PROBABLE SOVIET ACTION IN VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000400520001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1957
• Content Type: SNIE

50X1
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SNIE 11-9-57
24 September 1957
033985
TQP-SZET
N? 109
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-9-57
PROBABLE SOVIET ACTION IN VARIOUS
CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING SYRIA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 24 September 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the
IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
SECRET
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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TOP CRET
PROBABLE SOVIET ACTION IN VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES
AFFECTING SYRIA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable Soviet reaction in the event of: (a) armed intervention
in Syria by Iraq alone, or together with Jordan and/or Lebanon; (b) intervention by
Turkey alone or together with one or more of the above Arab states; (c) significant
US/UK logistical support to the intervening powers in any of the above contingen-
cies; and (d) US/UK intervention in support of Turkey if, following action by Turkey
as in (b) above, the USSR had sent large numbers of "volunteers" to Syria.
ASSUMPTIONS
A. That military action in the cases considered would be taken only following provo-
cation by Syria, involving border incidents or recognizable subversive acts by Syria
inside one of the neighboring states.
B. That Israel does not intervene in the conflict.
ESTIMATE
THE GENERAL SOVIET REACTION
1. By its recent warnings against pro-Western
intervention in Syria, especially its latest note
to Turkey, the USSR has publicly adopted a
strong position on this issue. The USSR would
be reluctant to accept the loss to its prestige
which would occur if a government it openly
supports were overthrown. It would be even
more concerned with the resulting setback
to its newly won position in the Middle East
and with the corresponding strengthening of
the US position in that area.
2. We believe, therefore, that armed interven-
tion by Outside powers against the Syrian gov-
ernment would produce a major interna-
tional crisis. The USSR would make great
propaganda play of alleged Western instiga-
tion. It would almost certainly promote sab-
otage and subversive actions, send such ad-
ditional technical and logistical support to
Syria as it could through available channels,
and make threatening military gestures. Be-
yond this, it could choose among three broad
courses of action (not wholly mutually ex-
1
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2
elusive): (1) overt military action by So-
viet forces directly against the states involved;
(2) such assistance to Syria as sending as
many Soviet "volunteers" as feasible and fly-
ing in Soviet aircraft to operate from Syrian
bases; or (3) attempts to secure immediate
UN or great power action to halt the conflict
or possibly to provide justification for sub-
sequent Soviet armed intervention.
3. A key factor in the USSR's choice of coun-
termoves would be its estimate of the US re-
action. We do not believe that the USSR
would desire to let the crisis reach such pro-
portions as to involve grave risks of general
war; Zhukov and the Soviet military would
probably advocate caution in this respect.
But the Soviet leaders would probably believe
that their own deterrent capabilities as well
as other factors would also induce caution on
the part of the Western powers and leave the
USSR considerable maneuverability.
4. In this regard the possible role of Khru-
shchev deserves consideration. He has exhib-
ited great boldness and even some impetuosity
in dealing with a number of problems. How-
ever, we believe that he would be disposed to-
ward caution on issues which he thought to
involve appreciable risk of hostilities with the
US. Moreover, he probably does not yet oc-
cupy so dominant a position that his personal
decision alone would be controlling on issues
of such importance.
5. The Soviet leaders are well aware that it
would be extremely difficult for them to bring
substantial Soviet forces to bear in Syria
quickly without violating the frontiers of US
and UK allies, and thereby incurring risks
of direct conflict with US and NATO forces.
We believe that the Soviets would be reluctant
to take these risks unless they were confident
that the US and UK would not react with
armed force, and they probably could not be
confident in this regard.
6. We also believe that the Soviets would be
sensitive to the repercussions on their prestige,
their position in the Middle East, and perhaps
even more their position in Eastern Europe
if they were drawn into a major test of West-
ern-Soviet strength in the Middle East, par-
ticularly one involving Soviet forces, and then
TOP
had to back down. Finally, they would prob-
ably judge that a reverse in Syria would not
be permanent, since Western chances of es-
tablishing a stable pro-Western regime would
seem limited at best.
