SUDAN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CIVILIAN REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200250008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
et
Sudan: Problems and Prospects
for the New Civilian Regime
325
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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S N I E 78-86
SUDAN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE NEW CIVILIAN REGIME
Information available as of 20 March 1986 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved on that date by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ......................................................................................
1
KEY JUDGMENTS ..............................................................................
3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................
9
Key Problem Areas ...........................................................................
9
Political Factionalism in Khartoum ............................................
9
The Islamic Factor ........................................................................
11
The Southern Insurgency .............................................................
12
Economic Problems and Prospects ..............................................
13
The Loyalty of the Security Forces .............................................
14
The External Dimension ..................................................................
14
Relations With Egypt and Saudi Arabia .....................................
15
The Libyan Rapprochement ........................................................
15
The Soviet Union and Ethiopia ...................................................
16
Prospective Scenarios ........................................................................
16
The Short Term: The Civilian Government
Remains in Power .....................................................................
16
The Longer Term: The Military Steps Back In ..........................
17
Alternative Outcomes ...................................................................
17
Implications for the United States ...................................................
17
Overview .......................................................................................
17
If the Civilian Government Remains ..........................................
18
If the Military Takes Power .........................................................
18
ANNEX A: The Military Balance in the South ..................................
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SCOPE NOTE
This Special National Intelligence Estimate on Sudan is based on
the assumption that the elections scheduled for April will take place and
that a civilian government will take power. The Estimate focuses on the
prospects for the survival of the new government over the next 12
months. Emphasis is given to the economic, military, and political
problems that confront Khartoum, the external dimension that bears on
these problems, alternative domestic outcomes, and their implications
for the United States.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that Sudan's soon-to-be-elected civilian government,
most likely led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, may muddle through for almost a
year but that there is a better-than-even chance that it will not remain
in power much beyond that period. The new government's longevity
will depend on how it manages five key problem areas:
- Endemic political factionalism in Khartoum.
- The status of Islam.
- Continuing deterioration of the economy.
- An expanding southern insurgency.
- The questionable loyalty of the security forces.
In our judgment, the new civilian government will not be able to
address these problems effectively. We believe that, after a grace period
of several months, the cumulative effects of these problems will begin to
destabilize it.
Sadici is probably Sudan's most experienced and skilled politician.
He probably can expect a brief honeymoon in the first few months after
the elections while he forms a national coalition government likely to
include the left and southerners but possibly excluding the Muslim
Brotherhood. Most civilian elites in Khartoum want the Army out of
politics and support a democratic form of government, and the Army
probably would prefer to see a civilian government confront Sudan's
intractable problems for a time-keeping open the option to return to
power.
A civilian coalition government is unlikely to maintain the neces-
sary cohesion or discipline for effective leadership and will probably
suffer from the factional infighting and petty, personal squabbles
characteristic of the past. In the freer political climate in Sudan, the
new government probably will be hard pressed to maintain stability in
the north if infighting among party factions spills over into armed
conflict or if ethnic and regional groups disgruntled over the outcome of
elections initiate sabotage in Khartoum.
The status of Islam in Sudan could develop into a bitter and even
violent controversy. Northern Muslim political groups, especially the
Muslim Brotherhood, will be militantly in favor of an Islamic constitu-
tion, but southerners, other non-Muslims, and the left will demand a
secular one.
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Sudan's economic outlook is bleak. Acute shortages of goods and
spiraling inflation will almost certainly lead to further labor unrest. A
vicious cycle has already begun-of escalating demands by unions for
higher wages followed by government concessions that entail further
monetary expansion. With the government unable to provide any real
increase in purchasing power, crippling strikes and work stoppages are
likely to become an endemic feature of the Sudanese landscape in the
year ahead. Such unrest will further debilitate an already prostrate
economy and offer radical elements an issue to exploit. It will also be a
factor in heightening intercommunal violence.
Prospects for resolving Sudan's international payments crisis are
extremely bleak in the aftermath of the IMF decision declaring
Khartoum ineligible to use the Fund's resources. Foreign donors,
moreover, will probably not repay Sudan's arrears to the IMF in the
likely absence of a sound economic reform program. The new govern-
ment will probably remain mired in the traditional statist approach to
resolving economic issues, and many donors will probably reduce
balance-of-payments support, a move that will have a further adverse
impact on Sudan's politically sensitive public-sector economy.
The Ethiopian-backed insurgency in southern Sudan poses a major
challenge for the new government. The rebel force-15,000 to 20,000
strong-is growing and controls much of the southern countryside. The
rebels will probably intensify attacks-possibly even carry out sabotage
in the north-to maintain pressure on the new government to meet
their constitutional demands. Meanwhile, Khartoum's efforts to acquire
arms-even if successful-and reinforce southern garrisons are not
likely to improve its military position. Khartoum's severe logistic
problems, supply shortages, and military defeats will continue to lower
morale and foster desertions of the undermanned and underequipped
government combat units
Resolution of the southern conflict probably will not be possible for
the new government in the next year. Even if Khartoum holds a
constitutional conference after the elections, meeting southern rebel
demands will prove difficult, and prospects for meaningful negotiations
will remain poor. Consequently, the insurgency is likely to remain a
severe drain on Sudan's already limited economic reserves, a serious
strain on the Army's unity and loyalty, and a stimulus for Khartoum to
seek new arms suppliers
The civilian government will pursue a neutral foreign policy
because Sudan's civilian parties from the left to the Muslim Brother-
hood favor nonalignment. In its search to enhance sources of economic
aid and undercut support to the rebels, the government will maintain
good relations with Libya, seek improved ties to Ethiopia, and hope to
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acquire some aid from the Soviet Union. Khartoum will still expect
continued military and economic support from the United States,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, even though it is less able or willing to support
many of the regional goals of these traditional allies.
The new government will continue the rapprochement begun with
Libya last year in order to deny Libyan support to southern insurgents,
to obtain Libyan economic and military aid, and to try to keep Libyan
subversive machinations within some bounds. A Sadiq government will
follow the interim government's pattern of acceding to some Libyan
demands but attempt to evade Libyan efforts to ally Sudan formally
with Libya. The new government will sign additional agreements with
Libya, welcome Libyan military support, and avoid acts that would
provoke Qadhafi, such as providing support to Libyan dissidents or
acceding to closer military cooperation with the United States or Egypt.
Overall, Libyan influence in Khartoum will probably increase over
the next year in direct proportion to the supply of Libyan military and
economic assistance. Libyan military support for the Sudanese Army's
counterinsurgency efforts-which may well become Sudan's most
significant source of such aid-will offer the Libyans further access to
the Sudanese military for proselytizing and subversion, as well as
influence with the new government. In the short term this will be
partially offset by traditional anti-Libyan sentiments of much of the
Sudanese officer corps and conservative religious and political factions.
