COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
4110.,==.4=10
ler6SERET--
SECURITY INFORMATION
COPY NO. 150
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE
0;0657
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
? COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
NIE-80
Published 3 April 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 26 March 1953.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
' r7-37/-
S17 77
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA--RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re-
cipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties.
Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the
information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Mutual Security Agency
Psychological Strategy Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION IN KOREA THROUGH 1953
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea
through 1953.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communist military potential in
the Korean area has grown steadily since
the initiation of cease-fire negotiations in
mid-1951. Troop strength has more
than doubled and logistic support has
been substantially improved. Jet fighter
strength has more than tripled. An esti-
mated 100 jet light bombers have been
introduced in Manchuria. Combat effec-
tiveness of Communist military forces has
improved and is now believed to range
from good to excellent. A highly organ-
ized, well-integrated defensive zone ex-
tends possibly 15 to 20 miles to the rear
of present battle positions. Many forti-
fied areas have been constructed in rear
of this zone and are being improved and
expanded.
2. The Communist Air Force in China
(CAFIC) 1 currently has the capability of
seriously challenging UNC daylight air
operations under conditions of good visi-
bility over North Korea. It also has the
capability of expanding CAFIC air oper-
1 The term CAFIC is meant to include North
Korean air units and Soviet units which are
believed to be operating with the Chinese Com-
munist Air Force.
ations into UN-held territory and adja-
cent waters. If the Communists sup-
ported a major ground offensive by exer-
cising the maximum capabilities of the
CAFIC over the entire Korean theater of
operations and UNC supporting bases,
and achieved optimum success in these
operations, the enemy might place the
UNC forces in Korea in jeopardy.
3. The enemy is capable of launching a
major ground and/or air attack with lit-
tle or no warning. On balance, current
Communist military, diplomatic, and
propaganda activities do not indicate
that the Communists intend to launch
large-scale ground or air operations in
the near future.
4. Political and economic conditions
within North Korea and Communist
China are not exerting compelling pres-
sure on the Communists to conclude an
armistice in Korea.
5. We believe that during the period of
this estimate Sino-Soviet cooperation in
Korea will not be materially reduced by
frictions and conflicting interests.
'"11:717-72-6= 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
6. The Communists probably estimate
that the Korean war exerts a divisive in-
fluence on the Western Powers and that
at least during the period of this esti-
mate the UN/US is unlikely to commit
the military strength in the Far East
necessary to drive the Communists from
Korea. At the same time the Commu-
nists probably believe that the UN/US
will take actions during the period of this
estimate which will increase the costs
and risks of the Korean war for the Com-
munists.
7. We believe that during the period of
this estimate the Communists will seek
to maintain strong military pressure in
Korea while retaining a primarily de-
fensive posture. At the same time, the
Communists will continue to build up
CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA
2
their military strength in the Korea-
Manchuria area in order to be in a posi-
tion to exploit any advantage which
might develop or to counter possible UN/
US intensification or expansion of the
war.
8. We believe that so long as the military
stalemate in Korea continues, the Com-
munists are unlikely to make concessions
on the POW issue to secure an armi-
stice.'
9. We believe that the Communist objec-
tive to gain control of all Korea will re-
main unchanged. We also believe, how-
ever, that the Communists desire to avoid
general war over the Korean issue and
that Communist courses of action in
Korea will be determined by Communist
global interests.
DISCUSSION
Force Strengths
10. Ground Forces. Enemy ground forces in
the Korean area have grown steadily in per-
sonnel strength since the initiation of armi-
stice negotiations in mid-1951, and currently
are more than double their mid-1951 strength.
STRENGTH OF ENEMY GROUND FORCES
IN KOREA'
July 1951
July 1952
March 1953
North Korean
230,000
267,000
294,000
Chinese
Communist
272,000
680,000
836,000
TOTAL
502,000
947,000
1,130,000
In addition to the Chinese Communist forces
in Korea, there are about 255,000 Chinese
Communist troops in Manchuria and 129,000
'By way of comparison, United Nations Command
(UNC) ground force strength in mid-1951 was
about 416,000. UNC ground force strength at
present is about 513,000.
in North China. These forces could be used
in Korea should a situation develop which
required rapid, substantial Communist rein-
forcement of their current forces.
11. The combat effectiveness and morale of
Communist ground units in Korea is judged
to range from good to excellent. Major pro-
grams of reorganization, re-equipment, and
reinforcement, particularly in armor, artillery,
and antiaircraft artillery units, have resulted
in substantially increased enemy fire power.
In recent months, improvements have been
noted in the enemy's employment of field and
AA artillery and in training, as evidenced by
SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of
Certain Courses of Action Directed at the In-
ternal and External Commerce of Communist
China" (dated 9 March 1953) , concludes that a
naval blockade of Communist China, in con-
junction with large-scale and sustained air and
naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist
transportation lines, would not in itself induce
the Communists to accept a Korean settlement
on present UN terms.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
111 Ink JIM"- niraillb ????
better leadership and tactical use of troops,
particularly in small unit tactics. There has
been an increased emphasis on the use of fire
and maneuver and less emphasis on "human
sea" tactics.
