THE OUTLOOK FOR TUNISIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000400230001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

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0114A NIE 71.3-57
18 June 1957
SECRET
N? 302
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 71.3-57
THE OUTLOOK FOR TUNISIA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 18 June 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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THE OUTLOOK FOR TUNISIA
THE PROBLEM
To assess prospects for Tunisian viability and stability, and to estimate the prob-
able orientation and policies of Tunisia over the next few years.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Tunisian Premier Bourguiba is at-
tempting to create a modern secular state
oriented toward the West. He has the
admiration and affection of the great
majority of his people, but is faced with
deteriorating economic conditions and
incipient political opposition. The prin-
cipal obstacles to the success of his pol-
icies are Tunisia's lack of natural re-
sources and trained personnel, and the
impact of the Algerian conflict. (Paras.
7, 10, 13)
2. Tunisia's economic difficulties will con-
tinue to be severe well beyond the period
of this estimate. Annual foreign assist-
ance on the order of $75 million will be
required to maintain even the current de-
pressed economic level. Conaiderably
larger sums would probably be needed to
insure continuous modest improvement.
(Para. 11)
3. The ramifications of the Algerian con-
flict pose a substantial threat to Tunisia's
internal security and strain the country's
relations with France. At present, there
is a better than even chance that dis-
orders in Tunisia arising from this cause
will not lead to a breakdown of govern-
ment authority, though this estimate
might be changed if the strife hi Algeria
were prolonged. Negotiation of a new
relationship acceptable to both France
and Tunisia is not likely while the Alge-
rian conflict continues, and there will
probably be a loosening of ties between
the two countries. (Paras. 18, 21, 23)
4. Bourguiba probably will retain his
dominant position over the next year or
two, although some defections from his
National Front are likely. Should he
leave the political scene, his Neo-Destour
Party probably would retain political
power for some time. However, Tunisia
is likely to experience increasing political
instability unless it receives substantial
external economic assistance. (Paras..
14, 16-17)
5. Continued difficulties with France will
cause Tunisia to look increasingly toward
the US for both financial and diplomatic
support. The Tunisians are unlikely to?
seek aid from the Soviet Bloc as long as
they can expect to receive it from the
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West. However, Tunisia is likely to estab-
lish diplomatic relations and to expand
commercial dealings with the Communist
Bloc countries during the next year or
two. But those countries are unlikely
to develop any significant influence in
Tunisia over the next few years. (Paras.
12, 26)
DISCUSSION
6. Tunisia, which entered the UN last fall,
has been an independent state since 20 March
1956. But it has made only limited progress
toward overcoming its dependence on France.
French-Tunisian relations are still governed
to a considerable extent by arrangements
made before France's recognition of Tunisian
independence. The French have shown little
disposition to meet Tunisian terms for new
arrangements, largely from fear that their
ability to protect their interests and nationals
and to repress the Algerian rebellion would be
greatly diminished. Significant restraints
on Tunisia's freedom of action include its
membership in the franc zone and its need
for French financial aid, technicians, and
administrators. The Tunisian government,
headed by Prime Minister Habib Bourguiba
? the terms are practically synonymous ?
thus has been seriously hampered in its at-
tempts to deal with internal problems and
gain an influential role for Tunisia in inter-
national affairs.
7. Nevertheless, Bourguiba has been able to
initiate what amounts to a social revolution
designed to change Tunisia from a traditional
Moslem state into a modern secular one, with-
out, however, directly challenging Islamic be-
liefs. The status of women has been im-
proved; further polygamous marriages have
been forbidden; lands held in religious trust
have been nationalized; certain religious in-
stitutions of higher learning have been taken
over by the state and given a Westernized
curriculum. The general public reaction to
these rather drastic measures so far has not
been antagonistic. However, this situation
may not persist unless Bourguiba can satisfy
larger national aspirations by fulfilling his
program for creation of a strong constitu-
tional government capable of attacking fun-
damental domestic problems. The two out-
standing obstacles confronting Bourguiba as
he attempts to carry out his policies are the
impact of the Algerian conflict and Tunisia's
great poverty, especially the paucity of nat-
ural resources. These factors are basic and
complicate all of Tunisia's problems.
