MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC SENIOR STAFF PREPARED TO SUPPLEMENT NIE-69: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000100630002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 12, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECURITY INFORMATION
COPY NO. -
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC SENIOR STAFF
PREPARED TO SUPPLEMENT NIE ? 69:
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
Published 12 September 1952
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
NORTH AFRICA
This Supplement was prepared by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in consultation with the member agencies
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,/
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?
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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA
Tunisia
1. The Moslem population of Tunisia is politi-
cally and culturally the most advanced in
North Africa, and constitutes a relatively ho-
mogeneous society. Since 1881, when France
established its protectorate, the French
have followed a policy of "association" rather
than assimilation which has not altered the
nature of this society. Well defined cultural
and social barriers exist between the 3,100,000
natives and the 153,000 "colons" of French
descent (there are also 88,000 Italian settlers
in the north) . The proportion of native
illiteracy is high, but less so than in other
North African areas. Owing largely to a
growing and influential French-educated
group, the Tunisians have shown substantial
capacity for self-government.
2. Political Structure. Tunisia is legally a
sovereign state under the rule of the Bey of
Tunis, but the protectorate treaty and a modi-
fying convention of 1883 give France control
of defense and foreign affairs and the right to
propose internal reforms. In practice, the
French Resident General exercises almost
total control of Tunisian affairs. The
"colons" and officials from the metropole play
a major role in the government, holding al-
most all civil service posts of any consequence.
Despite their small numbers, the "colons" also
dominate the Tunisian economy. French
commercial interests are allowed special
advantages. The French-dominated protec-
torate government enjoys majority participa-
tion in public utilities, railroads, and airlines
and holds various other monopolies.
3. Since World War II the French have
allowed increased Tunisian participation in
the government, although the natives are un-
able to make policies or pass laws. There is
an equal number of French and Tunisian
cabinet members, with the former holding the
important portfolios. In 1951 France started
a program for expanded Tunisian participa-
tion in the civil service, though its impact was
largely vitiated by French use of political
patronage. Municipal reforms have been
blocked by Tunisian refusal to agree that the
"colons" should participate in local govern-
ment, as demanded by the French. The
Tunisians insist that the "colons," as French
citizens, cannot be allowed to vote or hold
office in another sovereign state. Native par-
ticipation in elective governmental assemblies
is mostly on the local advisory council level.
Even at this level only a small proportion of
natives is enfranchised.
4. The Bey of Tunis, while sympathetic
toward the aspirations of his people, holds his
position only with French concurrence and
finds it difficult to oppose the French. France
has used the nominal ruler as its instrument
of power. The present ruler, despite fitful
periods of stubbornness, has generally yielded
to French coercion and threats of deposition.
5. Nationalism. Nationalist activity in Tu-
nisia dates roughly from 1907, but the first
effective nationalist party, the Destour, was
formed only after World War I. In 1934,
stimulated by the Pan-Islamic revival in the
Near East, the radical element in the party
broke off and formed the Neo-Destour. The
Old Destour has since declined into relative
unimportance, but the Neo-Destour Party, led
by Habib Bourguiba, became sufficiently prom-
inent by 1947 to be offered cabinet posts by
the French. In 1950 the nationalists entered
the government after the French proniised to
institute reforms.
6. Before the present crisis the French-edu-
cated leadership of the Neo-Destour was essen-
tially moderate in outlook. Although request-
ing French recognition of Tunisian internal
autonomy and initiation of a program leading
gradually to independence, the Neo-Destour
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leaders aimed chiefly at winning greater par-
ticipation in the government.
\- '7. The relatively well developed native Tu-
nisian labor movement, primarily the influen-
tial UGTT (General Union of Tunisian Work-
ers) led by French-trained Farhat Hached, has
given the Neo-Destour increasingly effective
support. While the UGTT affiliated with the
Communist-sponsored World Federation of
Trade Unions in 1949, it soon withdrew and
joined the anti-Communist ICFTU. Its new
affiliation has given the UGTT and Tunisian
nationalism important contacts with organ-
ized labor in Europe and the US, and has
lessened the possibility of Communist influ-
ence over nationalist labor. The Communist
Party itself probably has less than 4,000 mem-
bers. Its chief source of strength lies in its
control over a smaller union, the USTT (Syn-
dical Union of Tunisian Workers) , which has
steadily declined in influence and may even-
tually be absorbed by the UGTT. French
efforts to identify the Neo-Destour and UGTT
with a Communist conspiracy are not sup-
ported by the available evidence.