12. The Communist logistic position in Korea
has improved during the long semi-static
period since the beginning of armistice nego-
tiations. Although UNC operations against
lines of communication in North Korea have
made Communist re-supply efforts difficult,
the enemy has been able, though at consid-
erable cost in effort and equipment, to trans-
port sufficient supplies to meet his combat
requirements and to create stockpiles. It is
estimated that the enemy now has stockpiled
in Korea sufficient supplies to support about
35 days of offensive operations. However, be-
cause of a limited transport capability for sup-
port of his attacking echelons, the enemy
probably would not be able to sustain a large-
scale offensive for more than 10 to 14 days.
It should be noted, however, that the enemy's
build-up in military strength in North Korea
has brought an accompanying increase in his
logistic requirements. Thus, effective logis-
tic support of a major sustained offensive
would now necessitate, more than at any time
in the past, a steady flow of supplies to for-
ward areas.
13. Air Forces. The Communist Air Force in
China (CAFIC) 4 has grown steadily since the
initiation of truce negotiations in mid-1951.
It is estimated that the enemy's jet fighter
strength has more than tripled since mid-
1951. In addition, CAFIC strength has been
increased in recent months by the introduc-
tion of IL-28 jet light bombers, an estimated
100 of which are now in Manchuria.
ESTIMATED CAFIC TO & E STRENGTH5
July
1951
July
1952
February
1953
Jet Fighter
400
1,300
1,400
Jet Light Bomber
100
Other Types
600
800
850
Total
1,000
2,100
2,350
4 The term CAFIC is meant to include North
Korean air units and Soviet units which are
believed to be operating with the Chinese Com-
munists.
3
Of the present total combat strength of 2,350,
approximately 1,460 combat aircraft (includ-
ing 1,000 jet fighters and the 100 IL-28 jet
light bombers) are believed to be in the North
Korea?Manchuria area. The remaining com-
bat aircraft (including over 300 jet fighters)
are believed to be in China proper, based pri-
marily around Peiping, Shanghai, Canton,
and Hsuchou.
14. By US criteria, CAFIC fighter units are
believed to be reaching a fairly high standard
of combat efficiency. There has been a steady
improvement in enemy air tactics and, al-
though the degree of individual enemy pilots
aggressiveness has fluctuated periodically, the
proficiency and aggressiveness of enemy
fighter pilots by US standards is considered
"good" at the present time. The mosf serious
current CAFIC weakness is its deficiency in
all-weather and night-interception capability.
Although the CAFIC has been able to main-
tain sustained air activity over the past year,
the average CAFIC daily sortie rate, based on
sightings by UN aircraft, appears to be only a
fraction of the number of sorties possible with
the total aircraft believed to be available.
15. Airfield construction and repair has been
underway in North Korea since June 1950.
At present, there are approximately 33 air-
fields in North Korea which are or could be-
actual strength of CAFIC units is not
known, but most units are believed to be near
their 4jhoiTzed trength. Table of Organiza-
tion and Equipment strength is used as the basis
for estimation of CAFIC strength since it is con-
sidered that prior to any deliberate Communist
expansion of the air war the USSR probably
would provide the CAFIC with sufficient aircraft
to bring any understrength units to their full
TO & E complement. See Annex A and Annex B
for a tabular and graphic presentation of Com-
munist air strength since the outbreak of the
Korean war, together with a strength forecast
through the period of this estimate. See An-
nex C for a tabular presentation of Soviet Far
East air strength, and Annex D for CAFIC and
Soviet Air Force aircraft performance charac-
teristics. By way of comparison, the actual
UNC air strength in mid-1951 was about 960 air-
craft, the majority of which were piston type.
The actual UNC air strength at present is about
1,710 aircraft, of which approximately 775 are
jet fighters.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
eloriCTI"?TETIrrie 4
come suitable for military operations. Of
these, there are eight airfields which could
within a short time be capable of handling
sustained jet operations. Within Communist
China, an intensive airfield repair and facili-
ties build-up has produced a good system of
airfields capable of handling all types of air-
craft now available to the CAFIC. In Man-
churia, the recently developed air facilities are
so located as to provide excellent bases for the
air defense of Manchuria, and the ten jet air-
fields in the Antung/Mukden complex are so
located as to permit Communist jet fighters to
strafe ? but not to bomb ? forward UN in-
stallations.6
16. The CAFIC is almost wholly dependent
upon the USSR for logistical support, includ-
ing aircraft, fuel supplies, armament, and am-
munition. In addition, the USSR appears to
be providing advanced pilot training within
the USSR for CAFIC pilots, and Soviet per-
sonnel may be exercising operational control
of the CAFIC, either directly or indirectly.
17. Naval Forces. The small prewar North
Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in
the Korean war. Except for a substantial
capability for minelaying, its present effec-
tiveness is insignificant. The operational
Chinese Communist Navy consists of about
100 ships, including 42 amphibious vessels.