8. Economic Trends. Two-thirds of Tunisia is
virtually desert, and most of the remainder
along the coastline is marginal agriculturally
? yet agriculture supports 70 percent of the
3,800,000 people, and accounts for over half
the national income. Extensive exploration
has revealed generally modest mineral re-
sources of phosphates, lead, and iron, a little
natural gas, and thus far no petroleum.
Drought and famine are recurrent; 45,000
tons of US relief wheat, as well as commercial
imports, were required because of inadequate
rainfall in 1956. On the other hand, there
was a wheat surplus the previous year. Un-
employment has reached a figure of about
400,000, approaching the number of employed
wage-earners. Moreover, Tunisia's foreign
trade consistently runs a deficit, amounting
to a rough average of $50 million over the
past few years; about 75 percent of total trade
is with France through a customs union and
Tunisian participation in the franc zone.
9. Notwithstanding Tunisia's poor economic
potential, the French government has put
some $400 million into the country during
1947-1956, mostly for large transport and ir-
rigation projects in the north. These sums
have made up past deficits in the Tunisian or-
dinary budget and have provided almost all
the funds for the development budget, now
programmed at an annual rate of $50 million.
This French public investment, together with
civil and military expenditures and private
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investment, has averaged about $75 million
annually over the last nine years.
10. The first year of independence has been
one of continued economic deterioration. Un-
employment and the cost of living are steadi-
ly rising; departures of French technicians
are adversely affecting production; the popu-
lation is increasing at a rate of two percent
a year; and conservative estimates of capital
flight during 1956 ran from $15-30 million,
while private capital inflow from France was
sharply reduced. Further loss of capital is
unlikely to be replaced from domestic savings
and could greatly increase economic difficul-
ties, especially the unemployment problem.
11. Tunisia's economic problems will continue
to be severe well beyond the period of this
estimate. Pending resumption of full-scale
negotiations with Tunisia, the French have
released only an estimated $5 million of the
approximately $46 million of aid promised for
1956-1957. France has appropriated an equal
sum for 1957-1958, but a considerable portion
of this money may be spent for repatriation
of French nationals who wish to leave the
country. The Tunisians are to receive $5.5
million in US loans and technical assistance
during FY 1957, and have been offered an ad-
ditional grant of $3 million as a result of the
Richards Mission. This latter offer is con-
tingent on plans for its use by, the Tunisians,
but realistic planning is difficult since they
are ignorant as to the actual total of foreign
aid they will receive, and have had little time
for such planning. In any event, an annual
sum of about $40 million of foreign invest-
ment, and an additional $35 million of foreign
exchange now provided by declining French
civil and military expenditures will be re-
quired as a basic minimum for maintenance
of present economic conditions. Considerably
larger amounts would probably be needed to
insure continuous modest economic improve-
ment.
12. We believe that French aid is likely to de-
crease, and to be delivered only after pro-
longed bargaining, even though France will
seek to maintain its economic ties with and
interests in Tunisia as part of the "Eurafrica"
policy. For their part, the Tunisians will be
inhibited in seeking alternative sources of
aid by their close economic links with France.
They will be forced to move slowly in attempt-
ing to diminish their dependence on French
trade and assistance. However, if it becomes
increasingly clear that France is not prepared
to extend promised assistance, they will show
less concern for French sensibilities. They are
already pressing for increased aid from the
US, and will probably intensify their efforts
in spite of the expressed US intention to sup-
plement rather than supplant French aid.
The Tunisians are unlikely to look to the So-
viet Bloc so long as they can expect to receive
aid from the West. However, advantageous
trade offers, technical assistance, or even small
amounts of aid would probably be accepted
if the Tunisians felt that this would not
alienate Western sources, or would stimulate
increased contributions from the West.
