PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY PROGRAMS OF SELECTED FREE WORLD GOVERNMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000300580001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1955
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNE 100-8-55
13 December 1955
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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-8-55
PROBABLE TRENDS IN
THE? MILITARY PROGRAMS OF SELECTED
FREE WORLD GOVERNMENTS
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 13 December 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff and the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of the jurisdiction of the FBI.
. 2' 4 4
COPY NO
ASS ISTANT DIRECTOR* ONE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
migsion or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY PROGRAMS OF
SELECTED FREE WORLD GOVERNMENTS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the over-all trends in the military programs of our NATO allies (ex-
cept Canada) , and of Spain, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Japan over the next five years.1
ASSUMPTION
That US military aid will continue at approximately present levels.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Most, if not all, of these governments
believe that the danger of general war
has receded: Most of them believe they
ought to re-examine their armament poli-
cies in light of competing demands upon
the public revenues and in light of the
military requirements which are likely to
emerge from the new international situa-
tion and the rapidly developing art of
modern warfare. (Para. 14)
2. Increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities
have raised the question of whether they
can achieve any practical defense against
nuclear attack. They have not been able
to translate the current broad "forward
strategy" concept based upon the employ-
ment of nuclear weapons into a practical
and tangible pattern for their own armed
forces. With their feeling that the day
'This estimate has been prepared on short notice
in response to a specific request for coordinated
Intelligence. It is anticipated that another and
more definitive estimate covering the outlook for
Western Europe will be forthcoming at a later
date.
of reckoning has been indefinitely post-
poned, decisions as to military expendi-
tures therefore will be increasingly influ-
enced by domestic political and economic
considerations. (Paras. 16-17)
3. The general trend is in the direction
of a reduction of defense budgets in West-
ern Europe. Nevertheless, over the short
run there will be a modest over-all in-
crease in the defense expenditures of Eu-
ropean NATO countries, since increases
in Germany are likely to offset decreases
elsewhere. They will, however, continue
to be inadequate fully to implement the
NATO program. Even maintenance of
forces and budgets in NATO countries,
other than West Germany, at somewhat
reduced levels will not occur without con-
siderable political strain. (Para. 23)
4. Over the longer period through 1960,
the prospects are even less favorable. As
time passes, these governments are likely
to become more reluctant to adhere to
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an over-all strategy which, they feel ex-
poses them to nuclear attack but gives
them neither retaliatory nuclear power
nor substantial protection from nuclear
attack. They will find defense against
such attack both costly and extremely
difficult of achievement. We believe,
however, that in general the defense pro-
grams of our allies will be maintained at
levels necessary to secure a continued US
commitment and thus obtain the deter-
rent effect. (Paras. 23-24)
5. A series of even minor concessions by
the USSR would probably lead to a
further decline in military expenditures,
whereas resumption of the old Soviet poli-
cies would contribute to the maintenance
of present levels. (Para. 25)
6. A cutback in US aid, particularly a re-
duction of US forces abroad, almost cer-
tainly would be followed by both military
reductions and political discouragement.
(Para. 26)
2
7. The preceding conclusions apply gen-
erally to the NATO countries. The UK
is an exception, and during the next five
years will probably adhere generally to
a military program of approximately the
present level while revamping its char-
acter to the requirements of modern war-
fare. In Japan there is sentiment that
rearmament is now necessary, and a con-
tinued international detente is not likely
to retard the program. West Germany
may not adhere to the three-four year
build-up and may substitute a four-five
year period for rearmament. Both Tur-
key and Pakistan would be willing to ex-
pand their military programs, but even
fulfillment of existing plans, which have
contributed to their present economic
distress, depends on receipt of heavy US
aid. While there is a possibility that
Yugoslavia will cut back its program to
some degree, any such cuts are unlikely
to be substantial. (Paras. 27-28, 30, 32-
34)
DISCUSSION
I. BACKGROUND OF PRESENT MILITARY
PROGRAMS
8. The mainspring in the rearmament of the
major Free World nations of the West during
the past seven or eight years has been the
need and desire to counter growing Soviet
military strength and the threat of Commu-
nist expansion by military force. The seizure
of power in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin block-
ade, and the initiation of war by proxy in
Korea were signs that even the most opti-
mistic could hardly miss. Although the
United States alone in the postwar period had
the resources to carry out a speedy and large-
scale program for active defense against Com-
munist aggression, several other powers were
prepared to take steps within their capacities
to strengthen and modernize their armed
forces. With extensive US aid, the military
position of the Free World vis-a-vis the Soviet
Bloc has been very substantially improved.
