SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 13, 1961
• Content Type: SNIE

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO VARIOUSIw s
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C ENT R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
13 June 1961
SUBJECT: SNIE 2-61: SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO VARIOUS
COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING BERLIN
of Allied (US, UK, and France) action in the event of an un-
acceptable degree of Soviet or East German interference with
Western access to West Berlin. The courses of action are:
(a) a substantial effort to maintain ground access to West
Berlin by a limited military action; (b) a substantial effort
to maintain air access; (c) other pressures and reprisals
against the USSR and East Germany; and (d) large-scale prep-
arations for general war.
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This estimate is a revision of SNIE 100-6-59, dated
6 April 1959. The courses of action considered in that
estimate have been altered and expanded in the present paper.
THE ESTIMATE
1. It is now two and one-half years since the USSR pro-
jected the Berlin issue into the forefront of East-West con-
tention. During this period the USSR has persisted with great
seriousness in its attempts to bring about a change in the
status of the city. At the same time, the intervening events
have almost certainly caused the Soviet leaders to increase
considerably their estimate of the importance attached by the
US to the Western position in Berlin and of the lengths to
which the US would go to defend it.
2. During this same period, attitudes in France, the
UK, and West Germany have also undergone some change. On
the one hand, the sense of vulnerability in these countries
has grown with advances in Soviet weaponry and corresponding
increases in Soviet confidence and assertiveness. On the
SNIE 100-6-59, "Soviet and Other Reactions to Various
Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis," dated 6 April
1959, TOP SECRET, LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.
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other hand, these countries have drawn encouragement from the
fact that the Soviets, at least to date, have been unwilling
to implement threats which initially seemed to foreshadow
immediate encroachments., There has also been time for the
Western Powers to explore the Soviet position and to canvass
a variety of possible concessions which might accommodate the
USSR without jeopardizing the essentials of the Western position.
This process has led to a wide measure of agreement that the
Soviet purpose is, ultimately, absorption of the city by the
GDR rather than some lesser objective.
3. Nevertheless, while much has been clarified, much
remains uncertain. In particular, each side finds it diffi-
cult to reach a confident judgment of the point at which the
other would be willing to run substantial military risks over
Berlin. In these circumstances, the USSR will almost certainly
continue its efforts to induce the Allies. to negotiate their
own gradual departure from the city. Throughout these maneu-
vers, however, the Soviet leaders will be continually reassess-
ing the willingness of the three Western Powers to defend their
interests with force. In this appraisal, they will consider
the official positions and military dispositions of the Allied
governments. But they will also have to make judgments about
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intangibles -- the willingness of each government to disre-
gard or be guided by the advice of its partners; the degree
to which each is influenced by domestic public opinion; the
readiness of each, in a moment of crisis, to assume risks
which may run as high as general nuclear war.
4. In deciding when and how to move against Allied access
to Berlin, the Soviet leaders will seek to turn these factors
to their own advantage. They will precede any such move with
diplomatic measures designed to demonstrate that they are re-
sorting to unilateral action only after all other alternatives
have been exhausted. These measures may include another round
of negotiations and, almost certainly, a separate peace treaty
with the GDR intended to provide both another warning and an-
other occasion for the Allies to reconsider their position.
5. Even after these steps have been accomplished, the
USSR and the GDR almost certainly will not explicitly deny
access to Berlin. Instead, they will simply make Allied access
subject to certain new conditions, beginning presumably with
the replacement of Soviet by East German controllers in the
access procedures. They will almost certainly not attempt
at the same time to close off Berlin from West German civilian
access, which is already under East German control. Thus the
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USSR will hope to make it as difficult as possible for the
Allied governments to conclude that the new situation is a
clear-cut denial of access, to agree among themselves on
strong countermeasures, and to justify these to their popu-
lations.
6. In spite of such Soviet efforts, however, there has
been, according to the terms of our problem, an "unacceptable"
degree of interference with Western access to Berlin. It is
assumed that the US, UK, and France have therefore agreed in
undertaking one or more of the stated courses of action..?/
The subsequent course of the crisis would be heavily influ-
enced by the particular context of events at the time when
access was interfered with. Further, the exact nature of
tactical moves, and the manner in which they were made, would
have important effects on the way in which each side assessed
the continuing resolution and intentions of the other. An
added difficulty is that we necessarily treat each course
first in isolation, although we recognize that its effect
might be greater if it were combined with other actions. We
have therefore attempted only to describe the basic factors
It should be stressed that this assumption is by no means
an estimate of British and French willingness to agree to
all of these courses of action.