Libyan heavyhandedness also could provoke resentments and stimulate
coup plotting by conservative Army officers. We cannot rule out,
however, a Libyan effort to sponsor mob or terrorist attacks against the
US or Egyptian presence in Sudan despite continued good relations with
Khartoum.
The Army-especially the younger generals and unit command-
ers-would be likely to move to take over in the event of civil unrest,
parliamentary paralysis, or a series of major defeats in the south. Few of
the more senior officers are personally loyal to Sadiq al-Mahdi and
probably even fewer are committed to a multiparty democracy. In the
meantime, the police and civilian intelligence services have neither the
capability nor loyalty to the Sadiq government that could prevent a
military takeover
If, as we expect, the new civilian government fails to address
Sudan's economic and political problems in a meaningful way, a crisis
atmosphere will probably develop later this year. The likelihood of a
move by Army officers to take power will increase by early next year.
The most likely group to act will be a coalition of conservative young
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generals and colonels. While we cannot rule out plotting by junior
officers, we see a successful coup from this group as much less likely.
As the civilian government loses control, two other outcomes are
possible but considerably less likely. A weakened civilian government
could fully accede to insurgent leader Garang's demands for a funda-
mental restructuring of the political system. Such a move would
probably be supported by leftist and non-Arab and non-Muslim factions
but resisted by northern Muslim elites and much of the officer corps.
Alternatively, a weakened civilian government could break down into
contending armed factions-a situation reminiscent of Lebanon-with
none of them strong enough to impose a firm new national government.
Such an outcome would lead to the breakup of the security forces into
their ethnic and religious component parts. The latter outcome would
be seriously damaging to regional stability and injurious to US interests.
The United States will probably face similar problems with either a
Sadiq-led civilian government or a conservative military regime:
- Either would look to the United States for continued economic
assistance but will be unable (and probably unwilling) to make
comprehensive economic reforms.
- Either would press the United States for military help in
combating the southern insurgency but would also accept
military help from virtually any other source, including Libya
and the USSR. On the other hand, Libyan economic and
military ties could probably be reduced or eliminated-and
Soviet ties preempted-should Sudan's traditional partners re-
spond to Khartoum's perceived military and economic needs.
- Neither will be prepared to resume the level of military
cooperation associated with the Nimeiri regime. Combined
military exercises will be unlikely, and the pre-positioning
agreement will be held in abeyance.
A successor military government run by younger generals or
colonels could provide Sudan with stability in the short run. Such a
government might be strong enough to make hard decisions on the
economy and the south. These officers would probably have greater
incentive to end the war than most other groups in Sudan, and might
show greater unity and flexibility in negotiating an end to the insurgen-
cy than an elected government hobbled by infighting and the demands
of its northern Muslim constituents. We doubt that insurgent leader
Garang would move quickly to deal with a new military regime,
however, no matter how conciliatory it appeared.
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A military regime, however, would pose an additional problem for
the United States in that its restoration of order would probably involve
detentions and suppression of at least some political parties. This would
create a human and civil rights problem for the United States despite an
apparent increase in public order
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Figure 1
Selected Sudanese Tribal Groups a
e Authoritative sources acknowledge
56 groups comprising 597 tribes in
Egypt
Saud
Arabi
Red
Sea
Central
African
Republic
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T'anad
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DISCUSSION
1. Khartoum's ruling military leaders seem deter-
mined to honor their promise of national elections
early next month and the installation of a civilian
government. (See inset.) The senior officers who de-
posed President Nimeiri last year have brought Sudan
greater political freedom but not stability. The interim
military regime leaves a grim legacy for the new
civilian government: over the past year the economy
has deteriorated, the Ethiopian-backed insurgency in
the south has grown, the relationship of Islam to the
state remains unresolved, and the prospect of internal
and external subversion has increased. The survival of
the ruling Military Council and its civilian cabinet is
the result of divisions among their op onents and their
promise of a turnover to civilian rule.
2. We expect the elections to take place, barring a
major crisis such as assassination of a key politician,
The interim constitution approved by Sudan's mili-
tary and civilian leaders in late 1985 outlined a political
timetable for the transfer to civilian rule and the
creation of a permanent constitution over the next four
years. The "Constituent Assembly," which is to be
elected early next month, will have 301 seats, of which
28 are set aside for university-educated professionals;
the remainder are based on geographic districts. Elec-
tions are to take place from 1 to 12 April, and the
winners are to be announced on 16 April. The assemb-
ly's first session is scheduled for 26 April.
The assembly is to choose a five-man "Sovereignty
Council" to act as head of state (including having
command of the armed forces) and to select a prime
minister, who in turn will select a cabinet.
The assembly will be expected to draft and adopt a
constitution within nine months, thereafter turning
itself into a parliament to sit for three years and carry
out its duties as stated in the new, permanent constitu-
tion. If elections cannot take place throughout the
south, however, the government will suspend work on
the new constitution and continue to operate under the
interim constitution until all southerners can elect rep-
resentatives to the assembly. This could take several
years
massive civil unrest, or a disastrous defeat of the
government's forces in the south. Most civilian elites
want the Army out of politics and the establishment of
a more democratic form of government. The Army
wants time to reorganize itself and prefers to see an
elected civilian government confront the massive eco-
nomic and political problems facing Sudan, while
maintaining the option of again intervening should the
new government fail to address these problems.'
3. In our judgment, the Umma Party-which rep-
resents the largest northern Muslim sect, the Ansar-is
likely to win a plurality and its leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi,
will most likely be named prime minister. The Demo-
cratic Unionist Party-with roots in Sudan's second-
largest northern Muslim sect, the Khatmiyyah-prob-
ably will place second. Of the radical parties, the
Muslim Brotherhood's political party-the National
Islamic Front-probably will do best, possibly coming
in third. Most of the major regional and ethnic parties
that oppose elections before a national conference are
probably not united or well enough organized to make
a significant showing, although they nonetheless plan
to field candidates
Key Problem Areas
4. We believe the stability and even the survivabil-
ity of the new civilian government depend on the
interplay of five key problem areas. These are:
- Political factionalism in Khartoum.
- The relationship between Islam and the state.
- The course of the southern insurgency.
- The growing economic crisis.
- The loyalty of the security forces.
5. To undercut opposition to his leadership, Sadiq
will attempt to form a government of national unity,
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probably including the left and southerners but possi-
bly excluding the Muslim Brotherhood. Probably the
greatest challenge to the survival of parliamentary
government in the next year is whether the parties can
maintain effective leadership and avoid the factional
infighting and petty, personal squabbles characteristic
of the past.'