7. In these circumstances we believe that the
USSR would see major advantages in appear-
ing as a peace-loving opponent of aggression
by an immediate appeal to the UN. Whether
or not the intervention was provoked by Syria,
the USSR would label it as Western-initiated,
and might expect that it would be viewed as
aggression by a substantial number of UN
members, particularly among the Afro-Asian
nations. By acting through the UN, the
USSR would avoid the risks and difficulties of
extensive military countermoves as well as
the possible political disadvantages resulting
from the appearance of Soviet forces in the
Middle East. Soviet success in getting UN in-
tervention would greatly enhance Soviet pres-
tige and inevitably appear as a?def eat for the
US. Moreover, by itself playing a major role
in UN or great power intercession, the USSR
would help to achieve one of its major ob-
jectives, that of securing a recognized voice in
great power action on Middle Eastern issues.
8. The duration of the crisis might signifi-
cantly affect the Soviet reaction. If the initial
intervention were rapidly successful, the odds
against extensive Soviet military support to
Syria would be increased. But if the crisis
dragged on and UN action were delayed, the
USSR might step up its support of Syria, es-
pecially if growing world condemnation of the
intervention appeared to support this. How-
ever, the USSR's estimate of the likely West-
ern reaction would remain the key factor in
any such Soviet decision.
9. The USSR could count on the extensive
capabilities of Egypt and Syria for sabotage,
fomenting strikes and demonstrations, and
otherwise stirring up trouble in the Middle
East and it would aid and abet them in this
activity. In particular Egypt and Syria could
extensively disrupt Middle East oil supplies.
In event of fighting in Syria, some interrup-
tion of oil movements would almost certainly
CRET
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occur, and subversive activities in Lebanon,
Jordan, and Iraq would probably be stepped
up. Moreover, the USSR might make threat-
ening gestures outside the Middle East, as
a diversionary action.
CASE A ? PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO
INTERVENTION BY IRAQ ALONE,
OR TOGETHER WITH JORDAN
AND/OR LEBANON
10. Unless the USSR believed that Iraqi-Leb-
anese-Jordanian military capabilities and po-
litical stability had been substantially im-
proved prior to the attack, the USSR would
probably think that these countries were un-
likely to succeed in their designs, at least
quickly. Therefore, with US/UK and Turkish
forces not directly involved, it is almost cer-
tain the USSR would not intervene directly.
Instead it would probably attempt by threats
and intimidating military gestures to deter
subsequent Turkish or US/UK support to the
invaders, and to warn the states concerned
that the USSR might be compelled to inter-
vene if they did not withdraw.
11. The USSR would alinost certainly press
immediately for UN intervention to enforce a
cease-fire. It would label the US, UK and
Turkey as being the real ,behind-the-scenes
aggressors, and pointedly invite them to sup-
port strong UN action. The USSR might
threaten that unless the UN acted, it would
have to intervene. Alternatively, it might
call for great power intervention and media-
tion with Soviet participation.
12. Meanwhile, to enhance Syrian resistance,
the USSR would probably urge Egypt to send
troops and aircraft to Syria's support. Some
degree of direct Soviet technical and logistical
support to Syria would also be likely. How-
ever, the USSR probably would not risk broad-
ening the conflict (at least initially) by send-
ing in numerous "volunteers." The USSR
would employ sea lift, if feasible, and possibly
clandestine overflights over Iran and Iraq,
despite their Baghdad Pact status; some over-
flights over SE Turkey might be undertaken,
but the USSR would seek to limit the risks of
Turkish reaction.
TO
ECRET
3
CASE B ? PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO
INTERVENTION BY TURKEY ALONE
OR TOGETHER WITH THE ABOVE
ARAB STATES
13. In our view the USSR would feel com-
pelled to react much more strongly and im-
mediately in this case, because of the in-
creased prospects of early Syrian collapse. It
would almost certainly adopt a highly threat-
ening posture, possibly including military
gestures along Turkish and perhaps Iranian
frontiers.
14. But we believe that the USSR would still
see great initial advantages in diplomatic and
UN action for an immediate cease-fire and
withdrawal. In the case of Turkish interven-
tion alone it is unlikely that any provocation
justifying the intervention would be convinc-
ing to the world. In this case the USSR could
expect support from most Afro-Asian states,
and many abstentions from other countries.