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underlying Soviet and other reactions to these courses, recog-
nizing that these reactions will also be influenced by specific
elements of the situation which cannot now be foreseen.
COURSE A: A substantial effort to reopen and
maintain ground access by a limited military
action -- defined as the utilization of up to
two reinforced divisions with tactical air sup-
port in readiness if required. The force would
proceed on the autobahn toward Berlin. If its
movement was opposed, it would attempt to over-
come resistance and to secure the road.
7. In their advance planning for their introduction of
new access procedures, the Soviets would have considered a
reaction on this scale as possible but unlikely; if they had
judged it to be probable, they almost certainly would have
avoided provoking it. They probably would not conclude from
this reaction alone that the Allies had taken a firm decision
to press all the way to general war if necessary; yet they
could not be certain that they would not miscalculate further
Western steps as they had the first. They would wish to
minimize the risks of general war, and they would be gravely
concerned lest large-scale fighting within East Germany create
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an uncontrollable situation. Yet they would regard their
prestige as being heavily engaged, and they would greatly
fear that failure to act would undermine Communist authority
in East Germany, and perhaps lead to popular uprisings.
8. We believe it virtually certain that the Soviets
would not permit Western forces to seize control of the entire
autobahn and march unopposed into Berlin. They would probably
try first to block the Western forces at or near the zonal
border, using forces moved into position as soon as Allied
preparations were noted. If this failed, and a substantial
penetration-occurred, the Soviets would seek at a minimum to
halt and neutralize the Western forces and, probably, to force
their withdrawal. In general, we think that they would under=
take the minimum response necessary to accomplish their ob-
jective, recognizing that, the larger the scale of any military
engagement, the greater would be the risks of a further expan-
sion-of the conflict.
9. In the first stage, it is probable that the USSR
would use East German troops, in order to be consistent with
the claim of GDR sovereignty and to postpone a Soviet-Western
confrontation until it became clear how far the West intended
to go in its initial local action. We believe, however, that
the USSR would commit its own troops whenever it became clear
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that East German forces could not deal with the situation.
The Soviets would not use other Satellite troops.
10. Throughout, the Soviets would seek to keep the
fighting limited and to bring it quickly to an end, in a
manner which would demonstrate that a Western resort to force
was bound to fail. At the same time, they would mount an in-
tense campaign in support of a call for immediate negotiations,
calculating that this would redound to their credit, generate
pressure on the Allies to desist, and perhaps contribute to
an end to hostilities. They would probably refrain from
molesting West Berlin; we do not believe, however, that they
would immediately offer to restore the former conditions of
access. Their political and psychological activities would
be employed as a supplement to military action rather than a
substitute for it.
As a step subsequent to the above, the commit-
ment of West German troops as reinforcements.
11. The reinforcement with West German forces would pre-
sumably occur only after some fighting had already taken place.
Simply because it was a reinforcement, the Soviets would prob-
ably give increased weight to the possibility that the West
We do' not LLhere estima~te whether or`-'riot =the Federal '
Republic would agree to this course of action.
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was prepared to go very far and take very great risks in de-
fense of its position in Berlin. The fact that West German
forces were used would probably cause the Soviets also to
fear that the conflict mightl.transform itself into a libera-
tion campaign, involving East German Army defections and pop-
ular risings. The Soviets would therefore probably regard
any failure to defeat such a force quickly as highly dangerous
to their position in East Germany in Eastern Europe as a
whole.
12. The possibility that the Soviets might decide to
seize the initiative with a general nuclear attack on the
West would rise with'the commitment of West German troops,
even though no more than minimal surprise would be possible
at this point. However, we regard this as very unlikely.
Their most probable response would be an intensification of
political pressure and a major military effort, although
still nonnuclear, to, expel the Western forces. We believe
that they would still wish to confine the encounter to East
German territory, because of a fear that to retaliate against
or invade West Germany could lead rapidly to general war.
COURSE B: A substantial effort to maintain
air access -- defined as efforts to continue
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flights unilaterally following attempts by the
USSR and the GDR to alter existing flight pro-
cedures. If there
dangered the safety of aircraft in the corridors,
Allied combat aircraft would come to their assis-
tance.