6. Sadiq has the political skills and flexibility need-
ed for domestic coalition-building. (See inset.) He will
try to limit opportunities for domestic rivals to become
surrogates for external actors such as Egypt and Libya
by maintaining a balanced foreign policy with the two
neighbors. He will also adopt traditional economic
approaches favoring the public sector, resisting eco-
nomic reforms that could ignite civil unrest. Most
important, he will try to keep the support of the Army,
in which Muslim religious sects are heavily represent-
ed: the Ansar in the enlisted ranks and the Khat-
miyyah in the officer corps. Sadiq will attempt a
balancing act between southerners and northern Mus-
lims by repealing Nimeiri's harsh Islamic laws while
making traditional statements in support of an Islamic
state and pledging to maintain the Islamic-law aspects
of the constitution.
7. Nonetheless, partyfactional and personal rival-
ries are likely to reemerge within the Umma Party and
among members of the coalition. Sadiq, who has wide
foreign financial support, including Libyan, may face
challenges from rivals within his own party-for
example, Wali al-Din evidently has a loyal paramili-
tary group developed and funded in exile by Libya.
The Egyptian-supported Democratic Unionist Par-
ties-the political arm of the Khatmiyyah sect, led by
Muhammad al-Mirghani ill probably
make an unreliable coalition partner and will probably
refragment into three parties, each pursuing divergent
political alliances
8. The Muslim Brotherhood will pose a major prob-
lem for the new government if Sadiq fails to make a
commitment to an Islamic state. The Brotherhood,
which will run in elections as the National Islamic
Front under the leadership of charismatic Hassan al-
Turabi receives funding from private do-
nors in Sau i Ara ia, from Egypt's Muslim Brother-
hood, and, according to some reports, from Iran. It is
well organized, attracts a large number of students and
professionals, and has its own militia. The Muslim
Brotherhood has recruited military officers in key
units (including the airborne battalions) and retains the
' Since independence in 1956 Sudan has had only seven years of
parliamentary democracy; 11 months is the longest any one govern-
ment survived in the last parliamentary period, in the 1960s.i
Sadiq al-Mahdi combines political and religious leader-
ship as head of the Umma Party and imam of the Ansar
sect. While he exploits the symbolic significance of his
position as the great-grandson of the Mahdi, he also
presents himself as a reasonable, democratic, and pro-
gressive leader. A master of short-term coalition politics,
he has at various times made alliances with groups of
almost every ideological orientation, from the Commu-
nists to the Muslim Brotherhood. He has, however,
consistently refused to compromise his attachment to
Islamic values, arguing publicly that Islam is a crucial
element of Sudan's national identity.
Sadiq, who is 50, received degree in economics with
honors from Oxford University in the late 1950s. He
served as Prime Minister from July 1966 until the
following May. During most of 1970-78 he was in exile
or imprisoned. In 1976, with Libyan support, he orches-
trated a nearly successful coup against President Ni-
meiri. Sadiq reconciled with Nimeiri in 1978, but was
jailed in September 1983 for criticizing the President's
Islamic laws. He was released from prison in late 1984
after agreeing to refrain from opposition activity.
sympathy of a number of officers who share its
hardline views toward the south. If frozen out of a
ruling coalition or unable to make a private under-
standing with Sadiq, the Muslim Brotherhood will
probably work to remove the new government. It
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would employ several strategies, including enticing a
faction of the Democratic Unionists into leaving the
government, inducing or taking advantage of civil
unrest, or plotting to gain power through a coup led by
sympathetic officers
9. The National Alliance of unions and political
parties-led by professionals, including some leftists,
who last April spearheaded Nimeiri's overthrow with a
general strike-has little popular support and is likely
to lose its importance as a civilian lobby after the
elections. Nonetheless, student, professional, and labor
groups in Khartoum were the major catalysts in
bringing down governments in 1964 and 1985 and
probably would again initiate civil unrest in the event
of food and fuel shortages or price hikes, which are
likely in the next year. The radical parties will exploit
labor grievances.
10. Among the other parties, we expect the Suda-
nese Communists, led by Ibrahim Nuqud~ to
enter a Sadiq-led coalition while at the same time
working clandestinely to destabilize the government;
funded by the East Germans, the Soviets, and possibly
the Ethiopians, the Sudanese Communist Party lacks
popular support but is well organized and also has a
militia. The Iraqi- and Syrian-backed Ba'th Parties,
which may join the Sadiq coalition through alignment
with the Communists or Democratic Unionists, have
almost no popular support but have the sympathy of
some military officers because of their Pan-Arab
ideology. The Libyan-backed and -armed Sudanese
Revolutionary Committees will probably not be invit-
ed to join the new government; they are small,
unpopular, and badly divided but nonetheless pose a
potential subversive threat in Khartoum.
11. The Sudan Rural Solidarity, a loose coalition of
14 ethnic and regional parties and labor groups (seven
southern, one western, four eastern, and two Nuban)
has argued that elections should be postponed until a
national conference resolves such major constitutional
questions as the status of both Islam and the south.
Nonetheless, it is participating in the election. Solidari-
ty members have traditionally been on the periphery
of Sudanese politics and claim to share many of the
goals of southern rebel leader John Garang. (See inset.)
The major moderate southern parties in Solidarity will
probably make pragmatic coalitions with the tradition-
al northern parties after the elections, but the more
radical Nubans would pose a major subversive threat if
they reject the validity of the election results. Ele-
ments of this coalition, especially the Nubans, will
continue to engage in plotting and clandestine collabo-
ration with southern insurgents
Col. John Garang-since 1983 head of both the Sudanese
People's Liberation Army and its political wing-is
widely regarded as having excellent leadership skills. He
was on home leave in Bor when southern Army muti-
neers drafted him as the leader of their rebel movement.
We believe Garang is a nationalist and most likely an
African-style socialist. His speeches have consistently
stressed national goals and emphasized that the south's
problems with neglect and exploitation by the central
government are shared by all regions outside Khartoum.
He views the creation of a federal system with extensive
regional autonomy as the solution to rule by "a minority
Arab clique" that he believes is largely responsible for
Sudan's massive economic and political problems.
Garang, 40, is a Dinka tribesman and reportedly a
staunch Baptist who attended high school in Tanzania,
where he probably was introduced to socialism. In 1969
he graduated from Grinnell College in Iowa with honors
in economics. He fought with the Anya Nya southern
rebels during the last few months of the civil war that
ended in 1972 and thereafter joined the Sudanese Army.