9. However, it was not a simple and single
reason which motivated all the countries con-
cerned. Except possibly during several crises
in which fear of general war for a time monop-
olized the attention of governments, there has
never been a common belief that full-scale
war between the Soviet Bloc and the Free
World was inevitable. If there was a common
denominator, it was by recognition that such
a war could be averted by a reasonable balance
of military power. However, it was a common
feeling (particularly in Western Europe) that
if the two great powers fought each other,
most other countries would be overrun or dis-
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astrously bombed and they must do what they
could to prevent the holocaust. Thus, while
active defense always has been a considera-
tion, the idea of deterrence became the chief
rationale of European NATO powers in de-
fending the pact and in developing forces
under its aegis.
10. But it was not deterrence alone that
caused some governments to develop military
programs in cooperation with the US and with
US assistance. In some countries the military
program was adopted in part to strengthen
the existing government against the threat
of internal subversion, as in Greece; to
strengthen the government against its imme-
diate neighbors, as in Pakistan; or to gain
in international standing, as in Italy. The
weight of US leadership and economic power
also has been a factor; the expectation of
US economic aid and US expenditures within
their borders were strong motivations in some
of these countries. Moreover, the importance
of obtaining a US commitment, in the form
of an open declaration if not of actual forces,
was often an overriding factor. The risk or
annoyance caused by the presence of US forces
and bases was for the most part overshadowed
by a sense of security against the USSR, and
in some cases other erstwhile or potential ene-
mies (e. g., Germany) as well.
11. Along with the desire for a US commit-
ment was an effort to influence US policy and
to achieve a voice in international affairs
which these countries would not otherwise
have been able to assert. The nature of mod-
ern warfare and the increased polarization
of power meant that, unless some form of
association occurred, the less powerful be-
came mere pawns. In these circumstances,
the NATO and other alliances provided a form
of association which did not offend national
sensibilities and enabled them to influence
Free World policy. These factors constitute
a foundation for cooperation not without
meaning for military programs, and suggest
that there is a minimum level of military con-
tribution below which members cannot uni-
laterally go without an unacceptable loss of
influence.
II. THE PRESENT SITUATION
3
12. Decline in motivation. To the extent that
the military programs were based upon fear
of war, they have lost some of their motiva-
tion during the past two to three years. The
termination of hostilities in Korea and Indo-
china, the relative quiet in the Taiwan Straits,
and the relative stability in Europe have given
an appearance of a world freer from situa-
tions which generated the fear of incidents
and expanding conflict. The developments in
the USSR following the death of Stalin have
created an atmosphere in which the danger of
Communist expansion by force appears to be
at least temporarily reduced. The Summit
Conference at Geneva in July led to the estab-
lishment of a tacit understanding that issues
in dispute between the Bloc and the West
would not be allowed to lead to a general East-
West crisis involving serious danger of gen-
eral war. Thus a growing popular feeling has
crystallized that the nightmare of nuclear
war, in which everyone in one way or another
would be involved, can be permanently exor-
cised, despite the disappointment of the For-
eign Ministers' Conference in Geneva.
13. New factors in policy determinations. We
see few signs that the governments themselves
share this popular optimism. Responsible
leaders and experts who have lived through
the last decade cannot so rapidly become con-
vinced that the USSR has changed its ulti-
mate objectives. They fail to see any con-
vincing signs that the fundamental Soviet
threat to the Free World has in fact dimin-
ished. Nevertheless, the situation in which
these governments now find themselves has
changed in several ways, and they must make
their policy decisions over the next few years
in the light of factors different from those
which existed several years ago.
