THE OUTLOOK FOR MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000400240001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 7 1 . 1 ?5 7
29 January 1957
Nt 262
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 71.1-57
THE OUTLOOK FOR MOROCCO
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 29 January 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
2r,REf
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department Or
Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC?D--69/2, 22
June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
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Department of State
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Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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THE OUTLOOK FOR MOROCCO
THE PROBLEM
To assess prospects for Moroccan stability and viability; and to estimate the
probable orientation and policies of an independent Morocco over the next few years.
CONCLUSIONS
1. At least for the short term, the Sultan
and the Istiqlal Party are likely to co-
operate, and the Moroccan government
will probably maintain an essential min-
imum of control over the country. Al-
though extreme elements may break
away from the Istiqlal and form opposi-
tion groups, the government probably
will retain the capability for keeping po-
litical extremism in check for the next
year or two. Over the long run, mount-
ing political opposition probably will com-
pel the Sultan to cede much of his sec-
ular authority to representative political
leaders. (Paras. 10, 22)
2. Morocco's economic difficulties will
continue to be severe over the next few
years. We estimate that Morocco now
requires up to $100 million of new foreign
investment annually even to maintain the
present low standard of living. (Paras.
14, 16)
3. So long as Morocco remains econom-
ically dependent on France, the French
will be able to retain some special privi-
leges in Morocco. (Paras. 13, 15)
SE
4. Morocco will almost certainly not
reach a settlement on major issues with
France as long as the Algerian conflict
continues. An intensification of that
conflict would lead to increasing violence
against French colons and troops in Mo-
rocco, in which event, the Moroccan gov-
ernment might be unable to control wide-
spread disorders. (Paras. 10-12, 19)
5. Morocco will look increasingly to the
US for diplomatic support and economic
aid, especially if friction with France
continues. Should the US fail substan-
tially to meet Moroccan expectations, the
present leadership would probably seek
greater diversification of its sources of
aid, turning to certain Western European
nations and even to the Soviet Bloc.
However, Communist Bloc countries are
unlikely to develop any substantial in-
fluence in Morocco over the short term.
Given US support and assistance, the
Moroccans are likely to regard continua-
tion of the US base program with favor.
(Paras. 17, 21)
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DISCUSSION
6. In the little more than a year since Sultan
Mohammed V regained his throne, Morocco
has achieved independence and has entered
the UN. However, Morocco faces critical
problems in attempting to: (a) maintain in-
ternal control and achieve political integra-
tion and stability; (b) arrive at an acceptable
relationship with France; (c) obtain vitally
needed external aid, and (d) define its rela-
tions with the Arab world, with the West,
and with the Soviet Bloc.
7. Morocco now incorporates the former
French-protected zone, the Spanish northern
and southern zones, and the International
Zone of Tangier ? with a total population of
roughly 10 million. The former protectorate
arrangement tended to strengthen regional
divisions; for at least the short term the
Sultan's continued rule therefore will be es-
sential to the maintenance and extension of
indigenous political and military authority.
The Sultan, a shrewd politician, wishes to
modernize Morocco under his personal guid-
ance and authority.
8. All authority derives from the Sultan as
both political and religious leader of the state.
The Sultan has enhanced his strength by
avoiding the struggles attending the daily
operations of the government, and by com-
mitting his reputation and authority only on
issues likely to magnify his prestige. He alone
bridges the gulf between the modern and
traditional elements of Moroccan society: be-
tween the rapidly multiplying working class,
the small urban middle class, and the semi-
feudal tribal communities still found in much
of the countryside. A national consultative
assembly has been appointed as an ostensible
start toward a constitutional monarchy, but
the Sultan almost certainly will not permit
any early decrease in his authority.
