PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES THROUGH MID-1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000200170001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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vw\ NIE 12-54
24 August 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 12-54
(Supersedes NI E-87)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN SATELLITES THROUGH MID-1956
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 24 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
COPY NO.
?SECRET- ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN
SATELLITES THROUGH MID-1956
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current situation and probable developments in the European
Satellites through mid-1956.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Kremlin almost certainly regards
the maintenance of the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe as essential for: (a) safe-
guarding the military security of the
USSR through possession of advanced
bases and defensive positions outside So-
viet frontiers; (b) adding to the economic
and military resources of the USSR; (c)
upholding the prestige of the USSR in its
role as leader of the world Communist
movement; and (d) checking the re-
emergence of a powerful Germany allied
with the West. We believe, therefore, that
the Kremlin will continue to push for-
ward its long-term plans for integration
of the Satellite countries into the Soviet
system, though almost certainly not, dur-
ing the period of this estimate, to the
point of outright incorporation into the
USSR.
2. The emergence of a new leadership in
Moscow has not weakened Soviet control
over the Satellites. This control remains
virtually complete and is unlikely to di-
minish or to be successfully challenged
from within during the period of this esti-
As used in this paper, the term "Satellites"
means "European Satellites" and includes East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ru-
mania, Bulgaria, and Albania.
mate. Although the principal obstacle
to the Sovietization of Eastern Europe is
and will continue to be the opposition of
the Satellite populations to Communism
and Soviet domination, this opposition
alone will not seriously impair Soviet con-
trol or threaten the stability of the Satel-
lite governments.
3. The revisions of Satellite economic
plans have not altered the Kremlin's
basic aim of increasing as rapidly as prac-
ticable the Satellites' contribution to So-
viet economic power. These revisions are
aimed primarily at removing the threats
to future industrial growth by correcting
the imbalances in the Satellite economies
resulting from an overemphasis on heavy
industry at the expense of agriculture and
light industry. In essence, they provide
for slowing down the expansion of heavy
industry in 1954-1955 and for increasing
the resources allotted to agriculture and
consumer industries. Nevertheless, Sat-
ellite economic policies will still be strong-
ly oriented toward development of heavy
industry. At the same time, defense out-
lays will probably be maintained at ap-
proximately present or only slightly high-
er levels. We believe that the revised
economic programs will not result in any
1
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significant improvement in the standards
of living and that the Satellite govern-
ments at the end of this period will be
faced with much the same basic economic
problems as at present.
4. By the end of 1953, the combined GNP
(Gross National Product) of the Satellites
had returned approximately to the level
of 1938. We estimate that total Satellite
GNP in 1953 was about two-fifths that of
the USSR and that this ratio will remain
substantially unchanged through 1956.
During this period the growth rate will
probably average about 4 percent annu-
ally as compared with an average of 6
percent annually from 1948 through 1953.
5. The productive capabilities of the Sat-
ellites constitute an important addition
to Soviet economic strength and war po-
tential in certain fields. The Satellites
provide a substantial proportion of Soviet
Bloc production of uranium ore; East
Germany alone accounts for about 50
percent of total Bloc production. The
Satellites also supply the USSR economy
substantial quantities of industrial goods,
2
notably precision instruments, certain
chemicals, selected items of machinery
and transport equipment, and electrical
equipment.
6. The Satellite armed forces have be-
come a substantial element in the balance
of military power in Europe. We esti-
mate that the Satellite armies will reach
an over-all peacetime strength of approx-
imately .1,265,000 men by mid-1955 and
that no substantial increase is likely
thereafter. The Satellite air forces now
have an estimated TO&E strength of
3,600 aircraft of all types (approximately
2,400 actual) , and we estimate that by
mid-1956 they will probably have a TO&E
strength of 4,400, of which 2,450 will
probably be jet fighters. The Satellite
naval forces have only minor capabilities.
We believe that while the Satellite armed
forces would probably fight well against
traditional enemies, their reliability will
remain sufficiently questionable during
the period of this estimate to place a
significant limitation upon their military
usefulness in event of general war.
DISCUSSION
8. We believe that the Kremlin will continue
to push forward its long-term plans for in-
tegration of the Satellite countries into the
Soviet system, though almost certainly not,
during the period of the estimate, to the point
of outright incorporation into the USSR. Dur-
ing the next two years Soviet policy will prob-
ably concentrate on perfecting the Soviet
mechanism for directing over-all Satellite de-
velopment and on consolidating the position
already won, rather than on striking out on
any new aggressive campaign of Sovietization.
Primary concentration will probably be upon:
a. Maintaining the system of controls which
bind the Satellites to the USSR while attempt-
ing to make Communist programs more palat-
able to the populations;
I. SOVIET AIMS IN THE SATELLITES
7. Soviet policy in the Satellites is directed
toward developing them into a strong area of
the Soviet empire which will increase Soviet
power and strengthen the Soviet world posi-
tion. The Kremlin almost certainly regards
the maintenance of the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe as essential for: (a) safe-
guarding the military security of the USSR
through possession of advanced bases and de-
fensive positions outside Soviet frontiers; (b)
adding to the economic and military resources
of the USSR; (c) upholding the prestige of
the USSR in its role as leader of the world
Communist movement; and (d) checking the
re-emergence of a powerful Germany allied
with the West.
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b. Continuing the development of Satellite
heavy industrial potential, but at a reduced
rate of growth which will permit greater em-
phasis than in the past on agriculture, and
which is based on a more realistic appraisal of
Satellite material and human resources;
c. Strengthening of the Soviet military posi-
tion by modernizing airfield and radar net
facilities, by increasing the combat effective-
ness and political reliability of Satellite forces,
and by qualitative improvement rather than
enlargement of Soviet forces stationed in the
Satellites.
II. THE SYSTEM OF SOVIET CONTROL
9. Soviet control of the Satellites is based on
the Soviet armed forces stationed in Eastern
Europe, on the MVD (Soviet security services) ,
on Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military
missions in each Satellite, and is exercised
through the Satellite Communist parties and
governments. In addition, the USSR exercises
direct administrative authority in many in-
stances through Soviet citizens in key posi-
tions or in command of ministries, armed
forces, and industries. Through this system
the USSR provides the Satellite governments
with over-all policy guidance. When neces-
sary, Satellite leaders are called to Moscow for
instructions. Although Moscow permits and
encourages programs of cultural, economic,
and technical collaboration among the Satel-
lites, the Soviet control system is designed to
bind the Satellites individually to the USSR
rather than to one another. Enforcement of
obedience to Soviet wishes is assured by the
system's military and police power.
10. The USSR continues to maintain strong
combat-ready forces, totalling an estimated
531,000 army troops, 24,000 security troops,
and 1,800 aircraft (estimated actual strength)
in the Satellites, mostly in East Germany. Al-
though the deployment of these forces is based
primarily on strategic rather than internal
security considerations, the mere presence or
near proximity Of Soviet forces has had and
is likely to continue to have the effect of re-
straining potential resistance. The overt em-
ployment of Soviet troops in suppressing the
17 June 1953 riots in East Germany demon-
strated Soviet willingness to use these forces
where necessary. In addition, the Satellite
armed forces, which are being developed un-
der close Soviet supervision, now total over
1,100,000 army troops, 300,000 security troops,
and 2,400 aircraft (estimated actual strength) .
This military development program provides
the Soviet Union with important additional
means of internal security, mass-indoctrina-
tion of youth, and control.