The Chinese Communist Navy has increased
its effectiveness in the past year. There has
been no indication to date of Chinese Com-
munist naval aid to North Korea.
18. The USSR is supplying the Chinese Com-
munist Navy, and to a lesser extent, the North
Korean Navy, with motor torpedo boats and
other small naval vessels, as well as naval
ordnance, mines, POL, radar, and deck and
minesweeping gear. No Soviet submarines
are known to have been transferred. The
Chinese Communists and the North Koreans
are probably receiving Soviet guidance and
training in naval warfare and coastal defense.
Over-All Military Capabilities
19. Ground Forces. There are currently de-
ployed in North Korea approximately 19 Chi-
See attached map.
/6
nese Communist armies and 5 North Korean
corps. Artillery, rocket launcher, and ar-
mored units are attached to infantry divisions.
Approximately 300,000 of these forces are
either engaged in or immediately available for
coastal defense operations. The bulk of this
force is disposed in the coastal areas where
amphibious operations might be anticipated.
The Communists have been engaged in the
strengthening of their coastal and front-line
defenses since 1951. A highly organized, well-
integrated defensive zone extends possibly 15
to 20 miles to the rear of present battle posi-
tions. Many fortified areas have been con-
structed in rear of this zone and are being
improved and expanded. A defensive zone is
believed to exist slightly to the rear of the
forward fortified area and a third zone has
been reported across the waist of Korea. Re-
ports indicate extensive employment of en-
trenchments, wire, mines, and roadblocks in
all defensive areas. Strong field fortifications
have been constructed in depth along present
front lines and along the east and west coasts.
Logistical reserves have been substantially
improved in these areas.
20. At the present time and under present
conditions of limited air support, Communist
ground forces in Korea have the following
capabilities:
a. A large-scale offensive, with little or no
warning;
b. Limited-objective offensives;
c. Defense in depth over a prolonged period;
d. Limited guerrilla operations in South
Korea.
1. Air Forces. The CAFIC currently has the
capability of seriously challenging UNC day-
light air operations under conditions of good
visibility over North Korea and of expanding
CAFIC air operations into UN-held territory
and adjacent waters. CAFIC capabilities ap-
pear to have been greatly increased during the
past six months by the conversion of two light
bomber regiments in Manchuria to IL-28 jet
light bombers. The maximum estimated
combat radius of the IL-28 is such that by
, Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
wortrif=trrrEmt 5
staging from Southern Manchuria bases the
CAFIC could launch attacks throughout
South Korea and part of Japan.'
22. The CAFIC does not have the present ca-
pability, however, of challenging UNC air
operations under conditions of poor visibility
and has only a limited all-weather capability.
CAFIC capabilities against UNC ground forces
and installations are presently limited by the
lack of operational jet-fighter installations in
Korea from which short-range attacks, em-
ploying bombs or napalm, could be mounted.
The CAFIC has not yet demonstrated the
capability of carrying out either effective air-
ground support operations or effective high-
altitude bombing by jet aircraft.
23. Communist air defense capabilities in
Korea, Manchuria, and to a lesser extent in
China proper have considerably increased
during the past year as a result of intensive
effort. A visual observer and/or radar air
warning net has been established which pro-
vides almost complete coverage along the
China coast from Hainan Island through
Manchuria to the Soviet frontier. An exten-
sive radar net has been developed in the
Korea-Manchuria area. However, despite the
considerable progress made, present Commu-
nist radar control and communications facili-
ties are not believed capable of operating
effectively against mass or saturation raids.
Communist antiaircraft fire in North Korea
has continued to increase in volume and ac-
curacy over the past year and now includes
some use of radar-controlled searchlights and
guns. The Communists have an estimated
1,000 jet fighters in the North Korean-
Manchurian area and have the capability in
this area of making a vigorous fighter defense
against UN air attacks under conditions of
daylight and good visibility. However, these
fighter defense capabilities are severely limited
by darkness and poor visibility. Elsewhere in
Communist China, the CAFIC may be able to
deploy enough aircraft for defense of selected
'See attached map. IL-28's are believed to have
a combat ceiling of 37,000 feet, approximate
maximum air speed of 450 knots, and bomb-load
capacity of up to 6,600 pounds.
specific areas against air attack, but the pres-
ently available forces are too sparsely deployed
and other elements of the air defense system
are too weak to prevent saturation of the air
defense system through simultaneous attacks
against several areas. There is no indication
that airborne intercept radar equipment is
available to the CAFIC.
24. Combined Air and Ground Capabilities.
If the Communists employed their maximum
air capability simultaneously with a major
ground force offensive but restricted their air
activity to Communist-held territory, they
would interfere at least initially with UNC
close-support and interdiction operations.
