?
Caldwell reversed his prior isolationist stance and supported the
idea. He wanted the United States to ask for a conference, possibly
for 1929, and then approach it with greater flexibility than had
been the case in 1924-25. Johnson was not persuaded of the idea's
merit. "So far as I know," he told Caldwell, "we have no program
other than that which our delegation offered at Geneva in 1925,
which was rejected and would be rejected again by the powers.""
That assessment seemed accurate, since, -by_ks_insistence on a
program of limitation at the source, the United_States-strongly
disc---ordagd?consideration of any other drug control scheme, - 4
cliiiminufa-cturing restricti9ns. American rigidity thus ob-
ScTIFF-d the cultural, -financial, and political difficulties some
countries had in accepting Washington's program wholesale.42
Renewed cooperation with the League was essential for effective
drug control. If nothing else, the OAC provided an available forum
in which pressure, however limited, could be brought to bear on
producing and manufacturing nations. Such pressure might not
have had sufficient influence if exerted through bilateral diplomatic
channels. To United States officials this must have seemed espe-
cially true concerning Latin America by 1928. At the time of the
- ? ,
4'1'1
3i;
?
'HA ri
????..
t??
.?
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Heti-111i
is addicted to drugs," Porter remarked several months before his
death, "is sick. He or she is the victim of a disease and should be
placed where treatment can be given. You can't cure a sick person
by sending that person to jail. "76 That sentiment seemed to be
anathema to the commissioner of narcotics in 1930, as his actions
?
in office would soon reveal. ?
Flexibility rather than rigidity marked the relationship of the
United States with the international drug control movement at that
time. During its January 1931 session the OAC, with Caldwell's
active support, enlarged the list of narcotics that might become
subject to manufacturing limitations at the May conference.77 In
his instructions to the delegation Stimson told Caldwell and the
other members (including Anslinger) not to oppose a convention
"which would be acceptable to other governments and unaccepta-
ble to the United States . . . , provided it would seem likely to
accomplish the desired restriction of manufacture." The secretary
of state hoped that the United States would be able to accept any
convention agreed upon.78
Prior to the opening of the Conference for the Limitation of the
Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Stimson also encouraged Latin
American participation at Geneva. Some hesitancy about commit-
ting themselves wholeheartedly to League-directed antinarcotic
activity still existed, but over half the countries there sent repre-
sentatives to the conference." In attendance were Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Ven-
ezuela. Physical presence in Geneva did not ensure active partici-
pation in the deliberations. Mexico, for instance, assisted in
administrative procedures, but contributed little to the substantive
discussions. This reluctance may seem anomalousmhen compared
With her eputinuing domesticproblem with.drugs. Yet as Martinez
de Alva explained for his government: :There [is] no problem of
narcotic drugs in Mexico. Mexico produce[s] no raw material,
[does] not manufacture narcotic drugs, [does] not export them and
[does] not even consume them except for legitimate require-
ments.-"8? Under Mexican law the activities mentioned were illegal-
unless carried out under strict government supervision. The state-
ment of the Mexican representative, otherwise disingenuous, be-
comes explicable if it is remembered that Mexico, still immersed
in th.
a woi
existi.
Ar
role
main
who
ment
a dir.
remi
This
supp '
have
abou
In
dent
Cald
have
Ansl
of ax
subr
Next
colic
the;
exce
pose
of rz
B.
sive
Agri
stric
of el
vent
sum
-
.71
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CHAPTER 3
?
onths before his
;e and should be
ire a sick pers-OV'
it seemed to be ,
10, as his actions
.41
lationship of the
novement at that
with Caldwell's
t might become
conference." In
:aldwell and the
Ilse a convention
s and unaccepta-
seem likely to
.? The secretary
de to accept any
..imitation of the
ncouraged Latin
y about commit-
ted antinarcotic
here sent repre-
Argentina, Bo-
nican Republic,
iuguay, and Ven-
re active partici-
Ice, assisted in
) the substantive
when compared
Yet as Martinez
I no problem of
a raw material,
export them and
timate require-
;ned were illegal
sion. The state-
ingenuous, be-
still immersed
71
Rebuilding the Politics of Drug Control
? ? . ? .
' ? -
71
' in the spirit of its revolution, was participating for the first time in
a world narcotic conference and probably did not want to admit the
existence of any blemishes on its antinarcotic record.
? Argentina, the only other Latin American nation to play a vocal
role in the conference, naively became involved in the debate over
manufacturing limitations. Its representative, Fernando Perez,
i
who had no constructive proposals to present, disiiiiiieTEIaire-
m----e-rti -That overproduction and eTh7C?essiVe-Foicsiiinption of drugs had ..
--a-dttetrilatioirs'hip. Perez told the assembled delegates in terms
reminiscent of those heard years earlier in the United States:
The spread of drug addiction and the development of the
illicit drug traffic are not the effect of over-production, but are
due to the moral perversion of the drug addicts and of the
unscrupulous. traffickers who supply them with material for
their vicious practices.
This assessment of the motives behind drug usage led Argentina to
support a proposal of the Soviet Union which, if adopted, would
have expanded the scope of the conference to include a discussion
about whether to place limits upon raw material cultivation.81
In more contentious times the United States would have ar-
dently supported a similar drug control plan. To the credit of
Caldwell and his superiors, the United States delegation did not
have to labor under such restrictions in 1931. Instead Caldwell and
Anslinger backed a Franco-Japanese proposal-based on the concept
of in alien and .competitive..market..First,..each?government would
submit to a central office..annuaLestimates.afiegitimate ,needs.
Next, internal regulations would limit the supply of available nar-
cotics 6-those requirements. Finally, the central office would have 1
the authority to regulate narcotic traffic as -a means of restricting i
excessive exportatioq.82 If this plan had been adopted as com-
posed, it would have ultimately resulted in limiting *e production
of raw narcotic material.
Because of objections, especially Germany's, to so comprehen-
sive a plan, the scheme could not be adopted without modification.
Agreement in principle was reached, however, on the need for
strict supervision of the quantity of raw materials in the possession
of each manufacturer. Accordingly, one provision_ofithei.931.con-
verition was _ intended ..to,prevent-the-accumulation?of_excessive
supply. Going beyond the 1925 convention, the new one made the
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r ? , ",? --. 7,--77. .47 '7-17 4 ? ??.:
V-K1i s." ? ?
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.74 .?
s .C?t-a."`?.
14,1
P .
?
' ?
1
, 72.?.
: I, :I ? .
:-?-?-?:
? 1 1
to.. t. 4 4! ?
i4?Z-, ,
- ! --? \ . ? ? ? ? . ? .
? ?"rnr;it",
P?4 ? %; ! ? estimates of legitimate narcotic requirements binding on the nation
. . submitting them: The Permanent Central Opium Board would try It
to curtail violations of the agreement by exercise of its supervisory ' -
,
and administrative duties. The.PCOB also received the authority ? e',.,,,,,,,
., . ? ? ,-..rt.;,-
to place embargoes on countries exceeding their import and export ? ....w?ie.?,
?. ? .-,?,,, .T:=-3.
. . estithatei. In sum, the manufacturing limitation conference sought
I, 3,I to bring under contitil-brthe-League-c-bmmerce in tlie7Thref ..,..: '
4 : ?
... ifr; ?, "preparatiairof the opiuriiTZR-5731-icrthe
-- - -: T-Fe, work-OT The conference pleased the United States govern---
.
ment. If the convention . did not exactly duplicate Washington's
,..- -
- position, it at least embodied many of the ideas Caldwell and his , ,,,,,
.?
- `::P .i . '? ?
associates found crucial to effective control. Caldwell therefore
- ,
L. signed the convention and protocol of signature on July 18. He
a.refrained from signing the final act only because the United States
did not belong to the League. Other signatories included the major -,
manufacturing countries?Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the
Netherlands, and SWitzerland." Among the Latin American states,
' Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, .Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina ad referendum
signed the convention. Nicaragua, a nonparticipant, deposited the ,
._
.?
,,,.- ?
first ratification with the League, followed closely by the United -it,l '
,?
..?
States in April 1932. Enough nations deposited their ratifications
for the conventionto.ta e.effecton-July9,..19331r
e Ar
,----u
The presence of the United States and numerous Latin American
countries at Geneva in 1931 and the convention drafted during the
conference underscored the changes which had transpired since
,
1925 in the attitudes of the American republics toward interna-
,: ? '4 "
? tional drug control. The United States had altered its method of ...44..
administering domestic policy with the creation of the Federal
A . ; . Bureau of Narcotics. As of 1930 Congress possessed less authority 4-
. 0
than before to formulate policy Henceforth le_gislative action would
-..-1,. ,.
reinforce rather than define the antidrug _efforts of the_executive
?b_____)ranch-Try-formallyticipating in the activities of the OAC, the
Department of State reduced congressional influence over narcotic
4: 1
? foreign policy as well. The results of the 1931 Geneva conference
- 1
- - - seemed 63 demonstrate both the_efficacy of shared power within _
Ali ': ; . the .executive branch and the return of the United States to lead- - -:*::f 4.
-
5,..
r4.?4 I ? ership in the international movement Disputes with Congress "
,
, ili'i.Y. ? 1
over the nature of policy could only undermine that position. ..
.'n : , Simultaneous attempts to build, let alone rebuild, the politics of - it li
-,.;.--4,.-- .i -' _ ,..
il .
, I ,
'1r i ?
, gt:
Oi t -4
I
I -sr' ?
CHAPTER 3
-
.1
???
r
? ?t'I
Rebuilding the
?
drug contrc
had existed
particularly
ceive drug
tered existi
Uruguay er
drug comrr
ineffective.
scale fin- an-4
major obst
throughout
trols. Neve
recognition
controls, a
been able ti
state there
ence over t
the logical ( I
control, wh
bureaucrac
vided the
policy chan
Cci?
????? ? ?
44^
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CHAPTER 3
. . . ,
hg on the nation
Board would try
)f its supervisory
ed the authority
iport and export
inference sought
.ce in the chief.
Loa
I States govern-
te Washington's
'.aldwell and his
!dwell therefore
on July 18. He
le United States
!hided the major
am, Japan, the
e rican states,
iexico, Panama,
ad referendum
:t, deposited the
by the United
heir ratifications
15
Latin American
afted during the
transpired since
toward interna-
its method of
of the Federal
!d less authority
lye action would
3f the executive
of the OAC, the
ice over narcotic
leva conference
d power within
I States to lead-
with Congress
lat position.
d, the politics of
Rebuilding the Politics of Drug Control 73
drug control in Latin America Produced a closer ielationship than
had existed previously with the League of Nations. Several nations,
particularly Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, began gradually to per-
ceive drug usage as a social problem. Remedial action rarely al-
tered existing conditions, however. On the other hand, Mexico and
Uruguay employed legislative and administrative means to restrict
drug commerce and usage. Yet even those efforts proved largely
ineffective. Financing was unavailable for proper control?if large-
scale financing could have helped; official corruption became a
major obstacle; and dru_g_y_se as Raft of the cultural heritage
throughout Latin America militated against comiirehensive con-
trsheless, at the close of the Geneva conference of 1931,
Ignition existed in Latin America of the need for additional
controls, a recognition that hemispheric diplomacy alone had not
been able to produce. In the 1930s, the growth of the bureaucratic
state there would contend with drug-related traditions for influ-
ence over the direction of drug policy. The United States seemed
the logical choice to lead the way toward greater hemispheric drug
control, whether by example or direct diplomacy. A reconstructed
bureaucracy and a revised narcotic foreign policy ostensibly pro-
vided the example of sound management necessary for effective
policy change.
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r ? e
?
I
4
'.??: ?
tiet-;*`?
? ?,
? ,
? ?
Vvr;
? .
?
, fa
?;,5 Api
.(1Y-
1.4j.
r4i5,YAf
? ? -? 14-4
? A . r
The adoption of Ale 1931 Geneva Convention buoyed hopes for
rapid progress in the worldwide antinarcotic campaign. Shortly
after the convention went into effect in July 1933, the World
Narcotic Defense Association celebrated. The association's leader,
Capt. Richmond P. Hobson, a Spanish-American War veteran who
had become an active campaigner for several organizations, deliv-
ered a number of speeches praising the work of the Geneva confer-
ence. In another tribute the Literary Digest heralded the
implementation of the convention with an article entitled, "End of
the Illicit Drug Traffic Now in Sight."'
Unfortunately, such euphoria was unwarranted. For nations
steadfastly committed to the eradication of illicit drug commerce
and usage, including the United States, the convention provided
an additional tool to help in the fight. Nations with less systematic-
programs, especially those in Latin America, were encouraged to
reconsider the extent of their antidrug activities. In some cases
more vigorous actions would be undertaken. For their part United
States officials believed that the recent integration of foreign and
domestic drug policies would mitigate some of the nation's drug
problems. They miscalculated the complexity of the situation. ?
In the early 1930s domestic addiction remained at a considerable
level, a steady stream ? of illegal drugs, including marijuana and
opium, continued to-flow north from- Mexico, and new problems ?
appeared for policymakers as Central America and Colombia be-
came important locales for, smuggling opiates and cocaine from
"
.7V1
?
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76 CHAPTER 4
Drug Control in the
. ? . ,
Europe. These conditions plus a general inability to control illicit
narcotic commerce by Latin American governments offered_ offi-
cials in Washington scant hope for success in their endeavars.
Conservative estimates provided by theFederal Bureau of Nar-
cotics placed the number of addicts around 100,000 in 1926; six
years later the official figure had increased by 20,000. This
amounted to approximately one addict per one thousand people. -
Testifying in 1930 on his bill creating the bureau, Stephen C.
Porter stated that the most reliable estimates of addiction ranged
from 200,000 to 1,000,000 addicts. Porter personally felt that the
accurate number approached 400,000.2 If Porter's statistics exag-
gerated the real extent of addiction, the government's figures
underestimated it. The point is that addiction was probably not
decreasing, despite the enforcement programs being carried out
under the provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Law and its amend-
ments. On the twentieth anniversary of the law's passage, an
editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch termed it a failure which
had only produced large-scale smuggling. The Federal Bureau of
Narcotics denied the allegation asserting that addiction had de-
creased during the two decades of the law's operation.3
Moreover, the continuing depiction of addicts as social deviants
belied the faith officials placed in their capacity to reduce addic-
tion. In 1932 Treasury Secretary Ogden L. Mills found addicts to
be "mentally defective and psychotic," easily given to the influ-
ence of other addicts. Bureau Commissioner Anslinger doubted
whether addicts could ever play a useful role in society. In remarks
before the Attorney General's Conference on crime held in Wash-
ington in December 1934, he commented that "we understand
that none of these addicts would have become habitu?had they
possessed the mental stamina to resist the drug. The mere fact that
they could not control their craving, and yielded time after time
even when they knew from experience that they faced a jail sen-
tence, is indisputable proof. . . that many of them will relapse to
the ravages of the old habit and form underworld associates." To
Anslinger, addicts were "derelicts from a sinking ship."4
Only occasionally in the 1930s was there heard a dissent from
such views. Dr. Walter L. Treadway of the Public Health Service,
reflecting perhaps his bureau's difficult historical experience with
drug addiction, warned of the danger in a facile dismissal of the
social and env
that addiction
more visible v
recidivism di
addiction was
the approach
punitivb meal
forcement pat
not obtain a la
At this time
tic controls cal
law. Long be
states were cl?
ing and enfon
served not as
not to pass col
October 1932
form State L
narcotic act.
drugs without
form State Na
cocaine; mar.
provisions of
licensing of n
receptive atm.
of articles abo
the governm(
added its sum
throughout th
states had pui
The renova
/vacuum isolat
exigencies brc
ulous work of
problem app(
various goven
veles adminis
plated change
from the Tres
Initiative for I
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CHAPTER 4
'fifty to control illicit
nments offered offi-
their endeavors. .
ieral Bureau of Nar-
100,000 in 1926; six
!d by 20,000. This
le thousand people.
>ureau, Stephen G.
of addiction ranged
rsonally felt that the
rter's statistics exag-
overnment's figures
n was probably not
Is being carried out
Law and its amend-
e law's passage, an
A it a failure which
Federal Bureau of
t addiction had de-
peration.5
:ts as social deviants
ity to reduce addic-
ills found addicts to
r given to the influ-
Anslinger doubted
society. In remarks
;rime held in Wash-
lat "we understand
habitu?had they
;. The mere fact that
led time after time
ley faced a jail sen-
hem will relapse to
orld associates.* To
ng ship."4
eard a dissent from
)lic Health Service,
cal experience with
ile dismissal of the
--4
.1
-
Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936
social and environmental causes of addiction. Treadway pointed out
that addiction appeared in all social classes, although it remained
more visible within the lower class. He also felt that a high level of
recidivism did not so much lend support to the assertion that
addiction was a function of a pathological personality. as it refuted
the approach which 'sought to control drug usage primarily by
punitive means.5 Since Treadway's views ran counter to the en-
forcement patterns practiced by the Bureau of Narcotics, they did
not obtain a large audience within the policy-making bureaucracy.
At this time the major instance of an attempt to improve domes-
tic controls came in the movement to adopt a uniform state narcotic
law. Long before 1930 it became evident to officials that many
states were defaulting to the federal government the task of enact-
ing and enforcing adequate antidrug legislation. The Harrison law
served not as a model for some state legislatures, but as an excuse
not to pass complementary state laws.6 At its annual conference in
October 1932 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uni-
form State Laws accepted a draft proposal for a _uniform state.
iI?otic act:Under the terms of the draft, no person could trade in
drugs without specific authorization. The final version of the Uni-
form State Narcotic Drug Act related primarily to the opiates and
cocaine; marijuana was incidentally included under the general
provisions of the act. The proposal also recommended the strict
licensing of manufacturers and wholesalers. Hoping to create a
receptive atmosphere, the Bureau of Narcotics prepared a number
of articles about the need for the act. It is noteworthy that early in
the government's campaign, the American Medical Association
added its support for the adoption of the act. The rapid response
throughout the nation pleased the bureau; by 1936 twenty-seven
states had put the act into effect.7
The renovation of drug control policy did not proceed in a
vacuum isolated from contemporary events. In fact, the economic
exigencies brought on by the depression almost negated the metic-
ulous work of the State Department and the young bureau. The
problem appeared in the form of a proposed reorganization of
various government agencies just as President Franklin D. Roose-
velt's administration was settling into office. Among the contem-
plated changes was the transfer of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
from the Treasury Department to the Attorney General's office.
Initiative for the change apparently came from the Bureau of the
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78 CHAPTER 4
Budget and its director, Lewis W. Douglas, who convinced the ?
commissioner Of prohibition, A. V. Dalrymple, that the interchange
of agents for narcotic and prohibition law enforcement would in-
crease the operational efficiency of the bureaus being merged.8 ---
Stuart J. Fuller, a narcotic expert speaking for the State Depart-
.
ment,?offered.tw. o *o'bjectiOn.' Firit, any change might contravene ?