9. The foremost challenge to the Sultan's
position will come from the strength and
ambitions of the Istiqlal Party. The party
faces a dilemma, since it cannot demonstrate
its strength without a parliamentary regime,
but must gain greater initiative in govern-
2
ment in order to retain popular support. The
Istiqlal is led by Foreign Minister Balafrej,
whose views appear in harmony with those
of the Sultan, and by the fiery religious
scholar, Allal el Fassi, whose more extreme
outlook has been shaped by years of bitter
fighting against the French. Thus far there
has been no open- break with the Sultan nor
?any formal cleavage within the Istiqlal
leadership on issues such as composition of
the government, future constitutional re-
forms, and economic and social programs.
However, the Istiqlal's labor federation ally,
the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) with
a dues-paying membership of about 300,000
(it claims a million members) , is likely to
exert increasing pressure upon the party and
the government to fulfill the economic and
social expectations aroused by independence.
In addition, militant Istiqlal factions, as well
as remnants of the largely disbanded guer-
rilla Liberation Army still active along Al-
geria's borders, will increasingly demand ex-
pulsion of French interests and profound po-
litical, economic, and social changes. Al-
though the outlawed Moroccan Communist
Party's current membership is numbered only
in the hundreds, it will continue efforts to
infiltrate the UMT, as well as the Istiqlal,
and to drive the UMT toward a more extreme
position.
10. Istiqlal leaders will be pressed to adopt
policies at variance with the moderate course
of the Sultan and his close, supporters. For
at least the next year or more, however, we
believe that both sides will try to prevent
any sharp break in their relations. There
are likely to be numerous disputes: the Sultan
may make greater efforts to organize his in-
dependent supporters politically, and will con-
tinue to insist upon a coalition government;
Crown Prince Moulay Hassan's interference
in political matters will be resented by the
Istiqlal; the consultative assembly may seek
to assume broader powers than the Sultan
has intended; and more extreme Istiqlal and
labor elements may attempt to form an op-
position grouping. But urgent requirements
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for a united front against the French, for ex-
ternal aid, for a solution to the Algerian prob-
lem, and for extension of central administra-
tion to cope with regional and tribal par-
ticularism probably will dictate continued co-
operation between the Sultan and the Istiqlal
leaders. In these circumstances, the Moroc-
can government is likely to be able generally
to maintain an essential minimum of internal
control for the next year or two, by relying
on its 30,000-man army and by distracting a
restive populace with such issues as with-
drawal of French troops and advancement of
territorial claims. The most serious danger
to that control is the possibility of some Mo-
roccan-French conflict which would set off a
chain reaction of widespread disorders. An-
other danger is posed by tribal disturbances
which could arise from the spread of political
unrest to the countryside. Inability of the Mo-
roccan government to control such disorders
could lead to a breakdown of authority.
11. Since early 1956, Morocco has been trying
to negotiate new ties with France, which has
neither ratified relinquishment of its protec-
torate nor abandoned the aim of "interdepend-
ence" with Morocco. Negotiations have been
greatly complicated by the presence of about
300,000 colons and 80,900 French troops (only
six percent of which are African natives) in
the former French zone, and by the continuing
controversy over Algeria. 1 The French are
inhibited by the need to safeguard their com-
mercial interests and the lives and property
of the colons. On the other hand, Morocco
is restrained in dealing with France by: its
need for external aid, France's control of its
currency, the orientation of its trade toward
France, and its dependence on the colons.
During the next year or two, large-scale emi-
gration of skilled French technical, adminis-
trative, and security personnel would seriously
hamper government operations and could
spell the loss of vital economic services.
12. Negotiations between France and Morocco
over the status of the colons and the defini-
1 Morocco has similar but much less critical prob-
lems with respect to Spain. About 40,000 Span-
ish troops and over 100,000 Spanish nationals
remain in Northern Morocco, where Spanish
currency continues in use.