This relief from UNC air action against enemy
forward elements and LOC would improve
considerably the enemy's opportunities for
limited success. However, under these circum-
stances, Communist forces would probably not
have the capability to eject UNC forces from
Korea. If the Communists supported a major
ground offensive by surprise attacks exercising
their maximum air capabilities over the entire
Korean theater of operations and UNC sup-
port bases,8 the enemy would cause consid-
erable damage to UNC jet airfield installations
in the forward areas. In addition, such at-
tacks would divert some UNC aircraft and AA
weapons to purely defensive missions. There-
fore, the ground force capabilities would be
enhanced in that their troop movements and
logistic efforts would be under considerably
?Insufficient information is available on which to
base a firm estimate of the maximum number of
CAFIC aircraft which could be committed in the
initial attack of a major air offensive. However,
assuming that units in the CAFIC are assigned
approximately 80 percent of their TO & E
strength and that a stand-down inspection was
was held prior to a major air offensive, the
enemy, without redeployment of aircraft, could
possibly commit at present about 700 jet fighters,
120 piston fighters, 40 jet light bombers, and 25
piston light bombers. With redeployment, and
with the same assumptions as above, these fig-
ures would increase to about 950 jet fighters, 150
piston fighters, 40 jet light bombers, and 150
piston light bombers. The sortie rate which
could be sustained after an initial air strike is
estimated to be 18 per month for each jet
fighter, and 15 per month for all other types.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
wirats-s-re-mwff
lighter air attacks. Although no firm esti-
mate can be made of the situation which
might ultimately develop under these circum-
stances, it is possible that if the Communists
supported a major ground offensive by exer-
cising their maximum air capabilities over the
entire Korean theater of operations and UNC
supporting bases, and achieved optimum suc-
cess in these operations, the enemy might
place UNC forces in jeopardy.
25. Naval Forces. With the exception of
minelaying, North Korean naval capabilities
continue to be negligible. If the Chinese
Communist Navy should enter the Korean
war, it would be capable of assisting the North
Korean Navy as follows:
a. Motor torpedo boat surprise attacks on
UN shipping in the coastal waters of the Yel-
low Sea.
b. Laying and sweeping naval mines.
c. Supplying up to 1,000 trained submarine
personnel.
d. Providing amphibious lift for a balanced
force of 3 to 4 divisions in the coastal waters of
the Yellow Sea, using conventional landing
craft. Control of the sea and air are neces-
sary to conduct such operations.
26. Likely Trends in Enemy Military Capa-
bilities in Korea.9
a. Under continued conditions of a stale-
mated war in Korea. Under these circum-
stances Communist capabilities probably
would continue gradually to improve during
the period of this estimate. The enemy is
capable of continuing the augmentation of
ground forces by the introduction of addi-
tional infantry, artillery, and armored units,
and of continuing the improvement of fire
power, tactical use of troops, and logistic sup-
port. If the USSR continued to support the
CAFIC, the over-all capabilities of the Com-
munists would probably be significantly im-
proved and the threat to UN installations in
Korea would be increased. The Chinese Com-
The effect of certain UN/US courses of action
on Communist capabilities in Korea is discussed
in SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc
of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the In-
ternal and External Commerce of Communist
China," 9 March 1953.
6
munist Navy is believed capable of absorbing
considerably more naval equipment, including
small coastal submarines or coastal destroyers,
than is now apparently being supplied them
by the USSR. Whether or not such addi-
tional Soviet support is given, Chinese Com-
munist naval capabilities for operations de-
scribed in paragraph 25 would continue to
increase. North Korean naval capabilities
would increase to a very modest extent.
b. In the event of a cease-fire in Korea.
The most significant trend likely to develop in
enemy capabilities under these circumstances
would be the rebuilding and re-equipping of
North Korea's airfields.
Soviet Capabilities to Intervene in the
Korean War
27. Ground Forces. If the USSR should de-
cide to intervene openly in the Korean war, it
could at the present time commit to combat
within Korea an estimated 13 to 15 divisions
(215,000-250,000 troops) within 30 to 60 days
after a decision had been made to employ
these forces. No firm estimate can be made
of the Soviet forces available for use in Korea
in the event of full mobilization in the Soviet
Far East. The total force under such circum-
stances would probably be substantially in ex-
cess of 13-15 divisions.
28. Air Forces. The Soviet Far Eastern Air
Force consists at present of an estimated
5,600'? aircraft, including 1,760 jet fighters,
320 jet light bombers, 1,150 piston light
bombers, and 220 TU-4 piston medium
bombers. It is believed that available facili-
ties would allow deployment into the Korean
theater of less than 20 percent of the above
total strength. However, the Soviet air forces
could launch air strikes with approximately
150 jet light bombers, 820 piston light bomb-
ers, and 130 piston medium bombers from
present bases in the Southern Maritime and
Port Arthur areas against UN installations in
Korea and Japan while maintaining an air
defense of Soviet territory. The Soviet Far
Eastern Air Force could also provide an air-
"TO & E strength. See Annex C.
'Tor oErelti-E
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
wetrirmirrrreTer 7
borne lift for 6,700 to 7,500 paratroops, or it
could lift 15,000 to 18,000 paratroops in an
operation extending over a 5-day period.