He attended the infantry Officers Advanced Course in
the United States in 1974 and later enrolled at Iowa State
University, where he received a doctoral degree in
economics in 1981. Before going to the bush, Garang
served in the Army's research branch in the capital and
taught development planning at the University of Khar-
toum
The Islamic Factor
12. The status of Islam in Sudan is likely to be one
of the most controversial and divisive issues facing the
new government. The Islamic laws declared by former
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President Nimeiri in September 1983 remain intact
under the interim regime, which liberalized applica-
tion of the laws but has left their final disposition to
the elected civilian government. As prime minister,
Sadiq-whom Nimeiri imprisoned for opposing his
Islamic laws-will probably encounter limited north-
ern opposition to the suspension of the September
laws, which many believe are too harsh, inconsistent,
and non-Islamic. The constitutional status of Islamic
law could develop, however, into a bitter and even
violent controversy. Northern Muslim political groups,
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, will be militantly
in favor of an Islamic constitution, but southerners,
other non-Muslims, and the left will demand a secular
one
The Southern Insurgency
13. The southern problem will pose a major chal-
lenge to the survival of the new government, just as it
undermined the Nimeiri regime. The roots of the
rebellion in southern Sudan can be found in the
fundamental ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions
between the Muslim Arabs of the north-who domi-
nate the central government-and the animists and
Christians of the south, who identify with their black
African heritage. The Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) is the major southern rebel group. It is
backed by Ethiopia and, until Khartoum's rapproche-
ment with Tripoli last year, had received support from
Libya. It has rapidly expanded to number at least
15,000 men-perhaps as many as 20,000-under the
command of former Sudanese Army Col. John Gar-
ang, and it is likely to keep growing
14. Overall, the insurgents have become an effec-
tive fighting force that operates in all three southern
provinces, makes occasional probes into adjacent
northern provinces, cuts off road and rail links to the
south, and controls much of the southern countryside.
In contrast, the 14,000 to 16,000 government troops in
the south, who are poorly equipped and supplied and
thinly deployed and who suffer from low are
vulnerable to direct attacks. (see annex A.)
15. Garang claims to seek a secular, unified, demo-
cratic, federal, and socialist Sudan. His preconditions
for dialogue late last year included Khartoum's public
agreement to a constitutional conference that would
choose a new interim government, to the repeal of
Nimeiri's Islamic laws, and to the suspension of exter-
nal agreements with Egypt and Libya. The Sadiq
government may convene a constitutional conference
if, as expected, Garang prevents voting in much of the
south and thereby blocks work on the new constitution
in the elected assembly. Even if a constitutional
conference were to convene, however, a successful
outcome would be unlikely because of continued
fighting, the widely divergent agendas of participants,
friction over controversial issues such as the constitu-
tional status of Islam and a federal government struc-
ture, and the strong prospect that the rebels might not
attend or would walk out
16. Even if a national conference adopts a federal
system, a major demand of the rebels, Khartoum will
find a political settlement with the south arduous to
negotiate. Equatorians, for example, would reject any
governmental structure that allowed the more numer-
ous Nilotic tribes from Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile
to dominate the political process in the southern region
(see figure 1, page 8); last year they opposed the
interim regime's reinstatement of the south's legal
status as one region. At the core of any settlement with
the rebels will be difficult negotiations providing
constitutional guarantees that the south will not be
forced to adopt Islamic law and formal agreements
regarding revenue sharing from development projects.
17. Khartoum's efforts to acquire arms and rein-
force southern garrisons, even if successful, are not
likely to improve its military position significantly.
Severe logistic problems, supply shortages, and Khar-
toum's inability to absorb new weapon systems will
continue to impede operational effectiveness, lower
morale, and foster desertions. These problems are
likely to be compounded when the rainy season begins
just before the elections. By the end of 1986 the SPLA
will probably reduce the central government's pres-
ence in the south to several besieged garrisons and
declare much of the south a "liberated zone."
18. Resolution of the southern conflict, therefore,
will not be easy and will probably not be possible for
the new government in the next year. Fighting will
probably intensify whether or not a dialogue takes
place between Khartoum and the rebels. Both sides are
likely to violate cease-fires as each tries to improve its
position by achieving military superiority. There is a
danger that Khartoum will be tempted by opportunity
or necessity to try to force a military solution. At the
same time, Ethiopian determination to support the
rebels and the strong likelihood that Garang will
receive assistance from Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya will
enhance insurgent prospects
19. In our judgment, the continuation of the insur-
gency will place an increasingly severe drain on
Sudan's already limited economic reserves, preventing
the return of foreign personnel needed to develop oil
and water resources in the south, straining financial
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resources, and discouraging foreign creditors and in-
vestors. The political stability and even territorial
integrity of Sudan will be seriously challenged by the
insurgency, especially if disgruntled northern ethnic
and regional groups join the southern rebels. More
important, the southern conflict will increasingly
strain the Army's unity and morale and will heighten
the prospect that the new civilian government will be
overthrown by an Army coup
Economic Problems and Prospects
20. If, as seems likely, the new government remains
mired in the traditional statist approach to resolving
economic issues and evades pressures for economic
reform and privatization of the economy, many do-
nors will probably reduce balance-of-payments sup-
port. Largely for political and humanitarian reasons,
most major donors will probably continue to disburse
bilateral financial aid, but at levels lower than in 1984-
85. The quantity and type of aid will probably be
influenced, however, by the level of commitment the
new regime gives to economic reform. On the other
hand, project assistance, such as aid for specific infras-
tructural development, will probably continue irre-
spective of Sudanese economic policies. (See table.)
21. Reduced levels of balance-of-payments support
are likely to play havoc with Sudan's public sector.
Those components of the economy dependent on
government funding-for example, government pay-
rolls, subsidies, and parastatals-will experience little,
if any, real growth over the next year and may even be
subjected to substantial cutbacks. Nevertheless, the
government will probably attempt to support these
politically sensitive public outlays by inflating the
domestic money supply in order to meet governmental
and parastatal expenses. Moreover, the new govern-
ment's desperation to generate additional financial
resources will probably trigger additional controls over
the private sector. The free (or parallel) economy,
fueled largely by remittance earnings from Sudanese
working abroad, until recently constituted one of the
few remaining robust sectors of the Sudanese econo-
22. Acute shortages of goods and spiraling inflation
will almost certainly lead to further labor unrest. A
vicious cycle of escalating demands by unions for
higher wages followed by government concessions that
entail further monetary expansion has already begun
and will continue. With the government unable to
provide any real increase in purchasing power, crip-
pling strikes and work stoppages are likely to become
an endemic feature in Sudan in the year ahead. Such
unrest will further debilitate an already prostrate
economy and provide an important source of political
unrest.
23. Sudan's bleak economic outlook is also likely to
force the new regime to consider increased reliance on
barter arrangements with Libya and Soviet Bloc coun-
tries. Libya has already provided 300,000 metric tons
of oil as an outright gift as well as other goods; similar
deals, possibly in exchange for a share of Sudanese
remittance earnings, are possible. Sudan's relatively
large cotton crop also provides a potential opportunity
for barter with Bloc countries that may be willing, for
political reasons, to absorb less than prime-quality
merchandise. While we do not believe that the Soviet
Bloc can ultimately provide the food, capital, and
technology that Sudan desperately needs, the opportu-
nity for limited economic inroads certainly exists and
probably will be exploited.