11. Under MVD aegis the various Satellite
security services have become in effect a part
of the USSR's police mechanism in Eastern
Europe. Since 1950 they have been reorgan-
ized according to the MVD pattern, staffed by
personnel deemed reliable by the MVD, and
brought under MVD control through a system
of advisers. The MVD headquarters in Mos-
cow gives these services over-all policy guid-
ance and exercises direct control over liaison
between one Satellite service and another.
As a result of this integration, the Soviet Gov-
ernment now has a security service of dis-
ciplined local nationals at its disposal in each
Satellite. This service operates as an arm of
the MVD in detecting and suppressing all
forms of subversion and in maintaining Soviet
authority and the stability of the Satellite
governments. Although some individual de-
fections may still occur as an aftermath of the
Beria purges, we believe that the effectiveness
of the Satellite security services will not be
impaired to any material extent.
12. The Satellite Comunist parties, the leaders
of which are approved by the Kremlin, consti-
tute the principal instrumentality for imple-
menting Soviet policy and for imposing Soviet
ideological and institutional forms upon the
Satellite populations. These parties provide
the inner core of Satellite government leader-
ship, play a leading role in managerial assign-
ments, regulate the local control machinery,
and direct the "voluntary activities" of the
people. The complete subservience of the Sat-
ellite Communist parties to the new Soviet
rulers has been reaffirmed at the recent Satel-
lite Communist Party congresses, which were
attended by top-level Soviet officials (e.g.,
Khrushchev at the Polish and Czechoslovak
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congresses, Mikoyan at the East German,
Voroshilov at the Hungarian, Pospelov at the
Bulgarian) .
13. The Soviet Union exercises control over
the economic development of the Satellites by
fixing over-all production goals and priorities,
by regulating the trade relations of these
countries with the USSR, and by supervising
their trade with other areas. Satellite eco-
nomic plans are prepared in accordance with
general policies issued by the Soviet Union,
but determination of detailed measures to ac-
complish plan objectives is probably super-
vised only indirectly by Moscow. Now that
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have readjusted
the timing of their plans, all the Satellites,
with the exception of Bulgaria, have long-
term plans which are synchronized with the
next Soviet Five-Year Plan, 1956-1960. The
machinery for coordination of planning is
probably the Council of Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA) which includes the USSR
and Satellites as members and maintains a
permanent headquarters in Moscow. Soviet
control is exercised, in addition, through a
system of tight bilateral trade and financial
arrangements.
14. More subtle aspects of control in the trad-
ing system arise from increased Satellite de-
pendence upon Soviet sources of raw materials
and certain capital goods, and integration of
trading agreements with long-term plans.
The effectiveness of this type of control has
grown with the reorientation of Satellite trade
toward the Soviet Union and the rapid in-
crease in the volume of this trade. Soviet
control is also exerted in some cases through
joint companies (notably in Rumania, Hun-
gary, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria) and
by extending long-term credit for such speci-
fied purposes as industrial development proj-
ects (notably in Poland). The Soviet Govern-
ment also maintains large economic missions
in each Satellite, as well as advisers and in-
spectors to monitor performance by ministries
and industries on commitments under trading
agreements, and if necessary, to assume direct
supervision.
15. The Soviet pattern of intellectual, cul-
tural, and religious life is being imposed upon
the Satellites. The Satellite governments
have a monopoly over the schools and mass-
information media and have brought church
organizations under the control of the state.
The educational system has been reorganized
to conform with that in the USSR; teaching
staffs and libraries have been purged and cur-
ricula revised to place emphasis on vocational
training and Communist indoctrination. The
power of the church has been broken down
through the imprisonment of church leaders,
the expropriation of church property, the
severance of former administrative links with
the outside world, and by progressively de-
priving the church of its facilities to educate
the youth. The cultural influence and auton-
omy of family life have been disrupted by
physically and psychologically exhausting
work norms, material want and the necessity
for the mother to work, obligatory political
activities, and the exploitation of small chil-
dren as unwitting informers on their parents.
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Internal Developments
16. The relationship between the Satellites
and the USSR remains basically unchanged
since the death of Stalin, but the new Soviet
leadership has adopted a more flexible atti-
tude toward the Satellites in some cases. The
most conspicuous changes are the new eco-
nomic policies and the recent moves in East
Germany, where the Soviet control commis-
sion has been abolished and formal sovereign-
ty granted. We believe, however, that such
changes are merely a transformation of the
facade of Soviet control and that they indicate
a refinement rather than a reduction of actual
control.
17. The Satellite leadership groups, which
have become almost completely reliable
through a continuous process of selection and
purging at the direction of Soviet authorities,
have been left relatively unchanged by the
new Soviet rulers. Although a few new per-
sonalities have become more prominent, such
as the new party first secretaries in Czecho-
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slovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, virtually the
same leaders are still in control in each Satel-
lite, and there appears to be little change in
their relative influence and power. Moves
taken by the Satellites to give a greater ap-
pearance of "collective" leadership are prob-
ably imitations of the Soviet pattern. There
has also been in almost all the Satellites ? in
conformity with changes made in the USSR
? a streamlining of the party secretariats
through a reduction in size and a more precise
definition of functions. In addition, Soviet
ambassadors with long experience in the dip-
lomatic service have been replaced in Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary by men with extensive party ex-
perience. These developments seem to sup-
port the conclusion that the new Soviet regime
has assigned an even higher priority than in
the past to strengthening the party apparatus
in the Satellite countries.
18. The principal obstacle to the Sovietization
of Eastern Europe is the continued opposition
of the Satellite populations to Communism
and Soviet domination. This opposition has
been intensified by the loss of personal free-
dom and a reduced standard of living, as well
as by outraged religious and national feelings,
but its effectiveness is severely constricted by
the controls imposed on every aspect of the
lives of the people. There is virtually no or-
ganized active resistance and only little un-
organized active resistance. The latter con-
sists mainly of isolated raids by small armed
bands and of individual acts of subversion
and sabotage. On the other hand, passive re-
sistance continues to be widespread and to
constitute a drag on economic programs. The
more prevalent forms of passive resistance are
worker absenteeism, work slowdowns, crop-
delivery evasion, increased church attendance,
and whispering campaigns.'
19. The Satellite governments are attempting
to alleviate unrest by providing a gradual im-
2 A detailed estimate of Satellite resistance activi-
ties and potentialities will be made in a succeed-
ing NIE. See also the report of the Resistance
Intelligence Committee, RIR?I, "Anti-Commu-
nist Resistance Activities and Potential in
Poland," 20 July 1954.
provement in standards of living. However,
we believe that these governments will be un-
able to satisfy consumer cravings on any sig-
nificant scale or to give the individual a
greater feeling of security. Popular opposi-
tion therefore will probably continue to slow
the process of Sovietization in Eastern Europe
and to limit the economic, political, and mili-
tary gains which the USSR can derive from
control of the Satellites. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that, during the period of this estimate,
Soviet authority over the Satellites will re-
main intact, that the control system will be
further improved, and that Soviet policies in
the Satellites will be directed toward the com-
plete Sovietization of this area. The opposi-
tion of the great majority of the Satellite pop-
ulations will continue to delay this process,
but, in the absence of general war, popular
dissatisfaction will almost certainly not de-
velop beyond the stage of passive resistance
and occasional acts of sabotage. Although
East Germany's extensive ties with West Ger-
many provide that state with a greater re-
sistance potential than any other Satellite, a
repetition of the June 17 riots is unlikely.
External Developments
20. During the past year the USSR has made
increasing use of the Satellites for political
warfare moves. This has been evident in Sat-
ellite efforts to further the Soviet proposal at
the Berlin conference for a European security
system. Especially noteworthy are the Polish
and Czechoslovak appeals to French opinion
which have pointed out the community of
interest between Slavic Europe and France
against revival of a nationalist Germany.