29. Naval Forces. Present Soviet naval
strength in the Pacific area is estimated to
be 321 surface vessels, the largest of which
are two heavy cruisers and 31 destroyers; and
93 submarines, of which 64 are modern types.
This force could be immediately employed in
the Korean area. Soviet naval aviation in
the Far East (all shore-based and included in
totals given above for the Soviet Far Eastern
Air Force) is estimated (TO & E) to consist
of 1,540 aircraft. Utilizing their presently
known number of 42 amphibious vessels, it is
estimated that the Soviets could provide am-
phibious lift for a balanced force of 2 divi-
sions against the east coast of Korea or
Japan. Utilization of merchant vessels
would afford an increased capability.
30. Likely Trends in Soviet Military Capabili-
ties in the Korean Area. No major changes
are expected in Soviet Far East ground force
or naval capabilities during the period of this
estimate. The effectiveness of the Soviet Far
Eastern Air Force will probably improve
through continued re-equipping of existing
units with jet fighters and jet light bombers,
and through increased proficiency of flying
personnel with respect to formation flying,
high altitude bombing, and long-range navi-
gation under both clear and restricted visi-
bility conditions.
PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES
OF ACTION IN KOREA
Soviet Global Interests
31. In terms of Communist global interests,
the Korean war has had both advantages and
disadvantages. On the positive side, the war
has served to tie down US military forces, has
created a source of tension between the US
and its allies, and has provided a useful focus
and stimulus for Communist propaganda and
other forms of political warfare. On the
negative side, the war has been a drain on
the resources of the USSR and Communist
China and has provided a stimulus for main-
taining the West's rearmament efforts.
Moreover, the Communists probably estimate
that a closing out of the war by concessions
to the UN would encourage the West to main-
tain a firm position on other issues of the
East-West conflict, would involve a loss of
prestige, and might increase Communist mili-
tary defections in the future.
32. Whether the Kremlin estimates that So-
viet interests in the Far East can be ad-
vanced by a prolongation or by a termination
of the war in Korea depends in large degree
on Soviet world-wide strategy. The Kremlin
probably would prefer to move toward the
attainment of its objectives by means short
of general war. While the Communist ag-
gression in Korea has involved, throughout,
an inherent risk of general war, the Kremlin
has sought to limit its own role in the Korean
war and has not sought to use the war as
an excuse for initiating broader hostilities.
The Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding'
general war over the Korean issue and for
this reason would probably prefer either a
continuation of the present situation or an
armistice to a spread in hostilities that in its
view would lead to general war.
Internal Conditions in Communist China
and North Korea
33. Communist China. During the Korean
war, Chinese Communist political controls
have been intensified. Forced collection of
funds has been instituted in order to finance
the war and the regime's internal programs.
These coercive measures have in all proba-
bility decreased the degree of willing support
given the regime and the war effort. But
the increasingly effective totalitarian meas-
ures of the regime are almost certainly ade-
quate to control any resentment which may
develop.
34. The economic and political strains im-
posed on Communist China by the Korean
war are probably less at present than they
were in 1950 and 1951. The rise in the in-
dustrial and agricultural output of Commu-
nist China and the strengthening of political
and economic controls have increased the re-
sources at the disposal of the regime. We
OP 0]BOIIET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
_41!t'arrtPgrus.""
therefore believe it unlikely that domestic fac-
tors, either economic or political, are placing
the Chinese Communist regime under any
immediate and demanding pressure to con-
clude an armistice in Korea. So long as the
USSR continues to furnish a large share of
the military equipment and supplies for the
war and provides economic assistance, the
Chinese Communist war effort, at current or
even somewhat expanded levels, is not likely
to subject the economy to serious strains.
35. North Korea. A critical food situation
apparently exists in North Korea. Although
the regime has claimed a bumper crop for
1952, food production and distribution have
apparently not met ? civilian and military re-
quirements, and substantial assistance from
Communist China has been necessary. North
Korean housing, industry, and electric power
have all been severely curtailed by UNC oper-
ations. In addition, major shortages exist in
consumer goods and in agricultural man-
power. Accordingly, morale among the
civilian population has continued to decline
and there is some evidence of factionalism
within the regime. However, there is no evi-
dence that resolution of the North Korean
regime or the morale of the North Korean
armed forces has been substantially weak-
ened. A prolongation of the war will almost
certainly have an increasingly adverse effect
on internal conditions in North Korea. How-
ever, this will probably have little influence
on Communist courses of action in Korea be-
cause the interests of the North Korean
regime will continue to be subordinated to
the global or regional interests of the USSR.
Sino?Soviet Cooperation in Korea
36. Although there is evidence of a recent in-
crease in Chinese Communist influence in
North Korea, we believe that the USSR still
dominates North Korean affairs. The ques-
tion of primary influence in North Korea may
eventually have an adverse effect upon Sino-
Soviet relations, but it is unlikely that such
rivalry will, during the period of this estimate,
have any major effect upon Communist
courses of action in Korea.