8. The Current Crisis. The present tension
in Tunisia followed a French note of last De-
cember which the Tunisian nationalists con-
sidered a refusal to accept their reform
proposals. Bourguiba's subsequent attempt
to put pressure on the French by demanding
UN consideration of the Tunisian case led to
his arrest and an outbreak of strikes and riots
in mid-January. Confronted with the need
for quick action the French embarked on a
policy of force, combined with new reform
proposals. When the pro-nationalist Chenik
ministry refused to negotiate on these terms,
the French arrested its members late in
March, and induced former premier Bac-
couche to form a cabinet which could negoti-
ate reforms. This attempt to present the UN
with a fait accompli was nullified by the in-
ability of the new prime minister to secure
the support of influential Tunisians for these
reforms. The French have moved in substan-
tial forces, however, and kept Tunisia under
firm control. A, state of siege has been fully
implemented and Moslem males over 18 have
been Made responsible for sabotage in their
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localities. While terrorism has not been
eradicated, the 9,000 French and 13,000 native
troops in Tunisia can almost certainly control
any nationalist uprising.
9. The most significant result of the French
policy of force has been greatly to stimulate
Tunisian nationalism. As a result of French
repression, the majority of Tunisians now
sympathize with the nationalist movement,
currently led by Farhat Hached. The nation-
alists have become progressively more in-
transigent and have come to demand complete
and immediate independence.
10. French reform program. Though the
French reform program is still flexible in its
details, it appears to call for: (a) creation of
an appointed consultative assembly with one
all-Tunisian chamber to deal with all but
financial and economic matters, which are
reserved to a second French-Tunisian cham-
ber; (b) French representation on elective
local councils only when there is a large
French element in the local population; (c) a
majority of Tunisian members in the Cabinet;
(d) gradual creation of an all-Tunisian civil
service except for a certain number of key
posts; and (e) the creation of an administra-
tive tribunal of appeal headed by a French
official, to replace the Resident's veto over
administrative regulations. Eventually the
consultative assembly would become an elec-
tive legislature. However, France would re-
tain indefinitely control over foreign affairs,
security, and finance.
French Morocco
11. The French protectorate over the Sher-
ifian Empire of Morocco dates from the
treaty of Fez in 1912. The population of
French Morocco is roughly 8,600,000, includ-
ing almost 350,000 French nationals and
about 60,000 others of European descent.
The native population is three-fifths Berber
and two-fifths Arab in ethnic derivation.
12. French financial interests were firmly im-
planted in Morocco well before the protec-
torate was established and France now com-
pletely controls the economy. Morocco is the
third most important producer of phosphates
in the world, and the source for about half the
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French steel industry's manganese. By 1937
the French had succeeded in abolishing all
important foreign capitulatory rights with the
exception of the US privileges, which are based
on an agreement last renewed in 1836.
13. Political Structure. France governs the
protectorate through a separate administra-
tion, headed by a Resident General, which
functions beside that of the Sultan and ex-
ercises almost complete control. The relative
importance of the two governments is illus-
trated by the fact that the French adminis-
tration's budget (largely provided by France
itself) is almost eighty times greater than
that of the Moorish government. There is
little coordination between the dual adminis-
trations. Virtually all officials in important
posts are French. Almost the only native
participation in the protectorate administra-
tion is in the advisory Council of Government
whin assists the Resident. Legislation is
promulgated by decree. Refusal to sign
French-sponsored decrees has been the Sul-
tan's chief means of opposing French domina-
tion. France also enjoys extraordinary dis-
ciplinary powers through a state of seige
which has been in force since 1912. Military
censorship has been the rule since 1939. Four
of the seven Moroccan regions are adminis-
tered by military officials, and the presence
of 54,000 troops (one-third of them native)
guarantees control of the zone.
14. While French controls have left the Sultan
at the head of only a shadow government,
recent events have greatly increased his pres-
tige and diminished French ability to coerce
him. More vigorous and able than his Tu-
nisian counterpart, he has openly supported
nationalism and has close connections with
several leading nationalists. His demands
for French reforms in October 1950 and March
1952 have made him a symbol of Moroccan
nationalism and even appear to have brought
many Berbers to recognize his leadership.
However, the French colons have in large
measures blocked such reforms.