The Soviets would probably estimate that a
condemnation-withdrawal resolution could be
obtained in a very few days, unless the US
vigorously opposed, and that in this event the
US would be very seriously embarrassed. If
the Turks had been joined by one or more
Arab states, the Soviet chances of a majority
would be less but the USSR would still expect
a large number of favorable votes.
15. We believe the attractions of this course
would be such that the Soviets would almost
certainly make it their initial move. Should
they do so, they might continue to make
threatening gestures, as being likely to pro-
mote rapid UN action rather than the reverse.
However, the Soviets would probably limit
their military help to Syria, at least during
this initial period of UN consideration, to
technical and logistical support. The Soviets
would also encourage active Egyptian support
of Syria, as well as sabotage, disruption and
subversion in any Arab states joining with
Turkey.
16. If a UN resolution brought a halt to the
Turkish action, the USSR would move to par-
ticipate as actively as possible in the settle-
ment and to insure a pro-Soviet government.
ECRET
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TOP
If, on the other hand, the Turks persisted
notwithstanding the UN resolution and, as is
probable, appeared likely to overthrow the
present Syrian government and occupy Da-
mascus, the USSR would be confronted with
the choice between major military action and
acceptance of this result.
17. If the Soviet leaders considered that the
prevailing climate of opinion would sharply
inhibit Western countermoves, and that Syria
could be effectively assisted, they might risk
sending "volunteers"; they might even risk
some overflights of SE Turkey where Turkish
air defenses are weak and the chances of a
clash limited. In fact, the USSR might esti-
mate that such actions would influence the
Western powers to accept a cease-fire. How-
ever, we believe that the USSR would be re-
luctant to try to oppose Turkish forces by
large scale use of Soviet forces in Syria. The
Soviet leaders would probably regard such in-
tervention as difficult to carry out on a scale
large enough to be effective against the Turks
without entailing substantial risks of US-UK
countermeasures. Finally, if a UN resolution
were in existence, large scale Soviet interven-
tion would be an inappropriate response un-
less specifically authorized by the resolution.
18. As to direct military action against
Turkey itself, we believe that such action
would be highly unlikely, though we cannot
exclude it altogether. We believe that, in the
absence of contrary indications, the USSR
would probably believe that a Soviet attack
on Turkey would be taken by the US as invok-
ing NATO obligations, and hence would create
grave risk of general war. Even if the Soviet
action were under a UN resolution, the Soviets
would probably regard the risk as substantial.
Moreover, in deciding whether to accept this
risk, the Soviets might calculate that the
Turkish success would be short-lived. Even if
Turkey had been joined by one or more Arab
states, the USSR would expect a widespread
popular Arab reaction against Turkey (and
against the US as Turkey's apparent sponsor) ,
which could subsequently be turned to major
Soviet advantage in the Middle East.
19. While the above reasoning seems to us to
weigh heavily against any Soviet resort to
CRET 4
direct military action, we repeat that we can-
not exclude such action wholly, having in
mind particularly the possible Soviet belief
that the US would not in the last analysis
resort to general war.
CASE C ? PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION IN
THE ABOVE CONTINGENCIES IF
THE US AND UK GAVE SIGNIFI-
CANT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
20. Since the USSR would regard any inter-
vention in Syria as being US/UK instigated
and supported, we believe that it would expect
further significant US/UK aid to Turkey
and/or its Arab partners once the in-
tervention had begun. Assuming that such
aid was demonstrable, the USSR would use
it to back up its diplomatic and propaganda
efforts to label the Western powers as the real
aggressors and to secure UN intercession.
21. The USSR might also regard such overt
US/UK aid as permitting the USSR to justify
publicly such open assistance to Syria as send-
ing "volunteers," or Soviet aircraft and crews
to operate from Syrian bases, thus intensi-
fying the crisis. On the other hand the fact
of such US/UK support would be additional
evidence of their determination and might
reinforce Soviet caution. On balance we con-
sider that the USSR probably would remain
unwilling to take the risks of extensive mili-
tary counteraction for the reasons given in
Case B above.