Article XV of the 1931 Geneva Convention which required each
signatory to maintain a separate, central narcotics office. Further:-
more, the proposal would probably place the enforcement of nar-
cotic 4ws in a situation similar to that Which existed before the
establishment of the Bureau of Narcotics. In a cover note on a
memorandum to Undersecretary of State William Phillips on
March 31, 1933, Fuller wrote, Our Narcotics Bureau has been
held up at Geneva as a model one." Fuller therefore concluded
that to:
abolish the Bureau of Narcotics would be regarded as a dis-
tinctly retrograde step and would discourage abroad the cen-
tralization and coordination of foreign narcotics administration
which the American Government has repeatedly urged.8
Fuller took his case both to the Justice Department and the
prohibition chief. He informed Dalrymple that the 1931 conven-
tion had been composed and signed on the insistence of the
American Government." Any alteration in the policy structure
would make it appear that the United States had reneged on its
antidrug commitment, causing embarrassment for the State De-
partment.1? Reports also reached Washington detailing concern by
the Opium Advisory Committee over the proposed merger. Presi-
dent Roosevelt finally ended all speculation when he told Phillips
that there would be no merger or abolition of the bureau, espe-
cially in view of the treaty obligations incurred in 1931.11 The
defeat of the proposed merger underscores the bureaucratic skills
at work in the management of national narcotic policy by Harry J.
An slinger and his colleagues in the Department of State. After an
early decrease in funding as a result of the depression, they were
able to maintain appropriations for the Bureau of Narcotics at a
relatively constant level throughout the depression, New Deal,
and the years of the heavy fiscal demands generated by the Second
World War. (See Table. 2.) In financial terms at least, the stability of
Drug"Control in the
TABLE 2. Annual Ai
Fiscal Year
1931.
1932.-
1933 ?
? 3934 ? .
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
Source: Compi6tior
funding shows
as a regular al
ment. With th
policy could b
longer subsum
the case since ,
support for th.
more concerte
As had been
its direct relat
required mud
ing in their effi
A crucial obst
Mexican gove
Usage apparer
persisted, am
society.12 Des;
decrees of the
tion.
A report in
the severity ar
minister of go,
nation, an acti
gling operatio
and then tram
Calles, the mo
-
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7% ?
CHAPTER 4
? ? :
1-
.convinced the
le interchange
lent would in-
rrierked.9' .
State Dvart-
lit contravene
required each
Hee. Further- -- -
ement of nar-
ed before the
Per note on a
-1 Phillips on
eau has been
re concluded
-ded as a dis-
road the cen-
Elministration
y urged.9
lent and the
1931 conven-
tence of the
Cy structure
neged, on its
le State De-
g concern by
erger. Presi-
told Phillips
areau, espe-
1931.11 The
ucratic skills
by Harry J.
ate. After an
1, they were
arcotics at a
New Deal,
the Second
e stability of
Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936
? ? .----. ?
TABLE 2. Annual Appropriations for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1931-1950
79
Fiscal Year
Appropriation
. fiscal Year
Appropriation
1931
$1,712,998
1941
$1,303,280 .
.1932,
.. ,
$1,708;528 -:
?
1942
? - ?$1,278,47$. ..
1933
?
$1,525,000 -
1943
- $1;289,060
1934
$1,400,000
1944
$1,150,000
1935
$1,244,899
-1945
$1,338,467
1936
$1,249,470
1946
$1,167,400
___ 1937.
.
51,p5,0001947
_ .
$1 300 000
1938
I ?
'
..___.....
$1,267,000 ,
1948
$1,430,000
1939
i
' $1,267,000,..)
1949
$1,450,000
1940
1
$1,306,700
1950
$1,610,000
Source: Compilation of Federal Bureau of Narcotics annual reports
funding shows that public narcotic policy had finally taken its place
as a regular and institutionalized function of the federal govern-
ment. With the end of the controversy over reorganization, drug
policy could be 'looked upon almost as an entity unto itself?no
longer subsumed within broader policy considerations as had been
the case since 1914. By having to devote less time to obtaining
support for their policy at home, drug officials were able to give
more concerted attention to related problems abroad.
As had been the case for some time, the situation in Mexico and
its direct relationship to drugs smuggled into the United States
required much of the energy officials in Washington were expend-
ing in their effort to .improve the quality of control in the Americas.
A crucial obstacle to their? goal arose out of the difficulties the
Mexican government faced in handling its own drug situation.
Usage apparently increased in the early 1930s. Marijuana smoking
persisted, and heroin was found among the lower levels of
society.12 Despite claims to the contrary by the government, the
decrees of the 1920s had not really alleviated a deteriorating situa-
tion.
A report in the newspaper Excelsior on June 12, 1931 revealed
the severity and extent of the situation. In a letter to the paper, the
minister of government, Carlos Riva Palacio, announced his resig-
nation, an action resulting from his alleged complicity in a smug-
gling operation which was introducing illegal drugs into Mexico
and then transporting them to the United States. 13 Plutarco Elias
Calles, the most powerful man in Mexico and now ex-president,
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^h-
_
4
Nr?
?
t"1.4;:i?Z"Pd''.. ? ;?,-;?"%e r-
_ ????.?,- ? 4 ?k
"te,
-
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1 !
'
?
CHAPTER 4
had the noininal president, Pascual Rubio OM. z, accept the Minis-
ter's resignation. There existed no certainty, however, that Riva
Palacio was intimately connected with the smugglers. Others men-
tioned in connection-with fife --Op-eratio-n were the president of the -4
Federal, District, the governor. of.San Luis Potosi, and also mem.;
hers of the staff of Rubio Ortiz. "The most charitable construction
to put on the action of the, President," declared United States
Military Attach?ol. Gordon Johnson, Is that the sudden expo-
sure Of so m-any high officials of his Administration might be politi-?-,--.1
cally disastrous."" _ _ _ - ? - - -
In short, a government crisis seemed at hand. Mexico's financial
condition, more precarious because of the depression, was worse
than at any time since 1915. Credit was poor; gold and silver were
in short supply. With the resignation of the head of the presidential
staff, Calles's faith in the ability of Rubio Ortiz to govern effectively
nearly evaporated. Fortunately for Mexico, the power and prestige
of Calles held the government together. In August the crisis passed
when Gen. Lazar? Cardenas, who would become president in
1934, accepted an appointment to Riva Palacio's former position.15
It is not clear that the appointment of Cardenas had a causal
effect, but shortly thereafter the government undertook a reassess-
ment of the operation of its drug control policies. Specifically?the.
Public Health De artment_sought to establish rspecial,hospitals,to
_ca-r-e-fol?-a-daicts: the program wasobligatory?and_ the departmept
h-a-dS-a-iiih-o-fizad-aict's ,discharge. -Und er.th e_pl an ,,fre e _care
would be provided for.poorer,Addicts.,Finally,,,physicianS,were,to
-
be held responsiblejor,the .condition.of.patients -upon .their.,re-..
Z
?
4,
lease." Nothing came of the proposal until Cardenas took office asl----
; 17-Ment. At the end of August 1934 the new administration pub-
lished a revised sanitary code and decree of implementation. U
der provisions of the code, if an addict had drugs in his possession
? , for personal use, he would be, consigned to the Public Health
Department, not to the criminal courts. But if an addict supplie
others with drugs, he would be subject to criminal prosecution
after undergoing treatment. Most important, the Department. of
Public Health would constitute the ultimate authority concerning
--possible prosecution for _ _ _
1: Implementation of the sanitary code left Mexico's drug law en-
1:i forcement practices at variance with those of the United States.
)??
Pouletjy an agency with a medical function rather
-
? --_--- -t-,.`1
,,,e! ?
Drug Control ii
. .
?\ than by or
enforcemei
partmept
Medicai 'att
? applicabilit
?
the United
solely for I
control woi
Washingtm
Despite
doubtful th
drug situati
United Pre
standing co
named Me:
were being
Mexican of
denied the
man ufactur
Whatever t ,
ernmenes
British and
from Persia
financially, )
cially stimul
denials, the
Based up
Mexico City
smuggling. :
ment for th
year official
with Consul
ico next ref
unrestricted
State Depai
quest, altho
Mexico wit]
Mexicans lu
exchange of
While rel
. ?
4lio- ?
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Ccep. the minis:
,
'ever, that Riva
rs. Others men-
president of the-
, and also rtiem. -;.-
ble construction' j
United States
le sudden expo-
might be politi-
lexico's financial
sion, was worse
and silver were
'the presidential
wern effectively
,ver and prestige
the crisis passed
ne president in
mer position.15
tas had a causal
rtook a reassess-
Specifically, the
cial hospitals to
the department
t plan, free care
ysicians were to
; upon their re-
las took office as
tinistration pub-
mentation. Un-
n his possession
; Public Health
addict supplied
[nal prosecution
Department of
)rity concerning
o's drug law en-
United States.
function rather
Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936?
ILLEGIB
thari by one -(the 'Bureau :of-Narcofics).-emphasizing4mnitive4aw
enforcement and administrative efficiency., The Public.Health De7
par"-Tinerif?planned treat addicts first as individuals meriting
medical attention; their particular situation would determine the
applicability of criminallaw..C9nversely, enforcement practices in
the United States blurred distinctions between sale and possession
solely for personal use. Whether the Mexican approach to drug
control would prove any more successful than that advocated in
Washington remained to be seen
Despite the intentions Of the Cardenas. administration, it was -
doubtful that the new' regulations had a discernible impact on the
drug situation in areas distant from Mexico City. In April 1935 the
United Press news wire carried a story from Geneva stating that a
standing committee of the League of Nations, probably the OAC,
named Mexico as a nation from which large quantities of drugs
were being smuggled into the United States. It also noted that
Mexican officials took part in the illicit activity. The government
denied the allegations, putting the blame for smuggling instead on
manufacturing nations with insufficient controls over exports.
Whatever the level of official corruption and complicity, the gov-
ernment's countercharges had a basis in reality. In Manchuria,
British and Swiss interests were seeking to have the opium trade
from Persia legalized: an increased trade would prove lucrative
financially, particularly if the demand for narcotics could be artifi-
cially stimulated in places other than China.19 Notwithstanding the
denials, the level of smuggling from Mexico remained high.19
Based upon _i_Les_orLiallie....early-1930sr-the-govermnent.in
_t_q7 a eat_,,np.,..,_.10.y___illing19...act_with?the...DattriAtack.t.o-stgp
smuggling. In 1930 the two countries concluded an infoppal=agree--
rri-e-Zr ol'rn-Zaiaiiirairiforrnation on drugs.16 The following
'arafli-crals sent a special agent to coordinate antidrug activity
with Consul William Blocker in the Juarez-El Paso region.21 Mvs-
ico next requested that agents of both countries be permitted
unrestncted-bgrthere ursuant-kitiFird
Stare-Department and Bureau of .Narcotics turned down the re-
quest, alihougli-United States agents would continue to-cross into
Mat& vith Anslinger's express approval.22 By mid-1932 all the
Nexicanslad.,achieved.was anotherjnformallrrangement,ZW
exchange of information.23.
While reluctant to engage in cooperative activity, the United
:1;
?
ILLEGIB
?=1.'
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States took several. unilateral steps to detect and prevent illegal .
traffic. Around 1930 private planes began smuggling drugs out of
Mexico. In response, an antidrug air patrol operated from various .
sites in Texas starting in 1931. During the first two years of the ---
program no drugs were seized, only liquor. Yet authorities re-
mained' Convinced that 'smuggling by air Was a. Prime means. of ? '4*
getting drugs into the United States.24
In addition to west Texas, Baja California continued to serve as a
prominent locale for smuggling. The consul at Ensenada, William ?
Smale, suggested that the State Department pressure Mexican
authorities to act by taking steps "which would reduce to a mini-
mum the travg and expenditures of American tourists in Baja
California. . "25 Not until Operation Intercept thirty-five years
later would the United States try, ih a comparable situation, to take
the action Smale suggested. In place of economic pressure, a
meeting was held on October 10, 1934 in Los Angeles to dissemi-
nate information on smuggling to representatives from the state,
treasury, labor, and justice departments. The need for the meeting
became evident after the district supervisor of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics in San Francisco stated that he saw no reason to believe
anything other than liquor was being smuggled into the United
States.26
Such ignorance of the actual situation was unacceptable in An-
slinger's Bureau of Narcotics; nor would it help matters in Baja
California. In January 1935 Smale found "the matter of
smuggling. . . taking more and more of the time of this office. "27
The meeting in Los Angeles provided some assistance. Communi-
cation lines between State Department representatives and 'Treas-
ury agents, who had often operated in Mexico without consular -----
knowledge, were improved. Smale and other consuls would re-
ceive any urgent information from the Customs Border Patrol
Office in San Diego. In turn, they were required to report period-
ically to a general coordinator in Los Angeles.28 The transfer of a
clerk at the consulate, Paul Carr, to the employ of the Treasury
Department provided additional help for Smale. Carr undertook
most of the daily work concerning smuggling. He worked for the
Treasury Department in order to avoid the necessity of presenting
a formal request to the Mexican government to allow him to move
freely about the Ensenada area. As noted previously, the United
States had no interest in reciprocal operations of this kind. "It is
Diug
mad
of th
Ye
illici
Was
rela3
he rf
mari
able
area
in oil
matt
In a
feeli:
of th
gling
the
sive
Nom
sion
1932
had f-
Illi
the e
the
acros
tion
respo
the E
begui
in th(
in oti
State:
versu
On
drugs
Latin
ation
1929
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? ' ? r:4 .1 t?1, . - ? ' I v za_rj ? ^ ? ?
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, ? : ?77. , .
?-?
4.1 '-?104' )??
? ?';rV.
- CHAPTER4
d prevent .illegal
;ling drugs out of
ited from various
two years of the ,
A authorities re- ?-).
prime means of
4
/.. ,
? %.
nued to serve as ` ?
nsenada, William
iressure- Mexican
reduce to a mini-
; tourists in Baja
t thirty-five years
situation, to take
omic pressure, a
3geles to dissemi-
n from the state,
for the meeting
le Bureau of Nar-
reason to believe
I into the United
acceptable in An-
p matters in Baja
"the matter of
le Of this office. "27
;tance. Communi-
itatives and Treas-
without consular
consuls would re-
ms Border Patrol
Ito report period-
The transfer of a
)y of the Treasury
Carr undertook
le worked for the
ssity of presenting
glow him to move
iously, the United
of this kind. "It is
?
;4.?
? ; t
-. ? 4.1 "
?.? ? _ L'
, ? .
Drug ontrol in the Americas, 1931-.1936
'
;
83
inadvisable:, &nate was told, "to notify the Mexican Government
of the general nature of the appointee's duties.""
Yet as Smale well knew, the United States could do little.abont
illicit drugs in Baja without assistance from Mexico_City. Assistance
ihfore
reiarinfonitatafro-his superiors. On one occasion in March 1936"
he reported learning of extensive cultivation of opium poppies and
marijuana in remote regions of Baja. ? The only action Smale was
able to take was to have a staff member take a "vacation" in the
-afea-and report on -conditions there. This and similar occurrences-
in other consular districts moved the United States to bring the
matter of border smuggling to the attention of the OAC in Geneva.
In a presentation distinguished by sensitivity for the diplomatic
feelings of Mexico, and therefore symbolic of the reciprocal nature
of the Good Neighbor Policy, Stuart J. Fuller declared that smug-
gling presented a problem on both sides of the border. In response,
the Mexican delegate, Manuel Tello, promised a more comprehen-
sive exchange of information on drugs would be forthcoming.
Nonetheless, available records for 1936 do not reveal the conclu-
sion of any agreement to augment the previous ones of 1930 and
1932." It seems unlikely that the Mexicans could believe, as they
had at Geneva in 1931, that there was no drug problem in Mexico.
. ?
,
Illicit drug activity also flourished elsewhere in Latin America in
the early thirties. Most governments failed to respond even with
the rudimentary measures of control prompted by smuggling
across the Mexico-United States border. Instead, official inatten-
tion and incompetence, even corruption, defined the spectrum of
responses to drug problems:Such a situation brought -- --
the extent to which Latin American_governments-actually?had
begun to view drug .usage.and .traffic,as .domestic,sociat.problems
in_thejate,1920s..It also demonstrated the difficulty of inculcating
in others by whatever means the antidrug fervor of the United
States. As before, the division remained in part one of culture
versus bureaucracy.
Only Uruguay embarked upon a serious campaign to control__
drugs: In -June 1931 the State Department distributed throughout_
Latin America a questionnaire seeking information about the situ-
ation there. Uruguay's reply showed a flurry of activity between
1929 and 1932. In May 1929 the Geneva Convention of 1925 had
_ - - ? - , -? -
?,t.r
-
12, t=t_ - ? - ? - l?k - .
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CHAPTER 4
gone into effect. Then came the implementation of an import-
export. certificate system and a decree in March 1932 seeking to
control further commerce in drugs. Most important, the govern-
ment gave full power to the National Council of Public Health to
supervise the enforcement of all narcotic regulations.31 _
In 1933 the government created the ornately titled Special Corn-
-mission for the -Defense Against Toxicomania and Control of the
Narcotics Traffic to work with the Public Health Council. The
duties of the special commission included supervising compliance
with all domestic and international regulations, compiling statistics
on the extent of addiction, and promoting an antidrug educational
campaign throughout the country. To assist the work of the special
commission Uruguaj, planned to spend $10,000 per year.32
As was true elsewhere, attention to domestic matters alone could
not mitigate the narcotic situation. The Uruguayan government
also had to deal with the possibility of increased drug traffic result-
ing from apparent Japanese efforts to establish an industrial center
in the Free Zone of Colonia across the Rio de la Plata from Buenos
Aires. The Anti-Opium Information Bureau in Geneva, a clearing-
house for narcotics data, asked Uruguay to scrutinize closely any
questionable activity in Colonia. Of particular concern to the bu-
reau was the relative proximity of Bolivian coca fields, an available
source of illicit cocaine.33 Unlike officials in Geneva and Washing-
ton, Uruguayan authorities did not believe Colonia would become
a transit point for smuggling. Dr. Jos?ora, a foreign office official
in charge of narcotics, told United States representatives in Mon-
tevideo that Colonia had never played a prominent role in illegal
traffic. Problems with illicit drugs centered around the border with
Brazil. Nonetheless, Uruguay promised to supervise any unusual
activity in Colonia. By the mid-thirties, it should be noted, the
feared Japanese industrial center had not come into existence.34
At this same time Uruguay took other steps to guard against the
introduction of unwanted drugs. At the Seventh Pan-American
Conference at Montevideo in December 1933 the government
urged those Latin American republics which had not yet ratified
the 1931 Geneva Convention to do so quickly.35 Uruguay also
sought assistance from the Opium Advisory Committee. At the
OAC session in May 1934, Alfredo de Castro asked the committee
_ . _ _ _
to make a special appeal to all Latin American governments urging
the prompt submittal of their annual reports. He further requested
Drug Contro
that Gen
paigns
support,
putting t
Availal
Alth
ernment
all comn
prefect (
officers N
early -19
1930-34
as before
with citie
United
is of min
Urugu
This fact
to restrii
ernment
tation, e
action w
officials
came ill,
The law
any phy:
cantly, a
funding
the mon
No of
Urugua3
tempt al
neva C,
Smuggli
prising,
than all(
instance
allotrnef.
Not u
drug lay
- ? ?
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CHAPTER 4
Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936
In of an import-
1932 seeking to'
:ant, the govern-.