24. Prospects for resolving Sudan's international
payments crisis are extremely bleak in the aftermath
of the recent IMF decision to declare Khartoum
ineligible to use Fund resources. Sudan's foreign ex-
change earning capacity almost certainly will remain
inadequate to service either international debt obliga-
tions or critical import requirements. Nor are foreign
donors likely to repay Sudan's arrears to the IMF-
which will approach $400 million by the end of
1986-in the absence of a sound economic adjustment
Total foreign debt $9 billion
Foreign exchange reserve (exclud- $8.8 million
ing gold), January 1986
Foreign debt service obligation $2.8 billion
1985-86
program.
25. Khartoum will be increasingly likely to steer
away from any systematic attempt to grapple with
debt repayment or economic reform. Paris and Lon-
don Club debt rescheduling exercises will largely
become irrelevant as Sudan's capability and willing-
ness to service even minimal loan requirements disap-
pear. Sudanese officials will probably repay only those
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creditors, private and governmental, willing to provide
fresh funds. Such an approach will do little damage to
Khartoum's already abysmal credit rating and will, in
effect, amount to a de facto unilateral moratorium on
most public international debt.
The Loyalty of the Security Forces
26. Historically, the military has been the key pillar
of support for Sudanese regimes, and the newly
elected government will need the military's accep-
tance and backing to survive even for the remainder of
the year. Most of the military and police forces have
supported the interim regime and have beenen ai n lly
optimistic about the return to civilian rule.
27. The most serious grievance of the military will
probably remain the handling of the southern insur-
gency. Officers in particular will be concerned over
the ethnic and regional divisions that have weakened
the military. They believe that the failure to make
headway in the south has lowered morale and in-
creased discipline problems.
28. Most of the officer corps currently blame poor
military performance in the south on the incompe-
tence and indecisiveness of their senior generals, in-
cluding the generals on the interim government's
ruling Military Council. The assumption of govern-
ment by a civilian regime, however, combined with
the anticipated retirement of several of the most senior
officers, will shift some of the burden of performance
to the new civilian leadership. Given that, in our
judgment, the southern insurgency will incrementally
grow over the next year and the government's fortunes
continue to decline, a sense of dissatisfaction with and
blame of the new civilian leadership will probably
grow within the officer corps. These sentiments will
stimulate afresh interest in a military takeover on the
part of the more aggressive and frustrated unit com-
manders. While some new inputs of external military
support can be expected for the armed forces-largely
from the Libyans-these will probably not meet the
perceived needs of the more competent and dynamic
officers, deepening their sense of frustration with the
civilian government
29. The role of Is a -in Sudan will also remain a
potentially explosive issue of concern to the military.
Virtually all soldiers-Muslim and non-Muslim
alike-were relieved by the ending of the excesses of
Nimeiri's rule, but many are now apprehensive be-
cause the questions of Islamization and the
.t~tus of
(Islamic law) have yet to be addressed
30. Muslim officers are divided in their views of
Islam. Many see Islamic law as an intrusion and a
constraint on their daily routine and lifestyle. Others
realize Islamic law impedes reconciliation with the
south and erodes the Army's cohesion, but they are
emotionally and intellectually drawn to its tenets. We
believe that the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood
has penetrated the upper levels of the officer corps
with greater success than any other radical group in
recent years.
31. For the foreseeable future, the large number of
non-Muslims and non-Arabs in the Army-southern-
ers, Nubans, and westerners-will be of concern to the
Army's Muslim Arab senior officers from northern
Sudan. An estimated 80 percent of the enlisted ranks
in the Khartoum area are either non-Muslim or non-
Arab, and about 40 percent of these are Nubans. The
perception that the military hierarchy is incapable of
caring for the wants and needs of non-Arab or non-
Muslim soldiers is already widespread and will proba-
bly grow. Failure to exempt non-Muslim soldiers from
Islamic law could lead to additional desertions, con-
spiracies, mutinies, and coup attempts. Nuban enlisted
men participated in an abortive coup plot in October
1984 and were primarily behind a mutiny in Khar-
toum in September 1985. Increasing intercommunal
tensions and violence will accelerate desertions and
defections of non-Arab, non-Muslim officers and men.
32. The traditional military reluctance to intervene
in large-scale disturbances makes the loyalty and
effectiveness of other security services keys to the new
government's ability to withstand coup attempts and
to control civil unrest. The Sudanese police organiza-
tion has low morale, is poorly trained and equipped,
and is held in low esteem by most Sudanese. The
police will be unable to contain large-scale distur-
bances in Khartoum or elsewhere.
The External Dimension
33. The new government will probably continue to
pursue the nonaligned foreign policy established by
the interim regime because Sudan's civilian parties
from the left to the Muslim Brotherhood favor non-
alignment. To enhance sources of economic aid and
undercut support to the rebels, the new government
will probably maintain the rapprochement with Lib-
ya, keep working for reconciliation with Ethiopia, and
make additional efforts to improve ties to and seek aid
from the Soviet Union. The new government will
probably also expect continued military and economic
aid from Sudan's US, Egyptian, and Saudi Arabian
benefactors despite its decreased ability or willingness
to support their regional goals.
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34. Khartoum's nonalignment will probably initial-
ly have a basically moderate, pro-Western tilt, but
Libyan and other radical states in the region will
increase their efforts to wean Sudan's loyalties from
the West. Khartoum will be hard pressed to resist such
pressures to realign itself, especially if traditional allies
fail to offer the economic and military aid it deems
necessary for its survival. Meanwhile, the presence of
radical Arab and Muslim groups with ties to Iraq,
Syria, Iran, and Libya-as well as the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization-will add external subversive ele-
ments to the tense political climate in Khartoum.
Relations With Egypt and Saudi Arabia
35. Egypt has a major concern in keeping a friend-
ly, stable government in Sudan that will be sympathet-
ic to its interests-specifically, access to water from
the Nile River. Bilateral relations have now stabilized
after strains that developed last year over Sudan's
rapprochement with Libya and popular Sudanese
demands for the extradition of Nimeiri. The political
and economic aspects of the Egyptian-Sudanese inte-
gration treaty of 1982 have been allowed to languish,
but the mutual defense pact of 1976 remains in place.