Pursuant to Soviet wishes the Balkan Satel-
lites have adopted a policy of seeking "normal-
ization" of their long strained relations with
Yugoslavia and with Greece and Turkey.
There is also evidence of increasing utilization
of the Satellites by the USSR to support the
activities of Communist parties elsewhere in
the non-Communist world. For example, Po-
land has been given substantial responsibility
for support of and guidance to the Italian
Communist Party, while Czechoslovakia ap-
pears to have a large degree of responsibility
for the parties of Central America. Moreover,
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the USSR has further extended its utilization
of Satellite diplomatic and trade missions for
either joint activities or independent Soviet
operations in intelligence and political war-
fare. During the period of this estimate the
USSR will almost certainly continue to use the
Satellites to further its diplomatic and intelli-
gence objectives in the non-Communist world.
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
Current Economic Policy in the Satellites
21. In 1953, the Satellites undertook revisions
of economic plans which ? like the plan re-
visions in the USSR ? were aimed at increas-
ing the production of agricultural commodi-
ties, especially foodstuffs, and of manufac-
tured consumer goods. The new Satellite
plans also stressed expanding the production
of basic raw materials and electric power.
These plans provide for a modest shift of in-
vestment from heavy industry to agriculture
and light industry, improved exploitation of
existing capacity, and a material incentives
program involving concessions to both the
collective and private sectors of agriculture
and increased benefits to the industrial labor
force. Statements by Soviet and Satellite
spokesmen have suggested that the revised
plans provide for more trade among the Satel-
lites and for more specialization of production.
However, further evidence of any recent in-
tensification of the long-standing effort in this
general direction is so far lacking.
22. The revision of existing programs was
occasioned mainly by the adverse cumulative
effects of overemphasis on heavy industry at
the expense of agriculture and light industry.
While substantial results had been achieved
in expanding production in the heavy indus-
trial sectors, and in enlarging the nonagricul-
tural labor force (by about two-fifths since
1948) , agricultural production had not only
failed to recover to prewar levels but had even
declined from the level attained in 1951. This
lag in agriculture threatened to retard future
industrial growth at a time when urbaniza-
tion, population increases, industrialization,
and the scarcity of foreign exchange made in-
creased agricultural production most essen-
tial. Moreover, the situation was further
aggravated by the adoption of goals for the
heavy machinery and equipment industries
which could not be supported by the basic
materials resources and electric power output
of the Satellite economics. The new pro-
grams are intended to remove these threats
to continued long-range industrial expansion.
23. These tactical changes in Satellites eco-
nomic policy do not alter the Kremlin's basic
aim of increasing as rapidly as practicable the
Satellites' contribution to Soviet economic
power. The Satellites during the next two
years will probably continue to place primary
emphasis on expanding the production of
basic materials and of energy, while slowing
the expansion of heavy manufacturing indus-
tries until the materials-supplying industries
have caught up. At the same time, defense
outlays will probably be maintained at ap-
proximately present or slightly higher levels,3
and increased resources will be allotted to
agriculture and consumer industries. We be-
lieve that it is unlikely, however, that agricul-
tural output will be increased significantly
during this period. On the other hand, out-
put of simple consumer durables will probably
be increased.
Satellite Economic Growth 4
24. By the end of 1953, the combined GNP
(Gross National Product) of the Satellites had
8 The percentages allocated to defense in the Sat-
ellite state budgets are roughly one-half to two-
thirds of the percentage of total budget given to
defense in the USSR.
The estimates of Satellite GNP in this section
are considered generally reliable for analysis of
trends of internal economic developments, but
because of conceptual and statistical problems,
they are less reliable in intercountry compari-
sons. The probable margins of error of produc-
tion estimates, based on the valuations of the re-
sponsible analysts, imply that the GNP estimates
are fairly reliable (considered accurate within
a neighborhood of plus or minus 10 percent) .
Estimates of trends are regarded more re-
liable than the estimates of absolute magnitudes.
Estimates of production of basic materials and
energy, such as agricultural products, coal, and
electric power, are considered more reliable than
estimates of highly manufactured goods, for ex-
ample, machinery of various types. Data for Al-
bania, Bulgaria, and Rumania generally are less
reliable than for the other Satellites.
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returned approximately to the level of 1938.5
Total Satellite GNP in 1953 was an estimated
45 billion of 1951 US dollars or about two-fifths
that of the USSR. We estimate that total
Satellite GNP in 1956 will be 51 billion of 1951
US dollars and that the Satellite share of total
Bloc GNP will remain substantially un-
changed during the period of this estimate.
(See Figure 1.) Although the growth rate
averaged about 6 percent annually from 1948
through 1953, it will probably average about
4 percent annually from 1954 through 1956.
25. Since the war, about 20 percent of Satellite
GNP has been devoted to investment - at
least twice as much as prewar. The modifica-
tion of economic programs in 1953 indicates
that for at least the next two years the pro-
portion of GNP devoted to investment may
decline somewhat, but as GNP continues to
rise the absolute level of investment for the
Satellites as a whole will probably remain
about the same. Assuming that sums allo-
cated for defense remain at about the same
level as in 1953 or increase only slightly, there
will be increased scope for allocations to con-
sumption.
26. A breakdown of Satellite GNP by sector
of origin indicates the rising relative impor-
tance of industry and the decline of agricul-
ture.6 In absolute terms industry, transport
and communications, and construction, have
5NIE-87, published 28 May 1953, estimates that
Satellite GNP had regained the prewar level by
the end of 1951. This estimate has been revised
using new price weights and more extensive com-
modity reports which resulted in slightly dif-
ferent GNP estimates. However, the revised
estimates are within a few percentage points of
those made for NIE-87.
'For a detailed breakdown by country, see Fig. 2.
grown rapidly above the 1938 level, while agri-
culture remained well below prewar levels.
These trends will probably continue through
mid-1956 with only slight improvement in
agriculture.
ESTIMATED INDICES OF SELECTED SECTORS
OF SATELLITE GNP
(1950=100)
1938
1950
1953
1956
Industry
110
100
137
168 '
Transport and
Communications
100
100
134
172
Construction
118
100
131
165
Agriculture
118 2
100
93
100
'Not including Albania.
2 1935-1939 average.
27. In 1953 Poland, East Germany, and Czech-
oslovakia contributed over 80 percent of the
total Satellite GNP, while Hungary, Rumania,
and Bulgaria (in that order) accounted for
less than 20 percent. Adjusted for territorial
changes, the output of Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia in 1953 was well above that
of 1938, while Poland's output was about at
the same level, Rumania's slightly below, and
East Germany's about 13 percent below 1938.
We believe that Poland, East Germany, and
Czechoslovakia will continue to account for
over 80 percent of total Satellite GNP during
this period. However, the shift of Soviet policy
toward a more determined buildup of the East
German economy will probably be reflected in
growth of the East German GNP at a rate of
6 to 8 percent a year - a more rapid rate than
that expected in the other Satellites. By 1956
East Germany will probably outstrip Poland
to become the most important contributor to
Satellite GNP.