3
tion of "interdependence" are likely to be pro-
tracted. Meanwhile, the Moroccans probably
will continue their attempts to diminish Mo-
rocco's reliance on France, will seek to re-
duce the number of French troops in Morocco,
and will chip away at the privileged status
of the colons. Despite the efforts of the Mo-
roccan government to insure a peaceful transi-
tion, there may be further attacks on the
colons. If the Algerian conflict is intensified,
there will be a better than even chance of
colon massacres. Over the long run, the
general emigration of the colons, or at least
the loss of their special privileges, appears
inevitable.
13. Morocco must continue to rely on foreign
financial assistance for its development needs.
In the past France has been the principal
source for both public and private investment.
Morocco's trade pattern and currency ar-
rangements within the franc area have also
made it heavily dependent on France. Ex-
ports pay for only somewhat more than half
of imports. The foreign exchange deficit
has been covered mainly by local expenditures
on US airbases ($30-50 million a year on the
bases and $20 million in local expenditures by
US nationals from 1951-1954) , by French civil
and military expenditures in Morocco (of
more than $100 million a year from 1952-
1954) , and by French public and private in-
vestment ($70-90 million a year from 1951-
1954) .
14. Morocco's economic difficulties will con-
tinue to be severe over the next few years.
Political and economic uncertainty has cur-
tailed production and trade and led the
French to repatriate their capital (at a rate
estimated as high as $150 million in 1956)
and to delay any new investment. At the
same time, the Moroccan government is faced
with new and expensive responsibilities aris-
ing from its independent status. Whereas in
the past revenues permitted allocations for
development, they are now insufficient even to
meet ordinary government expenditures. Un-
employment, chronic in the past, has risen
rapidly.
15. France agreed to lend Morocco $75 mil-
lion for its development budget in 1956
but still withholds one-third of the amount.
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While the French Assembly appropriated $90
million for use in Morocco in calendar 1957,
of which perhaps $70 million is planned as
loans for the Moroccan development budget,
France will delay release of these funds in
hopes of obtaining concessions regarding a
defense agreement and preservation of its
other interests. At most, French economic aid
will probably be no more than in the past;
its precise amount will be determined by
hard bargaining in which French efforts to
preserve large influence over the Moroccan
economy will be resisted. Morocco has al-
ready sought US aid of $70 million annually
for three years, but this amount has been
refused on grounds that it would supplant
French aid. However, if French aid is de-
creased, Morocco will turn to the US and,
failing that source, will probably seek as-
sistance elsewhere (e.g., West Germany), in-
cluding even the Soviet Bloc.
16. Morocco will continue to need supplemen-
tary outside assistance even when the pres-
ent difficult situation is overcome. It needs
up to $100 million of new investment each
year just to maintain the present annual aver-
age per capita income ($125) of its popula-
tion ? increasing at an estimated two per-
cent a year ? and considerably more to in-
crease that income. While its natural re-
sources are substantial compared with those
of other North African countries, private
foreign capital is unlikely to be invested in
amounts larger than in the past. For at
least the short run, both ordinary budget
deficits and a shortage of foreign exchange
are likely.
17. France also has a large stake in forth-
coming discussions regarding the US bases,
which were originally set up without consult-
ing Morocco. Even if Morocco continues to
insist upon separate negotiations with the
US and with France, as seems probable, the
question is closely tied to France's future de-
fense responsibilities. There are some prob-
lems involving the US which may not be
solved unless there is either full cooperation
or a complete break between France and Mo-
rocco on defense issues. In any case, the issues
are such that lengthy negotiations between
the US and Morocco seem unavoidable. The
4
Moroccans generally are likely to regard con-
tinuation of the base program with favor.
However, they probably will press increasingly
for larger US economic aid, and insist that a
new base agreement be restricted to a set
period and be subject to frequent review.
18. In their conduct of foreign relations the
Sultan and his government have in general
tended to regard Morocco as a bridge between
the West and the Arab world, uncommitted
fully to either grouping. On the other hand,
Morocco will probably join the Arab League,
though Moroccan leaders will continue to be
wary of Egypt's drive toward hegemony
in North Africa. Membership in the Arab
League probably would not lead in the next
few years to adoption of anti-Western or
neutralist policies by Morocco.