14. However much they may be convinced
that basic Soviet intentions have not changed
and that present Soviet tactics are likely to
be applied unevenly, most if not all of these
governments believe that the danger of gen-
eral war has receded. Most of them believe
they ought to re-examine their armament poli-
cies in light of competing demands upon the
public revenues and in light of the military
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requirements which are likely to emerge from
the new international situation and the rap-
idly developing art of modern warfare.
15. The nuclear factor. The increasing capa-
bilities of the US and USSR in nuclear war-
fare, and particularly the publicity given to
these increases, have had a profound effect
upon both public and official opinion in some of
these countries. In the UK, the government
faced the problem squarely. It concluded that,
despite the increased danger of total destruc-
tion, possession of a substantial nuclear capa-
bility constituted a substantial deterrent. The
government decided to continue the manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons and to undertake the
development of thermonuclear weapons. The
development of the capability for delivery of
nuclear weapons was continued. Without
such capabilities, it believes, the UK could not
remain capable of playing a major role either
in international politics or in the determina-
tion of military strategy.
16. On the Continent the situation has been
different. The NATO countries of Western
Europe, with the possible exceptions of France
and West Germany, at present do not indi-
vidually have the industrial and technological
capacity to develop a military nuclear capa-
bility 2 or a system of defense against nuclear
attack. They have been more immediately
concerned with the question of defending their
own borders while leaving the nuclear devel-
opment responsibility to the United States.
But increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities have
raised the question of whether they can
achieve any practical defense against nuclear
attack. With their feeling that the day of
reckoning has been indefinitely postponed,
decisions as to military expenditures therefore
will be increasingly influenced by domestic
political and economic considerations.
17. Another factor has been the absence of
adequate guidance from NATO to its member
countries in light of the new strategic situa-
tion. The various defense establishments feel
that they are not getting the advice they re-
quire to rearrange their own budgets in con-
West Germany is prohibited from manufacturing
nuclear weapons under the Paris Accords.
formity with new force patterns and to per-
suade their own parliaments that such re-
arrangements are necessary. As a result,
they have not been able to translate the cur-
rent broad "forward strategy" concept based
upon the employment of nuclear weapons
into a practical and tangible pattern for their
own armed forces.
18. In the countries where military programs
have been developed to protect the regime
against internal subversion and neighboring
countries or to gain in international standing,
the nuclear factor has had much less effect
on the development of military programs.
The nature and levels of military programs in
Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Pak-
istan are unlikely to be substantially affected
by the same strategic considerations and prob-
lems which apply in Western Europe general-
ly.
19. Economic and political factors. A con-
siderable variety of economic concerns will
also affect the decisions of governments on
the nature and level of the military programs.
Industrial and technological capacities vary
extensively, as do the scale and nature of US
aid. In Turkey and Pakistan, where the US
has supplied most of the equipment and pro-
vided direct financial support as well, the level
of military programs will continue in almost
direct proportion to the quantity of US aid.
For Spain, Portugal, and Iceland, the coun-
tries' attitude has been strongly influenced by
the economic benefits to be derived. In
France, Italy, the UK, and Japan where, aside
from direct expenditures by US forces based
locally, US aid has now taken largely the form
of offshore procurement, a principal value of
the aid has been its very considerable contri-
bution to the balancing of their international
payments. MDAP aid has, therefore, pro-
vided substantial economic assistance; in
some cases it has permitted an improvement
of military posture which otherwise would
have been impossible from local resources; in
some of the major countries of Europe it has
contributed to an advancing standard of living
by providing a means of paying for imports
while these countries were supporting their
own military establishments.
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20. Although US aid has been an important
factor, substantial local resources have been
applied to military establishments in most
countries, in many cases at rather a consider-
able sacrifice of domestic economic and social
programs. Nevertheless, there appears to be
little doubt that most of the countries con-
cerned have the economic ability to maintain
their programs at current levels provided US
aid continues in substantially the present
form and quality. Most countries discussed
in this paper have shared in the general eco-
nomic prosperity which presently character-
izes the Free World and only Turkey and Pak-
istan can be said at present to be in serious
economic difficulties.
21. But the principal question facing most
governments is not whether the economy re-
mains capable of supporting the continued
level of military budgets, but whether it is
politically possible to hold to present levels.