15. The French have traditionally followed a
policy of "divide and rule" in Morocco by
capitalizing on the historic antipathies be-
tween the Berbers and the Arabs, but these
groups are very slowly being welded into a
single people. In fact, a recent French at-
tempt to pit Berber against Arab appears
to have backfired, and the French have had
to suppress several local anti-French Berber
uprisings. However, despite growing Berber
association with Moroccan nationalism, the
French may still have some success with this
policy. As a further counter to nationalist
support of the Sultan, the French have fa-
vored the old religious fraternities and the
urban and rural native aristocracies. Berber
chieftain el Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech, has
received special attention.
16. Nationalism. Nationalist sentiment, re-
latively dormant before World War II, has
grown rapidly since the war. The chief na-
tionalist parties, the Istiqlal (Independence)
and the Shoura (Democratic Independence) ,
are technically outlawed, but are allowed to
function except in areas controlled by pro-
French Berber chieftains, where they have
been sternly repressed. The Istiqlal is by far
the more important, Shoura opportunism
having incurred the charge of collaboration
with the French. Estimates of Istiqlal mem-
bership vary widely because of the semi-clan-
destine nature of the Istiqlal and its cellular
structure; some 200,000 members plus a much
larger number of sympathizers appears the
most reasonable guess. Party strength is
strongest among the expanding middle class
and other urban, groups. The two Istiqlal
leaders, Allal el Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej
(internal dissension has prevented the nam-
ing of a single leader) , are opposed to vio-
lence, partly because of the risk to the very
limited group of educated leaders. However,
a growing faction of young extremists pres-
ently threatens to overcome the restraining
influence of the party heads. The Istiqlal
has no use for the Tunisian experiment of
native participation in the French adminis-
tration and instead demands acknowledge-
ment in principle of Moroccan independence.
A pact of unity was signed in 1951 between
the various nationalist parties in French and
Spanish Morocco and Tangier, but dissension
between moderates and extremists has pre-
vented extensive cooperation.
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17. The Communist Party has had little suc-
cess among the natives except in a few in-
dustrialized areas like Casablanca. Member-
ship is estimated at about 20,000. Commu-
nists dominate the largely French UGSCM,
the only Moroccan labor union. Since the
French do not permit separate native unions,
Istiqlal has sought to penetrate the UGSCM
and has recently taken control of its Execu-
tive Committee, following the deportation of
several non-Moroccan Communist leaders.
There is no evidence that the Istiqlal has
cooperated with the Communists despite the
latter's attempts to identify themselves with
nationalist aims. On the contrary, it has
vigorously denounced Communism.
Algeria
18. Algeria is unique among the North Afri-
can territories in that it has a large popula-
tion of French descent and is administered
as an integral part of metropolitan France.
French penetration has made Algeria the
most developed and Europeanized part of
North Africa. French nationals number
1,200,000 out of a population of some 9,300,-
000. They completely dominate Algerian
economic and political life.
19. Although France has politically assimi-
lated Algeria, there has been little social or
cultural assimilation of the native population,
and a sharp differentiation exists between the
European and Moslem communities. The in-
adequacy of modern educational facilities for
the Moslems and consequent reliance on an-
tiquated Koranic schools has only confirmed
this division. On the other hand, the forces
of Islam and nationalism are slowly tending
to submerge cultural and linguistic distinc-
tions between Arabs (about 60 percent of the
native population) and Berbers.
20. Political Structure. The three Algerian
departments (Oran, Algeriers, and Constan-
tine) elect representatives to the National
Assembly, the Council of the Republic and
the Assembly of the French Union. Their
administration, however, is markedly differ-
ent from that of metropolitan French depart-
ments. A Governor General appointed by the
French Cabinet and responsible only to Paris
is interposed between the Algerian depart-
ments and the Paris government. He has
broad authority, both legally and in practice,
and completely dominates the local scene.
There are also a separate Algerian Assembly,
which first met in 1948, and a separate Algeri-
an budget. While the Assembly has limited
fiscal and budgetary powers, its "decisions"
are mostly subject to ratification by Paris,
which remains the principal legislator for Al-
geria. The vast Southern Territories remain
under military control pending assimilation
into the existing departments.
21. Moreover, within the Algerian government
itself, the French minority exercises a wholly
disproportionate political influence. Although
the Algerian statute of 1947 makes all Alger-
ians legally French citizens, the French have
failed to implement the voting rights of the
bulk of the natives. The total registered
electorate, including the French residents, is
only 1,800,000. Native voting is further lim-
ited by ballot-stuffing and other practices.