13. This contingency is most likely to arise by way of
Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center and Allied
refusal to accept an East German substitute. In taking such
a step, the USSR would probably have concluded in advance that
the West would react initially by continuing flights to Berlin
without the usual guarantees of safety, and accordingly would
have planned its next step.
14. The Soviets and East Germans would probably employ
means of interference short of firing upon aircraft. If the
Allies felt obliged to employ combat aircraft as escorts, we
do not believe that the Soviets would even then actually fire
upon planes which remained within the corridor, although the
likelihood of their doing so would increase. Actual firing
would cause them to appear before the world as the initiator
of hostilities, and they would probably prefer to limit them-
selves to electronic countermeasures (ECM), "buzzing," and
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other nonviolent actions. If Allied aircraft opened fire,
however, Bloc aircraft would probably return it.
15. The Soviet and East German capability for electronic
countermeasures In the Berlin area and the air corridors is
sufficient to limit:Western air traffic to that which could
be maintained under visual flight conditions. Such limita-
tions would not be serious if ground access to West Berlin re-
mained open for West German civilians and their goods. Even
if a complete blockade of ground access were established, ECM
alone would not succeed in preventing the movement of essential
supplies to the city by visual flights, although Berlin's in-
dustry would be seriously disrupted. The use of ECM together
with other forms of harassment short of actual combat would
reduce the volume of flight traffic still further, but the
effectiveness of these tactics would depend on the degree of
deprivation which West Berlin was willing to bear; stockpiles
in the city are sufficient for a considerable period of timeal/
COURSE C: Other pressures and reprisals --
e.g., tripartite interference with Soviet
and.East German merchant shipping, Allied and
These stockpiles include basic foods sufficient for at
least a year, a 12-month supply of hard coal, and a six-
month supply of brown coal briquettes, dry milk, dehydrated
vegetables, clothing, and medical supplies. West Berlin
has its own utilities, with the exception of sewage dis-
posal.
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West German economic sanctions, the rupture
of diplomatic relations, and other retaliatory
measures.
16. We believe that such measures are among those that
the Soviet leaders would expect in the way of Allied reactions
.to altered conditions of access to Berlin. Taken by themselves,
they would probably have the effect of strengthening the Soviet
Judgment that the Allies were unwilling to risk the direct
use of force against any but the most clear-cut challenge to
their position in Berlin.
17. The Soviet response would probably be limited largely
to propaganda, to diplomatic and legal counteraction, and, in
the case of naval controls, to reprisals in the form of deten-
tion of Allied shipping in areas of Communist control and
closing of certain waters to Allied vessels. The USSR could
circumvent controls by recourse to ships of other flags and
by overland shipments if it felt obliged to do so. It might
use armed escorts for its shipping where feasible.
18. Allied naval measures and economic sanctions, even
in combination, would have little effect on the Soviet economy.
The repercussions for East Germany of a cutoff of all Western
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trade would be substantial, although current attempts to
reorient GDR trade away from the West will reduce this vul-
nerability in the future. East Germany would probably re-
spond with harassments of West German traffic to Berlin, but
we doubt that the Communists would wish in the first instance
to cut off this traffic entirely, preferring not to raise
this additional issue at a time when Allied access was in con-
tention. The USSR would probably calculate that the Allies
could not maintain most of these policies effectively over a
long period of time. We do not think, therefore, that these
courses of action, undertaken in the absence of other moves,
would have a significant effect on the Soviet position re-
garding access. Taken in conjunction with other measures,
they would probably reinforce in the Soviet mind the possi-
bility that the Allies were prepared to run substantial risks
over Berlin.
COURSE D: Large-scale preparations for general
war -- defined as widespread deployments, prepara-
tions to bring the US to full military and civil-
ian readiness, and corresponding official acts
such as declaration of a state of emergency,
appropriate Congressional resolutions, and con-
sultations within various alliances,
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19. While US preparations for general war of this scope
and nature probably would not convince the USSR that the US
had firmly decided to proceed if necessary to that extreme,
the Soviet leaders would certainly view the chances of general
war as dangerously increased, particularly if the principal
NATO Allies of the US appeared to be in agreement. We think
that, under these conditions, the Soviets would probably seek
ways to reopen negotiations in order to ease the crisis, hoping
that they could in the subsequent bargaining achieve some change
in the status of Berlin favorable to them. It should be ob-
served, however, that the danger of miscalculation in this
situation would be great. If the NATO Allies clearly were not
in step with the US, we still think it likely that the Soviets
would seek to open negotiations; in this case, however, they
would probably expect the divided policies of their opponents
to assure a favorable diplomatic outcome for themselves.