Egypt is helping the interim government rebuild its
civilian intelligence organ. Although it has also tried to
mediate between Ethiopia and the insurgents and
Khartoum, Cairo has reluctantly sent small amounts of
arms and ammunition to fight the rebels in response to
Sudanese requests
36. Egypt is outwardly supportive of elections and
probably believes that it can work with Sudan's new
government, although it probably remains wary of
Sadiq, whose party has traditionally opposed a strong
Egyptian presence in Sudan. Egyptian President Mu-
barak wants to neutralize Libyan influence in Khar-
toum, but Cairo's own domestic problems and meager
resources are likely to limit its ability to compete with
Tripoli in Sudan. We believe that Cairo would prefer
to remain indifferent to coup plotting in Sudan, but
Egypt would become involved if Khartoum moves to
align with Libya or if Sudan appears headed for
prolonged instability that would invite Libyan inter-
ference
37. Saudi Arabia believes that the stability of Sudan
is a factor in its own security and an important
element in preventing expansion of Soviet influence in
the region, but it has neither closely involved itself in
Sudanese politics nor granted extensive aid to Sudan.
Saudi leaders remain concerned, however, about Liby-
an intentions in Sudan and the prospects for increased
Communist or other leftist influence. Although Riyadh
generally will support a Sadiq-led government, it will
probably continue to avoid close or expensive involve-
ment in Sudan, particularly given decreasing Saudi
resources
The Libyan Rapprochement
38. The new government will continue the rap-
prochement begun with Libya last year in order to
deny Libyan support to southern insurgents, to obtain
Libyan economic and military aid, and to attempt to
keep Libyan subversive machinations within some
bounds. A Sadiq government will follow the interim
government's pattern of acceding to some Libyan
demands but attempt to evade Libyan efforts to ally
Sudan formally with Libya. The new government will
sign additional agreements with Libya, however, and
avoid acts that would provoke Libyan leader Qadhafi,
such as providing support to Libyan dissidents or
acceding to closer military cooperation with the Unit-
ed States or Egypt.
39. For his part, Qadhafi will probably provide
significant amounts of economic and military assis-
tance to a Sadiq government in return for continued
progress toward a closer relationship. He will deny
new support to the southern insurgents as long as he
sees the Sadiq government as meeting his minimum
requirements for good relations. Qadhafi would be
unlikely to turn against the new regime, even if it
evades his attempts to unify Sudan with Libya, as long
as Khartoum does not "backslide" on matters Tripoli
considers vitally important
40. Overall, Libyan influence in Khartoum will
probably increase over the next year in direct propor-
tion to the supply of Libyan military and economic
assistance. Libyan military support for the Sudanese
Army's counterinsurgency efforts will offer the Liby-
ans further access to the Sudanese military for prosely-
tizing and subversion as well as increased influence
with the government. An increased Libyan military
presence will also provide Tripoli some capability to
intervene either for or against a military coup. In the
short term this will be somewhat constrained by
traditional anti-Libyan sentiments of much of the 25X1
Sudanese officer corps and conservative political fac-
tions such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover,
Libyan heavyhandedness could provoke resentments
and stimulate coup plotting by conservative Army
officers. We cannot rule out, however, a Libyan effort
to sponsor mob or terrorist attacks against the US or
Egyptian presence in Sudan despite continued good
relations with Khartoum.
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The Soviet Union and Ethiopia
41. Moscow will probably continue its current dual-
track approach in its dealings with the new govern-
ment in Sudan in an effort to undermine or supplant
US and other Western influence there. The Soviets
have shown restraint in developing ties to the interim
government. To date, they have shown some interest
in developing economic relations, but they have
stopped short of fulfilling Sudanese requests for mili-
tary spare parts. Concurrently, Moscow has main-
tained close ties to the Sudanese Communist Party and
provided indirect support to John Garang's southern
dissidents through Ethiopia, Cuba, and East Germany.
42. Moscow's attitude will depend on Khartoum's
posture toward the United States, the USSR, and the
local Sudanese Communists and on Khartoum's poli-
cies toward Ethiopia, Libya, and Egypt. Moscow will
probably agree to provide some military support to the
Sudanese Government, particularly if the Sudanese
Communist Party is a coalition partner. We believe,
however, given Soviet equities in the region-particu-
larly in Ethiopia-that Moscow will proceed cautious-
ly. If the elections lead to new tensions and instability,
the Soviets would probably also discreetly step up
support to the Sudanese Communists and to Garang's
forces, in the hope of promoting anti-Western senti-
ment and leftist influence in any government that
emerges.
43. Ethiopia will consider a Sadiq-led government
as little better than its predecessor. Addis Ababa has
long insisted that improved ties are dependent upon
Khartoum's closing down facilities operated by north-
ern Ethiopian dissidents, arresting the leadership of
these movements, and cooperating with Addis Ababa's
efforts to seal the border. It is unlikely that the new
government will be able to meet such demands, but
Ethiopian leader Mengistu will consider Khartoum's
failure to do so as a sign of Sudanese duplicity. As a re-
sult, Ethiopia will continue its military and political
support to the southern Sudanese insurgents led by
Garang.
44. Ethiopian support will be a key factor in en-
abling the SPLA insurgency to continue to flourish.
Addis Ababa would view a Muslim-dominated govern-
ment in Khartoum-civilian or military-with suspi-
cion and hostility. It will continue to provide safeha-
ven, training, extensive supplies of arms, logistic
support, and equipment to the rebels and make it
possible for such Soviet surrogates as the Cubans and
East Germans to continue to support the SPLA over
the next year. Should the civilian regime show signs of
collapsing, Mengistu might well increase support to
Garang's forces in the hope that they might be able to
deal with Khartoum from a position of greater
strength.
Prospective Scenarios
45. We believe there is an even chance that a
Sadiq-led government will muddle through for almost
a year but that there is a better-than-even chance that
it will not remain in power much beyond that period.
To survive, the government must make some visible
progress in dealing with economic problems and the
southern insurgency. The Sadiq government will also
need to play the difficult game of nonalignment well
enough to convince its opponents that it can attract a
broad range of political, military, and economic sup-
port. Most important, however, will be its ability to
retain the loyalty of the military, which has not
relinquished its political role. The military will be
closely watching the performance of the parliamenta-
ry government and will probably play a major role in
shaping any successor government.
The Short Term: The Civilian Government
Remains in Power
46. The parliamentary government's liabilities will
probably far outweigh any assets that could guarantee
its survival much beyond a year. On the positive side,
Sadiq's ambition, charisma, intelligence, and past ex-
perience as Prime Minister probably will make him
Sudan's best qualified civilian politician to head the
government. Khartoum's elites are eager to participate
in a parliamentary democracy, and the Sudanese in
general will probably give the new government several
months to get organized before expecting any real
change in the domestic situation. In addition, the fear
that the Army will take over may temper northern
opposition activities for a time. In the first few months
the Army will be preoccupied not only with the
insurgency and a possible major reorganization of its
forces but also with consolidating its own leadership
after the promised retirement of the senior officers on
the Military Council after the elections.
47. A Sadiq-led government will face major liabil-
ities in maintaining itself in power, however:
- Few senior Army officers would remain loyal to
Sadiq in a crisis and probably even fewer are
committed to parliamentary democracy.