In addition the French residents and pro-
French Moslems hold a preponderant num-
ber of seats in the Algerian Assembly, the
departmental general councils, and the var-
ious municipal councils. Algerian access to
posts in the civil service and in industry is
severely limited by inability to meet the edu-
cational requirements for higher positions.
Extensive native participation is found only
in the djemaas, the elective assemblies of the
rural villages.
22. Nationalism. There are two important
nationalist parties in Algeria. The MTLD
(Movement for the Triumph of Democratic
Liberties) , led by Messali Hadj (now under
surveillance in France) , is an extremist move-
ment recruited primarily from the laboring
classes. It advocates systematic violence in
order to win complete independence from
France. Party membership is unknown, but
was estimated at 150,000 in 1945. The UDMA
(Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto)
includes better educated natives of the pro-
fessional and small business classes. Its lead-
er, Ferhat Abbas, appears to favor gradual
evolution toward an Algerian republic within
the French Union. UDMA membership is
probably less than 100,000.
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23. Although not now an organized political
force, the ulema, Moslem teachers and re-
ligious figures, appear to be the natural lead-
ers of the masses. Many of them support the
nationalist movements and have been endeav-
oring to reconcile the aims of the MTLD and
UDMA. They have also shown willingness to
ally with the Communists to further their own
ends.
24. The Algerian Communist Party numbers
only about 15,000. Its potential strength lies
in its ability to identify itself with the
Algerian nationalist movements, in which it
has had some limited though probably super-
ficial success. Communist domination of the
CGT (General Federation of Labor) , by far
the strongest labor group in Algeria, has pro-
vided the party with a useful vehicle for prop-
aganda and action. In July 1951 the Com-
munists played a major role in forming the
FADRL (Algerian Front) , which includes the
ulema, UDMA and MTLD. The Communists
have since played the leading part in this com-
mittee. So far, however, FADRL activities
have not led to much unity of action among
nationalists and Communists, or among the
nationalists themselves.
25. Since the uprising in 1945 in the Depart-
ment of Constantine, Algeria has been rela-
tively quiet. Last April, however, the trial of
several Communist and nationalist leaders in
Algiers led to demonstrations and sporadic
clashes with the police. Tighter govern-
mental restrictions have since been enforced
against free assembly and movement and
against the nationalist press. France un-
questionably can maintain order with the
56,000 troops now in Algeria.
Spanish Morocco and Tangier
26. Spain's "zone of influence" in Morocco,
roughly one-twentieth the size of French
Morocco, derives from Franco-Spanish agree-
ments of 1904 and 1912. Of an estimated pop-
ulation of almost 1.2 million, about 7 percent
is of Spanish descent. Only one-third of the
zone is considered arable and the only im-
portant raw material is iron ore, exported
mainly to the UK, Spain, and Germany. The
zone is a drain on Spain's economy. Al-
though there are limited possibilities for min-
ing development, Spain lacks the necessary
investment capital. Spanish Morocco is ad-
ministered by a High Commissioner who exer-
cises almost dictatorial powers, and is
responsible directly to Generalissimo Franco.
On the Moroccan side, the Sultan's deputy,
the Khalifa, is the native ruler. Reforms of
1946 and 1948 provided the Khalifa with a
premier and ministry but gave him little
power. In addition to the large Spanish
ground forces of about 60,500, there are
approximately 7,500 Khalifian troops which
are under Spanish control.
27. Nationalism. The chief nationalist party,
the Islah, has about the same proportionate
strength and influence in the Spanish Zone as
the Istiqlal in French Morocco. The minor
Wahda Party is almost defunct. Spain is
sponsoring a new Al Maghreb Party, designed
to give the impression Spain is receptive to
nationalism, but this party probably will be
no more successful than previous ones spon-
sored by the Spanish. The Islah and Istiqlal
cooperate in seeking a re-unified and inde-
pendent Morocco. In view of Spain's attitude
toward Communism and its tight control of
the region, organized Communism is virtually
nonexistent.
28. Spain has recently modified somewhat its
hostile attitude toward local nationalism,
after a ldng period of repression. As part of
Spain's current policy of endeavoring to win
favor in the Arab world, it has undertaken a
rapprochement with the nationalists. Islah
leader Abdelkhalek Torres has been allowed to
return from Tangier, and Islah has been al-
lowed to hold political meetings and to publish
its newspaper, supposedly free from censor-
ship. There is no indication, however, that
Spain intends to grant more than civil rights
or that the conflict of nationalist and Spanish
interests will be resolved.