8
37. Continuation of the Korean war almost
certainly creates strains in the Sino-Soviet
partnership. The war undoubtedly raises
the problems of the distribution of its burdens
between the two powers. Furthermore, the
death of Stalin has probably created some
uncertainties in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
In addition, Communist China's growing
military and economic dependence on the
USSR probably poses other difficulties which
could eventually place serious strains on the
Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the con-
flicting individual interests and the frictions,
actual and potential, which may exist in the
Sino-Soviet partnership have not to date ham-
pered the enemy's effective cooperation in
Korea, and there is at the present time no
evidence of changes in the Korean policies of
either of the two powers. Communist China
probably views its security as being closely
linked to that of the USSR and has demon-
strated its willingness to subordinate its im-
mediate interests to the broader objectives it
shares with the USSR. Therefore, we be-
lieve that the effectiveness of Sino-Soviet co-
operation in Korea, at least during the period
of this estimate, will not be materially
reduced.
Current Indications of Communist
Intentions in Korea
38. Military Indications. Present Commu-
nist military activities in the Far East indi-
cate a Communist intention to maintain their
military commitment in Korea. While the
nature of Communist military activities in
Korea suggests an immediate intention to
continue defensive-type operations, the con-
tinued build-up of both ground and air
strength of all types appears to anticipate
the possibility of the resumption of full-scale
ground fighting and an extension of air war-
fare.
39. Indications from Communist Diplomatic
Moves. Soviet and Chinese Communist dip-
lomatic actions, while providing no conclusive
indications of Communist courses of action,
suggest an intention to continue the war in
Korea. In particular, the Communists have
16-eettEn.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
refused to to make any concessions on the POW
issue. Since the indefinite suspension of
truce negotiations at Panmunjom on 8 Octo-
ber 1952, the Communists have not indicated
any readiness to compromise on their demand
for "total repatriation" of POW's. This in-
transigence was demonstrated in the Soviet
Union's violent rejection of the Menon Reso-
lution in the UN General Assembly. The
Moscow Sino-Soviet discussions and the Sep-
tember 1952 Sino-Soviet exchange of notes on
the retention of Soviet forces in Port Arthur
offer no conclusive indications of Communist
intentions in Korea. However, these events
do indicate a Communist desire to impress
the West with the solidity of the Sino-Soviet
alliance.
40. Propaganda Indications. Recent Com-
munist propaganda has indicated no disposi-
tion on the part of the Communists to accept
a truce on other than their own terms. The
main burden of recent Communist propa-
ganda has concerned itself with alleged US
plans to extend the war and Communist
ability to thwart these plans. However,
there has been no indication in Communist
propaganda of a major Communist offensive
in Korea. Chinese Communist propaganda
has stressed that its internal economic plans
need not be disturbed and indeed can be
stimulated by a continuation of the Korean
war.
Probable Courses of Action
41. The Communists probably estimate that
the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on
the Western Powers and that at least during
the period of this estimate the UN/US is un-
9
likely to commit the military strength in the
Far East necessary to drive the Communists
from Korea. At the same time the Commu-
nists probably believe that the UN/US will
take actions during the period of this esti-
mate which will increase the costs and risks
of the Korean war for the 'Communists.
42. We believe that during the period of this
estimate the Communists will seek to main-
tain strong military pressure in Korea while
retaining a primarily defensive posture. At
the same time, the Communists will continue
to build up their military strength in the
Korea-Manchuria area in order to be in a
position to exploit any advantage which
might develop or to counter possible UN/US
intensification or expansion of the war.
43. We believe that so long as the military
stalemate in Korea continues, the Commu-
nists are unlikely to make concessions on the
POW issue to secure an armistice.11
44. We believe that the Communist objective
to gain control of all Korea will remain un-
changed. We also believe, however, that the
Communists desire to avoid general war over
the Korean issue and that Communist
courses of action in Korea will be determined
by Communist global interests.
il SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of
Certain Courses of Action Directed at the In-
ternal and External Commerce of Communist
China" (dated 9 March 1953) , concludes that a
naval blockade of Communist China, in con-
junction with large-scale and sustained air and
naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist
transportation lines, would not in itself induce
the Communists to accept a Korean settlement
on present UN terms.
akerr?S-E E T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
/fisEiv??WEstr" 10
ANNEX A
THE ESTIMATED TO & E STRENGTH OF THE
COMMUNIST AIR FORCE IN CHINA
TYPE OF
AIRCRAFT
JULY
1950
JULY
1951
JULY
1952
PRESENT
JULY
1953
JULY
1954
Jet Fighter
400
1,300
1,400
1,750
2,100
Piston Fighter
200
200
240
240
300
300
Ground Attack
87
170
140
200
250
300
Jet Light Bomber
100
100
160
Piston Light Bomber
20
130
260
240
250
350
Medium Bomber
?
?
Transport
100
160
170
150
240
Reconnaissance
50
TOTAL
307
1,000
2,100
2,350
2,800
3,500
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
ANNEX B
THE ESTIMATED TO & E STRENGTH OF THE CAFIC
3600
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400 ?