- The civilian intelligence capability has been se-
verely weakened by purges and reorganization.
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- The national police force-many of whose mem-
bers are drawn from non-Muslim or non-Arab
minorities-would not be loyal or effective in
containing widespread civil unrest.
- The parliamentary democracy will probably be
ineffective because of factionalism and personal
rivalries. 0
48. Khartoum's new government will probably
have only a brief respite from being the target of
antiregime activities. There is a strong prospect that
the labor strikes of the recent past will recur, as will
clashes between leftist and Muslim students on univer-
sity campuses. Ethnic and regional groups, especially
Nubans and southerners disgruntled over the outcome
of elections, may initiate sabotage activities in Khar-
toum. Increased economic and political tensions will
probably trigger intercommunal violence. In addition,
infighting among party factions could spill over into
armed conflict on Khartoum's streets. Under these
conditions, the effectiveness of Sudan's security forces
and their loyalty to the civilian government would be
questionable
49. In sum, we believe the Sadiq government will
muddle through the first several months with its
efforts to form a national government and its promises
of ending the insurgency and improving the economy,
but thereafter the new government will be increasing-
ly vulnerable to removal by a coup. There is a strong
likelihood that bickering and infighting among party
leaders will cause parliamentary paralysis and political
tensions that could lead to violence. As a result,
Khartoum will have difficulties in making the neces-
sary hard decisions on domestic problems. In such a
climate, civil unrest over economic grievances would
be probable, and successful negotiations that would
end the insurgency would be, unlikely. The evident
instability and ineffective leadership would probably
also make foreign donors less supportive
50. A less gloomy outcome would hinge on Sadiq's
ability to make a southern settlement his government's
top priority. Acutely aware of the threats to his
political longevity, Sadiq will be likely to view rapid
progress toward halting the insurgency as the one area
in which creative leadership might tip the odds in his
favor. He will have an opportunity during the first
weeks of his government to demonstrate his break
with the interim government's refusal to take Garang
seriously. If Sadiq presses for a national conference,
endorses a version of Islamic law that explicitly ex-
empts non-Muslims, and embraces Garang's call for
federalism, he might generate the momentum neces-
sary for successful talks. If, instead, he moves more
cautiously, he will quickly lose the initiativeF__1
The Longer Term: The Military Steps Back In
51. If, as expected, the government comes under
critical attack from many quarters and seems unable
to cope, there is a strong prospect that the Army will
return to politics, possibly in a ruling coalition with
civilians but most likely as a result of a coup. Although
in 1958 Sudan's Prime Minister handed the reins of 25X1
government to the military during a crisis, we believe
Sadiq would be unlikely to resort to this precedent.
Instead, Sadiq would probably try to ward off a coup
by asking senior officers to enter a coalition with the
civilian government. Such a civilian-military coalition
would probably not improve decisionmaking or stabil-
ity in the short run. We believe that eventually the
Army would dominate or the government would be
removed through a coup.
52. Younger generals and senior middle-grade offi-
cers are the most likely candidates to lead a successful
coup against the civilian government. Such officers
pressured their seniors into removing Nimeiri last
year. In addition, officers from this level have com-
mand over combat units large enough to stage a coup
and to impose martial law. A seizure of power by
junior officers is less likely and probably would come
about only after a prolonged period of civil unrest and
economic decline in which senior officers failed to
take charge. Such a coup would be bloody and would
need the external backing of Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia,
or the Soviet Union in order to succeed
Alternative Outcomes
53. Two other outcomes might become increasingly
likely over the longer term. On the one hand, in the
event that northern ethnic and regional groups join the
southern rebels in armed opposition to the new gov-
ernment, Khartoum might be pressured into meeting
rebel demands leading to a federal system, new elec-
tions, and a complete restructuring of the political
system. On the other hand, the central government's
authority could deteriorate completely if party in-
fighting immobilizes decisionmaking in Khartoum and
the Army is too divided to mount a coup. We believe,
however, that these outcomes are unlikely in the next
year.
Implications for the United States
Overview
54. Sudanese-US relations are not likely to improve
significantly during the balance of 1986, and further
strains are possible.
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If the Civilian Government Remains
55. In the area of military cooperation, we expect
the new government to continue the interim govern-
ment's present pattern of requesting more military aid
but refusing to host or participate with US forces in
combined exercises. If the pre-positioned US military
supplies at Port Sudan become a political issue, the
civilian government might quietly press the United
States for their removal. A lack of progress in resolving
the southern insurgency will widen the gap between
what the Sudanese armed forces need and what they
receive from the United States and its allies. Addition-
al Libyan military assistance to Sudan that is useful for
counterinsurgency efforts will highlight this gap.
56. The new government initially will seek the
accommodation with Ethiopia and insurgent leader
Garang that has eluded the interim government, and
such negotiations could jeopardize US-backed cross-
border famine relief efforts for Eritrea and Tigray in
northern Ethiopia. If the negotiations fail, as we
expect, the Sudanese will probably seek increased US
military assistance to combat the insurgency and
covert military aid for Eritrean and Tigrean insur-
gents. Western failure to respond favorably would
render Libyan aid offers more difficult to resist,
despite their obvious costs in terms of relations with
the United States and Egypt. A Sadiq government will
seek military and economic aid from the Soviet Union,
but Moscow will remain a target of suspicion. The
Soviets will probably move very slowly in providing
military aid because of their other regional equities.
57. US pressure for economic reform, both bilateral
and multilateral, could harm Sudanese-US relations,
but that is more likely to become a problem in 1987
than during the balance of this year. For at least
several months after taking office, the new leaders will
probably be distracted from economic issues by ques-
tions of political patronage and efforts to negotiate
with southern insurgents. Implementation of economic
reforms presupposes widespread Sudanese recognition
that the long-term benefits outweigh the short-term
costs. For the balance of the year, the new government
and its supporters will be more likely to distrust donor-
proposed reforms and pursue the general Sudanese
preference for public-sector initiatives. As the new
government will probably have a wider rural base
than the former regimes, pressure may eventually
mount to reverse public-sector initiatives that favor
Khartoum at the expense of rural areas.F---]
58. Cooperation between Sudan and the United
States on the security of US personnel may improve
under the new government, thereby reducing the
threat to US personnel posed by Libyan and other
terrorists. If, however, a Sadiq government includes
numerous individuals with a benign view of Libya and
the PLO and a malign view of the United States,
cooperation may instead decline initially or until
Libyan excesses provide a necessary corrective. The
anticipated lack of cohesion and discipline in the new
coalition government may well result in contradictory
policies on cooperation with the United States between
different ministers and security agencies.