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SATELLITES GNP, BY COUNTRIES
(NOT INCLUDING ALBANIA)
Year
European
Satellites
Bulgaria
Czecho-
slovakia
East
Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
1938
100
2.2
16.4
36.3
5.6
32.8
6.7
1948
100
3.3
21.4
25.6
6.9
35.3
7.5
1950
100
3.1
20.4
27.3
7.2
35.3
6.7
1953
100
3.1
18.7
31.3
7.6
32.8
6.5
1956
100
3.1
18.0
33.5
7.2
31.8
6.4
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Satellite Industry
28. The distinguishing feature of the indus-
trialization programs imposed on the Satel-
lites by the USSR has been the emphasis
-placed on heavy industries producing capital
goods. Over-all Satellite industrial production
was back to the 1938 level by 1951 and in 1953
it was about 25 percent above the prewar
level. Within the industrial sector the most
impressive growth has been in the production
of machinery and equipment,- chemicals,
metals, energy, and building materials, gener-
ally in that order. Output of the light and
textile industries surpassed the prewar level
in all the Satellites except East Germany,
while production of forest products and pro-
cessed foods generally failed to return to these
levels. (See Figure 3.) During the period of
this estimate over-all Satellite industrial pro-
duction will probably increase about 23 per-
cent above the 1953 level, with primary em-
phasis continuing to be on heavy industrial
development.
29. Satellite production of certain key indus-
trial commodities will continue throughout
the period of this estimate to constitute a maj-
or contribution to the economic strength of
the Bloc, particularly in the following fields:
a. Machinery and Equipment. Estimated
Satellite production in 1953 of machine tools,
metal working machinery, electric motors,
and steam locomotives ranged from about one-
half to about two-thirds that of the USSR,
while production of freight cars was 43 per-
cent, tractors 30 percent, and bearings 16 per-
cent. We estimate that during the next two
years Satellite output of these commodities,
except metal working machinery and tractors,
will increase at a faster rate than that of the
USSR.
ESTIMATED SOVIET AND SATELLITE PRODUCTION OF SELECTED
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT PRODUCTS 1953 AND 1956
Satellite
'Production as
Commodity
Units
Satellites
?
USSR
Percent of USSR
1953 1956
1953
1956
1953 1956
Antifriction Bearings
Millions
20 31
125
145
16 21
Tractors
Thousands
36 49
120
175
30 28
Passenger Automobiles
Thousands
37.6 51.0
73.0
80.0
52 64
Steam Locomotives
Units
1,135 1,345
2,310
2,430
49 55
Freight Cars
Thousands of
2-Axle units
59.7 71.7
140.4
151.0
43 47
Machine Tools
Thousands
46.3* 66.6
88.0
97.0
53* 69
Metal-working Machinery
Thousands
6.7 9.1
10.5
19.0
64 47
Electric Motors
Million 1950 rubles
2,405 3,480
3,852
5,136
62 68
* Bulgaria not included. Production data not available. However, output is relatively unimportant.
b. Metals Production. Satellite output of
finished steel and pig iron in 1953 was about
24 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of So-
viet production. Satellite production of re-
fined lead was about 54 percent, aluminum
19 percent, primary copper 11 percent of So-
viet production. During the period of this
estimate, the Satellite-USSR ratio of steel,
iron, and copper production will probably ze-
main about the same, while that of aluminum
production will substantially increase, and
lead substantially decrease.
ESTIMATED SOVIET AND SATELLITE PRODUCTION
OF SELECTED METALS 1953 AND 1956
(In 000's of metric tons)
Satellite
Production as
Commodity
Satellites
USSR
Percent of USSR
1953 1956
1953
1956
1953 1956
Finished Steel
6,700 8,890
27,600
34,200
24 26
Pig Iron
6,200 8,350
28,000
35,800
22 23
Primary Copper
33 50
310
480
11 10
Aluminum Ingot
58 200
310
625
19 32
Primary Lead
90 111
168
280
54 40
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c. Energy Production. Satellite production
of lignite and brown coal in 1953 was almost
2.5 times that of the USSR, while production
of hard coal and electric power was about
one-half as much. Satellite production of
9
crude oil was approximately one-fifth that of
the Soviet Union. Satellite production of syn-
thetic petroleum products was about 6 times
that of the USSR, but this ratio will be reduced
to approximately 3.5 times by the end of 1956.
ESTIMATED SOVIET AND SATELLITE PRODUCTION OF SELECTED
ENERGY PRODUCTS 1953 AND 1956
(In billion kwh and million metric tons)
Satellite
Production as
Commodity
Satellites
USSR
Percent of USSR
1953
1956
1953
1956
1953 1956
Electric Power
63
86
133
192
47 45
Lignite and
Brown Coal
226.4
280.8
92.0
118.0
246 238
Hard Coal
115.3
132.8
228.0
267.0
51 50
Synthetic Petroleum
Products
1.8
2.5
0.3
0.7
600 357
Crude Oil
9.2
14.6
48.0
65.4
19 22
d. Chemicals Production. The Satellites
produced in 1953 approximately 3 times as
much calcium carbide as the USSR, slightly
more caustic soda, and about the same amount
of chlorine. In 1953 output of synthetic am-
monia was about 86 percent, refined benzol
53 percent, and sulphuric acid 44 percent that
of the USSR. During the period of this esti-
mate the principal change in these percent-
ages will be an increase of Satellite output of
synthetic ammonia from 86 to 123 percent
that of the USSR.
ESTIMATED SOVIET AND SATELLITE PRODUCTION OF SELECTED
CHEMICALS 1953 AND 1956
(In 000's of metric tons)
Satellite
Production as
Commodity Satellites
USSR
Percent of USSR
1953
1956
1953
1956
1953 1956
Sulphuric Acid 1,211
1,564
2,750
3,660
44 43
Caustic Soda 403
510
387
540
104 94
Chlorine 294
381
295
377
100 101
Synthetic Ammonia 462
737
535
600
86 123
Calcium Carbide 1,015
1,264
340
445
299 284
Refined Benzol 143
164
271
376
53 44
Satellite Agriculture
30. In contrast to the rapid growth of indus-
try, Satellite agriculture has lagged seriously
since the postwar phase Of recovery. Although
the output of industrial crops returned to the
prewar levels between 1948 and 1950, over-all
agricultural production, owing to the low out-
put of food crops and animal products, has
not yet regained the prewar level of produc-
tion. Over-all agricultural output in 1951
was an estimated 14 percent below the prewar
level, but it slipped back in 1953 to approxi-
mately 21 percent below that level.
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ESTIMATED INDICES OF SATELLITE
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
1935-1939
(1950=100)
Average 1948
1951
1953
1956*
ALL
SATELLITES
118 85
102
93
100
Albania
92 99
107
101
104
Bulgaria
99 104
106
100
102
Czechoslovakia
110 83
100
95
96
East Germany
120 80
108
99
109
Hungary
108 93
112
95
100
Poland
119 80
92
86
93
Rumania
126 104
114
96
103
* These estimates assume continuation of current
policies and average weather conditions.
31. Total agricultural collectivization contin-
ues to be the acknowledged long-term goal of
Satellite governments. However, the Satellite
leaders of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary, in deference to peasant opposition,
have publicly committed themselves to allow
voluntary withdrawals from the "coopera-
tives." As a result, Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary have lost ground in their collectivization
programs, the greater loss being sustained by
Hungary, where about 33 percent of arable
land was socialized6 in December 1953 as
against 39 percent six months earlier, and
where there was a 42 percent net loss in mem-
bership in "cooperatives" during this period.
On the other hand, no steps have been taken
by Bulgaria, Poland, or Rumania to permit
the peasants to withdraw. Poland, in fact,
with only about 21 percent of its arable land
socialized (one of the smallest percentages
among the Satellites) , has announced that
agricultural collectivization in 1954 and 1955
will continue at the same tempo as in 1953 ?
approximately 3,000 collectives per year. Bul-
garia, which leads the Satellites in percentage
(about 55) of arable land socialized, and Ru-
mania (about 25 percent of arable land social-
ized) have given no indication that they plan
to push forward with collectivization for the
present. We believe that these latter states
? along with Czechoslovakia (about 45 per-
cent of arable land socialized) , East Germany
(about 18 percent of arable land socialized) ,
and Hungary ? are likely in the immediate
future to concentrate on making the present
collectivized farms more efficient and also
Including cooperatives and state farms.
more attractive to the peasants and on in-
creasing the level of mechanization.