Public Health to
ions.31 -
led
Special ,Corn-:
d -Controtof the'''.
th Council. . The
ising compliance
,mpiling statistics
drug educational
ork of the special
per year.32
itters alone could
tyan government
rug traffic result-
industrial center
lata from Buenos
;neva, a clearing-
inize closely any
ncern to the bu-
elds, an available
;va and Washing-
ia would become
eign office official
:ntatives in Mon-
ent role in illegal
d the border with
-vise any unusual
Id be noted, the
nto existence."
guard against the
th Pan-American
.the government
d not yet ratified
.35 Uruguay also
Immittee. At the
;d the committee
rernments urging
lather requested
that 'Geneva encourage the development of drug education cam-
paigns by individual nations. The suggestions received substantial.
support, including Fuller's for the United States, and resolutions
putting them into effect passed easily.36
- Available evidence suggests that Uruguay's efforts were succeed-
ing. Although, not formally establishing. a state monopoly, the gov-
ernment effectively -assumed full.autliority to supervise' and direct
all commerce in drugs." Also, the public health minister and
prefect of police in Montevideo offered cash rewards to those
officers who were most productive in their antinarcotic work. By
early 1937 drug- co-n-sumPtion--seems Io have fallen below the
1930-34 level. What illegal drugs were uncoveredcame primarily,
as before, from Brazil and secondarily from Argentina. "Compared
with cities of similar size in the United States or Europe," observed
United States Minister Julius Lay, "drug addiction in Montevideo
is of minor importance."38
Uruguay imported all its narcotics, both raw and manufactured.
This fact plus careful regulation of sale and consumption did much
to restrict illicit traffic there. Finally in September 1937 the gov-
ernment officially created a state monopoly governing the impor-
tation, exportation, and distribution of all narcotic substances. This
action went beyond the more limited effort of 1923. Public health
officials took charge of the monopoly. Possession of narcotics be-
came illegal whether intended for personal use or sale to others.
The lair putting this program into effect outlined stiff penalties for
any physician or police official who violated its provisions. Aignifi-
cantl a state hos s ital was set u ? to treat addiction.jar,t of the
ndmg for the institution would come_from revenues.derivedfrom,
the monopocr.3?
No other Latin American nation followed the example set by
Uruguay. Argentina, for example, had never made a serious at-
tempt at drug control. The government acceded to the 1925 Ge-
neva Convention but did not actually sign the document.4?
Smuggling was uncontrolled around Buenos Aires.
not sur-
prising, therefore, that Argentina--tended to. import_more__drugs
than allowed under the terms of_the 1931 convention. In 1935, for
instance, imports of morphine and cocaine exceeded the stipulatO
allottieids."-- - "
? Not until three years later did Argentina enact a comprehensive
drug law. In February 1938 the government placed controls on the
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,
CHAPTER 4
traffic in opium, heroin, and -cocaine', and began import and export
supervision. In a comment on Argentina's action, the assistant
secretary of the treasury, Stephen B. Gibbons, declared that the -
regulations were malleable enough to permit phy-sicians to pre-
scribe sufficient quantities f.drugs. to Maintain addicts in. their .
In? Gibbons's view, Argentina's annual? estimates far sur-
passed the actual yearly need. A newly created Section of Narcotics
Control in the government evidently did not deem it necessary to
revise national drug requirements.42
The narcotic-situation in Honduras seemectequally out of control?
early?irthrd,rtar-denr-i tile?eighteen months_prior to the end of
g33---11-tonditiaS?iMpoAed- enough morphine, eighty-seven kilo
?g raffig,--ftrinteritsr medical and scientific requirements-_ for one-
l?he
sukill, far in excess of quota allotments, came
mainly from France, Germany, and Switzerland, nations tradition-
ally reluctant to adopt manufacturing limitations. In 1934 when
Honduras received another twenty-two-year supply of morphine,
League of Nations officials suspected wholesale forging of import
certificateS.43
Considerable amounts of the imports, including morphine and
cocaine, found their way into the southern United States, particu-
larly the New Orleans area, where local authorities managed to
seize a portion of them. At least one other seizure took place in
Dallas. When the smuggling continued, the United States began
using Coast Guard vessels to track ships on which drug couriers
were believed to be traveling. Consular officials in the Honduran
ports of La Ceiba, Tela, Puerto Cort? and Belize provided the
Coast Guard with information on ship movements. The State De-
partment viewed the reconnaissance efforts as a temporary meas-
ure which might provide a deterrent to smuggling. Such an
eventuality was, of course, unlikely, given the historical role of
smuggling in Central America during depressed economic times.
In the 1930s as in earlier eras, smuggling became a part of the local
way of life?a potentially rewarding enterprise for some individuals
during the worldwide depression."
Numerous Hondurans received narcotics from Europe, but one
man, Jos?aria Guillen Velez, seemed to acquire larger quantities -
than most. (It was morphine from one of his shipments that officials
.in Dallas seized in 1932.) Guillen Velez, owner of a pharmacy in
Puerto Cort? accepted shipment of forty kilograms of morphine
''I?ij??.;-; ?
Dru
fro
}lc
tio -
act
of
Ur
mc
ye
drt
tici
the
pot
in
cial
Yet
dei
we'
?ne
pro
wa
Frr
mat
yen
con
con
and
plat
om:
imr
pr
the
wag
II
Oct
offic
hayi
and
_
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CHAPTER-47+
mport and export 7,
on, the assistant
leclared that the
hysicians to pre-----
addicts in their
siimatei far 'kir':
ction ofNarcotics
m it necessary to' ?
ally out of Contrci17?
ior to the 'end of
ighty-seven kilo-
irements for one
allotments, came
nations tradition-
s. In 1934 when
Ply of morphine,
forging of import
morphine and
d States, particu-
ities managed to
ire took place in
ted States began
ch drug couriers
in the Honduran
ize provided the
ts. The State De-
temporary meas--
ggling. Such an
historical role of
economic times.
apart of the local
some individuals
Europe, but one
larger quantities
tents that officials
of a pharmacy in
anis of morphine
WitiffieliT,1931=1 93b.,
-
from France in 1933, an amount large enough to satisfy legitimate ?
Honduran needs for fifty years...18 Faced with such a serious situa-
tion, the government professed a desire to revamp its control
activities. At the same time, however,. Dr. Ricardo Alduvin, dean
of the medical faculty at the, national universi.ty.in Tegucigalpa, told
United States representatives that the Director of Public Health,
P. H. Ordonez Diaz, had authorized Guillen's imports of opium,
morphine, and cocaine. Permission was evidently granted for the
years 1933 and 1934.48
Official corruptionYO dOubt contributed to the ease with which
drugs reached Honduras--Julius Lay reported that Honduran poli-
ticians were susceptible to bribery. The depression exaggerated
the consequences of the unhappy fact that Honduras was the
poorest of the Central American republics. As was true elsewhere
in Latin America, especially Mexico, accepting bribes helped offi-
cials personally make the best of an economically difficult situation.
Yet official corruption would mitigate in no way the impact of the
depression upon Honduras. In Mid-October 1932, scarcely two
weeks before scheduled presidential elections, Lay found trade
'nearly at a standstill."'"
As had been the case since earlier in the century, Honduran
prosperity primarily depended upon the banana industry, which
was controlled by the United Fruit Company and the Standard
Fruit and Steamship Company. Even had the com anies_notslom-
inated the economy, the monocu hiral tra ition wo1d_have,pre7
venteaLan-efrafiv.eponse to the-depression., As.-it_was,, the.
coyipanie, too were constrained in their_ability to_ameliorate
conditions_The depression cut world banana prices, and Panama
and Sigotoka disease devastated the fruit throughout the banana
plantations, further damaging the nation's export-oriented econ-
omy. Although the companies contributed in numerous ways to
improving the quality of life in Honduras, the wages they paid
provided little more than subsistence for workers and families" in
the estimation of career diplomat Willard L. Beaulac. In 1933
wages were reduced 10 percent across the board.48
_ It was within this climate that a national election was held on
October. 30, 1932. The victor, Tiburcio Carias Andino, would take
office on February 1, 1933. At that time, no informed person would
have predicted a future of amicable relations between Washington
and the new Honduran government. In 1924 the United States
? ? .
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11
_
-88
-CHAPTER 4
helped tp prevent Carias from assuming the presidency. Then in
1928 the United States supported Vicente Mejia Colindres as
Carias lost a relatively free election. After his electoral success in --
? 1932, Carias imniediately had to quell a revolt by dissident ele-.
? t
ments within the Liberal party. At the same time. the national ,
? ? . ?
. ? ? " ? ? .
treasury Was virtually eMpty.49 ? ? ? .
The two situations were not unrelated. While in office Mejia
?Colindres had kept potentially rebellious army factions in line by
paying them with funds borrowed from the banana .companies.
? ,r ?
?Y ?
(Repayment ofthe loans came in the form of reduced customs
collections.) The vicissitudes of the depression did not afford Carias
? , ,
a similar option. Unable to obtain requested arms from the United
States, Carfas received aid from El Salvador and soon put down
the revolt. The denial of the request for arms, despite Lay's rec-
ommendation to the contrary, could have only increased Carias
Andino's wariness of the United States.5?
In what cannot be interpreted as other than a diplomatic formal-
ity, Carias pledged himself to a policy of cordial relations with other
governments, "especially that of the United States." The pledge
included reorganization of the departments of justice and public
health. What this declaration portended for drug control, or United
States influence, remained to be seen.51 Even had Honduras
vindu
acceded at once to the 1931 Geneva Convention, the problem of
excessive narcotic importation would have existed. In turn, smug-
gling would have continued unchecked.52 When a legislative de-
cree in March 1934 finally put the convention into effect, the
practical problem of enforcement still remained?as Dr. Al
admitted."
Essentially the- problefiffOr-the United Stites in Honduris -Was-
that the governments of the two countries did not share the com-
mon objective of the eradication of illicit drug traffic. As a result,
reciprocity?a prominent aspect of the Roosevelt administration's
Latin American policy?played a lesser role in the situation than
the United States would have liked. No narcotics bureaucracy
existed in Honduras that would take the United States cause as its
own. The tacit assumption held by Washington in hemispheric
. narcotic relations?that 'cultural and other impediments to effective - ---
? drug control could be mutually overcome?simply was not rele-
vant. There were practical limits therefore to what American diplo-
macy could achieve. ?
^
Drug Contro
Severa
Its two r
the Unit(
.the hemi
dent Roo',
from pot(
Good Ne
Americar
spread al
Mexico:
rocally
Americar
HoweN,
been, he
noninten
roughgoil
discover
be used
wholesal
rebuild
1933 and
tation of
Julius
hand. La
situation
such acti
uncovers
means of
declared,
supply h
frustratio
forged in
to convi(
served a
administ
Hondura
the cowl
ambition
Fuller's 5..
against C
?
_
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? .
CHAFFER 4
sidendy. Theri in
ejia Colindres as -
ectoral success in - -
by dissident de-77j?
imp the ,national?,?
-
e in office Mejia
actions in line by
alma _companies.
reduced customs
I not afford Carias
s from the United
d soon put down
lespite Lay's rec-
increased Carias
liplomatic formal-
lations with other
tes." The pledge
ustice and public
:ontrol, or United
n had Honduras
1, the problem of
d. In turn, smug-
t a legislative de-
t into effect, the
?as Dr. Alduvin
in Honduras was
)t share the corn-
affic. As a result,
t administration's
he situation than
dries bureaucracy
itates cause as its
in hemispheric
rnents to effective - ---
ply was not rele-
t American diplo-
Drug Contra in the Americas, 1931-1936 89
? Several bornif!en.6-are in order about the Godd Neighbor Policy. ?
Its two primary tenets, military and political nonintervention by
the United States in Latin America and the return of prosperity to
the, hemisphere, became evident within a short time after Presi-
dent Roosevelt took office.54 Laterin the decade, Inilitarysecuiity.
from potential Axis subversion became inextricably linked with the
Good Neighbor Policy. Throughout, the idea of reciprocity in inter-
American relations provided a basis for giving the policy its wide-
spread appeal._ In the .words of Josephus Daniels, ambassador to
Mexico: "The only hope of the Good Neighbor Policy lies in recip-
rocally applying it with-justice and fair dealing between the Pan
American States . . ."55 ?
However skeptical of United States intentions Carias may have
been, he joined in the general approval of Roosevelt's policy of
nonintervention." This gesture should not be construed as a tho-
roughgoing acceptance of the Good Neighbor Policy. As Would be
discovered in other countries, particularly Brazil, reciprocity could
be used to domestic political advantage without being accepted
wholesale. As we shall soon see, Carias realized this as he tried to
rebuild the Honduran economy and cement his hold on power. In
1933 and 1934, reciprocity did not necessarily extend to implemen-
tation of a policy to curb illicit drug traffic.
Julius Lay experienced the selectivity of Honduran policy first
hand. Lay felt that the prosecution of Guillen would improve the
situation, but he remained pessimistic about the likelihood of any
sucb action. An official search of Guillen's pharmacy in June 1934
uncovered no evidence linking him to the narcotics trade. "By
means of forged government certificates," an exasperated Fuller
declared, "Honduras has imported sufficient morphine . . . to
supply her legitimate needs for a century." Compounding the
frustration, it was later learned that under Honduran law the
forged import certificates would not have been evidence enough
to convict Guillen of a crime.57 Lay learned, too, that Guillen
served as minister of government and justice under an earlier
administration and entertained hopes of becoming the president of
Honduras. As such, he tried not to alienate any elements within
the country, including the banana companies that might thwart his
ambitions.58 Even a League of Nations inquiry prompted by
Fuller's statement did not convince the government to take action
against Guillen.59 In an ironic epilogue to the Guillen affair, which
.. ?
-XL
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? 42
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_
.1. 'An,' 4,??
:II! ?
t4-4?1:??'
tie ?,
1.
04-)
du.
,q,-?
?
? 7, ?N.i.,? ''.;
?-?
'
? , .^*
4, ? ? ???
? . .
? CHAPTER 4
? . ? ? .
" -
will be discussed in greater detail later, the Department of State
learned that Guillen participated in at least two abortive attempts .
-- -to-remove -Carfas Andino from power in -1935 and 1936.- Had the
revolts suCceeded, Guillen would have become acting president of '
6?. ?? - ' :
Honduras.
Smuggling from Honduras was not the only problem troubling .
American officials. Elsewhere in Central America, especially in _
Panama and the Canal Zone, illegal drugs were abundantly avail-
able. !Costa Ric dC?l?thbi?o-Countrie? With negligible con-7'7'
trols,-Ifrequentbi 'ierved as 'transit points for drugs bound for
Panama. United States authorities regarded Panamanian police as
generally honest, but helpless to control the situation. One side
effect of this condition was that a large percentage of U.S. Army
personnel receiving hospital care in Panama were suspected of
being addicts. 61
If little could be done in a remedial way in Panama, continuing
problems in Honduras (in addition to the difficulties posed by
Guillen) made the situation there even less amenable to. resolution
along lines desired by the United States. Throughout his tenure as
minister, Lay suspected the government of complicity in the drug
traffic. It did not surprise him greatly therefore when Dr. Ricardo
Alduvfn, who had occasionally been helpful to Lay, resigned his
post at the university. In his capacity as dean of the medical faculty,
Alduvin possessed the authority to issue or withhold narcotic im-
port certificates. On at least one occasion, Alduvin signed a certifi-
cate for a firm to import narcotics from a New Orleans company,
the Meyer Brothers Drug Company, which was not authorized by
.!'er
?
YTI?
the Bureau of Narcotics-to export drugs to Honduras. The news- ::y7
paper El Cronista revealed that throughout his service as dean,
Alduvin had granted import authorizations to a select group of ;
businessmen suspected of participating in the illicit traffic.62
Dr. Francisco Sanchez replaced Alduvin. He evidently wanted ,
to change his predecessor's policy, declaring that only "pharmacies
of good reputation will be allowed to petition importations of
- narcotic drugs through the Faculty of Medicine." Trying to assist
Sanchez, Commissioner Anslingerturned down a request from the_.___
. ..
? . '4 ' ( Meyer Brothers Drug Company to export morphine to Honduras.
At best, Anslinger's action served a symbolic purpose. Without a
1:141 strong antinarcotic Commitment on the part of the Carfas govern-
''' ' ---,---=?ment; little could be done to stop the persistent smuggling. The
? ?1.. ,r6.6
? 1.2
Drug Control it I
murder of
narcotic siti
4- :13y that t
to ignore tl-
prior antin;
Affairs, An
ance. He a:
investigatoi
request;. SI
New Orlea; ;
United Stat
by officials i
ger knew, 4
narcotic cot
nothing.
What co
nomic revii '
valued at $
dropped oN
Trade with
of banana e
1937-38. B
tion's total
the United
Carias was
Secretar.
program pi
begun inn
18, 1935. 'I
diveracat
of customs
quickly for
conceivabl3
many; it a$.
Japan, a tr;
concluded,
economic a
dependenc
tunes of Ca
a guarantet
.t-r. ''....24 .....,-,.....--. .....i Z..4.1.,:. 4.1...--.4.-......1.,..9-i Aloe ..... ... ? 6 -.... 2.- -. -..c.
'A , ?. ? . .
4,-- - -; ,' - -
-
; 4.,1,27t:4
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"CHAPTER 4
.tmen't of State
)rtive attempts
1936. Had the -- -
ag president of
lem troubling
, especially in
undantly avail-
negligible con-._
igs bound, for
anian police as
tion. One side
of U.S. Army
e suspected of
ma, continuing
lties posed by
le to resolution
it his tenure as
?ity in the drug
en Dr. Ricardo
y, resigned his
nedical faculty,
Id narcotic im-
igned a certifi-
eans company,
authorized by
ras. The news-
?rvice as dean,
elect group of
t traffic.62
dently wanted
ly "pharmacies
nportations of
Crying to assist
quest from the
to Honduras. --
Be. Without a
Carias govern-
nuggling. The
?,-
Drug Control in-the ArriFfieli-1,1931=1936 91
murder of.Satiche-'ilti Julyr 1935 tegtified to just *how chaotic ffie
narcotic situation had become." ? ? ?
By that time, the Honduran government could no longer afford
to ignore the problems caused by narcotics, yet it had virtually no
prior antinircotie.experience.to rely upon. T.I4eMinister offoreign..
Affairs, Antoni6 Bermudez, tamed to the United States for assist-
ance. He asked the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to send a trained
investigator to Honduras. American authorities turned down the
request. Shortly after the death of Sanchez, federal agents and
New Orleans police had seized a shipment of heroin bound for the
United States through Honduras. Distrust of the government there
by officials in Washington abounded. One agent, Fuller and Anslin-
ger knew, could not compensate for the lack of a systematic anti-
narcotic commitment." The overture from Honduras accomplished
nothing.
What concerned Carias more than drug control was the eco-
nomic revitalizaton of Honduras. In 1929 Honduran exports were
valued at $24.6 million, dropping to $7.4 million in 1938; imports
dropped over the same period from $14.9 million to $9.5 million.
Trade with the United States also plummeted, as seen in the value
of banana exports: from $20.9 million in 1928-29 to $4.2 million in
1937-38. Bananas accounted for more than 80 percent of the na-
tion's total exports; and fully three-quarters of the export trade to
the United States in 1934 consisted of bananas.65 The task for
Carias was to diversify ancr increase the volume of exports.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade agreement
program presented a partial solution to Carias. Negotiations were
begun in mid-1934, and an agreement was signed on December
18, 1935. The agreement did not help to lay a basis for economic
diversification, though. It may even have resulted in the reduction
of customs revenues in Honduras, a liability which Julius Lay
quickly foresaw. Moreover, a total reciprocity agreement might
conceivably threaten banana markets in Great Britain and Ger-
many; it assuredly would harm the import of cotton goods from
Japan, a trade previously dominated by American merchants. As
concluded, the agreement made few concessions to Honduran
economic aspirations." Despite, or perhaps because of increased - ---
dependence upon the United States, the domestic political for-
tunes of Carias improved. If nothing else, Honduras had obtained
a guaranteed export market?not an inconsiderable achievement
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-
?