Reactions to the postulated courses in other areas
20. In the NATO countries, much would depend on the
manner in which the issue was posed. In general, the postu-
lated courses of action would excite widespread public alarm
and dismay in varying degree as they appeared to threaten
general war. To be sure, according to the problem as postu-
lated in this estimate, the British and French Governments
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would have agreed in advance to the stated courses of action,
and presumably they would have done something to prepare their
peoples for the crisis. It goes without saying that the other
members of NATO would expect to have been consulted. Yet we
believe there would be little public support for the more
drastic allied responses unless the earlier Soviet (or East
German) action could be convincingly portrayed as an attempt
to seize control of Berlin rather than merely to introduce
changes in access procedures. Even in this case, many Europeans
would balk at taking such risks for the sake of Berlin, and
public support from some NATO governments would be reluctantly
given.
21. In East Germany, there would be a possibility, par-
ticularly in connection with Course A, of popular risings, but
we think it more likely that the population would not expose
itself to retaliation so long as the outcome remained uncer-
tain. The longer the fighting under Course A, the higher the
chances of scattered antiregime demonstrations and violence.
Both hopes and fears woixld be aroused among the populations
of East Europe, but these would have no great political effect
in the short term.
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22. In most non-European countries, attention would be
focused primarily upon the possibility of general war, and
this consideration would probably override views about the
rights and wrongs of the access issue. Few countries would
cooperate in multilateral indirect reprisals of the type en-
visaged in Course C. It is almost certain that the situation
would be brought to the UN, and that many countries would exert
pressure on both the US and the USSR to resume negotiations
and ease the crisis.
General Considerations
23. It is important to emphasize again that the courses
of action postulated in this estimate have been considered
mainly in isolation from each other and from other events,
and that such a treatment is to a large degree artificial.
Just as the initial Soviet action would have been based on an
assessment of numerous indications, tangible and intangible,
of probable Western responses, so the Soviet reaction in the
second round would be based on a similarly broad assessment
of the West's next step, drawn from the entire range of po-
litical and military activity, Central to this assessment
would be the Soviet leaders' impression of the will and de-
termination of Western leadership to persist in a firm course,
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TOP SECRET
and the ability of that leadership to carry the Western peoples
with them. The Soviet judgment would be taken in a context of
severe international crisis, with many countries making their
weight felt in diplomatic exchanges and, probably, in UN de-
bate. As tensions rose, worldwide demands that the parties
to the dispute take no precipitate action and return to nego-
tiation would grow in intensity, to such a degree that both
sides might feel obliged to weigh seriously the reactions of
world opinion to any further steps.
24. The Soviets would probably consider that the conse-
quences of forcing their policy on Berlin under conditions of
intense and possibly prolonged crisis could be damaging to the
further perspectives of their policy. They might hesitate to
persist in their demands if they believed that the result would
be greatly heightened tensions and an atmosphere of such hos-
tility that nothing could be negotiated for a long time to
come. On the other hand, they would also consider the damage
to Western confidence and unity, and the advantages to their
own cause,.that would result from a clear victory on Berlin.
25. We are confident that the Soviet leaders do not
intend to wage general war in order to change the status of
Berlin. At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders have
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not yet been persuaded that the US will go to general war in
order to prevent a change in that status. If they were to
become convinced that the US will actually do so, we believe
that they would back off and seek negotiations, providing the
US had left them this recourse. We doubt that they can be
fully convinced that the US will do so, but even if they are
not fully convinced, we believe that one or more of the postu-
lated courses of action, taken together with supporting po-
litical and diplomatic action by the US and its allies, might
make the Soviet leaders uncertain of ultimate US intentions,
and persuade them that the West was willing to take actions
of such high risk that the situation would soon get out of
control. Thus the Soviets might be prepared to believe that
the crisis could eventuate in general war even though neither
side originally had intended to go that far. They certainly
desire to avoid such uncontrollable situations, but it is
impossible to estimate at just what point they might be
willing to modify their Berlin policy in order to retrieve
the situation, or when they would consider that the stakes
were already so high that they could not afford to compro-
mise.
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