19. The Algerian conflict is increasingly en-
dangering the prospect of an amicable set-
tlement between Morocco and France. Mo-
roccan unofficial material aid and diplomatic
and propaganda support for Algeria are in-
creasing. Should France fail to reach an
Algerian settlement soon, Moroccan aid to the
rebels and French countermeasures probably
would dispel any chance of establishing a
special relationship between France and Mo-
rocco. In the event of widespread attacks
on the colons resulting in conflict between
Moroccan and French armed units, France
might attempt at least partial re-establish-
ment of military control in Morocco. On the
other hand, if France were to propose further
concessions to the Algerian nationalists, it%
might be able to use the Sultan's moderation
and ambition to secure his intercession for an
Algerian settlement. In any event, Moroccan
territorial claims with respect to both Algeria
and Mauritania are bound to create new fric-
tion. Morocco's relations with Spain are also
likely to become embittered by controversy
over North African areas remaining under
Spanish sovereignty.
20. Another effect of the Algerian strife is its
tendency to increase sentiments for unity be-
tween Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and possibly
Libya. The recent amalgamation of leading
Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian labor fed-
erations may foreshadow greater efforts to-
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ward eventual founding of some form of polit-
ical federation. On the other hand, progress
toward a federation is likely to be accompanied
by a contest for leadership between the Sultan
and Tunisian Premier Bourguiba.
21. Continued friction with France will lead
Morocco to look increasingly toward the US
both for diplomatic support and for aid to
supplant that now received from the French.
Should the US fail substantially to meet Mo-
roccan expectations, even the present leader-
ship may be compelled by internal pressures
to adopt a less cooperative attitude. In any
case Morocco is likely to establish formal dip-
lomatic and expanded commercial relations
with Communist Bloc countries within the
next year or two. While those countries are
unlikely to develop any substantial influence
in Morocco ' during the next few years, they
may do so beyond that period if appreciable
progress is not made toward a stable and vi-
able Moroccan regime.
22. Over the longer term, mounting political
and economic grievances and Istiqlal opposi-
tion probably will erode the position of the
Sultan. Much ? if not all ? of his secular
authority is likely to be relinquished to repre-
sentative political leaders, at least at the out-
set probably under a constitutional monarchy.
Should such leaders fail to obtain essential
external aid and to cope with likely disturb-
ances, they in turn probably would be sup-
planted by more extreme and anti-Western
regimes. Control of the Royal Moroccan
Army would prove decisive in an internal
contest for power.
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15 10
35
30
25-
20
32
ATLANTIC
MADEIRA
ISLANDS eZr?
(Portugal) s
OCEAN
CANARY ISLANDS
(Spain)
4/1
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? \ ? WEST AFRICA
100 290 300 Mlles
0 160 200 300 Kilometers
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(.)
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Boundaries and names ore not necessarily
those recognized by the U S Government
GLOSSARY
Ain spring well
Aioun springs wells
Cabo cape
Cap cape
Hass i well
Kasba fort citadel
Ksar fortified village fort
military post
Morro rock headland
Oglat pool(s) wellIsI
Oiled wadi watercourse
Rio river
Sebkra intermittent lake salt flat
Souk market
Uad with watercourse
0
MOROCCO
+ USAF airfield
+ US?French joint use airfield
+ US?French joint use naval air station
+ Other important military and civil airfields
4, US naval communications facility
French naval base
- USAF pipeline (Approximate alignment)
CEUTA Spanish presidio
GENERAL BASIC INFORMATION
I Railroad standard gauge
Railroad various narrow gauges
Principal road
Intermittent lake
Marsh
50
Statute Miles
50 100
I--4
10,0
150
Kilometers
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36
34
32
30
28
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