13. Political and Internal Security Prospects.
Premier Bourguiba, who symbolizes the long
and successful nationalist struggle for inde-
pendence, is by far the most important factor
in Tunisian life. His complex nature com-
bines considerable intellectual capacity and
political shrewdness with the prophetic quality
of one who has led his people out of the wil-
derness, great sensitivity to emerging popular
opinions, a seeming indifference to adminis-
trative detail, a realistic view of Tunisia's basic
weaknesses, and an urge to become an inter-
national statesman. He has the admiration
and affection of the great majority of his
people, although he has no assurance that
they fully support his policies. However,
despite the advantages of his personal posi-
tion, Bourguiba currently is faced with incip-
ient political opposition from various quarters.
14. Bourguiba's foremost political problem is
that of holding together the twin bases of
his organized support: the Neo-Destour Party
? of which he is the leader ? and its labor
ally, the Union Generale Tunisienne du Tra-
vail (UGTT) , an ICFTU affiliate with about
150,000 members. These are the only politi-
cal and labor organizations of any great size
in Tunisia. Forming a National Front with
various commercial groups and independents,
Bourguiba's supporters won all 98 seats in
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the Constituent Assembly elected in March
1956. Bourguiba assumed control of the gov-
ernment in April. The leadership of the high-
ly-organized Neo-Destour consists of French-
trained intellectuals and middle-class busi-
nessmen, the large majority of whom are
Western-oriented. Some of these party fig-
ures, who also serve in the government, are
becoming concerned about indications of pub-
lic disillusionment with the results of inde-
pendence and the consequent possibility of a
setback in Neo-Destour popularity. Dissatis-
faction within the UGTT over Tunisia's mod-
erate economic programs and dependence up-
on French aid recently caused the govern-
ment to arrange for the replacement of the
UGTT leader, Ahmed ben Salah, with one
more sympathetic to Bourguiba's policies.
However, a major reversal of Neo-Destour and
UGTT support for the government is unlikely
in the near future, although there will prob-
ably be some defections. Greater opposition
to the government probably will be expressed
after the introduction of the new constitution
? likely to be published within the next 12
months ? which will provide for election of
a legislative assembly.
15. At present, there are only a few weak
political elements outside the National Front
which are clearly opposed to the Bourguiba
government. These elements include: (a)
the entourage of the aged Bey, Tunisia's titu-
lar ruler, whose remaining power is rapidly
being stripped away; (b) the conservative
Old Destour Party, which has only strength
enough for a "whispering campaign" against
Bourguiba's Western orientation; (c) sup-
porters of the extreme nationalist, Salah ben
Youssef, whose prospects depend on the sup-
port of Egypt, where he remains in exile; and
(d) the small Tunisian Communist Party
(PCT), which has only a few hundred hard-
core members. Although technically legal,
the PCT has been declining in strength for
several years; its small labor affiliate dissolved
itself last year; and the Neo-Destour and
UGTT have shown themselves ready and able
to prevent any significant degree of Commu-
nist penetration. The domestic Communists
are unlikely to make much headway over the
4
next few years unless economic conditions
worsen greatly.
16. We believe that Bourguiba will maintain
his dominant position over the next year or
two, either as prime minister or ? after abol-
ishing the Bey's titular function ? as head of
a republican government. Although he will
probably face increasing criticism from his
cabinet colleagues, who are often irked by his
lack of concern for their administrative prob-
lems, he is unlikely to be confronted with any
major political challenge until formation of
a legislative assembly. Even then it might
be some time before an effective opposition
could take shape. When it does, Bourguiba
may seek to circumvent a critical assembly
and maintain his power with more author-
itarian measures. Should Bourguiba die or
? as seems unlikely ? resign his office, the
Neo-Destour probably would retain political
power for some time; it would probably have
considerable success in preserving a balance
between its conservative and radical elements,
but ? eventually might come under extremist
influence and adopt less friendly policies to-
ward the West. In any case, Tunisia is likely
to experience increasing political instability
unless it can show a moderate degree of prog-
ress toward its objectives; substantial ex-
ternal aid will be a prerequisite to such prog-
ress.