144:?"r04-00
92 CHAPTER 4
. ? ? .
in depressed economic tithes. However 'minimal' economic pre-
dictability was something the opponents of Carias could not pro-
vide.
In Peru and Bolivia, where domestic antidrug activity directly
affected the international situation, rfew. constructive measures ?
were undert en. This lack of activity proved to be Partidularly.
disappointing to officials in Geneva and Washington. Prior to 1931
each nation had begun to consider drug use as a societal problem;
it was hoped that remedial actions might follow. Peru made a start
in the desired direction. In March 1932 a bill was introduced in
the Constituept,Assembly placing restrictions on cultivation and
use of the coca leaf 67 As before, the issue of the stability of Peru's
economy became closely linked with the question of coca restric-
tion, as did Peruvian tradition. An official in the narcotic office of
the government told William C. Burdett, United States Consul
General at Callao-Lima, that Peru wished to comply with the
regulations of the League ollCafions especially since "the_use?of
coca constitutes one of the-most pernicious habits of-the Indian
populations. The official acknowledged that coca chewing could
not .6e?ftilly- halted, but felt that coca production could be con-
trolled. In course, the international trade in cocaine would surely
decline."
Upon completion of a brief trip through Peru's coca-producing
regions, Burdett reported that coca controls were unlikely. "Amer-
ican engineers operating some of the most important mining enter-
prises in the world in Peruvian highlands," Burdett noted, "have
been unable to report adverse effects from coca upon their men."
He doubted as well whether export laws could successfully restrict...
illicit commerce: "There is, however, no guarantee," Burdett
stated, "of conscientious enforcement of these laws. Enforcement
is vested in the Bureau of Health, which has in recent years been
accused of more corruption than any other section of the Peruvian
government." Five different men headed the bureau between 1930
and 1932, a period when Peru was on the verge of civil strife after
the ouster of Leguia in August 1930.69 Any hope of effective coca
control therefore seemed unrealistic. Ultimately the bill limiting
coca leaf cultivation failed to secure passage; and for the year,1932
Peru produced more than 3.5 million kilograms of coca."
It was not until 1936 that the government made another attempt
to regulate the coca leaf. A planting crisis in Cuzco, a major area
Dru;
for
coc
of I
the
. ? ?
per
. for
Cre
tivf
the-
figh
tion
wer
duo
Coca
prof
Sepi
for s
ing ?
coca
E:
narc?
of lt
Unit '
conti
cont(
non
Unitg
clear
gling
antid
can r
look;
In
two
could
spons
tions.
devisi
! ! '
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CHAPTER 4
? ? . ?
)nomic. pre-
ald not pro-
vity directly
re'? measures:. ;
pariicalarly
?rior to 1931
tal problem;
made a start
itroduced in
ltivation and
lity of Peru's
coca restric-
:otic office of
tates Consul
ply with the
e "the use of
the Indian
iewing could
mild be con-
would surely
ca-producing
ikely. "Amer-
ruining enter-
noted, "have
ri their men."
.sfully restrict
ee," Burdett
Enforcement
at years been
the Peruvian
Detween 1930
vil strife after
effective coca
3 bill limiting
the year 1932
OCa.70
ather attempt
a major area
Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936 93
for production, kibstintially diminished die revenue derived from
coca sales. Moreover, a malaria epidemic drastically cut the'supply
of Indian labor. These occurrences induced officials to reconsider
the role of the coca leaf in Peru.71 No action was taken then,
perhaps because of the international narcotic conference scheduled
for June in Geneva. During these smile years the newspaper La
Cronic,a was calling for a more vigorous policy. The lack of substan-
tive aCtion led the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau to remark that
the government of Peru did not seem disposed to waging .a serious
fight against drug problemS.72 _
Like Peru, Bolivia failed-in the early 1930s to limit coca produc-
tion. Nearly two million kilos were grown in 1932, most of which
were consumed domestically. International pressure to restrict pro-
duction brought a response from a landowners' association in the
coca-rich Yungas region." Illustrating further Bolivia's rejection of
proposed coca controls; President Daniel Salamanca rescinded in
September 1933 a tariff on Peruvian coca in transit through Bolivia
for shipment abroad. Bolivian laborers, .employed in Chilean mj-
ing thejob, Controls on
coca would not soon come to Bolivia."
Except in Uruguay and to a lesser extent Mexico, the record of
narcotic control in Latin America between the Geneva conferences
of 1931 and 1936 was not an encouraging one to officials in the
United States and at the League of Nations. Patterns of usage
continued, tied as they often were to historical traditions and
contemporary developments; and smuggling became a phenome-
non more widespread than ever before in the hemisphere. The
United States suffered most from this situation. By 1936 it was
clear to officials in Washington that they could not eliminate smug-
gling by their own endeavors. Moreover, the perceived emerging
antidrug commitment of the late 1920s in important Latin Ameri-
can nations proved largely illusory. The only alternative place to
look for assistance was Geneva.
IJ.LWjng-to-re.strict,illicit traffic,_international authorities ,had
two means available not regularized by earlier conventions. They
could either atteinpf-IO Control' sources of supply or they75131a
?
a
sponsor move lo increase domestic penalties_for -druglaw,viola-
lions. The OAC decided to concentrate on the second tactic. After
eleVisinea draft conv-eritioif, the-Ciiinmittee Called' a corm- atconfer-
r ? i
? T.
STAT
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_
I ?
t ?
-CHAPTER-4? Drug Control hi thi A)
encejor June. 1936. -Although originally unenthusiastic about .the
proposal, the United States sought additional information about
the scope of the conference. The Department of State hoped to
broaden. the agenda. "The American Government considers it im-
?portant" a department communiqu?tated "that thA_Conference
. co. n-sider'pre'Verition.. and 'punishrrient Of illicit cultivation, gather-
m?g, and production of the poppy, coca, and cannabis.,-75 The
1.111--ue ap?p-edred-ttieTiciiura-ge Washington's plans. "Any delega-
tion at the conference may propose any matter," declared Eric
Einar Ekstrand, director of the Opium Traffia and Social Questions --
Section. The draft convention; Ekstrand suggested, merely offered
a basis for discussion. The State Department accordingly made
preparations for formal participation at the conference.76
Before the first session was held it became apparent that the
attempt to enlarge the scope of the conference agenda would
encounter opposition. Peru objected to further restrictions on coca
leaves?evidently havinTdecklednotto.reconsider the role-of.coca -
...!2ae.V. Enrique Trujillo Bravo was instructed to reverse the
position Peru had taken on the 1931 convention. He was to amend
Peru's acceptance of the convention with reservations similar to
those of Bolivia. He also hoped to obtain a quota for manufactured
cocaine.77 Dr. Carlos Enrique Paz Solari, Vice-Director of the
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, suggested the change in Peru's
position. In a pamphlet issued under the auspices of Peru's Socie-
dad Nacional Agraria, Paz Soldan wrote that exports of coca leaves
and raw cocaine had fallen dramatically sincethemid-tw-entiqs. As
result,much of the current cocasrop was being consumed dst
? mestically. If Peru were to restrict coca production, afieconomic
cnsis would occur. To placate those favoring restrictions, Paz of-
Iiaseveral options. Peru might attempt to regulate production
through the creation of a state monopoly. He suggested, too, that
Peru erect its own facility to manufacture cocaine. Paz envisioned
as well the establishment of a national_institute_to,study the impact
of coca on Indians, a proposal commensurate with the desires of
The indigeniltas. Finally, he advocated a program to educate the
masses about the possible dangers of coca usage.78
- Over half the American republics sent delegations to the confer- -
ence along with Peru. These included Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecua-
dor, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. For
Ward, a legal ad
tatives." The a
of the draft coni
ishment.. The .f
would reduce i
ment. Although
fenders, he did
asked other nat
_ _
purposes the na
tion relates." In
ation would mail
the United Stat
cultivation rest?'
suppression of t
In reply Port
posal fundamer
should not be cl
be introduced
further wished
activities in con'
nabis." The bul
belief that the d-1
international ag
noting, as we 1141
tevideo in 1933
hensive drug cc
Portugal rem'
proposal from
sented a seriow
amendment we
pared to refrain
Department of
action a decade]
delegation."
Ultimately a ci
and Portugal di
conference fina
"cultivation rest
-44
-
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^
a+,
CHAPTER 4
? ? - ? ?
c about the
ation about
e hoped to --
iders it im-
COnferenCc
on, gather-
bis."75 The
ny delega-
dared Eric
I Question
rely offered
ingly made
76
nt that the
!nda would
ons on coca
role of coca
reverse the
as to amend
S similar to
anufactured
!ctor of the
e in Peru's
eru's Socie-
coca leaves
wenties. As
Burned do-
n economic.-- -
Ins, Paz of-
production
d, too, that
envisioned
the impact
desires of
ducate the
the confer-
Uba, Ecua-
tguay, and
?
'
Drug COntrol in the Americas, 1931-1936
? 1 '
? !?
Venezuela. For the United States, Fuller, Anslinger, and Frank S.
Ward, a legal adviser in the State Department, served as represcn-
tatives.78 The conference .begar.i- with discussion of the first article'
of the ()raft .convention, which -.enumerated offense meriting pun-
ishment. The framers hoped that the threat of severe penalties
would reduce illidirtraffie:?Arolic-e Fuller proposed an amend-
Although in agreemeiiriiii_tliftfie_ .rieved' to punish,d_rtjg_of:
fe'ndersrhe-did-not-think-theliffe-nses should be listed. Instead he
to medical and scientific
pl'imrcerth=rcotittiriiliZnqf substances to which this
tionrelatet"In'turn;-Ward explaih.ed that the absence of enumer-
ifiould malce clearer the purpose of the conference. In short,
the United Slates-delegation -had-subtly-asked..for..a.prograin,,of
cultivation restriction in ,order to control the usage .of 41 drugs;
supTh7r---essi3r?i of The illicit rride was nOT In reply reply Portugal and Great Britain claimed that Fuller's pro-
posal fundamentally altered the purpose of the conference and
should not be Considered. Fuller rejoined that any subject could
be introduced as Ekstrand had stated, and noted that his delegation
further wished to discuss "prevention and punishment" of illicit
activities in connection with opium poppies, coca leaves, and can-
nabis.80 The burden of Fuller's argument reflected his country's
belief that the draft convention added little of substance to previous
international agreements. Uruguay supported the United States,
noting, as we have seen, that the inter-American meeting at Mon-
tevideo in 1933 passed a resolution recommending more compre-
hensive drug controls than those then in existence.81
95
_
PoriUgal remained adamant and sought to eliminate Fuller's
proposal from additional consideration. This turn of events pre-
sented a serious problem for the United States delegation. If the
amendment were not considered, Fuller and Anslinger were pre-
pared to refrain from further participation at the conference.82 The
Department of State, mindful of the difficulties caused by such
action a decade earlier, advised against any rash action by the
delegation." _
Ultimately a committee was appointed to study Fuller's proposal
and Portugal dropped its challenge to the amendment. The full
conference finally settled the matter bo place the
"cultivation restriction" proposal into the Final Act as a iesCcima4i-
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_ .
? , ,!,
"
Drug -Control-int]
? dation rather than in the text of the convention. After this step was
talceri the United .States delegation confined itself during the re-
mainder of the conference to occasional observations. At one point,
for example, when discussing whether to use the words "if willfully
committed", in the article advocating punishment for drug law
offenses, Anslinger made unmistakably clear the position. of his .?
government. concerning .such violations. "The work of narcotic au. - ?
.thorities would be radically handicapped," he stated, "if, wten
prosecuting for illegal possession, for instance, or for illicit sale,
they were obliged to prove willful commission." " Mere possession ??
of proscribed substances served as presumptive evidence of law ---
vidlation; it was that approach which the State Department and
Federal Bureau of Nakotics wanted other nations to adopt.
The final convention did not reflect the American sentiment.
Rather it resembled the preconference draft. In a cable to Wash-
ington, Fuller ,and Anslinger charged that countries with minimal
narcotic problems controlled the formulation of the convention.
Additionally, opium monopoly countries had been especially un-
cooperative since they feared revenues would fall if any restrictions
were accepted on opium beyond those already in existence. "It has
become evident," the two concluded, "that most European nations
are not prepared to sign any convention which would provide for a
really effective system [of control]." On June 26, twenty nations
excluding the United States signed the convention. Fuller termed
it "a retrograde step" for his country and found its provisions
inadequate.85 Other American republics signed the pact, including
Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Honduras and Peru were not present at the final session."
Years later Anslinger further explained the decision not to sign
the 1936 convention_He noted that it applied only to trade in and
distribution of manufactured narcotics. Such narrowly defined pro-
visions meant that it "would afford no Constitutional basis of Fed-
eral control of the production of cannabis . . . and the opium
poppy." As we shall see presently, control of marijuana was becom-
ing a matter of increasing concern to the bureau. And even though
no opium poppies were grown in the United States, the commis-
sioner's point was clear: "Provisions of the Convention would
weaken rather than strengthen the effectiveness of the efforts of
the Americal
ses."87 Indee
American 4:,o
the United
the conventi
patterns of I
? ? ? ? ? ? ? - ?
? ???--.. ? ? ? ?
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4-q-4,444;-'7
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. Control Across the Border .
- 4,
United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy between 1936 and
1940 offers the most demonstrable example of the impact of Wash-
ington's antidrug policies on relations with other countries. In the
early 1930s the governments in Mexico City and Washington, D.C.
concluded two agreements providing for the exchange of informa-
tion about drug traffic across their common border. By the middle
of 1936, Treasury Department agents had undertaken operations
in Mexico to gather additional information about smuggling activi-
ties. Although occurring on a limited basis, these operations took
place without the concurrence of the administration of President
Lizaro Cardenas.' The increasing strain in relations between the
two countries over petroleum, commercial policy, and other mat-
ters in the late thirties gave a greater importance to common
antidrug efforts than they might have otherwise enjoyed. From
1936 to 1940 United States drug diplomacy threatened to exacer?
bate the sensitive state of affairs existing with Mexico and accord-
ingly brought into question the reciprocal nature of the Good
Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration.2
In November 1936 Ambassador Josephus Daniels, acting as he
sometimes did to lessen tension between the two countries, ques-
tioned the secrecy surrounding the presence of the Treasury agents
in Mexico. In particular Daniels objected to the appearance in the
Mexico City region of Alvin F. Scharff, the assistant supervising
customs agent at San Antonio, Texas. The ambassador doubted that
119
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CHAPTER 6 ? -
? Control Acro
the presence of agents .in Mexico without the knowledge of the
government there served any useful purpose and might offend the
Mexicans.3
The activities of the agents may have shown that United States
? officials were dissatisfied with the way Mexico was carrying out the
? . . ? . r
:agreenients cif 1930 and 102.4 The Meiicadgo.Verninent, though',
felt differently about the accords,. On October 16, the Weekly News
Sheet, published by the publicity department in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, lauded the joint antinarcotic efforts of the two
nations, and especially rioted the reduction of smuggling through
the Port of Mazatl?6 (It should be noted that Daniels failed to
verify the accuracy of the report during a discussion with Jos?
Siurob, chief of the Department of Public Health.6)
Mexico seemed desirous of improving and expanding even fur-
ther its activity against narcotics. In January 1937 Luis G. Franco,
chief of the Alcohol and Narcotic Service of the Public Health
Department, told Daniels that he wanted to meet with United
States customs agents at a border city in order to alter the earlier
agreements so that Mexican agents, if need be, could cross the
border into the United States.? Narcotic authorities in Washington
rejected the proposal, just as they had turned down a similar
request some years before.8 Border crossings by agents, it seemed,
would remain a one-way proposition.
Although the Mexican officials failed to secureapproval from the
United States for border crossings, they took other steps to in-
crease antidrug activity. Franco and Siurob favored strengthening
sections of the national penal code dealing with illegal narcotics.
Such a legislative process would take many months to complete,
yet the situation demanded immediate attention. "Mexico is not
only an important producer of drugs," the newspaper El Universal
observed on February 25, "but .' . . also the chief distributing
center for this continent." The Public Health Department quickly
expanded the scope of its activities beyond simply a legislative
response to drug problems. A centralized narcotics administration
was planned and set up under Siurob's direction. Broadly defined,
the National Auxiliary Committee's responsibilities consisted of
devising ways to eliminate illegal narcotic traffic in Mexico.8
after operations began in April 1937, El Universal reported that
the committee was considering the creation of a national narcotic
monopoly.1?
?11=fOrts under Siurob's direction elicited a generally favor-
?
L
? 1
able resr
view sooi
unable to
related p:
been .mei
that. the:
since lg.:
abuse.12
Availak
having. lit
comment
constituti
were esp(
aboundec
committe
de la Gar,
either th(
He argue
the antid:
tion. The
Franco II
governnu
cornmitm
While :
gram, Ur
Marihuan
interestec
missioner
ari jurailk-
In fact, A
vation of
marijuana.
Whether
any more
Tello, the
that mad;
elements
? inarijuana
are comm
The numl
Whatex
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CHAPTER-6
wledge of, the
ght offend the
United States
Lrrying out the
ment, though,
Weekly News
le Ministry of
-ts of the two
;gling through
Lniels failed to
;ion with Jos?
ding even fur-
uis G. Franco,
Public Health
t with United
[ter the earlier
could cross the
in Washington
own a similar
nts, it seemed,
woval from the
m- steps to in-
strengthening
egal narcotics.
s to complete,
'Mexico is not
El Universal
ef distributing
rtment quickly
!y a legislative
administration
-oadly defined,
consisted of
Mexico.9 Soon
reported that
itional narcotic
;enerally favor-
-
Control Across the Border 121
able response .from United States personnel in Mexico." Their
view soon changed, however. In at least .two instances Daniels was
unable to substantiate Mexican claims of succes injiandlingstrug-
related prob ems. The matter of smuggling at Mazatl?has already
been mentioned. He also could not verify a government assertion
that The incidence of addiction in. Meiico had fallen- dramatically
since 1935. In fact, a story in Excelsior reported a rise in drug
abuse."
Available evidence suggests that Mexico's antidrug activity was
having little discernible effect upon domestic conditions. Excelsior
commented that for the campaign to be successful both the federal
constitution and penal code would require amending. Changes
were especially necessary in the nation's prisons, where drug usage
abounded." Not everyone agreed that the newly formed national
committee was the proper agency to handle the situation. Angel
de la Garza Brito, who headed the rural hygiene program, felt that
either the Treasury or Interior Department should be in charge.
He argued that as long as the Public Health Department controlled
the antidrug effort, political rivalry would supersede effective ac-
tion. The accuracy of this allegation seems doubtful. During 1937
Franco had achieved a cooperative relationship among various
government bureaus, and thus strengthened Mexico's antinarcotic
commitment and effort."
While Mexico was endeavoring to improve its drug control pro-
gram, United States officials were advocating passage of the 1937
Marihuana Tax Act. The Bureau of Narcotics therefore became
interested in Mexico's marijuana policy. Through_Daniels?,Com,?
missioner Anslinger learned_that.Me?cico restricted the.growing of
iffjuana, or hemp, for rope fiber without proper authorization,
In?faet, Article 202 of the Mexican Health Code forbade the culti-
vation of Indian hemp. Other provisions of the code outlawed
marijuana possession, sale, use, and any form of commerce."