0
00
CV
FIGHTERS
0
CV
LIGHT BOMBERS
TOTAL AIRCRAFT
21
0
CV
Piston
en
0
Jet
1.0
CV
E Piston
.0 o
ce3 in
00 7-1 1-4
c)
g3
0 Jet
c=:,
vti Ce3
c."
v-I
1.0
C-
.44
v-I
CV
Co
CO
CV
Co
,
200
..%--
<
/
../..'
?????"?
'........5
..."??'
....?'''
.--J.2 f"-.1 Fl r21
/
;..
.../ ....'
00 1-1 v--4 CV CV CeJ Nt4
L( to to to to to V) lf3 tS 12 LO'-1 171 , Lf In"
5 8 5 5 8 5 5 5 * 8 A.) 5 5
5 5
??
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
b"P, u et 12
ANNEX C
ESTIMATED SOVIET FAR EAST TO & E AIR STRENGTH
AIRCRAFT TYPE
1 JULY
1 JANUARY
1 JULY
1 JULY
1952
1953
1953
1954
Fighter
Jet
1,370
1,760
2,000
2,500
Piston
1,200
750
550
Attack
Jet
. . . .
. . .
160
Piston
630
630
630
450
Light Bomber
Jet
30
320
610
1,140
Piston
1,600
1,150
860
260
Medium Bomber
130
220
220
390
Transport
470
470
470
470
Reconnaissance
Jet
150
Piston
310
300
310
180
TOTALS
5,740
5,600
5,650
5,700
TITIP?MLIT-7241"-?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
.0.2??8 11216161E T 13
ANNEX D
*CCAF AIRCRAFT TE.CHNICAL CAPABILITIES
A 4,
OrreAnik.
TYPE AIRCRAFT 4s4. COM-1116=1:14SC*411.1COMVAV4tEILING
(Nautical Miles) (Feet)
ARMAMENT
Jet Fighters
2 Xs"
MIG-15 133!g 1 50,500 2/23 mm, 80 rounds/gun
4,o Mt 2 1/37 mm, 40 rounds
MIG-9 330 42,000 1/37 mm, 100 rounds
2/23 mm, 75 rounds/gun
YAK-15 300 31,500 2/20 mm, rounds/gun unknown
6-8/55 mm, rockets
Piston Fighters
YAK-9 540 30,500 1/20 mm, 120 rounds
2/12.7 180 rounds/gun
LA-7 300 33,500 2/20 mm, 200 rounds/gun
LA-9 440 30,500 4/23 mm, 100 rounds/gun
Jet Light Bombers
IL-28 590 1 37,000 5 4/23 mm, guns
690 3 4,400/6,600 lbs. bombs
Piston Light Bombers
TU-2 400
Ground Attacks
IL-10
Medium Bombers
TU-4
1'70
23,000 5
2/20 mm, 150 rounds/gun
3/12.7 mm, 250 rounds/gun
3,300 lbs. bombs
2/23 mm, 150 rounds/gun
2/7.62 mm, 750 rounds/gun
1/12.7 mm, 150 rounds/gun
2/132 mm, rockets
880 lbs. bombs
1,700 37,000 5 8/2.7 mm, 500 rounds/gun
2,150 4 2/20 mm.
10,000 lbs. bombs (normal)
20,000 lbs. bombs (maximum)
1 Internal fuel only. 4,4
2 With two external Tft gal. tanks.
8 With two external 220 gal. tanks.
Stripped-down version.
5 Combat ceilings will vary with gross weight.
"P.8-12-841411-14.0diftwi
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
SECURITY INFORMATION
?
f
i
I
4
40
35
3 o
? 120 125 130 135 140 145
45
40
35
30
\--.
' C
MONGOLIA ..?
-./
i
-.0-... S
I,0*--- -, --.% #J? .
?
.'._"
,.
, C
..- ..
,,
c
Shhwngng?ofisn-shu
en-,-ta-a-ka
Skui - 'en
I
al ang denn (N V )0
'ang-ch'un (W )0 A
Ta-eun
_
S /Yu:kg (1)
in - 9D
Tung -feng (1
ilvlei-ho-leou
Mukden (
?,
La-lin0
A
en-mi
? i
Kinn
' fil,)
?
-
'0'2,- \f?
--%
Changjin
4?
Taejon
Chinju
0
,
K?
Sun dna elm
Wetveh'un
,.
-
Tun-hua
(W)
I
tr.
11
Clua-mu-ssu (W)
?
114.114.231 ang .
&robtdzhm ,
SAKHALIN
(Uadministration)nder U
Konotoro
_
!
Q./
rohama
o a
o
I
S S R
0 oman
(K? a.
0
Wakkana
c)
Sapporo
0
- Muroran
Hakodate
Ohata
Senda
o
Ochlat (Dolmsk)
'onuma (Novo-Aleksandrovsk)
0 ? yohara (Yuzhno Saichahnsk)
? ? _
KURIL ISNDS
LA
(Under U S S R
administration)
Abashiri
Asahigawa ci c:0
Nemuro
(
\
arovsk
it
-. vskiKrasnaYa Rechka
i
..