17. In the event of political disorders, the
Tunisian government has few forces with
which to maintain internal security. These
at present consist of an army of about 2,200
men (roughly one-third of whom form an
honor guard for the Bey), and approximately
an equal number of special security personnel
with functions similar to the French Gen-
darmerie (which for the most part has been
withdrawn from Tunisia). These Tunisian
forces are poorly equipped and constitute a
rather ineffective force, although their ability
to perform their responsibilities in the face
of widespread disorders remains largely un-
tested. The Bourguiba government therefore
is seeking a substantial increase in the num-
bers and capabilities of the army, and US as-
sistance toward that end.
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18. In the short term, the major threats to
Tunisia's internal security arise out of the
Algerian conflict. These include: the dangers
involved in continued Tunisian official support
for the Algerian rebels, the presence of large
numbers of Algerian refugees in Tunisia, and
the possibility of armed conflict between the
colons' and the Tunisian populace. Bour-
guiba is aware of these dangers, and in par-
ticular is repeatedly urging the Algerian na-
tionalists to negotiate with the French. At
present, there is a better than even chance
that disorders will not cause a breakdown of
government authority. However, the situa-
tion might be substantially changed by pro-
longed and intensified strife in Algeria. In
this situation, French troops might intervene.
19. Relations with France. Numerous efforts
toward regularizing ties between France and
Tunisia have been made since March 1956,
but they have been largely negated by the
ramifications of the Algerian problem The
presence of some 35,000-40,000 French armed
forces in Tunisia has proved a particularly
contentious issue. The French insist on keep-
ing their approximately 25,000 troops in posi-
tion to seal off parts of the Algerian border;
and they hope to retain use of various air
facilities as well as the naval base at Bizerte.
However, Bourguiba is adamant that all
French troops must be withdrawn to Bizerte
before defense negotiations can progress.
20. A further problem is posed by the roughly
160,000 French colons remaining in Tunisia
(over 20,000 have emigrated during the past
year). 2 Tunisia is officially responsible for
their security, but the colons constantly press
for retention of the present level of French
forces. Many of these settlers occupy privi-
leged positions and perform vital services in
Tunisia's economy and administration; Bour-
guiba wishes to retain the services of most of
these settlers but to eliminate their special
We use the term to describe not merely the
great landowners of French ancestry, but all
settlers of European descent.
These figures do not include Algerians residing
in Tunisia, although nominally they are French.
There are about 65,000 other European settlers
(mostly Italian) in the area.
privileges. Their continued emigration in
substantial numbers ? added to further de-
partures of French civil service technicians ?
would prove a serious setback to Tunisia's
efforts to cope with its economic problems. ,
21. Negotiation of a new relationship accept-
able to both France and Tunisia is unlikely
while the Algerian conflict continues. There
may be occasional improvement in relations
and piecemeal settlement of particular issues,
but the future of the colons and of French
interests is likely to remain uncertain. In
these circumstances, the French community
in Tunisia is likely to become increasingly
bitter against the Bourguiba regime and de-
mand more support from the French govern-
ment. Without such additional support ?
which is unlikely to be extended ? we believe
the colons probably will not undertake more
than isolated acts of violence. Over the long
run, it appears inevitable that the colons will
lose their special position, and that most of
the best qualified of them will emigrate.
22. Probable Tunisian Foreign Policies. Pre-
mier Bourguiba has clearly, if not completely,
identified himself with the Western world.
He was among the first to applaud the US
Middle East Doctrine, he has criticized Soviet
actions in Hungary, and has condemned
Egypt's Nasser for relying upon Soviet aid
and for interfering in North African affairs.