32. Peasant opposition to the program of
forced collectivization and compulsory de-
liveries has been the principal deterrent to
increased agricultural production. Other ma-
jor factors contributing to the stagnation in
Satellite agriculture are the reduction in size
and quality of the agricultural labor force and
the low level of investment in agriculture. Al-
though East Germany, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Hungary are endeavoring to over-
come their agricultural labor shortages either
by shifting labor from industry to agriculture
or by halting the outflow of rural labor, the
agricultural labor force for the Satellites as a
whole will probably remain virtually static
through mid-1956 (somewhat less than 22
million) . On the other hand, the nonagri-
cultural labor force will probably increase dur-
ing this period from an estimated 21 million
to about 23 million. The revised plans pro-
vide for significant additions of agricultural
machinery, particularly for the machine trac-
tor stations and state farms. The shift of em-
phasis to agriculture appears most likely to
continue in Hungary, which has announced
that state agricultural investment in 1953-
1955 will be 2.5 times that of the preceding
three-year period. State agricultural invest-
ment plans in the other Satellites range from
a doubling in 1954 over the previous year in
Rumania and Czechoslovakia down to a 36
percent increase in Bulgaria (1954 over 1953)
and a 45 percent increase in Poland over the
two-year period 1954-1955. Even these large
percentage increases will leave total agricul-
tural investment at a low level and it will
probably be impossible to raise production suf-
ficiently to meet planned goals.
33. The Satellites will probably continue to
make only slow progress in applying modern
methods to the development of their agricul-
ture, and peasant opposition to agrarian poli-
cies of Satellite governments will continue.
Discrimination against the independent farm-
ers in favor of the "cooperatives" with respect
to taxes and compulsory delivery quotas, and
uncertainty regarding future state measures
for collectivization of agriculture will continue
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to have a depressive effect on production. We
believe that during the period of this estimate
Satellite agricultural output will probably
achieve only small advances (of the order of
8 percent) over the 1953 level, and that by the
end of 1956 it will still be about 15 percent
below prewar. During the same period the
total population of the Satellites will probably
increase about 3 percent (regaining the 1938
level) .
Foreign Trade
34. The most important development in Sat-
ellite foreign trade has been its reorientation
away from Western countries toward the Bloc.
The trade of the Satellites with the West de-
clined from more than four-fifths of their
total trade before the war to less than one-
third in 1951 and 1952. During the same
period, Satellite trade with the USSR in-
creased from one one-hundredth to over one-
third of the total trade. Czechosloviakia, Po-
land, and to an increasing extent East Ger-
many also carry on an important trade with
each other and with the other Satellites.
Trade with China, although still a small per-
centage of total trade of any of the Satellites,
is increasing. Altogether the intra-Bloc (in-
cluding China) trade of the Satellites has in-
creased from about one-sixth of their total
trade before the war to about two-thirds in
1951. (See Figure 4.)
35. The Soviet-styled programs of rapid in-
dustrialization in the Satellites, plus tight So-
viet economic controls, have played a decisive
role in the postwar decline of Satellite trade
with the West. Industrialization programs
have greatly increased requirements within
the Soviet Bloc for those industrial and agri-
cultural raw materials which formed a large
part of Eastern Europe's traditional exports
to the West. At the same time Satellite in-
vestment priorities have neglected the agri-
cultural sector which provided a large part
of these traditional exports. Moreover, the
Satellites have exported large quantities of
food and light industrial products to the
USSR, thus aggravating shortages in the Sat-
ellites and further limiting availabilities for
export to the West.
11
36. The trade agreements and negotiations
carried on by the Satellites with non-Commu-
nist countries in the latter part of 1953 and
the first few months of 1954 indicate that the
Satellites have been following a trading policy
similar to that followed by the USSR. Three
tendencies became evident in these negotia-
tions: (a) an effort to expand trade relations
with non-Communist countries; (b) an effort
to increase imports of consumer goods into
the Satellites; and (c) an effort to expand
trade relations with areas which were former-
ly not important trading partners of the Sat-
ellites. Satellite trade with the West may in-
crease during the period of this estimate.
However, expansion of this trade will continue
to be limited by the factors mentioned in para-
graph 35. Moreover, we believe it is Unlikely
that the Soviet Union will permit trade be-
tween the Satellites and the non-Communist
world to expand to such an extent as to alter
the basic economic orientation of the Satellites
toward the USSR or to weaken their economic
dependence upon the USSR.
37. In summary, economic development of the
Satellite area as a whole has followed much
the same pattern as in the USSR; i.e., a rapid
development of basic producers' goods indus-
tries and a neglect of agriculture and con-
sumers' goods industries. Though the Satel-
lites provide about 30 percent of the produc-
tion of the Bloc (excluding Communist
China) , their output parallels more than it
complements that of the USSR. Soviet de-
pendence on Satellite supplies to meet its own
requirements, while not quantitatively great,
is of particular importance in certain fields,
e.g., uranium ore, precision instruments, cer-
tain chemicals, selected items of machinery
and transport equipment, and electrical equip-
ment. On the other hand, given the current
low level of Bloc trade with the non-Commu-
nist world, the Satellites are highly dependent
on the USSR for a wide range of supplies.
V. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
38. The scientific and technical capabilities of
Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to
a lesser extent Hungary and Poland, consti-
tute substantial additions to those of the
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USSR. In particular, the electronics and
communications research capabilities of East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and
the optics research capabilities of East Ger-
many are of considerable value to the Soviet
Union. These countries, particularly East
Germany, and to a lesser extent Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, also have chemical research
facilities for the development of new or im-
proved products which are of economic or po-
tential military use. East Germany has also
made advances in medical research which may
increase the Soviet Union's biological warfare
potential.
39. The electronics industries of East Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have con-
tributed to the development of the elaborate
broadcast jamming system in operation
throughout the Satellite countries as well as
the USSR. The system now is capable of
covering all regularly used parts of the radio
frequency spectrum up to 30 mc/s. These
three Satellites possess the capability to de-
velop jamming equipment in other parts of
the frequency spectrum, up to and including
the microwave regions.
40. The Satellites have undertaken programs
to increase their scientific and technological
capabilities by enlarging enrollments in higher
educational institutions, by reorganizing acad-
emies of science, and by granting preferential
treatment to scientists. Although Satellite
scientific and technological facilities will be
better organized and will improve in quality
in the next two years, Satellite capabilities
will become less essential to the USSR because
of the growth of Soviet capabilities in the
areas in which the Satellites are now making
important contributions. However, the USSR
will continue to furnish the direction and con-
trols that it deems necessary to orient selected
Satellite scientific capabilities to Soviet ends.
41. Satellite Contribution to Soviet Nuclear
Program. Although East Germany and Czech-
oslovakia have supplied special equipment for
the Soviet nuclear energy program on a spe-
cific order basis (e.g., calcium metal of high
purity, fine drawn nickel wire, fine woven
nickel wire mesh, vacuum pumps, and electric
12
motors) , the main contribution of the Satel-
lites to the Soviet nuclear program is in ura-
nium ores and concentrates. We estimate
that East Germany is currently providing
about half of Bloc production of urani-
um. The other Satellites are less important
sources; the largest producer after East
Germany is Czechoslovakia. Although East
German uranium production has probably
reached its peak, uranium from that area will
probably be sufficient to meet a substantial
proportion of Soviet requirements during the
period of this estimate. Elsewhere in the Sat-
ellites, new uranium deposits are still being
developed. The USSR, however, is not de-
pendent upon Satellite sources. If necessary
the Soviet atomic energy program could prob-
ably be supported at its present level of opera-
tion from internal Soviet sources alone. Never-
theless, the USSR will almost certainly wish
to continue its rapid and large-scale exploita-
tion of Satellite ores in order to accumulate
maximum reserves.