Whether the restrictions were effective cannot be determined with
any more precision for Mexico than for the United States. Manuel
Tello, the Mexican representative to the OAC in Geneva, claimed
that marijuana smoking took place primarily among the criminal
elements in his country. Excelsior saw no reason to minimize
marijuana's suspected dangers: -Many of the crimes of blood. . .
are committed under the pathological influence of marihuana. . .
The number is beyond count:17
Whatever the extent of cannabis usage or the effectiveness of
is
1
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122 CHAPTER 6
drug conteo? I, an administrative change in February 1938 inter-
rupted the work of the Public Health Department. Siurob resigned
as department chief to become governor of the Federal District of
Mexico City, and Franco left the Federal Narcotics Service. for a
position with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.18 These changes'
ended the first phase of United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy
between 1936 and 1940. While Mexico's attempts to enhance its
antidrug activity had not yet produced noticeable results, a process:
NiFitirderwayViiria presaged the government's being more criti-
?fdnrgabiIse. Just as promising from the United States point of
Wqis Mexico's desire to work more closely with Washington to
halt the northward flow of illegal substances. To that end, Siurob
and Franco had met in 1937 with H. S. Creighton, supervising
customs agent at San Antonio, to discuss coordinating their coun-
tries' antidrug efforts along the border.18 But by the time the
Mexicans had left office, no formal plans had been agreed upon.
Leonidas Andreu Almazin succeeded Siurob at the Public
Health Department, and Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra took Franco's
place at the Federal Narcotics Service. Salazar had earned a good
reputation in Mexico as a result of his work with addicts in the
national mental health hospita1.2? Shortly after taking office, he
met with customs agent Creighton. Mexico, he stated, could only
reduce the flow of illegal drugs through government controlled
distribution, with the aid of an expanded antidrug educational
campaign, and through the construction of more hospitals to treat
addiction. Salazar did not underestimate the difficulty of the task.
"It is impossible to break up the traffic in drugs," he told Creigh-
to?n,_13-ecause of the corruption of the police and special agents and
-d-s-o because of the wealth and political influence of some of the
traffick-ers.:21 During the meeting Salazar mentioned that he did
eiMsider it his duty to act as a policeman in supervising drug
control activity.22 In so doing, he implicitly warned that his policy
on control would probably not parallel that of the United States to
the same extent as his predecessors'.
Despite the obstacles he envisioned impeding effective drug
control, Salazar seems to have favored the continuation of cooper-
ation with the United States. He requested the assistance of cus-
?
Control Across
toms agen
the states
burning of
Such col
antidrug -c
fore Salazr
Thomas H
were corn:
attitude tc
unspecifiet
from his
minimize
program fc
ington's. (I
States offic
nonmedica
Before t
produced f
the federal
ment the
and to crea
the faciliti(
included a
for the sal(
In reacti
ment, wrot
particular')
tions no lit
from the st
clinics nea
eluded that
inevitably :
put it, bon
on the Arm
sum, ambu
hands of ad
ington belii
commerce
trade."
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-? At!:
-
.,,CHAPTER.?
try 1938 inter- `''.1--TC- ?
iiurob resigned
leral District of ItZt :
:s Service for a
These changes, ? -.1i*t*
otic diplomacy - . -
to enhance its
!sults, a.process
eing more criti-
1 States point of.
Washington to
le end, Siurob
pn, supervising
ting their coun-
y the time the
t agreed upon.
, at the Public
ra took Franco's
3 earned a good
addicts in the
aking office, he
ated, could only
ment controlled
rug educational
tospitals to treat
:ulty of the task.
he told Creigh-
tecial agents and
of some of the
med that he did
;upervising drug
:d that his policy
United States to
g effective drug
iation of cooper- 'rr"
tssistance of cus-
,
. .
Control Across the Border'
'", ? - . I
"
? '--------
?
t
101 ?
6-,41F1
tr1:7-Vld
t4,0,
\`4,1
+--
?1. .;:. 4. 'r-ti ? ?" ?
123 ?
toms agents in the destruction of opium poppy fields growing in
the states of SonOra and Sinaloa. An-agent from Texas observed the
burning of a number of fields in Apri1.23
Such cooperative activity failed to prevent doubts about Salazar's
tidiui-C-om-m- Ifitin arising-within the United States. Be-
fore Salazar had completed two months :in office,.Creighton and
Thomas H. Lockett, a corhniercial attach?erving in Mexico City,
were complaining to Jos?Siurob about the narcotic chiefs lax
attitude toward, drug control. The charges .against Salazar were
unspecified, buttheyeason_for the criticism. must have stemmed
from his approach to drug law enforcement." Were Salazar to
minimiie the punitive 'aspect of his antidrug activity, Mexico's
program for control would become 'markedly different from Wash-
ington's. (During deliberations over the Marihuana Tax Act, United
States officials reiterated their belief in punitive treatment for the
nonmedical and nonscientific use of drugs.25)
Before the end of 1938 Salazar began to chart a course that
produced further displeasure in Washington. Proposed revisions in
the federal toxicomania regulations gave the Public Health Depart-
ment the authority to establish methods of treatment for addicts
and to create hospitals or dispensaries for their care. Entrance into
the facilities would be voluntary. Most important, the regulations,
included aproposal calling .for-the7fori-Mion. of.a,state.monopoly
for tlr"-e sale of.drugs,26
In reaction, R. Walton Moore, counselor of the? State Depart-
ment, wrote Daniels that the contemplated change in regulations,
particularly the provision for drug sale by the government, "occa-
sions no little concern to authorities in the United States." Judging
fromthe. short-lived and disappointing experience with dispensing
clinics nearly two -rileca-des earlier, officials in Washington con-
cluded that implementation of the new Mexican regulations would
inevitably lea to an increase .in .the_illicit_drug trade=g. oore
put it, liOrderdi;f3r?sation..would "nullify the efforts being made
on the American,side_to,suppress,the,abuse,oLnarcotic drugs." In
sum, ambulatory treatment of addiction, by_placing-drugsrin.the
hands of addicts, would create the very situationj:ifficials.in_Wash-
ing?Gib-elievedJed,toillicit.druglraffic:-Only strict supervision of - --
?mercei? drugs andconfinement of addicts could eliminate the -
trade."
PO. t'Att
-
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. . ?
124
CHAPTER 6
? The disquiet Salazar was creating in the minds of United, States ,
officials increased further with the appearance of his article, "El
Mito de la Marijuana." The fourteen-year study detailed wide-
? spread marijuana smoking by Mexico's lower classes, yet Salazar
had not Uncovered evidence,of.'psychOies:fesufting.frorin.1
canna'birr?. ny deleterious effects, he argued, were psychologically_
saMe-d.,"7-le ilaimed that marijuana?usage distagt_provoke
criminal iid.ses and in fact created fewer social problems than
abuse. Salazar's doubts about the harmfulness ofmarijuarra --
stood in sharp contEast to the position ,taken,by_the_Bur,eau_of.,
diSCrig.SiOris-,Ortlie. 1937 Marihuana-Tax-Act:29
of appeared at once. A derogatory
editorial was published by El Universal on October 22. Two days
later the paper printed,an_article_by_IvlanueLGuevara.Oropesa,
hrthe Mexican Association ofieurology..,?and_Psychiatry,
,44.1._itiris Salazar's conclusions. Next, Excelsior reported that many
officials in the Public Health Department also disagreed with the
contentions in Salazar's article. For the United States, Consul
General James Stewart suggested that ridicule would provide the
best means of combatting "the dangerous theories of Dr. Salazar
Viniegra." And Bureau of Narcotics chief Anslinger reiterated his
agency's unequivocal opposition to marijuana by referring to it as
"the deadly drug."29 When the article appeared in the December
issue of Criminalia, the editors felt compelled to print as a coun-
terbalance to Salazar's piece an antimarijuana study completed in
1931. The view of marijuana presented in that article approximated
the position of the Bureau of Narcotics.3?
Salazar _supported-by-other-research on.marijuana_in?Mexico 31 -
sought to refute his critics. The proposed alterations in the federal
regulations, he explained, stemmed from the generally inefficient
and often selective enforcement of prior antinarcotic laws in Mex-
ico. Salazar it seems, did not question the propriety of antidrug
.0,....1.101/1?0????(????????,..J. '..00.0.0?00000..A0...00.....00.0........
a_ctivity, but differed witkother officials in his,ucountry,?ancl,the?
States over the best way of fighting drug proklemis. He
descrilied all existing international agreements on narcotics, such
as the 1931 Geneva Convention, as "practically without effect."
? Illegal drug traffic was "surreptitiously tolerated, if not encouraged?
13-651-ri-anriF,Courtries ,.which have agreed, to suppress it", Thus
Mexico, to reduce smuggling and control the domestic drug situa-
Control Acr.
wc:
control,
Mexir;
probleir.
of late
He .felt
from thi
governni
addictio.
addict a.
The
change
ran comi
develop'
the Uni
express
tively Si
Anslingo
prevent!
cerned
Ansling,i
fight ag;
Such
United
availab11.
the incii,
eating t'
from a Ai
ington,
addicts
represe.
States.
the gov
punitiw
United
propose
Not c.
had Ma
Meeting,
?
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k?? ? ? ?./.'
CHAPTER -6-
Control Across the Border
125
or United States. .
f his article, "El
y detailed wide-
sses, -yet Sa
g from thp,use of .
e Psychologically
did not provoke
11 problems than
ness of marijuana
y the Bureau of
ma Tax Act."
ce. A derogatory
ber 22. Two days
uevara Oropesa,
and Psychiatry,
ported that many
sagreed with the
I States, Consul
?ould provide the
es of Dr. Salazar
;er reiterated his
referring to it as
in the December
print as a coun-
tdy. completed in
de approximated
Lana in Mexico,31
ons in the federal
ierally inefficient
otic laws in Mex-
dety of antidrug
i.country and the
ig problems. He
n narcotics, such
without effect."
fnot encouraged; ---'-
ippress it." Thus
nestic drug situa-
? ? ? ? ?
tion; . would Tit With a' relatiVely miteSted ,measuie for ?
control, the narcotic monopoly.
Mexico'rence-fienevineo eediSirazar that the solution to drug
prar?ems ridriot rest with the,jailing_oladdicts or-the expenditure
-
"of rarde-siim?s from the national Ireasumto,track elusiversm_ ng1.90:.
re-felt that _nite tes antidrug efforts,. foceiarnp,_.....le, suffered
- ?
frOin this eily -pUnitive and costly approach Salazar wanted
governments to "alter their traditional perceptions of addicts and
addiction. This meant re '
vising he_declared, "the concept of the
-
addict as a blair-WNWthy, antisocial individual."32 .
?T-Ilre?United States was not pm:eared to make such a fundamental
change rug ,. con trol?philp s op Indeed,??STlazar 's position
ran counter to Washington's foreign and domestic drug policies as
developed during the previous twenty-five years. In the view of
the United States, drugs were not to be dispensed for other than
express medical and scientific needs. By adhering to this decep-
tively simple formula every nation would insure cooperation, in
Anslinger's words, with "other nations in the common effort to
prevent the abuse of narcotic drugs." As the country most con-
cerned with effective drug control, the United States had the duty,
Anslinger felt, to supervise the vigilance of other countries in the
fight against narcotics.33
Such a self-appointed task would seem to suggest success by the
United States in its own struggle with drugs. Salazar held that
available information offered an opposite conclusion. Arguing that
the incidence of recidivism remained high, he cited statistics iildi-
catin the three-fourthswitharawal-a7G7M7 of_the,patients
om a voluntary program at the federal narcotics hospital in Lex- .
ington, Kentucky. He also estimated that the thirteen hunerZ
Zeals ii---Ti-e-rned as prisoners at Lexington for drug law violations
represented barely 1 percent of the addict population in the United
States. The remainder, he felt, had been virtually abandoned by
the government to illegal drug merchants, the result of overly
punitive narcotic policies.34 By attacking the antidrug efforts of the
United States, Salazar hoped to dissipate criticism of his own
proposed regulatory changes.
Not content merely with a defense of his plans- at home, Salaiar-.
had Manuel Tello elaborate upon the proposals at the May 1939
meeting of the Opium Advisory Committee meeting in Geneva.
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ILLEGIB ?
126 CHAPTER 6
Tello, afterpromisitig the cOntin'uation orMeXico's antidg effort,
, ? ? -
reiterated Salazar's statement that addicts would Only be able to
acquire drugs from official dispensaries or state-licensed _phyli-
'dans. The priricipal reactions to Tello's remarks came from dubious
Unlied States and Canadian representatives who condemned drug - ?
a
dispensation schemes and advocated stricter supervision by Mexico
of intercourse in narcotics. For the United States, Stuart J. Fuller
asked Mexico to postpone for one year promulgation of the contro-
versial regulations. 'tarry Anslinger, also in attendance, minced no _
?
'words reminding Tello that cr---'rug aadicts "wsre_ criminals_first_ane1_,
addicts afterwards:" He doubted as well whether Mexico's pro-
posed action would be acceptable under the 1931 Geneva Conven-
tion. Tello responded by reading a letter from Salazar defending
the changes, but promised nonetheless to convey to his govern-
ment Fuller's request for a delay in their promulgation.35
The pressure put upon Salazar by foreign and domestic critics to
alter the nature of his antidrug activity so that it would conform
more closely to that of the United States led to his departure from
the Public Health Department in August 1939. He was replaced
by Heberto Alcazar, public health director of the Federal District.
Also, Jos?iurob returned to his former position as head of the
Public Health Department, taking the place ofAlmazan, who while
in office played a subordinate role to Salazar.36
Consul General Stewart applauded the change in personnel,
noting that the "weakness and indifference" ofAlmazin had allowed
Salazar "to advance his wild theories regarding narcotics and nar-
cotic addicts." A representative of the Rockefeller Foundation in
Mexico, Charles A. Bailey, told Stewart that Alcazar was "a man
who will do just what he is told and will follow the policy which
Dr. Siurob will outline."37 With Salazar's departure another phase
of United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy came to a close.
Domestic disputes over his policies and contention with the United
States over proposed drug law enforcement changes marked Sala-
zar's eighteen months in office. His critics never tried to assess
dispassionately the plans he hoped would improve antinarcotic
activity in Mexico. As a result, he spent considerable time defend-
ing him-self rather than putting his ideas- into operation.38 That a
national narcotic monopoly would provoke controversy in the 1930s
is undeniable; but that it contravened the 1931 Geneva Convention
seems less certain, despite the assertions of United States officials
- to the contrary. Whether a monopoly would have successfully
? "'-?
-
Contrc
restz
issue
of
Dan
had
lacici
the 1
that
to tt
H.
Slur(
Ti
more
the :
Offic
user:
Addi
dapti
strait
myst
."defil
prais,
strug
prom
their
Sit
addic
Drug
gling
depat
regul
cony(
virtm
Siu
adver
antint
desirk
repre;
?
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?
(??v? '01
-?; t"fx," ? t ?
.:";;?,%
- ?CHAPTER-6
-
?
?
's antidrug effort, ?1-..;:'.; ?
3 Only be able to -
e-licensed physi-
ame from dubious 12'7'
condemned drug ."
rvisionby Mexico
s, Stuart J. Fuller/.,'
tion of the contro;
dance, minced no
?
riminals first and --
ler Mexico's pro-?.
. Geneva Conven-
Salazar defending
ey to his govern-
ilgation.38
lomestic critics to
it would conform
is departure from
He was replaced
Federal District.
on as head of the
mazan, who while
ige in personnel,
nazdn had allowed
narcotics and nar-
ler Foundation in
,cazar was "a man
the-policy-which
ure another phase
came to a close.
)n with the United
ages 'marked Sala-
er tried to assess
wove antinarcotic
able time defend-
peration.38 That a
iversy in the 1930s
eneva Convention ??tk,:?.
ted States officials
have -successfully -.-
;
Colitiolltcross-the
?
127
- - ? ? - - restricte'd illicit drug activit-On Mexico at that time temaint a moot'
? issue.
A
The return to.offide of Jose Siurob, seemed to.promise A rebirth
of 'Mexican-United States antinarcotic endeavors. Ambassador
Daniels commented that under Siurob's earlier tenure relations
had been cordial, but under Almazan "the spirit of cooperation was
lacking:" Siurob'asked fora copy of the drug control regulations of
. _
the'United States Public Health Service, and intimated to Daniels
that he would like to establish in Mexico 'a control system similar
to that found in the southern United States. Frequent talks with
H. S. Creighton about drug law enforcement likely influenced
Siurob's thinking on narcotic contro1.39
The American impact upon Siurob's antinarcotic beliefs became
more evident in November in Mexico at the annual convention of
the Pacific Coast International Association of Law Enforcement
Officials. In an address to the gathering, Siurob depicted drug
users in terms similar to those employed by United States officials.
4ddicts were individuals onstitutionally or educationally una-
thpted to TErstr777?gle_for life;_t1?=less.not?satisfied_with,A
straightand.noble,modeg,living,.......rthemeak,minds seducecijm
m sterious pleasures." Drug-usage.demonstrated
"deficiencies_of will.power." In, concluding.rhisjemarks, Siurob
praised the_leading roIe .of.the -United -States,.-in-its-eontinuing
struggleyith drugs.t? His words suggested that he was intent upon
promoting closer ties between Mexico City and Washington in
their antidrug activities.
.
Siurob's address, although showing a firm commitment against
addiction, belied the nature of the policy he would seek to enforce.
Drug problems in Mexico ranging from individual usage to smug-
gling were producing much concern among officials in the health
department. In an attempt to combat the situation, new drug
regulations had been promulgated on October 23 prior to the
convention of law officials, but surprisingly, these statutes were
virtually the same as those put forth by Salazar Viniegra.41
--Siurob hoped that the policy would not elicit-all- -
adverse reaction from Washington. He felt that cooperation in
antinarcotic work between the two governments remained not only
desirable, but possible. He continued to apprise United States
representatives of progress in the campaigns against opium and
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,01.1
,74st
?40,:
_
??
4,1?11
?
tit
!PI:4 11
f.j
128. ?
CHAPTER 6 1 Control Across the B
? 4- - 4 ? . .? ? , \ --??? .
.. - ?
nianjuana." Siurob then announced that.he would attend a public' -
health directors' conference scheduled for Washington in May
? 1940. He also asked Commissioner Anslinger to visit Mexico to
discuss the training of narcotic agents in order. to deal more effec-
tively with smuggling." ? ..: ?,?-? ?-- ? ? ..: '. '' ? ....-- : . ?
? .
i The Department of State favored a trip by Anslinger since a
..4
meeting "should result in a better understanding on the part of
competent Mexican authorities of the aims and policies . . . being
- pursued by the United States."- Daniels thought that March would
be a good time for Anglinger's visit since it was shortly before the .._,..
start of the public health caiference in Washington." On February
17, 1940, however, the trip and, more important, the
Mexican-United States antidrug effort Siurob desired were seri-
ously jeopardized. The new statutes creating a national drug mo-
and providing addicts withincrease ,access,to,narcotics_had
finally taken_effectA '
Anslinger at once informed the State Department that he would
embargo all shipments of medicinal drugs to Mexico. A 1935
amendment to the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922
authorized such action by the commissioner. Under the law-da:ugs,
icould only be exported to countries for explicitmedic.al,and scien-
tifis_mmoses. This stipulation _did_.not ,include.the -ambulatory
treatmentfor addiction ..which,Mexico,..was, about-Ao.,undertake."