CASE D ? PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION IF
LARGE SCALE SOVIET EMPLOY-
MENT OF VOLUNTEERS, FOLLOW-
ING TURKISH INTERVENTION IN
SYRIA, LED TO US/UK OR POSSIBLY
NATO INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT
OF TURKEY
22. By this time the crisis would already have
resulted in a direct confrontation of Soviet
and Western forces involving grave risk of
miscalculation leading to general war. The
immediate issues in Syria would be over-
shadowed by great power maneuvering on a
broader scale. The momentum of the crisis,
and the commitment of Soviet "volunteers,"
TOP-SECRET
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TO
would have carried the USSR to a point where
backing down would be very difficult. But by
this time, unless other factors emerged to
affect their estimate, we believe the Soviet
leaders would see grave risks of general war
in the light of demonstrated US/UK or NATO
unwillingness to retreat. Three broad alter-
natives would be open to the USSR: (a) to
increase the scope of the local conflict; (b) to
initiate general war; or (c) to seek a negoti-
ated solution.
SECRET 5
23. We believe that if the USSR had not be-
come engaged to a greater extent than a large
scale volunteer force and some overflights, it
would seek to avoid general war and the risks
of general war involved in intensifying the
local conflict. Despite a possible loss to its
prestige if it appeared to back down by seek-
ing negotiations, the USSR might even see
considerable advantages in being the power
which proposed a peaceful solution to the
conflict.
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20 SEPTEMBER 1957
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20 SEPTEMBER 19'57
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SECRET
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TURKISH NAVAL FORCES
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NAVAL DEPLOYMENT
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20 SEPTEMBER 1957
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0
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TOTAL FIGHTERS 130
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS 0
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (J) 0
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (P) 0
TOTAL MISC. AIRCRAFT 10
140
TOTAL
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BULGARIA
JODESSA M.D.
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TOTAL FIGHTERS
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (J)
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (P)
TOTAL MISC. AIRCRAFT
TOTAL
365
255
10
630
Dnepropetrovsk
Zaporozh'ye
All/TAURIC M.D.
--4(;PV0, NAVAL, LRAFt,
TOTAL FIGHTERS
TOTAL LIGHT4rMBEI14r1164
N..56114,te)ED.---BOABERS (J) 63
40T71,1".#0,. BOMBERS (P) 9
TOTAL dISC. AIRCRAFT?
TOTAL \\ p04,
U.
S.
Voroshilovgrad
Simferopol'
BLACK
eociosiya
2:1
Krasnodar
S. R.
NAAICASUS M.D.
(PVO, LRAF)
TOTAL FIGHTERS
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (J)
445
0
0
TOTAL MED. BOMBERS (P)
42
TOTAL MISC. AIRCRAFT
4
TOTAL
491
SE ET
Novorossiysk 6
BLACK SEA FLEET
CRUISERS 8
DESTROYERS 32
DESTROYER ESCORTS 20
PATROL VESSELS 119
MINE VESSELS 82
SUBMARINES 95
SELECTED SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE
BLACK SEA AREA
GROUND STRENGTH= 27 Line Divisions
(1 APRIL /957)
AIR STRENGTH= 3250 Total Operational Military Aircraft
(I JULY 1957)
NAVAL STRENGTH = 261 Surface Vessels
APRIL 1957) 95 Submarines (All Types)
rnArmy Eig Rifle
raLl Corps Mechanized
xx
Division [7.4 Mountain Rifle
I I Brigade
100 200 300 Nautical Miles
100
200
300 Statute Miles
100
200 300 Kilometers
Kirovabad
.Stepanakert
TURKEY
A`stara
IRAN
TRANSCAUCASUS.'6::
(11TH AA & PVO
TOTAL FIGHTERS 940
TOTA
TOTL LIGHT BOMBERS 290
L MED. BOMBERS (.1) 0 (
TOT
TOT MED. BOMBERS (P) 0
L MISC. AIRCRAFT 55
TOTAL
1285
26265 9-57
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP98-00979R000400520001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP98-00979R000400520001-0
1-94 RET
"IpPRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP98-00979R000400520001-0