VI. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
The Strategic Importance of the Satellites
to the USSR
42. Soviet control of the Satellites has in ef-
fect moved the Soviet military frontier into
Central Europe. In view of the strategic im-
portance of this region, the USSR has given
priority to its development for military opera-
tions. The USSR derives such strategic ad-
vantages as advance air and ground bases,
highly developed road, rail, and waterway
communications, and a substantial productive
capacity which can be harnessed to the
support of Soviet military operations. More-
over, the USSR has acquired a large geo-
graphic buffer in which to maintain a forward
deployment of its military forces and to de-
velop an extensive air defense system. Satel-
lite capability for jamming, added to that of
the USSR, would constitute a serious threat
to Western long-range radio communications
in time of war. The Satellites also possess an
extensive radar warning screen which is being
continually expanded and improved. This net
could provide a significant additional margin
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of time for warnings of air attack from the
west against the USSR. The Satellites have
also provided the USSR additional naval base
and port facilities.
Soviet Forces in the Satellites'
43. Of an estimated 531,000 Soviet troops
(plus 24,000 security troops) stationed in the
Satellites, approximately 4155,000 (22 line di-
visions) are located in East Germany, while
the remaining 140,000 (8 line divisions) are
located in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Ru-
mania. Soviet air units based in the Satel-
lites and in the Soviet zone of Austria have an
estimated TO&E strength of about 2,200 air-
craft (estimated strength about 1,800) . This
includes about 1,330 jet fighters and 180 jet
light bombers. Soviet Naval Forces in the
Satellites are confined largely to East Ger-
many, and are composed of small patrol and
mine vessels. We believe that Soviet forces in
the Satellites are not likely to increase in size
during the period of this estimate, although
re-equipment may improve their combat ef-
fectiveness.
Satellite Ground Forces'
44. The Satellite ground forces have become
a substantial element in the balance of mili-
tary power in Europe. Their present strength
is estimated at 1,115,000 men organized in
82 line divisions, of which 6 are armored
and 13 mechanized. These forces are
supplemented by Satellite security troops
which total about 306,000 men. The Sat-
ellite ground forces, with the exception
of the East German, have probably reached
nearly the desired peacetime strength level.
East Germany was set back in its military
development program by the 17 June riots,
and will probably increase the Garrisoned
People's Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei-
KVP) from its present strength of about 100,-
000 to about 175,000 by mid-1955. In addi-
tion, the Rumanian Army will show an in-
crease during this period from about 215,000
For more detail on Soviet military dispositions
in the Satellites, see Appendix, Table 1.
For detailed figures on ground forces in each
country, see Appendix, Table 2.
13
troops to about 290,000. We estimate, there-
fore, that the Satellite ground forces will reach
an over-all peacetime strength of approxi-
mately 1,265,000 men, organized into about 93
line divisions (8 armored and 18 mechanized) ,
by mid-1955. No substantial increase in
strength is likely to occur thereafter. We esti-
mate that the Satellite security forces will re-
main at about their present level of strength.
45. The USSR controls these Satellite forces
by direct Soviet staffing in Poland and by large
Soviet military missions in all other countries.
These missions vary from approximately 500
officers in the case of Albania to about 2,000
in Bulgaria. General officers possessing ex-
tensive combat and command experience have
recently been appointed as Soviet military
attaches in all the Satellites except East Ger-
many. Soviet control is being reinforced by
the selection of a politically reliable officer
corps, and by the use of Soviet methods, mili-
tary doctrine, organization, and equipment.
Moreover, with the exception of East Germany
and Albania, the Satellites are bound to the
USSR by a system of mutual assistance pacts.
46. The Satellite armies are equipped largely
with Soviet World War II material of good
quality, but they would require substantial
amounts of additional supplies and equipment
for sustained combat. They are dependent
upon the USSR for tanks, self-propelled guns,
heavy artillery, and some light artillery. The
Satellites are now manufacturing for their
use noncombat vehicles, light artillery, small
arms, and ammunition. Czechoslovakia is the
only Satellite now producing armored fight-
ing vehicles, but its production is negligible
(an estimated 60 tanks of the Soviet T-34 type
annually) . A relatively small proportion of
Satellite divisions is motorized and mech-
anized and major deficiencies in motor trans-
port, heavy armor, artillery, and communica-
tion equipment will continue for the period
of this estimate.
47. Although the Satellite armies have been
reorganized to conform to the Soviet pattern,
the various national units still exhibit marked
differences in training, equipment, and mo-
rale. Their combat effectiveness is greatly
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Inferior to that of equivalent Soviet units.
The combat effectiveness of these forces will
improve, but will remain only fair. It is un-
likely that many of the divisions would be
suitable for offensive operations. Moreover,
in case of war the Satellite forces would be de-
pendent upon the USSR for logistical support.
48. The questionable political reliability of
the Satellite armies places a significant
limitation upon their military usefulness. At
present the Kremlin could probably not rely
upon the majority of the Satellite armies in
a general war except for employment in sec-
ondary roles or in a defensive capacity. How-
ever, against traditional enemies (e.g., Poles
and Czechs against Germans, or Bulgarians
against Yugoslays, Greeks, and Turks) Sat-
ellite armies would probably fight well, at
least if victory appeared likely. Although
tight Communist control and continued in-
doctrination, coupled with intensive efforts to
win the youth, will probably increase the po-
litical reliability of the Satellite armed forces,
we believe that their reliability will remain
sufficiently uncertain for the period of this
estimate to limit their usefulness, particularly
the forces of East Germany.
49. The Satellite ground forces do not form a
single coordinated organization. There is no
reliable evidence of the existence of combined
staffs or commands among the ground forces.
No combined high-level maneuvers of Satellite
or Soviet?Satellite forces have been conducted.
However, a trend toward coordination is in-
dicated by Soviet efforts to standardize organ-
ization, tactics, and training as well as equip-
ment and weapons in all the Satellite armed
forces. In the event of general war, the Satel-
lite forces would receive over-all direction from
the Soviet high command, and might be
placed directly under Soviet officers.
50. Satellite ground force reserves are esti-
mated at more than 2,300,000 men fully
trained in the use of Soviet weapons and
tactics. These men receive frequent refresher
training and could be quickly mobilized in the
event of war. In addition, there are about
three million men who served before or during
World War II. These men would require ex-
tensive refresher training before they could
14
be effectively integrated into the new Soviet
trained divisions.
Satellite Air Forces and Airfields'
51. The Satellite air forces now have an esti-
mated TO&E strength of 3,600 aircraft of all
types (approximately 2,400 actual) , and we
estimate that by mid-1956 they will probably
have a TO&E strength of 4,400, of which 2,450
will probably be jet fighters. Total personnel
strength is estimated at about 89,000. Piston
fighters continue to be replaced by jet fighters
(there were an estimated 940 jet fighters in
April 1954 compared to about 700 in April
1953) , and other equipment is being modern-
ized. An estimated 40 jet light bombers of the
IL-28 type have been introduced into the Po-
lish Air Forces as a part of the jet re-equip-
ment program. Other Satellite air forces
have not yet received these bombers, but some
will probably be supplied with a few during
the period of the estimate.