While Bourguiba appears to be convinced that
Tunisia's interests are best served by identi-
fication with the West, he nevertheless is
seeking to play a role out of proportion to his
country's capacity and he expects to be re-
warded by the West. Some of his colleagues
are opposed to closer relations with the West,
as against solidarity with the Arab East.
Others are fearful that Tunisian sovereignty
will be impaired by Bourguiba's policies. The
premier responds to this criticism by making
compensating gestures toward the Arab world
from time to time. Nevertheless, he is in-
volved with the West to the point where his
domestic position could be seriously damaged
by failure to obtain adequate Western aid.
23. Bourguiba's ability to promote Tunisia's
national interest while adapting his policies
to domestic political considerations has been
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fully displayed in his dealings with France.
He makes clear to the French his personal
acceptance of their culture and the idea of
close relations, but he supports the rebels in
Algeria and criticizes French policy there.
Public pressures prevent him from taking a
more moderate stand regarding France and
the Algerian issue. French-Tunisian relations
thus are likely to undergo recurring crises so
long as the Algerian conflict continues. There
will probably be interludes during which nego-
tiations may be completed on various prob-
lems, such as currency, technical programs,
and cultural ties. But the impact of the Al-
gerian struggle and the likely decrease in
French financial aid will probably result in
a continuous loosening of ties between France
and Tunisia. Moreover, so long as large num-
bers of French troops remain in Tunisia, there
may be further serious incidents embroiling
French-Tunisian relations. On the other
hand, France almost certainly will not at-
tempt a military reoccupation of Tunisia un-
less the Tunisians become much more active
in the Algerian war or prove unable to pro-
tect the colons in case of widespread attacks
upon them.
24. In his relations with African countries
Bourguiba will continue his efforts to act
as the sponsor of North African unity and
of the fight against "colonialism." Initial
moves toward a North African federation have
been made by labor and student groups. Con-
crete political moves toward bringing Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and possibly Libya into a
federal relationship are unlikely to succeed
in the face of the present rivalry for leader-
ship within the area. However, more limited
special ties between these countries will prob-
ably emerge. Tunisia and Libya, for example,
have already established closer relations.
Both Morocco and Tunisia will compete for
6
the most influential role at pan-African con-
ferences such as that sponsored by Ghana for
next autumn.
25. Tunisia probably will strengthen its ties
with the Middle Eastern states and eventually
join the Arab League. As long as Bourguiba
receives substantial Western aid, he will prob-
ably continue to speak as a pro-Western Arab
leader and therefore come into public con-
flict with Nasser. He has already been an-
tagonized by Nasser's encouragement of Salah
ben Youssef, and by Egyptian attempts to
gain influence in Tunisia and other North
African states, particularly Libya. Thus, if
Tunisia joined the Arab League, Bourguiba
would probably align himself with Iraq on
many issues, although he is likely to wish to
avoid taking sides in existing Arab rivalries.
26. Continued difficulties with France will
cause Tunisia to look increasingly toward the
US both for financial and diplomatic support.
In an effort to obtain increased aid, the
Bourguiba government may even be willing
to offer Tunisian territory as a site for US
defense facilities. On the other hand, Tuni-
sia's attitude toward NATO is shaped by the
Algerian conflict. It is unlikely to favor mem-
bership in NATO while that conflict continues
or so long as France insists on serving as
primary intermediary. Membership in other
Western organizations will be regarded by
Tunisia in terms of the economic advantages
that might thereby be gained. At the same
time, Tunisia is likely to establish diplomatic
relations and to expand commercial dealings
with the Communist Bloc countries during
the next year or two, partly to demonstrate
its independence. While those countries are
unlikely to develop any significant influence
in Tunisia over the next few years, they may
in the future do so if substantial progress is
not made toward creation of a viable and
stable Tunisian regime.
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