29. Tangier. The International Zone of Tan-
gier is geographically an enclave in Spanish
Morocco. Of the estimated population of
roughly 110,000, some 45,000 are Europeans,
over half of them Spanish. The zone has
become an entrepot for European transit
trade, smuggling, and financial dealings be-
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cause its statutes permit uncontrolled re-
export of commodities and a free currency
market. During World War II Spain unilat-
erally assumed a dominant position in the
Tangier administration. In 1945 England
and France, with the support of the US and
USSR, ousted Spain from this position and
forced her to accept even less than her pre-
war role. A new committee of control was
formed to represent the US, UK, France,
Spain, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Por-
tugal, and the USSR. However, the USSR has
so far not exercised its right to participate.
There are an international administration, a
Mixed Court, and an appointive Legislative
Assembly representing the participating pow-
ers. The administration is headed by a
"neutral" Administrator, at present a Por-
tuguese. In practice France plays a domi-
nant role in the Zone. Owing to French
control of the Sultan of Morocco's appointive
powers, the Sultan's representative (the
"Mendoub") and the Moroccan members of
the Assembly are predisposed toward France.
30. Tangier has become a focal point for
North African nationalist activities and a
headquarters for exiled nationalists. All the
important Moroccan parties and the French
Zone Communist Party have branches in Tan-
gier (the Communists have only a few hun-
dred members and no real importance) . The
French and Spanish have taken sporadic
repressive measures against the nationalists
without reference to the other participating
nations.
31. Nationalist riots broke out in Tangier on
30 March 1952, the fortieth anniversary of the
Treaty of Fez. Although responsibility could
not be determined, Spain has used the riots
as a pretext to request increased participation
in the Tangier administration through a
return to the prewar agreements of 1923 and
1928. Specifically, it requests appointment of
a Spanish Police Commandant and Assistant
Administrator for Public Order, and reinstitu-
tion of the Mixed Bureau of Information (i.e.,
intelligence) under a Spanish director. The
other powers are concerned lest reopening the
question of Tangier's administration lead the
USSR to assert its right to participate. They
6
appear willing to grant at least a portion of
the Spanish demands, but intend to devise a
procedural method which will not stimulate
the USSR to take an active interest in the
Zone.
Libya
32. The new United Kingdom of Libya, which
became independent in December 1951, is com-
posed of three provinces ? Tripolitania, Cyre-
naica, and the southern desert area of the
Fezzan. The sparse populations of these areas
are widely separated from each other by the
Sahara (which comprises almost 95 percent of
the country), and have accordingly developed
strikingly different attitudes and characteris-
tics. There are: (a) 800,000 Tripolitanians
who are partially detribalized and sedentary
and divided by conflicting urban and rural
interests; (b) over 300,000 seminomadic Cyre-
naicans who, on the other hand, are united by
tribal bonds and still widespread allegiance to
the orthodox Moslem Sanusi religious brother-
hood; (c) roughly 50,000 Fezzanese oasis-
dwellers and nomads, who have little contact
with the coastal regions; and (d) 46,000
Italians settled in Tripolitania, who play a
leading role in its economy. The vast ma-
jority of the population are illiterate and
politically apathetic.
33. Libya is extremely poor and lacking in
most natural resources. Fuel is practically
nonexistent, although oil may be found along
the Cyrenaican coast, and the French have
reportedly discovered iron ore (and perhaps
oil) in the Fezzan. Agriculture supports over
three-quarters of the population and with fish-
eries contributes over 90 percent of the coun-
try's exports, mainly to Italy and Greece.
These cover at present only 45 percent of
Libya's imports, creating a payments deficit
which has fluctuated between two and eleven
million dollars since 1946. Even with foreign
help the Libyan standard of living is one of
the lowest in the Arab world.
34. Because of its economic weakness, Libya is
almost wholly dependent on foreign aid.
Great Britain has been Libya's main support
since it occupied the area in World War II.
In return for various concessions, Britain
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underwrites the major part of Libya's budget
deficit (currently about $3-5,000,000) and its
adverse balance of payments. France does
the same on a much smaller scale for its
sphere of influence in the Fezzan. These
powers and Italy have donated limited sums
to a Libyan Development and Stabilization
Agency and a Finance Corporation which were
set up by the UN Commission for Libya to
help the new state. The US gives a large
amount of separate assistance, which may
reach $5,000,000 in 1952; it consists of direct
payments for the US bases, technical assist-
ance, local US expenditures, and UN technical
aid contributions.