?
State Department officials had received advance information
that the regulations would become law. To have taken no position
on them would have constituted tacit acknowledgment that they
were acceptable. Authorities in Washington's drug policy hierarchy
could not allow this unless they intended to reexamine their own
restrictive and punitive methods of control. No top-level official
was prepared to do that.
? To explicate his government's position on the Mexican regula-
tions, Stuart Fuller prepared a lengthy memorandum. Mexico
could call drug dispensation by physicians "medical use," he stated,
but the United States found such a definition inconsistent with the
meaning of the term defined in various international antinarcotic
agreements. For instance, Fuller believed that the Permanent
Central Opium Board in Geneva would regard drug dispensation
through a national monopoly as a violation of the 1931 convention.
No major country except Mexico was trying to handle its drug
problem with a state monopoly. "The plan envisaged by the pro-
t?
posed legislati.
followed in all
tional narcotics
isew' orthy,"te .
.? for the purpOsi
by the COmmi
distribution foi
Anslinger's
cided with the
settled interna
issue export pe
travening the
embargo with
But because ol
ernment migh
ments were iss
actions."
Mexico mile
occurred. In fi
ences with th(
discuss ways c
nieans conside
officials to act
conversations ?
health chief m
prepared to su
most objection
suppression of
by licensed dc
the formation
problems. Siui
lar desire to SE
-"ions with Day
.?
commitment
said, was to re
unprofitable. _5'
Daniels four
ambassador th1
ciation of Me)
medicinal expe
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7
CHAPTER 6 ?-?
. ? ? : ,..c.1.72.:,,-tfx ? .
lattend a public ;
ngton in May..
iisit Mexico to
eal more effec- '
,
slinger'ince a
on the part of
Icies . . being
Maroh would
?rtly before the
44 On February
iportant, the
tired were seri-
honal drug mo-
to narcotics had
it that he would
4exico. A 1935
port Act of 1922
m- the law drugs
!dical and scien-
the ambulatory
:o undertake."
ace information
&eta no position
;ment that they
policy hierarchy
tmine their own
top-level official
Mexican regula-
andum. Mexico
I use," he stated,
isistent with the
mal antinarcotic
the Permanent-
ug dispensation
931 convention. ."
handle its drug
ged by -the pro-,
4"1
'
? "'M..
??'.4.(r
? 1r;.
4f.
1_
Control Across the Border
?
? posed legislaiion," Fuller wrote,- '`differs coMpletely irorn' those
?
. ? ? ? ?
?? ? ?
followed in all countries in the world which are parties to interna-
tional narcotics conventions." Even if.Mexican,actions were "pra;,.,
sewQihy,he.contmued,supplying addicts with narcotics "merely, ?
for the purpose of satisfying their cravings cou1drnotbe.regarded..
WCommissioner of.Narcotics?as otherwige than constituting
'aistribution for abusive use. : . "4, 7
. -------Anslr?nger's embargo on medicinal drug exports therefore coin-
cided - with the State Department's view, in Fuller's .words, "of
settled international policy." In sum,- the commissioner could not
issue export permits withOut breaking United States law and con-
travening the 1931 Geneva Convention. Anslinger followed the
embargo with the cancellation of his trip to meet with Siurob."
But because officials in Washington hoped that the Mexican gov-
ernment might be induced to reverse its policy, no public state-
ments were issued detailing United States opposition or Anslinger's
actions." ..
Mexico mildly protested the embargo, but no diplomatic rift
occurred. In fact, Siurob tried hard to reconcile Mexico's differ-
ences with the United States. First, he met with Creighton to
discuss ways of combating a recent increase in smuggling. One
means considered by the two men was allowing health department
officials to act as policemen in drug-related matters.5? Next, in
conversations with Daniels and Stewart on March 14 the public
health chief made a compelling offer. Mexico, he observed, was
prepared to suspend those portions of the new regulations found
most objectionable by the United States. Siurob promised to seek
suppression of the provision allowing drug dispensation to addicts
by licensed doctors. As a gesture of reconciliation, he suggested
the formation of a bilateral commission to study border narcotic
problems. Siurob hoped that Anslinger would demonstrate a simi-
lar desire to settle the contentious matter. Throughout his discus-
sions with Daniels and Stewart the Mexican official reiterated his
commitment to a strong antinarcotic policy. His ultimate aim, he
said, was to reduce domestic addiction and to render smuggling
_ ?.
unprofitable.51 ? _ _
Daniels found merit in Siurob's plan to alleviate the dispute:The
ambassador thought. that his government might show some appre-
ciation of Mexican intentions by suspending the prohibition on
- --medicinal exports. Siurob, Daniels noted, was "greatly disturbed
129
. ?
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;410, ?.!; _
,
:
cHAPTER-6
apd wopld? like to.find a. way of cooperatiOri.". The Mexican even
asked, without success, for an interview with Dr. Thomas Parran,
Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service.53 As
was often the case during his tenure in Mexico City, .josephus
Daniels had again surpassed officials in Washington in his efforts to
Maintaih good relations With Mexico: Anslinger's reply to SiurOb's *
. . . . .
conciliatory offer provides a case in point. The commissioner mat-
ter-of-factly told Fuller that the proper way to determine legitimate
drug usage was to ascertain if the usage was lawful under interna-
tional agreements";* meaning?in the view of the United States?
circumscribed medical and scientific use. Fuller and Anslinger
found Siurob's offer too vague to warrant a more receptive re-
sponse. The Treasury Department wanted to send the commis-
sioner's blunt statement of policy to the Mexican government, but
the Division 'of American Republics in the State Department
quashed the idea, noting that the memorandum . . ' . might also
give offense:"
Herbert Bursley of State proposed a compromise which would
let Siurob rescind the regulations and still maintain his integrity at
home. Bursley felt that there should be no hint of pressure from
Washington on Siurob. He volunteered to tell the Mexican consul
that "it might be well for Dr. Siurob to announce that he cannot
carry out his program because of the worldwide shortage of narcot-
ics caused by the European war and that therefore he is suspending
or cancelling the regulations in question. "55
By the time Siurob arrived in Washington in May for the Fourth
Congress of Health Directors of Pan-American Countries, he had
done what he could to improve relations over narcotics with the
United States. His -temporary suspension of Much of the new
narcotic code left Public Health Department clinics as the sole
dispensing stations in Mexico.56 On May 4 and 7; prior to the
opening of the meeting of the health directors, discussions about
the Mexican drug control regulations took place. Present at the
sessions for Mexico were Siurob and an English-speaking assistant,
Dr. Jose Zozaya of the Institute of Hygiene in Mexico City. Anslin-
ger, Fuller, Bursley, Dr. Lawrence Kolb, and John W Bulkley of
the Customs Bureau Division of Investigations and Patrol repre- ?
sented the United States.
Siurob found himself on the defensive during the first session.
Implementing the regulations, he stated, concluded a process be-
Cantrol
. gun
have 1
had ac
Depar-
,over,7,,
Who p
probal
the pi
memo _?
Unite(
official
losoph
The
stand k
nation
that of
Vinieg
monop
ence
official:
state 11
interne
As ti
7, Slur
lations.
dared,
was a r
promis._
but wa
sensith
cially o
the go'
to char;
again."
The;
was like
chief Ai
suspeni
resume
the nail
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? ???t-. ? ?
? 1
r-e
CifAifie e
Mexican -
fhomas Parran,
th Service.5.3 As
City, Josephus
in his efforts to
eply to \Siurob's
imissioner mat-
mine legitimate
!under interna -
United States?
and Anslinger
e receptive re-
id the commis-
overnment, but
te Department
. . . might also
se which would
his integrity at
if pressure from
Mexican consul
that he cannot
3rtage of narcot-
ie is suspending
y for the Fourth
runtries, he had
rcotics with the
_itch of the new
nics as the sole
7, prior to the
iscussions about
. Present at the
eaking assistant,
ico City. Anslin-
n W. Bulkley of
Patrol repre:
the first session.
ed a process
be-
'Control ACroii The ? 131
gun before he took offiCe: He, personally felt that the action might. -
have been premature, although he noted that the new program..
had achieved some success. For instance, the first Public Health
Department clinic in Mexico City placed under government care ?
over 700 of the 4,000 addicts in the Capital, When Anslinger.akked,
Who Provided.ihe remainder with drugs, Siurob agreed that they -
probably obtained their drugs illegally. At the close of the session
the public health chief received from Anslinger a copy of the
memorandum in Which the commissioner had tersely'outlined the
. _ . _ . . .
United States conception of legitimate narcotic usage. Privately,
officials urged Zozaya, who concurred with their drug control phi-
losophy to explain further Washington's position to his superior.57
The problem was not that Siurob remained equivocal about his
stand against drug abuse. In his address to the Pacific Coast Inter-
national meeting the previous fall, he displayed a resolve similar to
that of his counterparts in the United States. Rather, like Salazar
Viniegra, Siurob felt it worthwhile to explore a national narcotic
monopoly is a means of combatting illegal drug activity in prefer-
ence to the less flexible system espoused in Washington. Mexican
officials were not as convinced as United States authorities that a
state monopoly would worsen the drug situation or that it violated
international agreements.
As the second session of the talks began in Fuller's office on May
7, Siurob had evidently reevaluated his position on the new regu-
lations. "The Mexican regulations [are] entirely wrong," he de-
clared, indicating that the drug control policy of the United States
was a more appropriate response to the existing problem. Siurob
promised immediate suspension of the _regulations still in effect,
but warned that he could not publicize the policy change. The ?
sensitive nature of Mexican?United States relations, arising espe-
cially out of the petroleum disputes of the late 1930s, would leave
the government, in the midst of an electoral campaign, vulnerable
to charges that the United States: as Siurob put it, was "dictating
again."
The Mexican's fear of United States pressure and the reaction it
was likely to occasion had some basis in reality. Bureau of Narcotics
chief Anslinger closed the talks by telling Siurob that only formal
suspension of the controversial regulation would permit him to-
resume authorizing drug exports to Mexico. With this declaration
the narcotic policy talks ended. In seeking an accommodation over
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A ?1,
?
,
132
CHAPTER 6
policy differences as Siurob and Daniels wished, the Mexican
government made considerable 'eoncessions? while the United
States did little to reciprocate. In fact, Siurob was unable to extract
from Anslinger and his colleagues even a verbal pledge to intensify
cooperative activity in the important region around El Paso and? ' ??
Ciudad Juarez:my ' ' ? ? ' ? ?- . ." ? ? ? ? ? ' ? ?
The conclusion of the Washington discussions brought to an end
the final segment of United States?Mexican drug diplomacy be-
tween 1936 and 1940. The United States had been successful in its
? attempt to get Mexico to reconsider the nature of its drug control ---
? policy. Future antinarcotic collaboration was likely to proceed
along lines set forth by officials in Washington. As Herbert Gaston
of the Treasury Department told Secretary Henry Morgenthau: "I
had a very pleasant conversation with Dr. Siurob and his associate
Dr. Zozaya . . . They are completely won over to our method of
? handling the narcotics problem and ask our continued help and
advice." Gaston concluded: "This is a notable victory for Harry
Anslinger."66Anslinger's sense of achievement must have increased
two months later on July 3 when Diario Oficial published a decree
suspending indefinitely the February regulations. Thereafter,
Mexican addicts would be dealt with under the more punitive
statutes of September 1931.60
Jose Siurob, who held ultimate responsibility for the care of
Mexico's addicts, may have had misgivings about the outcome of
the talks in Washington. Shortly after his return home, but before
publication of the governmental decree, he wrote Creighton and
attributed the change in policy directly to the discussions. Creigh-
ton's reply referred to "your conclusions with respect to the control-
of illicit narcotics in Mexico.?61 On the same day that he wrote
Siurob, Creighton sent the following note to Washington and en-
closed copies of the two letters:
Realizing the position the Bureau [of Narcotics] has taken
with Dr. Siurob, I am very happy to now have the letter of
June 17th in which he states that he has finally come to
recognize the inefficacy of their experiment to control narcotic
drugs by administering game directly to the addicts: While IT-77?
believe that Dr. Siurob has taken this position now because of
the manner in which the situation was presented to him while
in Washington, you will observe from the enclosed that I am
Control Across_ti_
trying .;
? own "vo ?
The publica
thoughts Siu
Between.
. ?
shaped Mer
closely to th
the United
colleagues
Leopoldo S;
intervention
Neighbor P;
stance be hr
the United
ently was, ti
more under
of view. Suc
Througho
selves a lea
lengthy hist
of Mexico's
leadership a
in Mexican
propriety ol
tween the t
macy of dru
situation. T
commitmen
Josephus D
policy diffel
-
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?.
t" ? e
'
? ?';A 1' L 4".
^ ??^"..." -
?.?4 .
CHAPTER 6 -
the Mexican.
e the United
able to extract
ge to intensify? ,
1. El paso-an?
.4t.sg4
Light to an end
liplomacy be; 't.;!):471,..%--:*-4
?
UceeSSful in its
s drug control
[y to proceed
erbert Gaston
forgenthau: "I
d his associate
mr method of
med help and
ory for Harry
lave increased
ished a decree
Thereafter,
pore punitive
>r the care of
le outcome of
ne, but before
Dreighton and
sions. Creigh-
to the control
that he wrote
ngton and en-
q.
f?'?,?-?'i.????? -???
? ???',
40,,?P
le.:7?kt-1
??????;
.;* 4
?
Tr;
I " ?
nfcl
[cs] has taken
a the letter of -14i,_47.
ially come to ?
mtrol narcotic.
diets. While I
ow because of =
? -
Ito him while ????,;'41."'
)sed that I am
It
?
Control Across the Border 133
- trying to convince him that he has made this change of his
own volition.62 - ?
?.
The publication Of the decree rendered moot whatever second ? ?
thoughts Siumb may have entertained about the change in policy. ? ?
Between 1936 and 1940 the United States had successfully re-
shaped Mexican narcotic policy. Nominally, it would conform more
closely to the legalistic-punitive policy espoused and followed by
the United States. The exertions of Anslinger, Fuller, and their ----z---
colleagues helped force from office a dedicated public servant,
Leopoldo Salazar Viiiiegia. Moreover, since their actions led to
intervention in Mexican affairs, the reality of the professed Good
Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration must in this in-
stance be brought into question. Had the drug control program of
the United States been measurably more effective than it appar-
ently was, the interference with 'Mexican policy might have been
more understandable if no less objectionable from Mexico's point
of view. Such was not the case, however.
Throughout the 1930s officials in Washington arrogated to them-
selves a leading position in hemispheric activity Because of the
lengthy history of paternalism toward Latin America and as a result
of Mexico's proximity to the United States, this self-delegation of
leadership and assumption of moral superiority led to intervention
in Mexican affairs. Anslinger and others never questioned the
propriety of that interference. In the context of the disputes be-
tween the two countries in the late 1930s, the politics and diplo-
macy of drug control could have exacerbated an already sensitive
situation. That it did not do so is testimony to the antinarcotic
commitment of Jose Siurob and his desire, along with that of
Josephus Daniels, to reach an accommodation over the narcotic
policy differences between their two governments.
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CHAPTER 8
World War Hand After ..
161
Cesar Gordillo
cultivation had - -
I had cultivation
) that if the de- ? -
pium, he would ?
ustry under the
ate Department
scourage poppy
au of Narcotics,
partment ought
MUM in Peru for
!mained the om-
nisphere.
.event its opium
as through strict
of opiates. Such
ing stocks of op-
, Anslinger let it
the importation
)ssessed supplies
nment in Lima,
lenied one firm's
le same time the
idly needed nar-
not have enough
; upon a request,
issue the export
Washington had
option of stricter
? opiates and the
;, exporting the
al purposes. An
nd of 1943 when
the drug report-
had nearly ex-
iced that codeine
tuickly approved
!la?though it did
not match United States standards of strictness?must have pleased
officials in Washington. A Peruvian decree in November 1943
required all cocaine producers to sell to the government stocks,
e)cceedii-g?a O-ne year's supply. The next spring the government
even seriously considered the creation of a state monopoly to
control cocaine. But there were obstacles. Eight or ten producers
were maintaining their operations and did not want their permits
revoked. They argued that they were performing a service by
stockpiling cocaine during periods when there was an abundant
&rca-leaf harvest. Still, the government's rationale for monopoly
was that authorities were having to rely on the honesty of these
_
producers to provide production statistics which the government.
could not verify. Despite this, the monopoly did not come into
eidstence during the war.36
Officials in Washington would have preferred some form of
limitation at the source rather than a monopoly. But if there had to
be one, a state monopoly for the production and sale of coca leaves,
and not cocaine, would be preferable. Extensive_ supervision_ of
coca cultivation instead of cocaine productiiiiiwas unlikely thougb.
_
Despite the increased government activity resulting from wartime
exigencies, the enforcement of Peruvian drug laws was not uniform
through the mid-forties. Violators?especially-drug_sellersi_often
received lenient treatment. Near the end of the war a change in
policy m' have been in the offing. A key official in Peru's narcotics
bureau told Julian Greenup that Peruvian authorities regretted the
lack of a mandatory sentence for drug traffickers. But no evidence
suggests that any changes were forthcoming.37
Drug problems in Mexico had always posed more difficulties for
the United States than similar problems in the other Latin Ameri-
can states, for Mexico was after all a contiguous neighbor. Geo-
graphical proximity?and wartime?were not the only shaping
elements of the relationship between the two countries. Also sig-
nificant were political antagonisms originating at the time of the
Mexican Revolution and the differing ways in which each society
viewed drug use. But Mexico's renewed antidrug commitment,
arising out of the discussions in Washington in May 1940 between
United States and Mexican officials, had helped to minimize these
difficulties. As administrations in Mexico changed from that of
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162 -- . CHAPTER 8
i .
?
.4 ?1tO . ? :1 ? ?
Cardenas to Avila Camacho, Anslinger, H. S. Creighton, and the
' 4
others most concerned with the situation could only wait and see if
.-....-1,,- .. .. - .
the level of cooperation would remain the same.. ,-
. .
.: i.. Several indications. appeared late in, the year, suggesting that.. ....
their hopes would not be realized. In December, Creighton asked '
-v...4.11. ? ?
for and .received permission from his superiors ,to_resume_ thp
Iiceof Sending operatives into Mexico to aid in the _tracIdng of ---
_ . .,
"drtig-riim g-glrs: 3-8 At the Same time, a scandal arose within -Mex-
'iCo's narcotic bureaucracy Excelsior reported allegations of i_rr-
l'arFiaiees- in the- li.ealth department, including high-level,
complicity in the drug trade. The arrest of an attorney, Jose Per-
donio BenliZleVed-narcotics police discover numerous forged
authorizations for excessive drug imports. Large quantities of these
drugs, it was believed, ended up in the illicit traffic.