52. While substantial progress has been made
in the build-up of Satellite air strength, the
current operational capabilities of these forces
are unevenly developed. Emphasis will prob-
ably be placed on the strengthening of the
Satellite fighter and light bomber establish-
ments. During the period of this estimate
the Satellite air forces will probably constitute
a significant increment to Soviet air power
in Europe.
53. Intensive Soviet training of carefully se-
lected Satellite pilots assures Soviet control
and identity of doctrines, techniques, and tac-
tics. Soviet policy appears to be directed to-
ward the attainment of a high degree of co:-
ordination between the air force of each Sat-
ellite and the Soviet Air Force, and the inte-
gration of the Satellite air forces into the
Soviet air defense system. There has been
little coordination among the individual Sat-
ellite air forces. We estimate that this policy
is likely to continue through mid-1956.
54. The over-all political reliability of the
Satellite air forces, like that of the Satellite
armies, is questionable. Since the Polish de-
'For strength figures in aircraft and personnel by
country, see Appendix, Table 3.
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fections of last year, the USSR has strength-
ened its control over flying activities in all
Satellite air forces. Concomitantly, there
have been increased efforts to improve per-
sonnel selections and political indoctrination.
Emphasis has also been placed upon the role
of the air forces in the air defense of each
Satellite, thus stressing the national interest
of the air effort. These measures will proba-
bly increase the political reliability of the
Satellite air units. Nevertheless, for the pe-
riod of this estimate the reliability of such
forces will remain dubious enough to restrict
their usefulness, especially in a general war
situation.
55. Until 1953 virtually all combat type air-
craft and parts for their logistical support
were furnished to the Satellites by the USSR.
During 1953 Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser
degree Poland, increased their production of
aircraft and engines, and together these
countries accounted for about 10 percent of
total Bloc combat aircraft production. We
estimate that during the next two years Czech
and Polish production will probably be ade-
quate to meet all Satellite normal peacetime
requirements for jet fighters and ground-
attack aircraft.
56. An extensive program of airfield improve-
ment and construction is being continued in
all the Satellites. Principal emphasis has
shifted from East Germany to Poland, but
other Satellites continue to pursue a vigorous
airfield construction effort. There are over
400 airfields available to Soviet forces in the
Satellites, including 44 with a minimum run-
way length of 8,000 feet, 24 of 7,000 to 8,000
feet, and 35 of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, or a total
of 103 airfields with the minimum capability
of supporting sustained operations for MIG's
and IL-28's. Runways now being built are
at least 7,000 feet long and many are 8,000 'or
more. One airfield, now under construction
in East Germany, has an 11,500 feet runway,
an extra thickness of concrete, and large POL
storage facilities. Many Satellite fields are
being equipped with night lighting, radio
navigation aids, radar, increased POL facili-
ties, and improved structures. This growing
15
network of modern well-equipped air facili-
ties, as it progresses toward completion, will
add materially to Soviet Bloc air capabilities.
Satellite Naval Forcesi?
57. Owing to their small size, their meager
equipment, and the unreliability of the per-
sonnel, the Satellite navies lack the capability
of making more than a minor contribution to
Soviet naval strength. However, Satellite
ports and bases provide the USSR with a con-
siderable extension of naval logistic and oper-
ational facilities. Development of Satellite
naval installations will probably continue to
be limited to improvement of existing coastal
defense fortifications and to possible expan-
sion of existing operating bases. Satellite
naval and river forces are controlled by Soviet
officers and are being developed according to
the Soviet pattern to permit their operation
as adjuncts to the Soviet Black Sea and Baltic
naval forces. But despite these measures, the
questionable reliability of the Satellite naval
forces will continue during this period to re-
strict their usefulness. A Soviet destroyer
has been turned over to Bulgaria and a few
ships (mine and escort types) given to Poland.
By 1955 the Polish and East German navies
will probably have the capability of providing
appreciable assistance to the Soviet Navy in
such fields as minesweeping, minelaying,
escort, and coastal defense. The Rumanian
and Bulgarian navies, however, will be capable
of rendering only minor assistance. Satellite
shipbuilding facilities are largely devoted to
the construction and repair of merchant
vessels.
58. Poland has developed a naval air arm of
one composite air division comprising an esti-
mated 40 aircraft (actual strength) , includ-
ing 30 jet fighters and 10 piston-type light
bombers. By mid-1956 its strength will prob-
ably be about 150 aircraft with an increase in
the percentage of jet light bombers and
fighters. The effectiveness of this air arm
will probably remain limited during the period
of this estimate.
" For detailed figures on Satellite naval strength,
see Appendix, Table 4.
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PRODUCTION CHARTS FOR PARAGRAPH 55
ESTIMATED CZECH AND POLISH AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION 1952-1956
Country
Aircraft Power Plant
Czechoslovakia MIG-15
jet fighter RD-45
MIG-15 Bis
jet fighter VK-1
- MIG-17
jet fighter VK-1A
IL-28
light bomber VK-1
IL-10
attack AM-42
Poland MIG-15
jet fighter RD-45
MIG-15 Bis
jet fighter VK-1
MIG-17
1952
1953
1954
1955
21
432
267
422
340
60
48
395
300
3
42
210
50
150
1956
475
10
75
jet fighter VK-1A 25
ESTIMATED CZECH AND POLISH AERO-ENGINE PRODUCTION 1952-1956*
Country
Engine
Power Rating
1952
1953
1954
1955
Czechoslovakia
RD-45
5,000 lbs.
52
1,080
668
VK-1
6,000 lbs.
...
1,055
850
VK-1A
7,000 lbs.
..
150
AM-42
1,975 hp.
120
990
750
Poland
RD-45
5,000 lbs.
7
105
525
125
VK-1
6,000 lbs.
. .
375
VK-1A
7,000 lbs.
1956
50
1,190
. .
190
65
*It is believed that aircraft and engine production estimates through mid-1954 are within a few percent
of being correct. Estimates of the number of aircraft produced of each type are based principally upon
floor space, labor force, efficiency of the industry, date of first production, and on actual aircraft
counts. There is some question as to whether the current output of fighters consists of the MIG-
15 with the RD-45 engine or the MIG-15 Bis with the VK-1 engine. It is believed that those fighters
now being produced in Czechoslovakia are equipped with VK-1 engines while those produced' in
Poland, and earlier models in Czechoslovakia, are equipped with RD-45 engines. Estimates of future
production are based on assumptions that the present scale of production effort will not change sub-
stantially and that newer aircraft types now being produced in the USSR will gradually replace older
models in the Satellites after the Soviets begin production of new types of replacements for their
present models. Estimates of engine output are based on requirements to keep pace with airframe
output.