59. Sudanese-US political cooperation will probably
remain much as it has been under the interim govern-
ment. Khartoum's support for the Camp David ac-
cords will continue to wane, and Khartoum will also be
less supportive of US policy in regional and interna-
tional forums. Most Sudanese elites are more comfort-
able with the present moderate foreign policy of
nonalignment than with Nimeiri's strong pro-Western
tilt. Sadiq is aware of Mubarak's suspicions of his
movement's historical opposition to Egypt and of his
ties to Qadhafi and will seek to maintain good rela-
tions with Cairo as well as Tripoli. But Sadiq's confi-
dence in his ability to manipulate Qadhafi may result
in gestures Cairo will interpret as additional move-
ment into Libya's orbit.
If the Military Takes Power
60. A successor military government run by youn-
ger generals or senior middle-grade officers that takes
charge in a crisis could provide Sudan with stability in
the short run, especially if the officers are not closely
linked to Nimeiri and have a secular approach. Such a
government might be strong enough to make hard
decisions on the economy and the south while relying
on a cabinet of technical civilian experts. These offi-
cers would probably have greater incentive to end the
war than most other groups in Sudan and might show
greater unity and flexibility in negotiating an end to
the insurgency than an elected government hobbled
by infighting and the demands of its northern Muslim
constituents. We doubt that insurgent leader Garang
would move quickly to deal with a new military
regime, however, no matter how conciliatory it ap-
pears.
61. The military regime would initially find a
nonaligned foreign policy useful in avoiding domestic
criticism of foreign influence. Concern for ending the
insurgency, however, would cause the regime to main-
tain rapprochement with Libya and to settle differ-
ences with Ethiopia, which probably would be more 25X1
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willing to reconcile with these officers than with a
Muslim leader like Sadiq. Still, a military regime
would remain wary of Libyan, Ethiopian, and Soviet
subversion. Ties to Cairo could be warmer than under
Sadiq, and relations with Riyadh would probably stay
the same.
62. At first the Sudanese-US relationship would not
appear to be much different from that under Sadici.
The military regime would look for an increase in
military and economic support from the United States
and other traditional donors. If successful in acquiring
US aid, the regime could over time quietly reaffirm
strategic and greater political cooperation with the
United States although it would never be as publicly
forthcoming as the former Nimeiri regime. It would
also be prepared to diminish ties to Libya and the
USSR if US or other assistance bettered aid from those
states. Some agreement might be possible on US pre-
positioning and military access rights although an
agreement to renew Sudanese-US military exercises is
not likely
63. A military takeover by conservative or Islamic
fundamentalist officers would probably be challenged
by some non-Muslim elements in the security forces as
well as by leftists through strikes and street actions,
and the new regime would probably be forced to take
firm action in maintaining order. The newly awak-
ened political parties would not take their removal
quietly, and a military regime would probably be
forced to suppress at least some of the parties and
detain at least some civilian political leaders. Such
actions would be likely to provoke outcries in the
West-and from the Soviet Bloc if the new regime
had an anti-Communist orientation-and the United
States would be faced with human rights consider-
ations in its relations with the new regime
64. In the unlikely event that junior officers on the
religious right or the extreme left take power, US
interests in Sudan and the region would be seriously
damaged. Libya could easily enhance its influence
under either type of government, but the Soviets and
the Ethiopians would gain influence only in a coup by
left-leaning junior officers. Egypt would be unlikely to
tolerate a hostile regime of either sort. Possibly enlist-
ing economic support from Saudi Arabia, Cairo would
seek to engineer the overthrow of such a regime
through Sudanese collaborators
65. A federal system of government and restructur-
ing of Sudan's political system pursuant to SPLA
demands is unlikely in the next year but possible in the
longer term. Such a government could create a more
stable economic and political situation in Sudan that
would benefit US interests and those of regional allies.
The disintegration of Sudan reminiscent of Lebanon is
even less likely within a year but possible in the longer
term. In this worst case scenario, the stability of all
countries bordering Sudan would be seriously affected
and US interests in the region would suffer greatly.
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ANNEX A
THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE SOUTH
The SPLA
Led by former Sudanese Army Col. John Garang, a
highly educated man and an adept tactician, the SPLA has
grown from about 1,000 fighters in mid-1983 to a current
strength estimated at 15,000 to 20,000, of which 14,000 are
in Sudan at any given time. (See figure 2.) With a nucleus
of capable, former Sudanese Army officers, many with
advanced military training in the United States, the SPLA
has successfully conducted operations against Army con-
voys and isolated garrisons, employing standard guerrilla
hit-and-run tactics. By the beginning of 1985, it controlled
much of the countryside in the south and had seized the
military initiative. Major southern economic development
projects were shut down, and road, rail, and river lines of
communications with the north had been severed.
The expansion of SPLA activities and recent insurgent
military successes were made possible in large measure by
increased Ethiopian assistance in 1985. The SPLA appar-
ently received the resources necessary to conduct increased
operations throughout southern Sudan, including the re-
ported use of Ethiopian transport aircraft and helicopters.
SPLA units in Sudan have been resupplied with large
quantities of late-model, Soviet-manufactured infantry
weapons such as new assault rifles, rocket-propelled gre-
nade launchers, and light air defense systems. With contin-
ued backing from Addis Ababa and support from Cuba and
East Germany, the SPLA is expected to increase military
operations throughout southern Sudan during the next
several months, further isolating, and in some cases over-
running, Army garrisons.
The Sudanese Armed Forces
The estimated 14,000 to 16,000 Sudanese Army troops
deployed throughout the south have proved incapable
of stemming the advances of the SPLA. The Army's
near-term strategy will probably be to withdraw
troops from isolated posts that are difficult to reinforce
and resupply-particularly during the rainy season-
in order to consolidate its defensive posture in major
garrison towns.
The Army has long been plagued with severe
operational deficiencies, resulting in a slow reaction to
events in the south. During the tenure of former
President Nimeiri, many competent, respected senior
officers were replaced by ineffective officers owing
their positions and fealty to him. Indecision by these
officers and a lack of sufficient aviation assets to
transport supplies and reinforcements and to conduct
medical evacuation, or to provide reconnaissance and 25X1
close air support missions, have hindered the Army's
responsiveness.
Logistic inadequacies, insufficient manpower, lack
of coherent counterinsurgency doctrine, and poor
intelligence have kept the Army from mounting effec-
tive offensive operations and protecting likely guerrilla
targets. Also, northern officers cannot be sure of the
loyalty of their southern troops, who make up about 40
percent of the enlisted men. Many southern garrisons
have reported desperate conditions, with serious defi-
ciencies in ammunition, rations, and medical supplies.
Consequently, ethnic tensions and morale within the
Army are growing problems. Desertion from southern
garrisons facing rebel assaults has increased, and some
northern soldiers and pilots have refused orders assign- 25X1
ing them to the south. The growing morale problem
and the inability of the Army adequately to resupply
and reinforce key garrison towns threaten the govern-
ment's entire position in the south
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