Suspicion about the irregularities had surfaced in July when the
League of Nations released statistics showing that Mexico was
_ _
exceeding its import allotment for the year..0fficials in the Federal
District subsequently learned of a delivery of 150 grams of cocaine
to Perdonio. Two men who had previously served in the govern-
ment, Albert P Leon as secretary general of public welfare and
Francisco Bassols in the Office of Control of Medicine and Phar-
macopoeia, denied granting the order for the delivery of the co-
caine. The order had been questioned because the Department of
Public Health employed a special form for all consignments over
five grams. Perdonio refused to divulge how he obtained the
required signatures. Following his arrest, the Department of Pub-
lic Health ordered all suspicious narcotic imports halted and re-
\stricted the granting of import authorizations. As Excelsior
reported, illegal purchases continued?on proper forms which had
obviously been altered.39 . .
In his defense, Leon declared that the order found in Perdonio's
possession was false. The order was supposedly issued to Dr.
Heberto Alcazar, former chief of the Federal Narcotics Service. Yet
Leon claimed that a different name, that of a woman, appeared on
(.,.
the order stub found in the office where Bassols worked. He
further declared his and Bassols's signatures on the order to be
forgeries.40 Alci7ar, trying to clear his name, told his friends at the
United States Consulate General that he had done nothing irregu-
lar. He concluded that someone wanted to discredit him and others
formerly attached to the Department of Public Health. Alcazar felt
V
?
ILLEGIB
World War II
. , .
that Pascu
responsibl
feelings e:
Sanchez
narcotics
Allegati(
United Sh
only serve
Anslinger
that the sr
behind wa
Alvin Scha
bet Dr. Vi
eliminate
Fernandez
dal, but fel
a change in
icantly, thE
printed a s:
Perdonio I
Alcazar in
as a key fig
had report
Alcaza.r rep
records wo
As the ye
control in
the Carder
damaged re
indicated a
example,
income, op
naturally fo
One mitt
Fernandez
only way .sr
had no ream
his commit]
with Fernat
States gove:
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_
-CHAPTERS?.
.ightbn; rand the'
ly wait and see if
suggesting that
Creightqn asked
to resume the
n the tracking of
ose within Mex-
gations of irregu-
ding high-level
orney, Jos?er-
iumerous forged
uantities of these
ffic.
in July when the
hat Mexico was
Is in the Federal
grams of cocaine
d in the govern-
blic welfare and
licine and Phar-
livery of the co-
e Department of
nsignments over
le obtained the
iartment of Pub-
s halted and re-
s. As Excelsior
forms which had
.nd in Perdonids
y issued to Dr.
)tics Service. Yet
an, appeared on
ols worked. He
the order to be
his friends at the
nothing irregti-
t him and others
alth. Alcizar felt
Woild Wir .and Affei
. .
that Paicual SancheZ Anojia, chief of the narcotics police, might be ' ? ?
responsible. Sanchez had previously worked for Alcazar and ill
feelings existed between the two. In fact, Alcazar thought that
Sanchez might be a major participant in the illegal activities the.
. narcotics police had uncovered...41. .. ?
Allegations of complicity against?Alcazar worried officials in the
United States, for high-level corruption in the government would
only serve to increase drug smuggling. Were the charges true,
Anslinger and the State Department_woulce:_roT?loric ude,_ _
trarthe7S-ifiCarid:-Frietice.-of cooperation which -J6se-SiurobJeft.
_,...___'nd was fraodulent.-?Against this background, customs agent
.? harff visited the new public health director in mid-Decem-
ber. Dr. Victor Fernandez Manero told Scharff that he intended to
eliminate any illegal or questionable activities in his department.
Fernandez Manero admitted the potential seriousness of the scan-
dal, but felt that the situation might provide its own remedy since
a change in administrations and personnel was under way.42 Signif-
icantly, the day after the Fernandez-Scharff discussion, ? Excelsior
printed a story entitled, "The Narcotics 'Traffic Scandal Increases."
Perdonio Benftez had revealed information further implicating
Alcazar in the illegal activity. He possessed a note namin_g_Alcazar
as a key figure in the scandal, and an agent of the narcotics police
Ilaa reportedJy_yerified_the_note's -authenticity. To this charge
Xrcazar replied that a careful check of Department of Public Health
records would remove all suspicion from him.?
As the year ended, the future course and effectiveness of narcotic
control in Mexico seemed in question. Important officials in both
the Cardenas and Avila Camacho administrations suffered from
damaged reputations. Report's from several regions in the country
_ _
indicated an increase in smuggling. In some border areas, for
(
example, w_lte.getable.farming-had-failed_to produce_a_good. e
income opium_poppies were_ being-planted, ,Smugglings_woul4
naturally follow." .
Oifelinitigating factor in this situation was the avowed desire of
Fernandez Manero for cooperation with the United States?the
only way smuggling could be reduced.45 Officials in Washington -
had no reason to question his sincerity, and rather hoped to-bolster ---
hit commitment. Creighton arranged to go to Mexico City to talk
with Fernandez Manero about the illicit traffic, while the United
.........-.......z........m?swaomomor...,
States government, prompted by the uncertainty of the situation ,
?
1.6a-
-
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164 - CHAPTER 8
.. ? . ? ? . ?
in Mexico, temporarily removed the narcotic agents_ operating.
)
there." Diku-s-iioni-th-ok place early in February. One topic was
destruction of the opium. crop. Creighton expressed disappoint-
ment at the continuing poppy cultivation. in .Sonora and Sinaloa..
Yet both he and Fernandez Miner? knew that destruction was not
1 possible without the assistance of local officials.47 The Mexican
. public health director told Creighton that he intended to supervise
crop destruction of opium and marijuana plants in Baja California
later in the month."
, During the talks Creighton sought formal approval from the
Avila Camacho administration for the continued presence of United
States drug agents in Mexico. All prior agreements had been
informal. Creighton's translator William K. Ailshie, vice consul at
'Mexico City, favored formalization because of the uneven record of
drug control in Mexico. "The Federal Narcotics Service in Mexico
City," he said, "does not have facilities to prevent the cultivation of
poppy and marijuana plants throughout the Republic or the man-
ufacture of opium derivatives, not to mention the illegal introduc-
tion of narcotics into Mexico, chiefly from japan."49 The Mexicans
soon agreed to formalization, but sought an official request from
Washington.5? Herbert S. Bursley of the State Department at-
tached a handwritten note to the report on the talks. It read: "I
think it unfortunate that this question was aired. The situation
regarding our people going to Mexico was OK."51 The United
(States therefore deemed a formal accord unwise, and Mexico did
I not insist upon one. Washington's reluctance did not greatly offend
tie- Mexicans for the government named Dr. Zaragoza Cuellar
Garcia, new chief of the narcotics service, as correspondent with
the United States for the exchange of narcotic information. His
selection reinforced the informal arrangements first made in the
1930s.52
Throughout the year the United States continued the practice of
sending agents into Mexcoo?to- investigate smuggling and other
drug-related activities. Three special agents arrived at the height
of -antinarcotic efforts in the fall." Discretion was in order. As
George Morlock commented: "I said. . . that I thought Treasury
should be very careful not to overrun Mexico with its agents."54
By early 1.942 rumors of a government scandal subsided and
cooperative efforts were moving ahead. Consul General William P.
Blocker at Ciudad Juarez felt optimistic enough to report that "the
ILLEGIB
World war II;
traffic in n
Blocker kn
of smuggli
for. contink
Service off
Creighton,
Bermudez.
American,'
bon of bm
stated: "Rc
ment wher
Narcotic
ones confr,
came repo]
crop found
officials we
vation and
tional ant:
competitor
the Treasm
met with f
told Creigl
impossible
support thr
stantly incr
annual rep(
Loaiza di
ton. He oft
Federal tr(
destruction
closely witl
lines of con
a substitute
suggested t
hoped that
poppy culti
Some de:
April, obsel
dor Fena.5?
half of the c
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;ents, operating
One topic was
sed disappoint-
Ira and Sinaloa. -- ---
truction was not.
.The Mexican'
led to.pupervise ?
Baja California
)roval from the
sence of United ?
lents had been
vice consul at
Lneven record of
;rvice in Mexico
he cultivation of
Aic or the man-
illegal introduc-
18 The Mexicans
al request from
Department at-
alks. It read: "I
1. The situation
"51 The United
and Mexico did
)t greatly offend
aragoza Cuellar
.espondent with
aformation. His
rst made in the
the practice of
;ling and other
xl at the height
as in order. As
ought Treasury
a its agents."TM.
Ll subsided and
neral William P.
report that "the
WolId-War Wand Alter 165
traffic in narcotics as a whole has been sharply reduCed.?55 ut as
Blocker knew, intermittent vigilance would never reduce the level
of smuggling for more than a short time. To emphasize the need
for continuing action; a meeting was held in the Customs Agency
Service office in El Paso. Those in attendance included Blocker,
. . . . .
Creighton, a customs agent for. the El Paso region, and Antonio
Bermtidez, the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, who was "strongly pro-
American," as Blocker put it. Plans were discussed for the reduc-
tion of border smuggling. Blocker's report gave no details, but
stated: -Results of the campaign will be reported to the Depart-
ment when achieved.:56 ?
Narcotics problems in the state of Chihuahua were not the only
ones confronting Mexico at the time. From Mazatl?in Sinaloa
came reports of extensive opium growing. Some of the harvested
crop found its way into the United States. In fact, several state
officials were suspected of reaping large rewa7ds from poppy_culti-
Vatititrand smuggling, while concurrently implementing the na-
tional antinarcotic policy_by destroying_the_fields?of-their
-
competitors. Creighton, who had left his post in Texas to become
the Treasury Department's special representative in Mexico City,
met with the governor of Sinaloa, Rudolfo Loaiza. The governor
told Creighton that stamping out the opium industry would be
impossible since opium had nearly become the sole means of
support throughout the state. Acreage under cultivation was con-
stantly increasing, a fact noted by the Bureau of Narcotics in its
annual report for 1942.57
Loaiza did not depict an entirely depressing situation for Creigh-
ton. He offered three suggestions for reducing the opium traffic.
Federal troops, CriCluding cavalry, might help supervise poppy
&a-ruction. Alio, health department agents Could -work more
closely with state and local officials. Finally, improved roads and
lines of communication might help limit additional cultivation. As
a substitute for the revenue derived from poppy production, Loaiza
suggested that the state build qp its miningindustry. Creigh_tp.n
h?...22011_rat agricyltural crops would beplanted.even,though.opium.
,poppy cultivation was more lucrative."
Some -destruction of poppies took place in January, March; and
April, observed by special Treasury Department employee Salva-
dor Perla." He disputed Mexico's contention that one-third to one-
half of the crop had been destroyed, for he believed that numerous
1 / )
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`44 1 ,
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fr.."' Ni 4 , . -------x- - ?-.*: -,. s ?1.-, es
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r,.. ? ? ..--? n -1 -;,,,,- ? 1.? ?? }- X ,..1:.-
.? ?
? ? 7??,,i ir,41$1.
CHAPTER 8
:,....4.11.'
4,
? ' ? -,
? 5i ? , ? ' ? ?14.4.?
fields had 'been harveted`before beink liunied. Also, the destruc-
tion occurred only in Sinaloa?not in Durango, Sonora, and Chi- ............:.....4.-
huahua where it was needed as well. (Sonora reportedly served as ?
an important staging area for the smuggling of drugs into the
. - . .- ?? . ? United States.69 `- -
.
..
. Creighton'shared Pena's doubts.61 In a related, intriguing,deyel-
?? f
?-k 1-? :;
. opment a propo- s.....2,1emorgedy probably from one of Treasury
'
s mu!, ........-4.5.v,
,....... II ? 1
;. . iiriVexico, advocating that the...linited,States purchasetheMexican
'
.. opium-crop. -Alihough he felt the proposal might offer -a way to ---'7"--r?-_i-
ZA.?
it4f.
c'aiikarrmugg,ling, Creighton played down the idea in a report to
his superiors.62 United States opium supplies were sufficient and
.t;
any purchases might encourage additional, unwanted planting of ? ;I
poppies.
Throughout the year Mexico requested assistance combating
illegal drug traffic. In October Mayor Bermudez complained about
the inadequacy of prior aid and asked for additional agents. Mor-
lock, joined by other federal officials in the belief that smuggling ?
around El Paso was increasing, approved the request. 63 Some
s.o0-4
results were achieved when in December eight traffickers were
arrested and eight pounds of opium confiscated."
The campaign against border smuggling of opiates and marijuana
continued into 1943. At a meeting in Washington with state and
treasury department officials Fernandez Manero revealed that
Avila Cam acho had directed the governors of Sonora and Sinaloa to -
suppress poppy cultivation in their,states.,Fernandez iMprudently
asserted that cultivation had therefore ceased.65 Within a month
are?Sige?reFartment notifiTeliZeinTrDaniels's replacement,
?X, -
George S. Messersmith, that conditions near Mazatl?were wors=
ening. "The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs between Mexico and the
United States has increased considerably since 1940," a cable read,
"and unless checked will probably become as large as formerly
existing between the Ear East and the United States."
Treasury Department estimations that Mexico's opium produc-
tion for 1943 would reach sixty tons, or three times greater than
?
1942, underlined the urgency of the message. The cable empha-
- sized the need to suppress production. Messersmith was instructed
was to find out if Mexico desired additional assistance. The cable
also contained the prospect of unpopular, unilateral action: if exces-
sive production continued, border guards would have to search all
incoming vehicles and travelers from Mexico.6!....----
_
.1 ,)???-?
,1"14.05.
World War
. ?
Creig
Bulkley
opium-f-
oyer .90
making:
even sti:
assistanc
amount
the next
Creig.
Fernand
governot
Fernand
three mi
with Lo:
Closing
suggestic
against n
tions off
worsenec
protest t4
Subsec
Bursley,
inspectio
send an
success. 4
trip, Bun.
on Ferna
States err
some pop
been don
poppies."
reported
To offic
narcotics:
ises,-and
for 1943 rt
record wc
March 19.
in Mexiec
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CHAPTER 8
World War II and After
),Ahe destruc- .
lora, and Chi-. ?
edly served as
'rugs into the
triguing deyel-' ? ..
Freasury's men
3e the Mexican
offer a way to
t in a report to
sufficient and
red planting of
ice combating
nplained about
1 agents. Mor-
that smuggling
quest.63 Some
raffickers were
and marijuana
with state and
revealed that
t and Sinaloa to
imprudently
iithin a month
; replacement,
lin were wors-
Vlexico and the
a cable read,
ge as formerly
es."
opium produc-
n greater than
cable empha-
was instructed
nce. The cable .
action: if exces-
ve to search all
Creighton -, went to Washington to discuss the. situation ? with -
Bulkley and Morlock. He told them that. Chinese nationals began
opium production around 1925, but that Mexicans now controlled
over 90 percent of the operations. In. his opinion, Loaiza was not r
making a genuine effort in Sinaloa to restrict production. Creighton ? ?
'even *suspected that United Site's 'funds niarkeil.for anti:I-colic
assistance?were ending up in the pockets of smugglers. (The
tm -Wild had risen from 20,000 pesos in 1942 to 250,000 pesos
the next year.)
-- Creighton- also had unsubstantiated evidence that denied ?
Fernandez Manero's aroinarcotic commitment. While serving as
governor of the gulf coast state of Chiapas in southeastern Mexico,
Fernandez Manero amassed a personal fortune of between two and,
three nullion_peins. At that time he maintained a close relationship
with?a?aiza. The coincidence seemed important to Creighton.
ClaiSrthe discussion, he regretted that he had no remedial
suggestions. He doubted the likelihood of enhanced collaboration
against narcotics with Mexico despite his belief in the good inten-
tions of Avila Camacho. Morlock could only add that if conditions
worsened, as was probable, the United States would issue a formal
protest to the Mexican government. 67
Subsequent reports from Mexico were not encouraging. Herbert
Bursley, now embassy counselor, alerted Washington that another
inspection trip would be made to the northern states. He hoped to
send an observer even though he doubted the trip would be a
success. Questioning the sincerity of the commitment behind the
trip, Bursely suggested that it was being staged to relieve pressure
on Fernandez Manero from Mexican newspapers and the United
States embassy. After the trip Messersmith concludeLthaL;while,;? -
some poppy fields have been destroyed, nothing of impartancelas.
been &lie, however, to prevent cultivation or to destroy growing.
RTpiiii;" 68 Not surprisingly, the fall plantings in Sinaloa were
reported to be the largest yet.69
To officials in the United States, relations with Mexico over
narcotics seemed destined to follow a pattern of conference, prom-
ises, and nonperformance, as the Bureau of Narcotics annual report
for 1943 reveals. Had Jos?iurob remained in office after 1940 that
record would probably not have differed. The pattern recurred in
March 1944 when the Mexican government requested a meeting
in Mexico with top-level officials from Washington." After this
-
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?????4
iwo
7,
.e?
s
siS
h
168
CHAPTER 8
?
. ? ? ??
particular gathering Messersmith expressed the frustiation.his col:
leagues and predecessors had long felt. He belieyed_thatatihe_ 4,
highest level the administration _wished to cooperate wjth_the
triraVates and genuinely committed itself to .balting_poppy.
,FrOar the northern :border. .As before; Ldrng_agents_fmete.
welcome on trips into poppy 'country:
Sidney Kennedy, Creighton's replacement upon the latter's re-
tirement, was also present at the meeting of narcotics officials. He
thought that the United States should employ diplomatic protests
to produce compliance by Mexico in antidrug activity. Yet diplo-
macy, is Kennedy discovered, could not overcome the problems
which made effective control difficult. Dr. Gustavo Baz, minister
of public health, elaborated. In the first place the government's
antinarcotic program was poorly funded. Agents did not have suf-
ficient funds to meet their own expenses, let alone to pay inform-
ers?a necessary practice. As a result age.2LIKej:sal_p,sce
bribes from drug merchants. Second, for several years the govern-
,? -
ment had only enough manpower to send two agents to supervise
crop destruction even though the United States share of the pro-
gram's cost had risen steadily. Baz suggested that one more agent
and a small increase in funds from Washington would enable Mex-
ico to destroy 25 percent of the poppy fields. He intimated that the
program might falter without additional funds.
The meeting concluded after one of Baz's subordinates presented
a four-step plan to halt poppy growth. The measures included an
???????????. ?
educational campaign advocating the cultivation of agricultural.
"?crop?s, th?e withholding of public im'gation waters from lands with,
poppie?s, the forcible removal of opium growers from public lands,
aridllitiSrnsecution of selected growers as a warning to others. 71
flirm?ijcir drawback in the program as usual would be the difficulty
of implementation.
An early test of Mexico's resolve to fulfill its antinarcotic pledges
came in June. At the urging of Salvador Pena, a crop destruction
expedition with twenty-three soldiers traveled to Durango. An
inexplicable delay of one _day alerted the growers_to.the-comind
raid Upon arriving at_the.poppy fields,_ Mexican officials and.the?
soldiers discovered local villages deserted and some of the fields .
hurried: The soldiers made a superficial effort to destroy more
flelds; several soldiers assisted with the burning while the other
twenty guarded against a surprise ambush. At the conclusion of the
?
? ? ?
World War II s
-?
abortiVe e:
another tri
Peru, actui ,
the flow of
success. F(
ity to affec
country.
Hemispl -
inter-Amer
national efl
traveled to
to adopt mc
that printin
reporting p
that encour
trols to thos
visited twel
and Mexico
offer the pr
As we ha
; tina, the Ar
postwar rer
vast illegal
large quant
From 19401
primarily fn
principal sui
United Stet
of cocaine tr
with the wa
/ ton's concer
nally, most 4
early 1940s
The war I
When older,
scrutiny tha:
Organizatior
ceived a fay(
tion been 1:
V .4
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....r.i.??????.-
,
CHAPTER 8 -
listration his col- -
eyed that at the -
operate with the ,
o halting 'pot?py-7-
rug agents were
In the lattees re-.