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APPENDIX, TABLE 1
SOVIET FORCES ESTIMATED TO BE STATIONED IN THE SATELLITES 1 JULY 1954
Country
Army
Security
Troops
Soviet-Manned Aircraft 2
Number
of
Troops
Line
Divisions
Fighters
Light Bombers
Attack
Transport
Reconaissance
TOTAL
Jet Piston
Jet
Piston
Jet
Piston
E. Germany 400,000
22
15,000
740
90
330
90
1,250
Poland 35,000
2
2,000
150
130
10 30
320
Czechoslovakia 500
Hungary 30,000
2
1,500
110
90
200
Soviet Zone
of Austria 33,000
2
2,500
220
10
230
Albania 500
Rumania 30,000
2
2,000
110
50
30
190
Bulgaria 2,000
1,000
TOTAL 531,000
30
24,000
1,330
180
510
140 30
2,190
1 Includes units of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation.
2 Approximate figures based on authorized (TO&E) strength.
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51.2
1938 1953 1956
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SATELLITES*
ESTIMATED GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1938, 1953, and 1956
(Billions of /95/ US Dollars)
11.0 14 1.6
1938 1953 1956
17.1
1938 1953 1956
ALL SATELLITES* BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA
13459 CIA, 8-54
1938 1953 1956
EAST
GERMANY
SECRET
2.5
34 3.7
1938 1953 1956
16.3
14.6 14.7
1938 1953 1956
HUNGARY POLAND
Figure 1
3.0 29 13
1938 1953 1956
RUMANIA
*Excludes Albania
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SATELLITES*
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN, 1938 and 1953
(In Percent)
100%
Trade
Services
Agriculture
Transportation and
Communications
13.6
5.2
Construction
43.2
Industry
35.1
.3
1938 1953
44.41,..\
44.1
30.4
1938 1953
ALL SATELLITES* BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA
13460 CIA, 8-54
?
.6.5..
?
W.?
4-6:3
52.4
54.1
1938 1953
EAST
GERMANY
SECRET
::???????:
t3.0
NN?
49.9
33.5
1938 1953
HUNGARY
.1810
:::????-????,
...::?:?:?:-
34.0
22.3
1938 1953
POLAND
Figure 2
k.2
6.2E
32.3
24.7
1938 195?
RUMANIA
*Excludes Albania
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SATELLITES*
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION INDICES
1938 and 1953
INDUSTRY SUBSECTORS
Energy
100
94
7
A 129
1950=100
100
84
A
125
7
,
Metals
Machinery and
Equipment
Chemicals
Building Materials
Forest Products
Food Processing
Light and Textile
PREMORNMENIMMEMW11
V ,7
M.=
-...-
96
49
240
A 224
211
279
4V
V
157
44
150
30
V
A
iMaNaNi
WY444
132
gn= 183
V 4-V 4 161
?MM
18
104
8
124
105
t=N1
01
194
FMOMMONIN
vaMENEMINNE
113
103
173
152
EAST GERMANY
Energy
Metals
Machinery and
Equipment
Chemicals
Building Materials
Forest Products
Food Processing
Light and Textile
34
1 oo
* *
AV
v**
AV.
158
,
136
125
111
99
NUMMN
r
BULGARIA
13461 CIA, 8-54
113
131
KEY
1938
1953
0
418
FFA 987
POLAND
66
100
, A v , A
.5... 35
nM
% 7 ,
97
159
EMMENNOMI
95
IMEMOMINEM
HUNGARY
101
19
118
108
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153
178
7
Figure 3
64
100
ArI
MINEINEERVE
=MEM
93
123
121
109
99
99
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
100
!nant
A
93
100
130
126
130
,
136
47 A
wswipm
A'
/
n/a19M
159
101
===1=
8
116
150
19
136
RUMANIA
*Excluding Albania
**Zero or negligible
72
181
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Figure 4
SATELLITES
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE
1936-38 AVERAGE and 1951
(In Percent)
CHINA 1 CHINA 1
USSR USSR 1
SATELLITES
NON-BLOC
84
Ii
31
SATELLITES
1936-38 1951
EXPORTS
13462 CIA. 8-54
NON-BLOC
82
34
10074
1936-38 1951
IMPORTS
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APPENDIX, TABLE 2
18
ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF SATELLITE GROUND FORCES 1954-1956
July 1954 July 1956
Country
Total
Army
Total
Security
Troops
Percent of
Total Popula-
tion (Army
& Security)
DIVISIONS
Trained &
Partially
Trained
Reserves
Total
Army
Total
Security
Troops
Percent
Increase
(Army &
Security)
DIVISIONS
V)
Ts'
0
E-1
Ti
.21
"Cd
E-4
E. Germany 100,000
25,000
.68
0
3
4
7
30,000
175,000
25,000 60
0
4
8
12
Poland 250,000
65,000
1.22%
0
5
12
17
550,000
250,000
65,000 0
2
4
13
19
Czechoslovakia 170,000
40,000
1.86%
2
4
8
14
415,000
170,000
40,000 o
2
4
8
14
Albania 30,000
10,000
3.15%
0
0
3 2
3
37,500
30,000
10,000 0
0
0
3
3
Hungary 150,000
38,000
1.97%
1
1
122
14
300,000
150,000
38,000 0
1
2
11
14
Rumania 215,000
78,000
1.78%
12
0
12
13
450,000
290,000
78,000 25.6
1
2
12
15
Bulgaria 200,000
50,000
3.25%
2
0
12
14
550,000
200,000
50,000 o
2
2
12
16
TOTAL
1,115,000
306,000
1.5%
6
13
63
82
2,3 32,500
1,265,000
306,000 1%
8
18
67
93
(Mean Average)
(Mean Average)
The figures on the strengths of Satellite armies are considered fairly reliable;
the margin of probable error is less than 10 percent. Information on the
Rumanian Army is more limited than on the others, and strength estimates for
that army have a slightly lower reliability.
'Includes 1 Cay. Div.
8 Includes 2 Mnt. Div.
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APPENDIX, TABLE 3
19
ESTIMATED SATELLITE AIR FORCES JULY 1954
COUNTRY
Fighters
Light Bombers
Transport
TO&E Actual
Reconnais-
sance
TO&E Actual
Total
TO&E Actual
Personnel
Jet
TO&E Actual
Piston
TO&E Actual
Attack
TO&E Actual
Jet
TO&E Actual
Piston
TO&E Actual
E. Germany
?
150
80
150
80
6,500
Poland 2
630
300
330
260
60
40
100
50
20
20
40
30
1,180
700
20,000
Czechoslovakia
440
260
250
200
30
30
30
30
750
520
18,000
Hungary
220
200
80
90
40
40
30
20
?
370
350
18,000
Albania
10
10
10
10
200
Rumania
220
160
120
80
40
30
30
20
40
30
450
320
12,000
Bulgaria
270
110
100
90
130
110
120
70
30
20
40
20
690
420
14,000
TOTAL
1,780
1,030
260
180
910
740
60
40
300
190
140
110
150
110
3,600
2,400
88,700
The figures for actual aircraft strengths noted above are considered to be fairly reliable, particularly for the principal Satellites such as
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany; the evidence for the remaining countries is less firm.
'Includes Polish Naval Air Arm consisting of 40 TO&E (30 estimated actual) jet fighters and 20 TO&E (10 estimated actual) piston light bombers.
2 Does not include approximately 130 single engine trainer types carried in so-called "night light bomber" units of the Bulgarian Air Force.
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APPENDIX, TABLE 41
20
ESTIMATED SATELLITE NAVAL FORCES JULY 1954
Country
Destroyer
Submarines
Patrol
Mine
Amph. LCU Auxiliary
Personnel
East Germany
3625
(12)
18 (29)
2
9,200
Poland
1
3
15
12
15
9
8,800
Albania
0
14
3
800
Rumania
48
3
23
4
2
7,500
Bulgaria
1
314
20
4
4,900
TOTAL
6
6
119
57
15
17
31,100
1 The figures on the strength of the East German Sea Police, and on the Polish Navy are considered re-
liable. The figures on the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian navies are of a lesser order of relia-
bility, but are believed to be generally accurate.
2 Eight under operational control of border police.
Overage or obsolete.
'Twenty-nine are ex-PT boats.
These vessels are small district and harbor patrol craft, not strictly seagoing patrol vessels.
NOTE: The figures in parentheses indicate vessels under construction.
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