The atmosphere of detente, uncertainty as to
the real value of these programs, in some cases
increasing political pressure for domestic eco-
nomic development and financial stability, a
general return to domestic concerns, and de-
clining interest in international problems will
make it increasingly difficult for some of these
countries ? particularly where governing co-
alitions already lack unity and have unstable
bases of parliamentary support ? to hold to
present levels.
III. GENERAL LEVEL OF FUTURE MILITARY
PROGRAMS
22. There are no signs that these governments
are prepared to make any major departures
from the basic concept of a joint military ef-
fort. There is a considerable body of opinion
in Europe either unaware of or indifferent to
NATO. Moreover, a number of politicians
would prefer that NATO's political and eco-
nomic aspects be given added emphasis. In
the predominant view, however, a joint defense
effort is essential to deter not only open Soviet
aggression but Soviet diplomatic and subver-
sive offensives as well.
23. We believe that defense programs in the
NATO countries will be maintained at levels
necessary to secure a continued US commit-
5
ment. The general trend is in the direction
of a reduction of defense budgets in Western
Europe. Nevertheless, over the short run
there will be a modest over-all increase in the
defense expenditures of European NATO coun-
tries, since increases in Germany are likely to
offset decreases elsewhere. They will, how-
ever, continue to be inadequate fully to im-
plement the NATO program. It appears al-
most certain that the member countries will
not meet the current force goals for 1956.
Lack of certainty over the implications of the
"forward strategy" concept, the high cost of
carrying it out, and the major assistance and
rearrangements required to develop an inte-
grated air defense system, make it unlikely
that present broad programs will be realized.
Even maintenance of forces and budgets at
somewhat reduced levels will not occur with-
out considerable political strain.
24. Over the longer period through 1960, the
prospects are even less favorable. The impact
of new weapons has not been fully digested.
As time passes, these governments are likely to
become more reluctant to adhere to any over-
all strategy which, they feel, exposes them to
nuclear attack but gives them neither nuclear
retaliatory power nor substantial protection
from nuclear attack. On the other hand,
they will find defense against such attack both
costly and extremely difficult of achievement.
However, most will maintain what they con-
sider to be reasonable forces as a contribution
to the total deterrent effect, and for protecting
their own borders in case of attack, protecting
colonial and dependent areas, and insuring
internal order. It will be extremely difficult
to meet emerging problems involving mainte-
nance of equipment now on hand, growing
obsolescence of large stocks of materials, and
the rising costs of new equipment designed for,
units capable of meeting the test of nuclear
warfare. This factor will assume added im-
portance as equipment costs compete for a
larger share of the defense budget.
25. The development of Soviet policy will have
a most profound effect. If the USSR were to
make a series of even minor concessions, this
would probably lead to a further, and possibly
even a substantial, decline in military expendi-
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tures as governments found it increasingly
difficult to obtain parliamentary support for
high military budgets. Resumption of the
old policies would contribute to the mainte-
nance of present levels, but even then Soviet
capabilities and technological achievements
In the weapons field, appropriately handled by
Soviet propaganda, could lead to an increasing
sense of frustration and futility.
26. US policy will also have a profound effect.
A substantial reduction of the US defense ef-
fort would be regarded as a signal for many
of these countries to follow suit. A cutback
in US aid, and particularly a reduction of US
forces abroad, would be regarded as a slacken-
ing of US interest and almost certainly would
be followed by both military reductions and
political discouragement. On the other hand,
it may be possible to trade out substantial in-
creases in the amount of US aid, including
new weapons, for some increases in European
military budgets.
IV. SPECIAL SITUATIONS IN CERTAIN
COUNTRIES
27. The generalizations in the preceding para-
graphs apply generally to the NATO coun-
tries. As noted above, the UK is an exception,
and during the next five years will probably
adhere generally to a military program of
approximately the present level while re-
vamping its character to the requirements of
modern warfare. Two of the NATO coun-
tries ? West Germany and Turkey ? and
four countries outside NATO ? Yugoslavia,
Pakistan, Japan, and Spain ? also constitute
special situations which are dealt with briefly
below.