Ch ? C 133.11,4SU. (E)
Cli, taAtku-sso (C)
U4 S. S? R.
g
ere'rRybolov zrANK,01
Spas -Danny
\ KhoroPO Voskres aka
g 00 0 ernyshevka
' \ Lu
novka
i Voros ?v/ 0Pga
Voziiv ? a
S A( )o 0A /Knorichi
e 0 Sergeyev S
i Romanovka

....... aya
-? ?05t0k/ Via& osto
hta Patrokl
Nam.'
gjin
S E A 0 F JAPAN
Niigata
I
<
-
HONSHU
Kanazawa
11
'S.
I, Matsue -, )
(1.4E
Hai-
Lan I,..-''
Tui hue (E.)
.
yen-chL (s
iiiCh'o
SOnglin A
line -
I.
tr
Pusan Pusan Ac
/
Y air
o
.,
Sagasakaseboit
N ?
r 1c
v.,
KaTiZ
, -
Son-chm
11?i;
HOKKAIDO
Z
17cP"V
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Some boundaries shown on this map are de facto bound
arias (19.53), not necessarily recognized as definitive by the
United States Government
en
' Chm-chou (W ) Liao- ,_ ( )
.0
T'eng-a
, Feng-ch'erig
Ta-tung-kou
Ku-shan.
San-shih-h-p'u . P' - -Inv.
T'u-ch'eng-tzu . ' Hua-chia-t'un\
GULF -Port Arthur Chm-hbieri(S E -2)
Chin-hsien (S E -1)
0 F
C II ..r-H L I 4. PORT_,ARTHUR NAVAL BASE AREA
Yen at (SW),...e,,,,..
Wei:listen
.?
..r u t mg
t
1.:.
smgtao
u en (S E.) -,
T'ung-hua
0 -
-pao
.-.0."/
Ta-pao
,0A
E
?
1
P yon an j
?Sariwonit
.?,
HOngnam
Wonsan
Present
-
h'unch'an
Ta gu
.
t,-
c>9)
0
Chan yo
es
4.
.
EO L
K 0 R E A 1,.
,
' 0 o
.0.-
YELL() TirTOKYO
---___
SEA
t
i
CHIN :k
,..,
'ang
litang-wan
4,, hanghai
,P
Hunt. Lu g-hua
o -
Ciata g
..
0 a.1/4
bkp o
8
,V,":::51?
Nagoya
,
,
Osaka ..,
, Hiroshima
,
Matsuyama
Kochi
IIIIIr
SHIKOKU
3
KYUSHU
i
NOTE The effectiveness of North Korea s railroad system is
severely hampered by continuing UNC operations
..,
-0 .d.rai Shan
Chani-ch'iao0 ' '
Ym-hsten@ P
125 130 135 140
KOREAN
COMMUNIST AIRFIELD CLASSIFICATIONS
I Airfield capable of supporting sustained IV Airfield capable
0 operations of heavy bombers medium bomb @ of light transports piston
ers and light jet bombers Runway length jet fighter operations
7 000 feet or more feet or more
II Airfield capable of supporting limited oper V Other operational
* ations of heavy and medium bombers, and 0 important airfield
sustained operations of tactical support jet or more
fighters Runway length 6 000 feet or more * vi Seaplane station
III Airfield capable of sustained operations
of jet interceptor fighters with a potential
0 for heavy and medium bomber operations
easily improved to class I Runway length
5 000 feet or more
of sustained operations
fighters and limited
Runway length 4
4
airfield or potentially
Runway length 2 000 feet
with complete facilities
0 25 50
; i
THEATER OF OPERATIONS s.,ea..
A OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING
FROM
1
12-4-666W
? ?
COMMUNIST BASES
ASS"
.. _23$3:rnautical miles-MIG 15 with two gallon
'-'' wing tanks and no added armament 0.-
690 nautical miles-IL 28 bomber Lit,- rt-T
4 with a
n
4 400 pound bomb load , coh..- 3 ,..i c)1 an 0 --t+
Crok- 0,-A.....g ,../w... 0A-- .1.2---ir
International boundary
Selected railroad
\ os
90 nautical miles-MIG 15 with two 550 pound
1 bombs ei.Y.-82..14:14Xi.-Pekete?- and internal fuel
000 only 0--
?.
2 .?,-. nautical miles-MIG 15 with no added
armament, and internal fuel only a_
"Thrw-Q"a-,-0-,-, -k.t.).-a...
....
Ct 9-?-'s'a-fr-1
Scale 1 6 000 000
190 290 390 Nautical Miles
o 2p 50 190 290 390 Statute Miles
,
0 25 50 100 290 390 Kilometers
1 i 1
"figgraia
12583 CIA 3 53
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5
TOP SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 : CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5 _
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02,.
CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5 UL?..1-?"
# = ESTIMATES - VIEW/OBTAIN FROM NARA
+ = PG. COUNT CONFIRMED
(SAN) = SANITIZED
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/05/02 :
CIA-RDP98-00979R000100780001-5