Dtics officials. He
plomatic protests
Aivity. Yet diplo-
ne the problems
Lvo Baz, minister
he government's
did not have suf-
le to pay inform-
re susceptible to
years the govern-
ents to supervise
share of the pro-
t one more agent
)uld enable Mex-
ntimated that the
linates presented
;ures included an
n of agricultural
s from lands with
rom public lands, _
ning to others. 71
d be the difficulty
tinarcotic pledges
crop destruction
to Durango. An
!rs to the coming
n officials and the
ome of the fields- - -
to destroy more
; while the other
conclusion of the
World War 11 and After 169 ----
abortive expedition, .the coordinator from? Durango declared that
another trip would not be made.72 (See Appendix.) If Mexico, like
Peru, actually desired to join with the United States in controlling
the flow of illicit narcotics in the Americas, its efforts met with little --
success, Federal administrators simply did not possess. the capabil-
ity to affect Conditions in the Major drug &Wing region' s of -the :
country.
Hemispheric drug control through 1945 became essentially an
inter-American matter which reflected how the War halted inter:: --
national efforts. Just before the war a League of Nations mission
traveled to Latin America hoping to influence governments there
to adopt more comprehensive control programs. The League found
that printing its documents in Spanish increased compliance with
reporting procedures on the domestic drug situation. It was hoped
that encouragement from Geneva might bring more efficient con-
trols to those states plagued by serious drug problems. The mission
visited twelve states including Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia,
and Mexico. Results of the trip gratified the League and seemed to
offer the prospect of an intensive antidrug effort."
As we have seen, the wartime history of drug control in Argen-
tina, the Andean region, and Mexico thwarted this expectation. A
postwar report on the extent of wartime drug traffic chronicled a
vast illegal trade. Both the United States and Canada had seized
large quantities of contraband raw opium originating in Mexico.
From 1940 to mid-1946, a total of 428 kilograms of prepared opium,
primarily from Mexico, was seized. That country, too, served as a
principal supplier of morphine and adulterated heroin reaching the
United States. On the other hand, the report minimized the extent
of cocaine traffic. The stated reason was the preoccupation of Japan
with the war, but that assertion should be tempered by Washing-
ton's concern with illicit cocaine emanating from the Andes. Fi-
nally, most of the marijuana confiscated in the hemisphere in the
early 1940s came from Mexico."
The war had several notable effects upon-the illicit drug trader
When older establisga-CliaTirielifor -s?n-iuggling came under closer,
new_ones opened. The International Labor__
Qrganization appealed for assistance by seamen's unions and re,-
ceived a favorable response. Had this and other methods of detec-
tion ree?n- largely effective, the flow of drugs would not have
F
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. .7" 'dr. t
q _ " "1-.? ?
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o
? ? ? ??,t ? ? ? , ? ??,
?
f
????'
a X
.? .. ? 44 4
,7
?
stopped. From Mexico, couriers often ,crossed the. Rio Grande by
Wading or iwiMming and pushing their precious cargoes on rafts..
Traditional European and Asian transfer points closed during the J.
war. The risky, bustling romanticism associated with Marseilles and "
Hong Kong disappeared as drugs entered the United States after .
Passing through less recognizable 'towns iii Mexico and Ceniral and
South America.
As for the quality of drugs, the. war evidently caused much
adulteration of the opiates. The level of purity often did not reach
5 percent. Supply from the Americas, falling short of prewar inter-
national levels, drove prices higher. On the other hand, the war
set off an increase in the iMuggling of a cheaper substance, mari-
,
juana. By 1942 organized gangs were reportedly distributing it in ?
the United States. The risks were great; the number of seizures
rose appreciably for the next few years." Anslinger and his col-
leagues hied to bring this situation under control by appealing,
-
where possible, to Latin American governments to improve their
own control programs. There was little the United States could do
legislatively. One law which was,passed, an opium poppy Control
measure, proliibifeirdomesticoop_py cultivation except-uncleAa
special license all;ving.p.Aisatialmnedic.1..xl and,scientificipur, ...,?
iiirserTre-gre7n7;74issued.no,such,licenses.nuring the wan!!
?A7e7-17emerged in Washington that the global conflict had done
much to reduce the number of addicts in the United States. The
Bureau of Narcotics saw this as a continuation of a prewar trend
initiated by its tough policies and vigilance in enforcement. A -,17P
United Nations report echoed this sentiment.77 This feeling of -
.
success renewed the unresolvable controversy about the number
of addicts. Apparently, the figure fell somewhere between 20,000, -
;7-
4-;
CHAPTER 8
which would have been slightly more than one addict per 10,000
people, the bureau's estimated ratio, and 48,000, the number given
by the Public Health Service in 1948. Anslinger termed the lower ?
figure an irreducible minimum."78 The evidently low level of
addiction prompted Congress in 1948 to consider closing the fed-
eral narcotic farms, but Anslinger succeeded in keeping them
open." As always the precise extent of addiction was not possible.
to calculate; methods remained unreliable and self-serving. It is .;
clear, however, that the level fell during the war, barely increased
for the next two years, and then began a steady rise." - ? ? ?
When this increase Was beginning, the bureau seemed to be
??%.
4,
World War-Hind -
searching. fo:.
climate of pr
addition," At
publicity mil-
- ? -.It has 'b
pariicul
"adverb
stimulai
otherwi-
Abuse amoni
quences but
of drugs. "82 i
liked to haw
played a sign
decade later
goals.
Anslinger'
New York 1-1(
times a leath
persons possi
coauthored, '
'of the article
reporting Ma
sensationalist
mation was n
the research.
dia report of]
The comm
atmosphere f
ately detecte
denounced it
//done. Potent
error, Anslini
on the road t
ated to heroi)
was gone."
during the lu
The war and
scientific deb
T ???
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?"'" ?';
-5 .
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?t, ? ?-?
???
_
-4?
CHAFTER 8 i.7.1A
?
-- ? f'?
?
' ? ? -
io Grande by Axial:,
;oes on rafts .7:14-71:5
d during the
farseilles and
1: States. affet *.?
I Central and
? -1.1.4":'?*7.;.?
- ?.u.-.-
..:aused much
lid not reach ?????????,1.
prewar inter-
and, the war
stance, mari-
ributing it in
q- of seizures
and his col-
)3, appealing,
mprove their
ates could do
ioppy control
ept under a
cientific pur-
g the war."
let had done
I States. The
prewar trend
Orcement. A
lis feeling of
the number
oveen 20,000,
? per 10,000
lumber given
led the lower
low level of
rsing the fed-
eeping them
; not possible
serving. It is
ely increased
.80
emed to be
World War 11 and Mier 171
?
searching for a scapegoat to blame. "There has always been a
climate of public opinion which has favored the spread of narcotic
addition," -Anslinger declared.81 He especially feared that undue - ---
pulplicqy might tempt people into narcotic use:
? .
? It has been our observation that direct propaganda on drugs,
particularly to the youth, is likely to be dangerous, because it
"advertises" the use of drugs for nonmedical purposes and
- - - stimulates curiosity on the part of persons who would' not
'otherwise have become interested.
, .
-Abuse among youngsters resulted not from "ignorance of conse-
quences but because they had learned too much about the effects
of drugs."82 As one of the guardians of public morality, the bureau
liked to have it both ways: in the 1920s an educational campaign
played a significant role in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act; a
decade later public awareness impeded realization of the bureau's
goals.
Anslinger's tenacity in the fight against drugs was unrivaled. The
New York Herald Tribune reported in 1948 that he carried at all
times a leather-bound book containing the names of thousands of
persons possibly involved in the illegal drug trade.83 In a book he
coauthored, The Traffic in Narcotics, Anslinger disparaged many
of the articles on narcotics appearing in the press. He found the
reporting inaccurate and misleading, and he denounced the use of
sensationalism for the sake of sales. As always, nonbureau infor-
mation was regarded with skepticism, no matter how sophisticated
the research. The acrimonious controversy over the 1944 La Guar-
dia report offers a prime example."
The commissioner claimed that the report contributed to the
atmosphere favoring drug experimentation. "The Bureau immedi-
ately detected the superficiality and hollowness of its findings and
denounced it." In the eyes of the bureau the damage had been
done. Potential users believed marijuana to be harmless.85 This
error, Anslinger would argue in 1951, started many young people
on the road to heroin. "They started there," he said, "and gradu-
ated to heroin; they took the needle when the thrill of marihuana--
was gone."88 This position effectively reversed the bureau's stand ?
during the hearings on marijuana control fourteen years earlier. 87
The war and immediate postwar years saw a continuation of the
? scientific debate on the effects of marijuana. At the very least, the .
?
'":PA4j0
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Appendix:
Opium Poppy Destruction
in Mexico, 1944
Durango
AMERICAN CONSULATE
Durango, Durango, Mexico, June 27, 1944
AIR MAIL
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Subject: Opium Poppy Fields in State of Durango Destroyed.
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
I have the honor to transmit herewith copies, with translation,
of a report of the destruction, under the supervision of the Servi-
cios Sanitarios Coordinados (Public Health Service) of Durango,
accompanied by kodak photographs, of the poppy fields and the
work of destruction being carried on by the Federal troops and the
men employed to assist in the work.
The poppy plantings mentioned in the enclosed reports are
located at the villages of METATES, QUEBRADA HONDA, and
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-
APPENDIX
_
FRESNO which places are three days by horseback almost due
west from Tepehuanes, the end of the railway line extending from
Durango to Tepehuanes. These places are situated to the right of a
line drawn from Topia to Copalquin, Durango, and about half way
between those those places. These villages are located in the heart of the
Sierra Madre mountains and are ,very difficult to reach. In fact the:
only manner of reaching these villages is by horse or mule back.
The people in that section of this state are quite uneducated and,
ultrired-arid-wliCise [sic] standard of living is very low. It will be ? ?
iiote-dTr-oiiitlieTeports transmitted herewith that the poppy plant-,
ings-were on small parcels of land. This is due to the fact that the
arricii?mt-Of 'finagle land in that secluded part of the state is in small
tracts located in small valleys between mountains. The pictures
accompanying this report will give a better idea of the terrain? in
that section of the state.
The expedition 'covered by the enclosed report was made as a
result of representations made to the local Servicios Sanitarios
Coordinados by Mr. Salvador C. PENA, Treasury Representative
assigned to the American Embassy, Mexico, D.F. The originals of
the documents enclosed herewith were delivered to this Consulate
by Dr. Casimiro VALLADARES PINEDA, Chief of the Servicios
Sanitarios Coordinados, Durango, and this office transmitted them
to the Treasury Representative mentioned through the Embassy.
It will be noted from the report submitted by Inspectors Juan
Francisco CURIEL and Miguel Onesimo CALDERON that the
10th Military Zone, with headquarters in the city of Durango
ordered Lieutenant Colonel of Cavalry Romulo Soto BURCIACA,
stationed at Tepehuanes, to accompany the inspectors designated
by Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados, Juan Francisco Curiel and his
assistant, Miguel Onesimo Calderon, to the region where it was
reported there were plantings of poppy for the purpose of destroy-
ing them. Lieutenant Colonel Burciaga took a squad of 23 soldiers
with him. It will be noted further from the report that there was -a
delay of one day in the expedition getting started from Tepehuanes.
Whether the pretextoffered for the delay was legitimate or not it,
is-nof known, but it is stated in the report that the people of these
-Villages had been notified two days previous to their arrival that
government employees were on their way. Although it cannot be
verified, it is not improbable that the poppy growers were in-
formed from Durango of pending arrival of forces to destroy
......armar??????????..,..11=1.
Opium Poppy De:
their fields
parted from
It will alsc
lack of coop(
destination,
were almost
several perst
Ramon GAN
The enclo:
assisted in t
Valladares P:
in the destru
squad was g
the natives fi
that the reas
to poppy we:
Lieutenant
women the n
Valladares fu
him that the
are afraid th
may come in
stated that if
to destroy p(
to send insp
that his loci
being murd(
The EXCI
published ar
Rodolfo LO./
Mazatlan, Si
assassinated
/grown in th(
claim that (
published in
of the local i
The area v
the Chief of
extent, and s
is practically
npriaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
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APPENDIX
thack almost due
ke extending from
d to the right of a
rid about half way -
in the heart of the
reach. In fact the..
-se or Mule back.
uneducated and..
E..ry low. It will be
the poppy plant-
the fact that the
Le state is in small ?
ins. The pictures
of the terrain in
rt was made as a
rvicios Sanitarios
y Representative
1 The originals of
to this Consulate
f of the Servicios
transmitted them
h the Embassy.
Inspectors Juan
)ERON that the
city of Durango
Dto BURCIAGA,
.ctorS designated
co Curiel and his
on where it was
rpose of destroy-
ad of 23 soldiers
that there was a
.orn Tepehuanes.
;itimate or not it
people of these
heir arrival that
igh it cannot be
-owers were in.:
'Drees to destroy
Opium Poppy Destruction in Mexico. 1944
. .
207
their fields prior to the time the inspector and.. his assitant de-
' parted from' 'this, city: ? ** ? ?i '`?? ? ?
?It-Wilrals-9 be noted that the report of the inspector mentions a
lack of cooperation on the part of the people along the trail to their
-destination, and upon their arrival at the villages mentioned they
were almost depopulated. Although statements were taken from
several persons, including principally women, but one individual,
Ramon GAMIZ, was arrested and brought into Durango.
The enclosed photographs will show that but one or two soldiers
assisted in the destruction of the poppy fields. Doctor Casimiro
Valladares Pineda explained that the reason so few troops assisted
in the destruction of these plantings was because thelalance.ofthe
squad was guarding those who were working in order to_prevent
the natives from ambushing them. Doctor Valladares stated further
that the reason that some of the women whose lands were planted
to poppy were not arrested and brought into Durango was because
Lieutenant Colonel BuzsAAga was afraid that if he arrested-these
women the natives would ambush the troops along the trail. Doctor
Valladares further stated that his inspector and assistant informed
him thatthey_would not malce another trip to that section. They
are afraid that some of those whose poppy fields were destroyed
may come into Durango and assassinate them. The Doctor further
staailiat if he is ordered to send inspectors to that section again
to destroy poppy plantations, he will ask the Federal Government
to send inspectors from Mexico City for that special _purpose, so,
that his local inspectors will not be subject to the possibilities of
being murdered in the city of Durango.
The EXCELSIOR, one of the principal Mexico City dailies,
published an article a short time ago to the effect that Governor
Rodolfo LOAIZA, of the State of Sinaloa, which [sic] occurred in
Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, during the Carnival last Feburary was
assassinated by individuals belonging to a ring handling opium
grown in the State of Sinaloa in the vicinity of Badiraguato who
claim that Governor Loaiza double crossed them. That notice
published in the paper has created even a greater fear in the minds
of the local inspectors of the Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados.
The area visited by the inspectors making the enclosed report to
the Chief of Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados is but a few miles in
extent, and since the terrain of the entire western part of this State
is practically the same as that in which opium poppy was being
,
r?-?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
,
;
a ? ?
/ 2 --
208
APPENDIX
grown, and as considerable plantings of this poppy have been
destroyed in the vicinity of Badiraguato, Sinaloa, located to the.
'West of the blantings in this State, and since that section is quite
isolated, it is not improbable that there may be other plantings in
that district which have not been reported. ? -
It is difficult to arrive from the report of Doctor Valladares at the
exact acreage?of poppy planting destroyed by the inspectors., but it.
appears that the acreage destroyed, and already harvested prior to
their arrival, amounted to approximately 232 hectares (1 hectare
equals 2.47 acres), or 573.04 acres which is quite a sizeable acreage
planted to this drug producing plant. ? ? -
It will be noted from some of the enclosed reports that a part of
the poppy plantings visited by the inspectors mentioned above had
already been harvested when the inspectors arrived. It has been
learned that opium poppy is planted in the district around Metates
during the month of October. In order to prevent plantings from
maturing it appears_necessaryt at a 1- I Wori Fie Ws t that section
Three times a year; one time in EiFeeTribei'-''?aftei: the plants planted
l'i-aTie-had time to come up and begin growing, another time in,
Veb?ruary?so- as to destroy a second planting;_and_another_time
g the latter part of April in order to destroy anylelds which
may have been missed on the two previous_trips.
This Consulate has been informed through the correspondent
which first reported the existence of opium poppy to the Federal
Health Department, Mexico City, whose name is mentioned in
Doctor Valladares' report, that a Major Gorgonio ACUNA, as-
signed to the 9th Military Zone with headquarters at Culiacan,
Sinaloa, and who is a native of Metates, is the go-between for the
growers and the purehasers for the opium which finds an outlet on
the west coast. It was further reported that Major Acuna is associ-
ated with an American, name not known, who purchases for 1,000
pesos per kilogram (1 kilogratn equals 2.2046 pounds) all the opium
which finds an outlet to the west coast, and that this American
smuggles the opium into Los Angeles. As stated above, the name
of this American is not known, but it is reported that Major Gor-
gonio Acuna acts as his go-between with the producers, so he can
disclose the name of this party, if he can be made to talk. It is also
reported that this American visits Mazatlan quite frequently. It is
further reported that he advances money to the producers of opium
in Sinaloa and Durango with which to clear additional lands for
Opium Poppy Desi
planting to pc
the district IT.
GUanacevi, r
It is believ
the inspect?r
sive evidence
extensive sea)
real effort wa
fact that it w:
district, a pa
that the groN
these authori
and quite po
which these i
As a precax
to the Amen.
office to the
Respectfully
E. W. Eaton
American Vic
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8
APPENDIX
poppy have been
m, located to the
at section is quite
other plantings in
T Valladares at the -
inspectors, but it
harvested prior to ,
ectares (1 hectare
a sizeable acreage
)orts that a part of
ntioned above had
ived. It has been
et around Metates
!nt plantings from
visit that section
the plants planted
g; another time in
and another time
y any fields which
,s.
he correspondent
py to the Federal
3 is mentioned in
mio ACUNA, as-
rters at Culiacan,
o-between for the
finds an outlet on
)r Acuna is associ-
urchases for 1,000
nds) all the opium
lat this American
above, the name
that Major Gor-
ducers, so he can
e to talk. It is also
e frequently. It is
roducers of opium
Iditional lands for
Opium Poppy Destruction in Mexico. 1944 209
planting to poppy. It appears that a part of the opium produced in
the district mentioned finds its way to the United States through
Guanacevi, Durangci; Parral, Chihuahua; and El Paso, Texas.
It is believed that the enclosed copies of reports submitted by
the inspector of Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados present conclu-
sive evidence that opium poppy has been cultivated on a somewhat
extensive scale in the immediate district visited, but that but little
real effort was made to break up the ring of producers. Due to the
fact that it was late in the season when these officials visited that
district, a part of the crop had already been harvested. The fact
that the growers were tipped off two days before the arrival of
these authorities indicates that they have lookouts in Tepehuanes,
and quite possibly in the city of Durango in the same office to
which these inspectors pertain.
As a precaution for greater safety, this report is being forwarded
to the American Embassy, Mexico, D.F. for transmission by that
office to the Department by courier.
Respectfully yours,
E. W Eaton
American Vice Consul
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8