28. West Germany. During the occupation
period West Germany progressed rapidly from
economic prostration to prosperity through
close collaboration with the three Western oc-
cupying powers and under the cover of their
protective military forces. Despite consider-
able opposition to rearmament, it was finally
accepted as a symbol of sovereignty and an
expedient to retain Western aid and support.
Now, however, even with sovereignty restored,
economic prosperity, and the spectre of Com-
munist aggression somewhat faded, the gov-
6
erning coalition has had difficulty in getting
on with rearmament. Moreover, parliamen-
tary groups, both within and outside the
coalition have been particularly concerned
with insuring civilian control over the mili-
tary. Some delays in rearmament can be
attributed to this concern. Although the pro-
gram is already underway, West Germany
may not adhere to the three-four year build-up
and may substitute a four-five year period,
unless US aid is provided to cover a substan-
tial portion of the deficit.
29. Another and important factor in the Ger-
man situation is the still unresolved problem
of German unification and European security.
There are no signs that the present govern-
ment will become any less convinced of the
desirability of rearmament and NATO mem-
bership, but the disposition of some Germans
to consider trading these for unification and
to keep open the possibilities of direct nego-
tiations with Moscow may cause further delay
in rearmament. Recruiting of volunteers is
already underway, but it is possible that the
government will not start conscription before
the 1957 general elections, and other steps
to implement the NATO program may be held
up pending both further international devel-
opments and the outcome of the elections.
30. Turkey. At present there are no discern-
able pressures within Turkey for a reduction
in the military establishment. The Turkish
defense effort has the support of the people
and government. The Turks would, indeed,
be willing to build a military force even be-
yond the limits projected if the additional
funds and equipment were available. Should
national revenues fall short of meeting ap-
propriations, however, and continued US aid
not be forthcoming in at least the present
amount, some effort to reduce defense ex-
penditures must be expected. Turkey cannot
support her present or projected defense es-
tablishment without outside assistance. The
current defense program is only possible be-
cause the most expensive element ? major
equipment ? is being provided by the US.
The requirement for this assistance will con-
tinue for the foreseeable future if the present
Turkish defense effort is to be maintained.
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31. Spain. Spain will continue to maintain
her armed forces at approximately the cur-
rent force and budgetary levels. It is anxious
to modernize its present antiquated defense
establishment, but any substantial improve-
ment will be dependent on US aid.
32. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership is
presently convinced that the threat of attack,
particularly against itself, has abated. There
is thus a possibility that Yugoslavia will cut
back to some degree in its military programs.
Nevertheless, any such cuts are unlikely to be
substantial. Tito is likely to retain a healthy
respect for military power as one bulwark of
diplomatic strength, particularly if the gen-
eral impression grows that the major powers
are unwilling to permit full-scale nuclear war
to develop.
33. Pakistan. The level of future Pakistani
military programs will probably depend di-
rectly on the amount of US aid forthcoming.
The Pakistani military authorities would like
to expand their army and have even discussed
the possibility of expanding their troop basis
over and above present requirements for de-
fense of Pakistan's own territory so as to pro-
vide an expeditionary force which could be
earmarked for use by the Baghdad Pact group
in event of general war. However, such an
expansion would have to be virtually corn-
7
pletely US-financed. Even prosecution of the
present modernization program would be eco-
nomically impossible without US defense and
direct forces support in addition to MDA aid.
Should such support be reduced or eliminated,
the Pakistanis would probably be forced to
make some cuts in troop strength, though
they would try to retain the present approxi-
mate strength ratio with India.
34. Japan. Rearmament in Japan, originally
undertaken at US behest, is now generally
accepted as necessary. The most significant
factors sustaining this program are the de-
sires to achieve the status of an important
world power exercising an independent in-
fluence in international affairs, and to elimi-
nate the necessity for the stationing of US
garrison forces in Japan. However, there is
no general support for either a rapid or
sizeable build-up of the armed forces beyond
presently planned levels. A continued inter-
national detente is not likely to retard this
program which over the next five years would
give Japan a modest military establishment
capable of making some contribution to its
own defense. It is predicated upon continu-
ation of US aid, although not necessarily in
present quantities. It seems unlikely that the
Japanese will step up this program during the
period of this estimate.
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