35. Political Problems. Six months of inde-
pendence have brought little change in the
fundamental disunity of the Libyan kingdom.
While Tripolitania adhered to the concept of
a united kingdom through fear of renewed
domination by Italy, the Cyrenaicans have
been largely separatist in outlook, fearing
domination by more populous Tripolitania.
After the UN decision of 1949 in favor of a
unified Libya, Tripolitania reluctantly ac-
cepted as monarch the Amir Sayyid Idris
al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica, who was almost equal-
ly reluctant to head the new state. Time has
only widened the breach between the two
areas; King Idris I constantly reasserts his
preference for Cyrenaica, and the Tripoli-
tanians show increasing distaste for their
"Shepherd Chieftain."
36. The separatism of Tripolitania and Cyre-
naica is expressed in the nation's political
forms and the provision for two capitals. At
the insistence of Idris, supported by the Fez-
zanese, a federal form of government was
adopted which insured that the Tripolitanian
majority would not dominate. The elective
lower house of the Assembly recognizes the
numerical superiority of the Tripolitanians
(by a seating ratio of 35:15:5) , but the three
provinces have equal seats in the royally ap-
pointed senate. In the nation's first elections
last February pro-government candidates
gained at least 46 of the 55 seats in the lower
chamber; only 7 seats (including all those
from the City of Tripoli) went to presumably
hostile candidates. The able and pro-Western
Prime Minister, Mahmud Muntasir, gives
Tripolitania high level representation in the
government, but he has little support either
from his province or the king in his efforts
to strengthen national union. Except for
Muntasir and the able Cyrenaican Defense
Minister, Ali Jarbi, few of the ministers have
the capacity to view Libyan affairs from a
non-provincial standpoint. Most members of
the legislature also are politically inexperi-
enced, and there is a serious lack of trained
administrative personnel.
37. The chief opposition to the government
comes from the Tripolitanians, who desire a
dominant influence in the kingdom. While
Tripoli is the center of agitation, the Cyre-
naican coastal towns of Bengazhi and Derna
are also opposed to royal conservatism and
royal control over their economic interests.
The Tripolitanian opposition was seriously
crippled when its leader, Bashir Bey Saadawi,
was deported after the elections. His Con-
gress Party immediately lost most of its
strength, merging into a heterogeneous group
of opposition parties. There is no recognized
Communist Party; pro-Communist leader En-
rico Cibelli and several of his lieutenants were
deported in 1951. Several trade unions and
a large number of anti-foreign malcontents in
Tripolitania supported Cibelli, but the gov-
ernment appears determined to suppress any
renewed Communist activity.
38. In view of the present weakness of the
potential opposition to the government, the
Libyan police (over 1,900 in Tripolitania and
almost 1,000 in Cyrenaica) would be able to
control any outbreak short of a major revolt.
In the unlikely event of such a revolt, the
British garrison probably would assist in its
suppression. Libya wants its own national
army of about 3,000 and is negotiating with
the British for military assistance and ad-
visors. The British consider 1,000 sufficient
for the near future, however.
39. External Relations. The new Libyan gov-
ernment, and especially King Idris, are
strongly pro-Western in their orientation,
owing both to Libya's need for foreign aid and
the strong ties developed with UK during the
war. Since then, British influence has been
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predominant in Libya; the UK provides the
bulk of Libya's outside economic assistance,
UK advisers are the backbone of the admin-
istration, and roughly 9,000 British troops
stationed in Libya provide the country's chief
security force. Perhaps as a reaction to Brit-
ish influence, the Libyans are now more
strongly pro-US. The US has a major airbase
in Libya, as does the UK. France remains
in de facto control of the Fezzan, which it
occupied in World War II, and has 400 troops
as well as French advisers there. Italy still
maintains substantial interest in its former
colony and is anxious to reassert its influence
in Tripolitania, where the dominant Italian
commercial interests are expanding.
40. Libya has only slight relations, at present
primarily cultural in nature, with Egypt and
the Arab states. The King and most Cyren-
aicans fear the ascendancy of adjacent Egypt
and have shown little desire to join the Arab
League. Egypt itself apparently has ambi-
tions to dominate the new kingdom, though
its influence has declined with the expulsion
of the pro-Egyptian Saadawi. However, var-
ious Tripolitanian urban elements and a few
politically conscious Cyrenaicans still regard
Egypt as their champion against Sanusi con-
servatism and Western "imperialism" and
call for closer ties with the Arab world.
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